Karnataka High Court
Venkatesh Bandenavar vs Laxmibai on 14 January, 2026
Author: Pradeep Singh Yerur
Bench: Pradeep Singh Yerur
-1-
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253
WP No. 202339 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI BENCH ®
DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
WRIT PETITION No.202339 OF 2025 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
1. VENKATESH BANDENAVAR
S/O BASAVARAJ,
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS, OCC: GOVT. EMPLOYEE,
R/O WARD NO.24, BADI KAMAN ROAD,
UPPAR GALLI, VIJAYAPUR
TQ. AND DIST. VIJAYAPUR-586101.
2. VIKAS BANDENAVAR
S/O BASAVARAJ,
AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O WARD NO.24, BADI KAMAN ROAD,
UPPAR GALLI, VIJAYAPUR,
TQ. AND DIST. VIJAYAPUR-586101.
Digitally signed by
NIJAMUDDIN 3. SHAILA
JAMKHANDI W/O BASAVARAJ BANDENAVR,
Location: HIGH
COURT OF AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
KARNATAKA R/O WARD NO.24, BADI KAMAN ROAD,
UPPAR GALLI, VIJAYAPUR,
TQ. AND DIST. VIJAYAPUR-586101.
4. RAJSHEKHAR BANDENAVR
S/O MOHAN,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, OCC: SDA,
R/O WARD NO.4, ANAND NAGAR, VIJAYAPUR,
TQ AND DIST. VIJAYAPUR-586101.
5. BASAMMA
W/O MOHAN BANDENAVAR,
-2-
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253
WP No. 202339 of 2025
HC-KAR
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O WARD NO.4, ANAND NAGAR, VIJAYAPUR,
TQ. AND DIST. VIJAYAPUR-586101.
6. SUDHARANI
W/O SHRINIVAS MASARAKAL, D/O MOHAN,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O WARD NO.4, ANAND NAGAR, VIJAYAPUR,
TQ. AND DIST. VIJAYAPUR-586101.
7. PRIYANKA BANDENAVAR
W/O. RAGHAVENDRA, D/O MOHAN,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEWIFE,
R/O WARD NO.4, ANAND NAGAR, VIJAYAPUR
TQ. AND DIST. VIJAYAPUR-586101.
8. SHRIDEVI
W/O VITHAL MASARKAL,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O WARD NO.24, BADI KAMAN ROAD,
UPPAR GALLI, VIJAYAPUR
TQ. AND DIST. VIJAYAPUR-586101.
9. SHIVAPUTRA BANDENAVAR
S/O GYANAPPA BANDENAVAR,
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O WARD NO.8, VTC-KOPPAL-583231.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. MAHANTESH PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. LAXMIBAI W/O MANSINGH
@ MAHALINGAPPA, BANDENAVAR @ UPPAR,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O TALIKOTI, TQ. TALIKOTI,
DIST. VIJAYAPUR-586214.
2. SUDHIR
S/O SAMBHAJI POL,
-3-
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253
WP No. 202339 of 2025
HC-KAR
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O SANTH KAKKAYYA ROAD,
TQ. AND DIST. VIJAYAPUR-586101.
...RESPONDENTS
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT IN
THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED
COMPROMISE DECREE IN O.S.NO. 123/2025 DATED 07-03-
2025, PASSED BY THE LEARNED PRL. CIVIL JUDGE
VIJAYAPURA, VIDE ANNEXURE-E2.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
ORAL ORDER
This petition is filed by the petitioners seeking to quash the impugned compromise decree in OS No.123/2025 dated 07.03.2025, passed by the Principal Civil Judge, Vijayapura.
2. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners and respondents are coparceners and the suit schedule property is an ancestral joint family property of the petitioners and husband of respondent No.1. The names of petitioners and respondent No.1 came to be mutated in the joint ownership dated -4- NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR 07.04.2025. It is the further contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent No.1 in collusion with respondent No.2 allegedly entered into an agreement of sale dated 16.01.2025 in respect of 30 guntas of land and by colluding with each other, instigated the respondent No.2 herein, who filed OS No.123/2025 for the relief of specific performance of a contract. The suit was filed on 27.01.2025 and notice was got issued on 29.01.2025 and a compromise petition came to be filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on 06.03.2025 and by Order dated 07.03.2025 the learned Civil Judge accepted the compromise petition and passed a judgment and decree, on the basis of the said compromise petition. It is this order of compromise decree that is questioned by the petitioners herein, having not been made parties to the said original suit proceedings.
