National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
Regional Provident Fund ... vs Mamta Binani Resolution Professional & ... on 21 May, 2026
NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026
[Arising out of the Impugned Order dated 15.12.2025 passed by the
Adjudicating Authority, National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench-I
in C.P. (I.B.) No. 530/2020]
IN THE MATTER OF:
REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER-II
RO, KANDIVALI-EAST
Having office at Sector-8, MTNL Building, Charkop,
Kandivali (W), Mumbai-400067 ...Appellant
Versus
MS. MAMTA BINANI,
RESOLUTION PROFESSIONAL
ROLTA INDIA LTD.
Reg. No.: IBBI/IPA-002/IP-N00086-2017-18-10227
R/o. Second Floor, Nicco House, 2 Hare Street
Kolkata-700001, West Bengal
Mob. No.: 9831099551
Email: [email protected] ...Respondent No. 1
ASHDAN PROPERTIES PVT. LTD.
Successful Resolution Application/SRA
Regd. Off.: S. No.36/1/1, Office No. 701, 7th Floor,
Mumbai Bangalore Highway, Baner,
Pune, Maharshtra-411045
Email: [email protected] ...Respondent No. 2
COMMITTEE OF CREDITORS
Rolta India Ltd.
R/o. Rolta Tower 'A', Rolta Technology Park,
22nd Street MIDC-Marol, Andheri (East), Mumbai
Maharashtra-400093
C/o. Union Bank of India
Email: [email protected] ...Respondent No. 3
Present:
For Appellant : Mr. Sanjay Agarwal, Ms. Prachi and Ms. Shikha Saloni,
Advocates.
For Respondents : Mr. Ananya Pratap Singh, Ms. Gyanika Kochar and Mr.
Anurag Sahay, Advocates for R2.
ORDER
(Hybrid Mode) Per: Barun Mitra, Member (Technical) Present is an appeal which has been filed by the Appellant under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, ('IBC' in short) challenging the impugned order dated 15.12.2025 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench-I) in CP(IB)/530(MB)2020. The Appeal is accompanied with an application praying for condonation of delay in filing of the appeal which is being taken up for consideration .
2. Company Appeal No. 503 of 2026 has been e-filed by the Applicant before this Tribunal on 30.01.2026. The Appeal has been accompanied with I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 which is an application praying for condonation of delay in filing of the Appeal. The prayers contained in I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 read as follows:
"a. Allow the present application thereby condoning the delay of 16 days in filing the accompanying Appeal;
b. Pass any other such order(s)/direction(s) that this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in light of the abovementioned facts and circumstances and in the interest of justice."
3. At the very outset we take notice that the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 61(2) of the IBC is 30 days, which period is, however, extendable by a further period not exceeding 15 days in the event the Tribunal is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the 30 days permissible period of limitation. Section 61(2) is extracted below:
"61. Appeals and Appellate Authority.
(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal:Page 2 of 15
I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days."
(Emphasis supplied)
4. When we look at the present sequence of events, we find that the impugned order bears the date 15.12.2025. Calculated therefrom, the statutory period of 30 days for filing the Appeal came to an end on 14.01.2026. Calculated forward, the further extendable period of 15 days expired on 29.01.2026. However, the present Appeal has been e-filed on 30.01.2026 involving a time-span of 46 days from the date of pronouncement of the impugned order. It is an admitted fact that the Appeal was filed on the 16th day after the expiry of initial 30 days from the date of the impugned order.
5. The grounds for condonation of delay as mentioned in I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 are that the Applicant was not a party before the Adjudicating Authority and acquired knowledge of the impugned order dated 15.12.2025 only upon receipt of communication dated 26.12.2025 sent by Respondent No.1 which the Applicant received on 29.12.2025. It has further been pleaded that the impugned order was uploaded on the portal only on 19.12.2025. The limitation therefore deserved to be computed from the date on which the impugned order was uploaded i.e. 19.12.2025 and not from the date of the impugned order. Counted from the date of uploading of order, the limitation period for the present appeal was not barred by limitation. It is further submitted that after receipt of the impugned order, the Applicant took some time seeking legal opinion from its panel counsel and for appointment of counsel for filing the Appeal before this Page 3 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 Tribunal besides consumption of time in collating voluminous records in the process of preparation of the appeal.
