Punjab-Haryana High Court
Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims ... vs Union Of India And Others on 9 November, 2009
Bench: T.S.Thakur, Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 1
In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, at Chandigarh.
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Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 Date of Decision: 9.11.2009 Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims Association ...Petitioner Versus Union of India and Others ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.S.THAKUR, CHIEF JUSTICE.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA.
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. Whether to be referred to the reporters or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Present: Mrs. Anju Arora, Advocate and Ms.Aditi Girdhar, Advocate, for the petitioner.
Mr. Onkar Singh Batalvi, Advocate Central Government Standing Counsel for respondent No.1.
Mr. H.S. Hooda, Advocate General, Haryana with Mr. Randhir Singh, Addl. AG Haryana, for respondents No.2 and 3.
Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sunish Bindlish and Mr. Subhash Gupta, Advocates, for respondents No.4 and 5.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 2Mr. Girish Agnihotri, Senior Advocate with Mr. Arvind Seth, Advocate for respondent No.6.
Mr. Mahavir Sandhu, Advocate for respondent No.7.
None for respondent No.8.
Mr. Gaurav Mohunta, Advocate for respondent No.9.
T.S. Thakur, Chief Justice Four hundred and forty six precious lives, mostly children and women, were lost in what turned out to be the worst fire tragedy ever in this part of the Country. Besides those who died, nearly 200 suffered burn injuries, disfiguring some of them beyond recognition. Payment of compensation to those, who survived or the next of kin of those, who did not, may never heal their wounds completely nor make any material difference in the ground realities unless all those concerned do some introspection to identify the causes for such tragedies and take corrective steps to prevent their recurrence in future. That is because human tragedies of such magnitude are more often than not caused as much by lack of care and caution as by the all round failure of public authorities statutory or otherwise in the due and proper discharge of their functions and duties especially those concerning enforcement of safety measures.
D.A.V. Centenary Public School, Mandi Dabwali was known to be a Premier Educational Institute in District Sirsa in the State of Haryana. The school was amongst six hundred and fifty other colleges and institutions under the management of DAV College Managing Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 3 Committee, Chitragupta Road, New Delhi. For an Annual Prize Distribution Function, the school appears to have chosen what was known as Rajiv Marriage Palace situated at Chautala Chowk, Mandi, Dabwali, as the venue to which the children on the rolls of the school, their parents and teachers were invited. An invitation card sent to the invitees by the Principal of the School and the Regional Director of the DAV Managing Committee announced that Shri M.P.Bidlan, IAS, Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa would be the Chief Guest and Shri S.N.Kamboj, SDM Dabwali as the Guest of Honour. The function was to start at 11.00 A.M. on the 23rd of December 1995. At about 1.40 P.M. or so, the pandal under which a very large number of invitees were sitting, appears to have caught fire. To the misfortune of those attending the function the fire spread much too fast to let them escape. The blaze claimed 446 lives apart from causing burn injuries to 200 others. The cause of death was fire and a resultant stampede inside the pandal for want of escape routes the single exit point proving to be too small to let everyone under the pandal run to safety.
Nearly nine months after the incident when the funeral pyres and the ill fated venue had cooled, CWP No.13214 of 1996 was filed by the petitioner-association in the interest of those affected by the tragedy claiming a number of reliefs including adequate compensation to those who had lost their near and dear ones. Several directions were issued in the said writ petition from time to time which was finally disposed of by an order dated 28/29.01.2003, whereby Justice T P Garg, a former Judge of High Court of Allahabad was appointed as a one man Commission for determining the negligence of those connected with the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 4 incident and the amount of compensation payable to the victims or their next of kin.
The one man Commission, pursuant to the above directions, published notices inviting claim petitions from the general public, in response whereto the victims association filed a total of 493 petitions, out of which 405 cases related to compensation in death cases while the remaining 88 cases pertained to burn injuries suffered by the claimants. Notices were also sent to nine respondents including Union of India, State of Haryana, DAV Managing Committee, Haryana State Electricity Board, Municipal Council, Mandi Dabwali and Rajiv Marriage Palace.
In their claim petitions, the claimants alleged that the DAV Managing Committee and the school authorities had organized the ill fated function at a Marriage Palace without taking reasonable care and caution expected of a prudent person regarding the safety of all those attending the function. The School Authorities had thereby committed an act of negligence especially when the Marriage Palace and the Pandal under which the function was held were constructed in defiance of the building plan sanctioned by the Municipal Committee and had more than double the sanctioned electric load with loose wires crisscrossing the Pandal. Absence of fire fighting equipment and proper exits made the peace vulnerable to any mishap which mishap did occur claiming valuable human lives. The claim petitions prayed for several reliefs apart from payment of compensation.