3. It is the contention of the petitioners that the said compromise petition is illegal, arbitrary and fraudulent one, created and executed behind the back of the -5- NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR petitioners, who are not made parties to the original suit. Therefore, when the property is an ancestral property belonging to the petitioners and the respondents, and the mutation entry stands in the name of the petitioners along with the respondent No.1, the question of the respondents not making the petitioners parties to the suit proceedings and having obtained a decree fraudulently behind the back of the petitioners is illegal and arbitrary. Hence, the same requires to be set aside and the petitioners' say requires to be considered.
4. This Court does not find a need or necessity to issue notice to the respondents, as this Court is inclined to direct the Trial Court to consider the application or petition, if any filed by the petitioners.
5. It is seen that the petitioners were not made parties to the original suit proceedings in OS No.123/2025, which ended up in a compromise decree. Petitioners have raised several contentions and urged several grounds to set aside the compromise decree, as the same was -6- NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR obtained fraudulently behind the back of the petitioners. It may not be proper for this Court to entertain this petition, as the matter will have to be reverted to the very same Court which passed the compromise decree to reconsider the matter afresh, on the petitioners filing an application or petition in OS No.123/2025. This Court in WP No.204220/2025, in similar circumstances, disposed off a petition on 07.01.2026, relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma and Others [2024 INSC 970], wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held in paragraph Nos.11 and 12 as under:
"11. This Court in Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi [(1993)1 SCC 581] has laid down the law on the disposal of a proceeding in accordance with a compromise between the parties and on recall of a compromise decree. It held that under Order 23, Rule 3, the Court must be satisfied upon applying judicial mind that the agreement between the parties is lawful before accepting the same and disposing the suit. Further, the proviso and the Explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 mandate that the court must "decide the question" of whether an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, and it is clarified that void and voidable agreements under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall be deemed to be not lawful. Upon such reading of the -7- NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR provision, it held that the court recording the compromise can examine the legality of the agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the Contract Act, even after the compromise decree is passed and when a party moves an application for recall.
12. The law on the issue is summarised in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh [(2006)5 SCC 566]. In this case, the Court also took note of Section 96(3) of the CPC and the deletion of Order 43, Rule 1(m) of the CPC by way of an amendment in 1976, as well as Order 23, Rule 3A. The consequence of these is that an appeal against a consent decree and an order recording (or refusing to record) a compromise is not maintainable, nor can a fresh suit be filed for setting aside such decree. Hence, the only remedy available to the aggrieved party is to approach the court that recorded the compromise under the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3. The Court held:
"17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order
43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A. -8- NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made..."
6. It would be relevant for this Court to extract Order XXIII Rule 3-A, CPC, which reads as under:
"3. Compromise of suit.-
XXXX [3A. Bar to suit.- No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful]"
7. It would be relevant for this Court to delve into the matter further in view of there being some conflicting views with regard to whether a challenge to the -9- NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR compromise decree could be before the same Court, which passed the compromise decree or by filing a separate suit or by way of filing a writ petition.
8. In the case of Bahu Bali Ramappa Padnad and Another v. Babu alias Babu Rao S. Padnad and Others reported in 1999 (5) Kar. L.J.562(DB), Division Bench of this Court at paragraph No.10 and 11 held as under:
"10. It is well-settled principles that the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit by virtue of Section 9 of the CPC which are all civil in nature. In view of the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3-A the appellants are not being the parties in O.S. No. 16 of 1991 and the said suit having been properly represented by the appellants' father- Ramappa Padnad, it is not open for the appellants to question the said compromise decree. That apart, the appellants are not being the parties in O.S. No. 16 of 1991 also have no locus standi to file a miscellaneous application. It is accordingly, the learned Civil Judge, Athani has rightly dismissed the Miscellaneous Application No. 8 of 1995 filed under Section 151 of the CPC and also rejected the plaint in O.S. No. 4 of 1996.