6. More pertinently it has additionally been pleaded by the Applicant that though bonafide attempts were made to e-file the Appeal from 28.01.2026 onwards, the filing could not be completed due to technical glitch on account of backend defects on the e-filing portal of this Registry which therefore came in the way of filing the Appeal within the condonable period of 15 days. Ultimately the appeal could be successfully e-filed on 30.01.2026 after personally approaching the Registry. The technical glitch aspect has been articulated in paragraph 4 of I.A No. 1951 of 2026 which reads as under:
"4. That the counsel was trying to e-file the appeal since 28.01.2026, however due to the technical defects on the e-filing portal, the same could not be filed. On 29.01.2026, the registry of this Hon'ble Tribunal informed that there is some technical defect from the backend which is taking considerable time to repair. On 30.01.2026, the appeal was finally e-filed after the counsel specially approached the registry of this Hon'ble Tribunal."
7. It has further been contended that the Applicant repeatedly failed to e-file the Appeal on 28.01.2026 and 29.01.2026 due to technical glitch on the e-filing portal and ultimately the appeal came to be efiled on 30.01.2026 after approaching the Registry. It was therefore submitted that the delay, if any, apart from being a marginal delay of only one day, even that delay was not deliberate on their part but was occasioned by the fact that the efiling portal the Registry was dysfunctional which prevented the Applicant from filing the Appeal despite persistent efforts being made in this direction by the Applicant. Thus though the appeal could be filed on the 30 + 16th day, there was "sufficient cause" for this Page 4 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 delay and hence the same deserves to be condoned. It was also pressed that this was not a case of any mechanical or routine delay but caused by exceptional circumstance beyond the control of the Applicant and when considered in the totality of circumstance, the delay ought to be condoned so that the ends of justice are not defeated. The Applicant has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in M/s. Shivpad Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Deputy Commissioner (ST) & Anr. W.P. No. 26655 of 2024 & W.M.P No. 29173 of 2024 wherein it had been held that an appeal should not be rejected for technical issues beyond the control of litigant party in the interest of justice.
8. The Learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 vehemently opposing the arguments canvassed by the Applicant pressed hard that it is well settled that the computation of limitation for filing of the Appeal has to commence from the date of the impugned order i.e. 15.12.2025 and not from the date of upload of the order or the alleged date of knowledge of the impugned order. It was further submitted that the running of limitation is entirely independent of when the Applicant alleges to have acquired knowledge of the impugned order. It was submitted that the prescribed statutory period of 30 days expired on 14.01.2026 and the further condonable period of 15 days came to an end on 29.01.2026. However, the present Appeal admittedly came to be e-filed only on 30.01.2026 i.e. on the 46th day and therefore clearly fell beyond the statutory outer limit of 45 days prescribed under Section 61(2) of the IBC. Technical glitches or backend issues with NCLAT Registry portal impeding the filing of the appeal on 29.01.2026 cannot be a valid ground for condonation of delay since this Tribunal cannot exceed the statutory freeze of 15 days beyond the initial 30-day period in Page 5 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 condoning any delay. It was asserted that this Tribunal cannot override the express statutory mandate under the IBC on equitable grounds or otherwise. The present appeal having been filed beyond the maximum condonable period and falls beyond the statutory outer limit of 30 + 15 days is therefore not maintainable and the delay cannot but has to be rejected.
9. We have heard both sides and perused the materials placed on record carefully.
10. The principal issues which arise for consideration is whether in the facts of the present case, the limitation for the purposes of filing the Appeal under Section 61 of the IBC deserves to be computed from the date of the impugned order i.e. 15.12.2025 or from the date on which the impugned order came to be uploaded on the portal and/or when knowledge thereof was allegedly acquired by the Applicant. The other issue which also requires consideration is whether the technical glitches in the NCLAT e-portal which prevented the Applicant from filing their appeal on 29.01.2026 which happened to be the 45th day from the date of impugned order is sufficient ground to allow the condonation of delay.
11. Coming to the chronology of filing of this Appeal, we find that the impugned order was passed on 15.12.2025 which order was subsequently uploaded on 19.12.2025. Calculated from the aforesaid date of pronouncement of order, the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal came to an end on 14.01.2026. The further extendable period of 15 days in terms of proviso to Section 61(2) of the IBC expired on 29.01.2026. However, the present appeal admittedly came to be e-filed on 30.01.2026 i.e. on the 46th day from the date Page 6 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 of the impugned order. Prima facie, therefore, the appeal falls beyond the outer limit of 30+15 days contemplated under Section 61(2) of the IBC.