In the reply filed by the respondents to the claim petitions, the allegation that there was any negligence on their part or that any legal liability accrued against them were both denied. Reply filed by Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 5 respondents No.1 to 3 inter-alia pointed out that the State Government was shocked over the tragic incident and that apart from remedial measures and providing relief to the affected instituted a fact finding enquiry into the incident. FIR No.397 of 1995 under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code registered at Police Station, Dabwali was subsequently transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation. Respondents No.1 to 3 further pleaded that the Government had announced an ex-gratia payment of Rs.1,00,000/- for every death and Rs.50,000/- for every injury case which amount had been disbursed to the persons concerned. Reimbursement of medical bills to the injured was also one of the reliefs, which the State Government had conceded to the victims before the High Court. Respondents 1 to 3 alleged that the incident had taken place on account of the negligence of respondents No.4, 5 and 9, who had organized the function and on account of their short sighted, careless and greedy approach meant to cut corners and save money in total disregard of the safety of the students, the parents and guests invited to the function. It was also alleged that the incident had taken place on account of highly inflammable material used to erect the pandal and the inadequate number of exit points from the same. The charge sheet filed by the CBI, had, according to the respondents, culminated in the conviction of Kewal Krishan, Rajinder Kumar and Devi Dayal by Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Ambala.
Respondents No.4 & 5 had also similarly denied the averments made in the claim petitions and asserted that the fault leading to the tragedy lay with respondent No.9, who had failed to make proper arrangements and take all such steps as were essential in the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 6 circumstances. It was also asserted that no claim was maintainable against respondent No.4 as the said respondent was not a juristic person. It was also alleged that the function was not organized by the DAV Managing Committee, as such no negligence or blame for the tragedy could be attributed to the said Committee. It was further alleged that the DAV organization had treated the tragedy as a natural calamity and taken several steps in the matter such as helping the victims in getting free education, medicines and even financial assistance. According to respondents No. 4 and 5, the responsibility for the safety of the students, staff and parents was that of respondent No.9, engaged to organize the function and not the School Authorities or DAV Managing Committee. Respondent No.9 was, according to the school, expected to make arrangements for the safety of the students, staff, parents and guests invited to the function.
Respondents No. 6 and 7, HSEB and Municipal Committee, Dabwali respectively also disputed their liabilities and denied that they were guilty of any negligence whatsoever. Similarly respondent No.8, Sh. M.P. Bidlan, the then D.C. Sirsa denied his liability and pleaded complete innocence in the matter.
Respondent No.9-Rajiv Marriage Palace too filed a reply inter- alia stating that the venue had not been formally inaugurated till the time the incident occurred and it was only because the school was serving a social cause that the venue was offered to them without charging a single penny in consideration thereof. It was also alleged that the responsibility for making the necessary arrangements for seating of the guests and provisions for electricity and water etc. was that of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 7 respondents No. 4 & 5. The allegation that they had been using more then the sanctioned load of electricity with loose wires hanging all around was also denied by them. The Pandal was, according to respondent No.9 made of pure cotton fabric purchased from M/s Sukh Chain Singh Makhan Singh and Co. Gandhi Chowk, Abohar. All other arrangements towards electricity, water, security, eatables according to respondent No.9 and seating etc. were to be made by the school itself.
The Commission afforded the fullest opportunity to the parties to lead evidence in support of their respective cases. Consequently, as many as 1084 witnesses including 393 doctors were examined on behalf of the claimants over a period of four years. In rebuttal, the respondents examined 29 witnesses on their behalf, while the Commission examined as many as 30 witnesses on its own. It is noteworthy that as many as 2800 documents were produced, marked and exhibited during the course of inquiry proceedings. The hearing of the claim petitions filed before the Commission commenced on 29.8.2006 and was completed on 24.12.2007. The Commission submitted the first part of the report on 19.8.2008 in which it determined the amount of compensation payable to the claimants in death cases. The second part of the report submitted by the Commission on 10.12.2008 dealt with the amount of compensation payable to the victims in injury cases. The third and final part of the report submitted on 16.3.2009 determined the negligence of the respondents and the apportionment of the liability to pay compensation among them.
Dealing with the question of negligence of the respondents, the Commission recorded a clear finding to the effect that while the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 8 accommodation in the School building was admittedly insufficient for holding of a function like the one which the School was organizing, the same did not absolve the School of the responsibility to look for a suitable alternative. The Commission took the view that it was the responsibility of respondents No.4 and 5 to see that the Marriage Palace where they were holding their Annual Function was safe and had the capacity to accommodate the large number of invitees attending the same. It was also the responsibility of the said respondents to ensure that adequate arrangements for fire fighting in the case of an emergency existed and that there were sufficient number of exits for escape in any such eventuality. The School was also expected to ensure that the Marriage Palace owner had the necessary certificates and permissions from the Municipal Committee, Dabwali, for holding of a function like the one being organized by the School. The Commission took the view that respondents No.4 and 5 had, in their anxiety and over enthusiasm, failed to take care and look into all these aspects of security even when the function was to be attended by a very large number of persons comprising men, women and children. The Commission observed:-
"Under the above circumstances, it is clear that respondents No.4 & 5, who were expected to see that the Marriage Palace where they were holding their annual function was safe and sound and it had the capacity to accommodate about 1500 persons/invitees; that there were sufficient arrangements for fire fighting equipment and water Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 9 in case of emergency and there were sufficient number of exits and openings for escape and going out in case of emergency and also that the owners of the Marriage Palace had with them the completion certificate from the Municipal Committee, Dabwali, before holding any such function but in their anxiety and over-enthusiasm they did not care to look into any such thing".