11. It is pertinent to note that O.S. No. 4 of 1996 filed by the appellants are for claiming 1/6th share. We have already pointed out that the
- 10 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR appellants' father-Ramappa Padnad was a party represented in the suit and filed the compromise petition duly signed. In that view of the matter, it is not open for the appellants to take any other defence or to reopen the compromise as the same is found duly executed by their father-Ramappa Padnad and thereby the same is binding. The appellants being the L.Rs of Ramappa Padnad they are entitled only to the share of their father and nothing more. Even on this count also that the compromise decree passed does not call for interference."
9. In the case of Siddalingeshwar and Ors. V. Virupaxgouda and Ors. reported in ILR 2003 KAR 2559, Division Bench of this Court dealt with a matter where again a compromise decree was challenged. In this case the issue that was dealt with was the compromise decree in a representative suit, where a Court held that a person, who is effected by such compromise, but not a party to it, may file a separate suit seeking proper reliefs in regard to such compromise decree, by way of declaration or otherwise. At paragraph No. 14 of the this judgment, the Division Bench has held as under:
- 11 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR "14. The said principle will equally apply to Order 23 Rules 3, 3A and 3B CPC, in so far as consent decrees are concerned. A consent decree in a representative suit will bar a subsequent suit challenging the compromise on which such consent decree was passed only if the compromise had been entered and consent decree is passed in accordance with the relevant Rules. A bar is imposed to challenge the compromise in a separate suit because a party to a compromise is entitled to challenge the compromise as not lawful, either by filing an application in the same suit or by filing an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1A.
But such remedies are available only to the parties to the suit. A person who is not a party to the suit, cannot obviously file an application in the suit, or an appeal, to challenge a compromise as being not lawful. But in a representative suit, if the Court issues notices to persons interested in the suit (who are not parties to the suit) and hears them before deciding whether leave should be granted to the parties to the suit to enter into a compromise/agreement, then they would also in effect become parties to the suit and will be entitled to avail the remedies that are available to a party to the suit against a compromise or the consent decree, which is not lawful. In no notice is issued to the persons interested in a representative suit and as a consequence the consent decree is void under Rule 3B, then such persons (who are not parties) will not be entitled to file an application in the suit or file an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1A. Therefore their right to bring a separate suit seeking appropriate remedy, remains unaffected. We therefore hold that if Rule 3B is not complied with, while passing a decree on a compromise in a representative suit, any person who is affected by such compromise decree, but not a party to it may file a separate suit seeking appropriate relief in regard to such compromise decree, by way of declaration or otherwise. He
- 12 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR may also file a suit for appropriate relief ignoring the compromise decree and such a suit will not be barred either by the principle of res judicata or estoppel."
10. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had the opportunity to deal with the same issue in the case of Smt.Sushila and Ors. vs. Vijaykumar and Ors. reported in 2020 SCC Online Kar 3374 This Court relying upon the judgment of Division Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh (D) through Lrs. and Ors. reported in AIR 2020 Supreme Court 2111 made a distinction and arrived at a conclusion that a person, who is neither a party to the suit nor to compromise petition had an independent right to seek any share in the suit property. Therefore, the bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII CPC is not applied, as he is claiming independent right.
11. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CRP No.100106/2023 in the case of Mahesh v. Ishwar and Ors. relying upon the case of the judgment in the case of Bahubali Ramappa Padnad and Another (supra) and
- 13 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR various other judgments, at paragraph No.18 has held as under:
"18. It is clear that in the present case the plaintiff not being a party to OS No.152/2021 and the compromise in the said suit was not recorded after complying with Rule 3B of Order XXIII of the CPC is entitled to file the suit. The Trial Court has considered the application and held that the plaintiff has pleaded about the compromise in OS No.101/2021 and having regard to the fact that the plaintiff was not a party to the earlier suit and since he was not allotted a share, has dismissed the application filed by defendant No.5."