12. We would like to deal with the contention of the Applicant that the limitation for filing the present appeal should not start from 15.12.2025 i.e. the date of pronouncement of the order as the order got uploaded on 19.12.2025. and was brought to their knowledge still later on 29.12.2025. We are unable to accept this contention of the Applicant since we are guided by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Pandurang Kalate vs. Vistra ITCL (India) Limited & Ors. (2024) 3 SCC 27 which reads as under:
"16. From the above discussion of law, it is clear that the date on which the limitation begins to run is intrinsically linked to the date of pronouncement. The question that arises in the facts of the present case, therefore, is when is an order deemed to be pronounced...."
In the present case, it is an uncontroverted fact that the order was pronounced on 15.12.2025. The Respondent No.2 has also placed before this Tribunal the cause list of 15.12.2025 which clearly shows that Company Petition 530 of 2020 was slated for pronouncement of orders and that the same was also pronounced. Hence limitation commences in the present case from 15.12.2025 being the day when the order was pronounced.
13. We next come to the contention of the Applicant that the limitation for filing the present appeal should start from the time the impugned order was brought to their knowledge which was on 29.12.2025. Even this contention is not tenable as it is well settled by judicial precedent laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Nagarajan vs. SKS Ispat and Power Limited and Ors. Page 7 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 (2022) 2 SCC 244 that limitation for filing an appeal commences on the day when order is pronounced and the question when the Appellant came to know about the order is inconsequential. In para 33 of the above judgment, following has been laid down:
"33. The answer to the two issues set out in Section C of the judgment-(i) when will the clock for calculating the limitation period run for proceedings under IBC; and (ii) is the annexation of a certified copy mandatory for an appeal to NCLAT against an order passed under IBC must be based on a harmonious interpretation of the applicable legal regime, given that IBC is a Code in itself and has overriding effect. Sections 61(1) and (2) IBC consciously omit the requirement of limitation being computed from when the "order is made available to the aggrieved party", in contradistinction to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act...."
It is therefore amply clear that question as to when the Applicant came to know about the order is not a material factor and cannot be a ground for arresting the running of limitation from the date of pronouncement of the order.
14. This brings us to the next plank of delay condonation taken by the Applicant that they could not file the appeal on the 45th day despite making bonafide and persistent efforts to do so. However, their efforts were stultified because of glitches in the NCLAT e-portal for which the Applicant cannot be held responsible in any manner. Since it was the technical problems in NCLAT e- portal file which prevented them from filing the appeal within the 15 days extendable period, the delay of only one day should be condoned in view of the exceptional circumstances. In their defence, it was submitted that even the report submitted by this Registry reveals that they had sent emails on 29.01.2026 addressed to the IT Support Team of the NCLAT Registry regarding non-receipt of OTP on mobile and email while attempting registration on the Page 8 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 NCLAT e-filing portal and that they had sought intervention of the Registry to help them overcome the technical difficulties faced while attempting to e-file the Appeal. Hence the filing of the appeal on the 46th day deserves to be condoned as it was for reasons beyond their control.
15. To ascertain the veracity of the contention made by the Applicant that they had to face technical difficulties in e-filing of their appeal with the NCLAT Registry, on 29.04.2026, we directed the Registry to verify the Applicant's submission regarding emails sent by them on 29.01.2026 addressed to the IT Support Team to help them overcome the technical difficulties faced while attempting to e-file the Appeal. The Registry has submitted a report confirming that an email dated 29.01.2026 was received from the Applicant by the IT Section at around 12:46 PM regarding non-receipt of OTP on mobile and email while attempting registration on the NCLAT e-filing portal. Thereafter the IT Section had taken up the matter with NIC for resolution. It has further been reported by the Registry that another email was sent by the Applicant at around 07:00 PM on 29.01.2026 to the Registrar which was then forwarded to the IT Section on 30.01.2026 for necessary action. The Registry has additionally reported that in coordination with NIC, the Applicant was ultimately manually registered on the NCLAT e-filing portal on 30.01.2026. Further, the report received from NIC confirms that during the dates 28.01.2026 to 30.01.2026, there existed technical issues in OTP delivery services on SMS and email after migration to the NGC platform. Owing to such technical difficulties, registrations were being completed manually by NIC. Basis these reports by this Registry and NIC, undoubtedly there is force in the explanation furnished by the Applicant that technical Page 9 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 difficulties beyond the control of the Applicant had come in the way of e-filing of the appeal by them on the 45th day.
16. We now advert attention to the judgment of the High Court of Madras which has been relied upon by the Applicant in support of their contention that the High Court of Madras had held that an appeal cannot be rejected solely on the ground that the soft copy was not uploaded due to technical problems and that in the interest of justice the Applicant should be given an additional opportunity to present their case. The relevant paragraph of the above judgment is as reproduced below:
"5. Considering the submissions made, this Court finds that the appeal was rejected solely on the ground that the soft copy was not uploaded due to technical problems. This Court acknowledges that the delay in filing the appeal was genuine, as it was caused by these issues during the upload process. In such circumstances, an appeal should not be rejected without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard, particularly when the rejection arises from technical issues beyond their control. Therefore, in the interest of justice, this Court deems it appropriate to grant the petitioner an additional opportunity to present their case."
17. The distinguishing feature of the above case was that this judgment was passed by the High Court of Madras by invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which jurisdiction cannot be exercised by this Tribunal. Furthermore in that case, a hard copy had already been submitted but the soft copy of the same which was also required to be uploaded could not be so done due to technical problems. In the present case, neither efiling nor physical filing was done. Thus, we are of the considered view that the ratio of the above judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It may be pertinent to add here that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Spot Page 10 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 Exchange Ltd. Vs. Anil Kohli, RP for Dunar Foods Ltd. (2022) 11 SCC 761 has held that delay beyond 15 days in preferring an appeal cannot be condoned even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. Para 20 of the above judgment reads to the effect:-
"Thus, considering the statutory provisions which provide that delay beyond 15 days in preferring the appeal is uncondonable, the same cannot be condoned even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution."
18. The Respondent No.2 has canvassed that even if technical glitches confront a litigant, which technical bottleneck was not their doing, any delay in filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation is not legally permissible and that in a similar factual position the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court did not allow condonation of delay. Attention was adverted by the Respondent No.2 to the judgment of the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Ravi Plumbing and Construction v. Union of India, Special Civil Application No. 844 of 2026, wherein in a similar matter where technical glitches in the CGST portal had come in the way of the Applicant to file an appeal under the CGST Act within the additional period of 30 days therein, the Hon'ble High Court had observed that where the statute itself prescribes a specific condonable period, the discretion of the Appellate Authority stands exhausted upon expiry of such prescribed extended period and even constitutional jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be exercised to dilute the legislative mandate and the delay cannot be condoned by re-examining "sufficient cause". The relevant excerpts of the said judgment is extracted as under:
"10. Section 107 (4) of the CGST Act grants discretion to the Appellate Authority, to allow additional one month in case he/she is satisfied that Page 11 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 the appellant was prevented by "sufficient cause" from presenting the appeal after 90 days, but within a period of 30 days. Thus, the discretion of the Appellate authority ends on the completion of additional 30 days. Such discretion does not extend to powers under Article 226 of the Constitution on India as well. The statute, thus provides additional one month to file the appeal, and all the reasons satisfying the expression "sufficient cause" can be raised by the appellant. Similar expression is found in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 29 of Limitation Act, 1963 which deals with "Savings", which prevents the overriding the provisions of specific statutes that have their own distinct limitation periods. It permits such laws to govern their own timelines while still leveraging the mechanics of the Limitation Act. Thus, when an additional period of 30 days is supplied by the statute over and above the basic period of 90 days, and the same stands exhausted, this Court cannot exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to dilute the intention of the legislature and further extend the limitation by condoning the delay by re-examining the "sufficient cause". The reason assigned by the petitioner that he did not have his login I.d and password and in fact the GST Portal, the mobile number and e-mail did not belong to the present petitioner and the accountant's persons e-mail and phone were added in the GST Portal while taking the GST registration appears to be a lame excuse. We clarify, that even if the appellant had a valid reason and sufficient cause explaining the delay, this Court cannot condone the delay beyond 120 days unless the Appellate authority has fell in error in calculating/mis-understanding the limitation period. The tax payers are supposed to remain vigilant of all the proceedings and have to timely verify the orders on the portal. The taxing statutes operate in very strict time frame, and any relaxation or easing of limitation period will have cascading effect on the functioning of the revenue."