12. In the case of Praveen Annasaheb Gijavani v Appasaheb Bharmappa Gijavani and Ors. reported in 2025 SCC Online Kar 17653, Division Bench of this Court dealt with same situation i.e. challenge to the dismissal of compromise decree. At paragraph No.15, it held as under:
"15. Hence, it is clear that it is not open to the plaintiff to file O.S. No. 78/2019 challenging the compromise decree passed in O.S. No. 99/1992. Recourse of the plaintiff, if any, is to be availed in accordance with Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC, as also the legal position as noticed above. Hence, the question framed for consideration is answered in the 'negative'."
- 14 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR
13. Hon'ble Apex Court dealt with similar subject matter and held as under in the following cases.
14. Division Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhgath (dead) through LRs V. Rajender Singh and Ors, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 566 has held as under in paragraph No.17:
"17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is
- 15 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none of 9 the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to pursue the application filed before the court which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code."
15. Division Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ved Pal (dead) through Lrs. and Ors. V. Prem Devi (dead) through Lrs. and Ors. reported in (2018) 9 SCC 496 in paragraph Nos.7 to 11 as held as under:
- 16 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR "7. In this case, we prefer to follow this course keeping in view the bar contained in Order 23 Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "CPC") for filing the suit in a case of this nature and also another bar created under Section 96(3) CPC, which prohibits filing of any appeal, though in this case it does not apply because the dispute arose in second appeal filed under Section 100 CPC.
8. The purpose in making reference to these two provisions is to show the legislative intent which does not allow the parties to take recourse to these legal remedies to challenge the compromise once it is arrived at in the suit/appeal. The only exception being if the challenge is founded on the ground of fraud committed by the parties in obtaining any judicial orders, the suit, in appropriate case, may lie.
9. In this case, we find that the High Court did not examine the plea of the appellants properly keeping in view the facts alleged in the application and while negativing the attack observed that the appellants are free to take recourse to any other legal remedies. Since the second appeal was disposed of affecting the rights of the parties in the light of compromise, the proper forum to re-
examine the issue, in our opinion, is the High Court, which disposed of the second appeal rather than any other forum to examine the issue at this stage. It is more so when we find that the High Court did not go into the details in the proceedings filed by the appellants in its correct perspective.
- 17 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR
10. It is for this reason, we decline to examine the several factual and legal issues urged by the parties in this appeal and leave these issues for the High Court to examine afresh on merits in accordance with law and dispose of the same.
11. The appeal thus succeeds and is allowed in part. The impugned order dated 29-1-2007 passed in review petition is set aside and the High Court is requested to decide the matter afresh on merits in accordance with law without being influenced by any of our observations on merits which we have refrained from entering into them having formed an opinion to remand the case to the High Court for its disposal."
16. In the case of Triloki Nath Singh (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph Nos.17 and 22 as held as under:
"17. Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of all adjudicating forums. Thus, creation of further litigation should never be the basis of a compromise between the parties. Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC put a specific bar that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties to amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing and a voluntary act on the part of the parties. The Court can be instrumental in having an agreed compromise effected and finality attached to the same. The Court should never be party to imposition of a compromise upon an
- 18 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR unwilling party, still open to be questioned on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC before the Court.
22. In other words, the appellant can only claim through his predecessor Sampatiya, to the extent of rights and remedies available to Sampatiya in reference to the compromise decree. Merely because the appellant was not party to the compromise decree in the facts of the present case, will be of no avail to the appellant, much less give him a cause of action to question the validity of the compromise decree passed by the High Court by way of a substantive suit before the civil Court to declare it as fraudulent, illegal and not binding on him. Assuming, he could agitate about the validity of the compromise entered into by the parties to the partition suit, it is only the High Court, who had accepted the compromise and passed decree on that basis, could examine the same and no other Court under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC. It must, therefore, follow that the suit instituted before the civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable in view of specific bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC as held in the impugned judgment."
17. Division Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Srimanth Chhatrapati Udyan Raje Pratasinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another, reported in (2024) 15 SCC 675 in paragraph No.39 has held as under:
- 19 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR "39. Admittedly the plaintiff is a stranger to the suits which ended in compromise. Therefore, in view of the direct bar under Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC, he cannot seek a declaration "that the compromise decrees passed in Special Civil Suits Nos. 152 of 1951 and 1622 of 1988 and Civil Appeal No. 787 of 2001, Pune are void ab initio, null and void and the same are liable to be set aside". The law on this point is also already settled by this Court in Triloki Nath Singh v.