(Emphasis supplied) The ratio that can be culled from the above judgment is that procedural or technical explanations cannot override the express statutory framework governing limitation. Where a special statute prescribes a strict outer limit for condonation of delay, the same cannot be extended on equitable considerations beyond the jurisdiction expressly conferred by the statute. The above judgment clearly supports the contention of Respondent No. 2.
Page 12 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026
19. We also remain guided by the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 408 of 2023 which reads to the effect:
"11. As indicated above, the IBC prescribes strict timelines for filing appeals and taking legal action so as to ensure that insolvency proceedings are not misused to recover time-barred debts. The proviso to Section 61(2) clearly limits the NCLAT's jurisdiction to condone delay only up to 15 days beyond the initial 30-day period. Where a statute expressly limits the period within which delay may be condoned, an Appellate Tribunal cannot exceed that limit. In other words, the NCLAT being a creature of statute, operates strictly within the powers conferred upon it. Unlike a civil suit, it lacks inherent jurisdiction to extend time on equitable grounds.
11.1. Once the prescribed and condonable periods (i.e., 30 + 15 days) expire, the NCLAT has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals, regardless of the reason for the delay. In Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited, while interpreting Section 9 IBC, this Court underscores the IBC's strict procedural discipline i.e., only applications strictly conforming to statutory requirements can be entertained. This principle is also applicable to limitation issues under section 61(2), as it supports the idea that tribunals must operate within the bounds of the Code, without adding equitable or discretionary powers not conferred by statute. This Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another has categorically held that the NCLAT cannot condone any delay beyond 15 days even on equitable grounds; and that the appellate mechanism under IBC is strictly time-bound by design to preserve the speed and certainty of the insolvency resolution process. 11.2. Thus, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Accordingly, the second issue is answered by us.
13. Before parting, we may observe that time is of the essence in statutory appeals, and the prescribed limitation period must be strictly adhered to. Even a delay of a single day is fatal if the statute does not provide for its condonation. As held by us, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Allowing condonation in such cases would defeat the legislative intent and open the floodgates to belated and potentially Page 13 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 frivolous petitions, thereby undermining the efficacy and finality of the appellate mechanism."
(Emphasis supplied) When we apply the legal precepts outlined in the above judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the present Appeal having been e-filed on 30.01.2026 i.e. on the 46th day from the date of the impugned order, it falls beyond the statutory outer limit of 45 days contemplated under Section 61(2) of the IBC and hence cannot be entertained.
20. Thus, though in the given circumstances explained by the present Applicant, denial of condonation of one days' delay in filing after the fifteenth day will be rather harsh on the Applicant, nevertheless this Tribunal is helpless as it is required to follow the express provisions of the statute. It is a well-accepted principle that inconvenience caused to any litigating party cannot be considered as a decisive or determinative factor while interpreting a statute. Section 61 of IBC empowers this Tribunal to admit an appeal even after the prescribed period of 30 days only upto another 15 days provided the Appellant gives 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the appeal within the 30 days prescribed period. This Tribunal has not been vested with any discretionary powers after the expiry of the 15 days extended period to admit an appeal. Clearly therefore it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss any appeal which is presented before it beyond 30 + 15 days limitation. Any condonation of delay being allowed beyond 30 + 15 days would be in violation of the legislative intent and statutorily impermissible. This Tribunal cannot clothe itself with a jurisdiction which has not been vested upon it by the legislature. Thus, grant condonation of delay beyond the 15th day even on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship Page 14 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026 or technical considerations will amount to jettisoning the intent of the legislature which is impermissible. Being a creature of the statute, this Tribunal is bound by the provisions of the statute and has to apply the statutory provision with all its rigour and vigour. The Tribunal has no choice before it but to apply the law as it stands which does not vest any power to condone the delay on equitable grounds after the expiry of 30 plus 15 days period. We are therefore unable to condone the additional one days further delay beyond the 30+15 days condonable period laid down under Section 61(2) of the IBC in the present case.
21. For the aforesaid reasons, we reject the delay condonation application. Consequently, the Memo of Appeal is also rejected. No costs.
[Justice Ashok Bhushan] Chairperson [Barun Mitra] Member (Technical) Place: New Delhi Date: 21.05.2026 Sheetal Page 15 of 15 I.A. No. 1951 of 2026 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 503 of 2026