Anirudh Singh. The bar under Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC is applicable to third parties as well and the only remedy available to them would be to approach the same court. In the present case, such an exercise is also not possible in view of the bar of limitation. Hence, we find the suit to be unsustainable."
18. Division Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi and Anr. V. Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi (dead through Lrs.), reported in 2025 INSC 517 at paragraph Nos.12 and 15 as held as under:
12. The only remedy against a compromise decree is to file a recall application. This Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 summed up the position of law as follows:
"17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.
- 20 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made..."
Thus, even if he accept the contention of the appellant that their father was coerced by his brothers and father (appellants' grandfather) to enter into a compromise, which led to the passing of the consent decree, a fresh suit is still not a valid remedy. In that situation, the appellants' father should have filed a recall application before
- 21 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR the Court that had passed the decree. The appellants' father has never done so! Moreover, he had admitted the consent decree and never questioned its validity.
15. In view of the above, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 23.09.2022 passed by the High Court. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed."
19. In the present case on hand, it is the case of petitioners that they were not made parties to the original suit and compromise decree has been passed by the learned Trial Judge in their absence. It is also contended that suit schedule properties are ancestral properties of petitioners and husband of respondent No.1. But, behind the back of the petitioners, a deliberate attempt was and fraudulent compromise decree is obtained, which is illegal and arbitrary and the same has to be set aside.
20. Several judgments are passed by this Court and various Courts and the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Triloki Nath Singh (supra) and Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. (supra) very specifically dealt with
- 22 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR challenge by a stranger to the compromise decree, whether to be made by way of separate suit or in the same Court, which passed the compromise decree. The question has been raised in the following manner- "The question arises in the appeal for our consideration is as to whether on a decree passed in a compromise petition can be challenged by the stranger to the proceedings in a separate suit?" and the same has been answered in the negative, in view of the specific bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII of Code of Civil Procedure. The said opinion of the Hon'ble Apex Court in 2020 is further fortified by the later judgment, dealing with the very same issue in the case of Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. (supra), by holding "The law on this point is already settled by this Court in Triloki Nath Singh the bar under Order XXIII Rule 3-A CPC is applicable to third party as well. The only remedy available to them would be to approach the very same Court, which drew compromise decree."
- 23 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR
21. In the case of Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi and Anr. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the fresh suit is still not valid remedy against compromise decree. The only remedy would be to file an application before the same Court, which passed the compromise decree.
22. In view of the several judgments of this Court and Hon'ble Apex Court and a finality having been arrived at by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Triloki Nath Singh (supra), Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. (supra), Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi and Anr. (supra), it is no more res integra that when a person/party to compromise the decree challenges the compromise decree before any Court other than the very same Court, which passed the compromise decree, such petition would not be maintainable.
23. Secondly, the only remedy for a party to the compromise decree, if aggrieved on the reason of fraud, is
- 24 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253 WP No. 202339 of 2025 HC-KAR to challenge the same before the very same Court, which passed the compromise decree.
24. If a person, who is not party to the compromise decree challenged the said compromise decree by way of a separate suit, the same is not sustainable, in view of specific bar under Order XXIII Rule 3-A, CPC.
25. In the present case on hand, the petitioners are not parties to the compromise decree and they have filed present writ petition, questioning the compromise decree. The writ petition would not be maintainable as remedy available to the petitioners is to approach the very same Court, which passed the compromise decree to agitate and urge all points and contentions that are taken in this petition before the said Court.
26. Accordingly, I pass the following:
- 25 -
NC: 2026:KHC-K:253
WP No. 202339 of 2025
HC-KAR
ORDER
i. This petition is disposed of.
ii. Petitioners are provided liberty to approach the very same Court which passed the compromise decree by filing an application or petition, urging all grounds and contentions, which are taken up here before this Court. On filing such application or petition, the learned Trial Judge shall consider the same afresh in accordance with law and keeping in mind the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases mentioned hereinabove and decide the matter expediously.
Sd/-
(PRADEEP SINGH YERUR) JUDGE NJ List No.: 1 Sl No.: 26 CT:SI