The Commission rejected the contention urged by respondents No.4 and 5 that the responsibility for making arrangements for the function lay entirely with respondent No.9, the owner of the Marriage Palace, or that safety and security of the guests including the children who were participating in the function was a matter that rested with Marriage Palace or its owners. The Commission observed:
"Although respondents No.4 & 5 have throughout alleged that the Banquet Hall owners had to make all arrangements including sitting, electricity, lighting and tent etc. but then they have not led any evidence in support of their allegations. Their own witnesses: Smt. Neelam Wadhwa, a teacher of the school, and Shri V.K. Mittal, Principal of the School, have categorically stated that there was only one gate of entrance and exit in Rajiv Marriage Palace and the width of that gate as per their estimate was about 10 X 12 feet. Respondents No.4 & 5 have not Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 10 led any iota of evidence in support of their plea that their 'agent' respondent No.9 was negligent in so far as the sitting, lighting, electricity and tent arrangements were concerned. None of their witnesses has stated as to what steps were taken and what arrangements were made by the organizers of the function i.e. Respondents No.4 & 5 to meet any emergency, or unforeseen event like the present one. Admittedly, the size of the only gate of entrance and exit to the Banquet Hall was only 10 X 12 feet. Thus, when the fire engulfed the entire Pandal, it was humanly impossible for the children, ladies and gents to come out speedily from out of the single gate of exit".
Repelling the contentions urged on behalf of respondents No.4 and 5 that they had paid a sum of Rs.6,000/- towards hire charges of the Marriage Palace and, therefore, had no responsibility for the safety and security of the children and other guests, the Commission observed:-
"Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that the respondent No.9 had to make all these arrangements for a consideration of Rs.6,000/-, although as per the statement of Kewal Krishan, one of the owners of respondent No. 9 (RW19/1-DFT), they offered the Marriage Palace to the School Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 11 Authorities for their publicity free of charge; that the entire arrangement with regard to the chairs, curtains and other installations were all made by the School Authorities with which they had no concern whatsoever. He has also stated that as many as two generators were provided by the School Authorities and which were placed outside the Marriage Palace in the street. It can thus safely be concluded that even if the Rajiv Marriage Palace was hired for an amount of Rs.6,000/-, but as per statement of Kewal Krishan, they had only offered the Banquet Hall while all other arrangements were to be made by the School Authorities. It is also a matter of common observation that in such functions, the sitting, lighting and such type of other arrangements are always made by the organizers themselves as per their requirement. To say now that all these arrangements like sitting, lighting, tent etc. were to be made by respondent No.9, does not, therefore, appeal to reason. The respondent No.9 was only an 'agent' of respondents No.4 & 5 and whatever he did, was done during the course of his agency".
While examining the liability of respondent No.9, the owner of the Marriage Palace, the Commission recorded a finding that the owners had not applied for a completion certificate after the construction of the Marriage Palace was completed nor had they obtained any licence from Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 12 the Municipal Committee for running the Marriage Palace. The Commission further recorded a finding that respondent No.9 had not made any arrangement for a Fire-brigade and/or Ambulance in the event of an emergency arising during the function. The Commission accepted the assertion made by respondent No.9, the owner of Marriage Palace, that the Marriage Palace was offered to respondents No.4 and 5 free of any charge only with a view to promoting the commercial interest of the establishment. Analysing the deposition of Mr. V.K. Mittal, Principal of the School and Mr. Jagdish Deol, Upper Division Clerk, produced by respondents No.4 and 5 as defence witnesses, the Commission came to the conclusion that payment of Rs.6,000/- to the Marriage Palace was not established as the receipt showing the said payment had not been produced. The Commission observed:-
"From the evidence of Shri V.K. Mittal, it is rather made out that there did not exist any such receipt showing the alleged payment of Rs.6000/- to respondent No.9. In case there would have been any such receipt, Shri V.K. Mittal or Shri Jagdish Deol, Upper Division Clerk of the Head Office of the D.A.V. College Managing Committee must have produced it but the same has been withheld from the Commission for the reasons best known to them. Shri Jagdish Deol has nowhere stated about his having received any such receipt of Rs.6-000/- from the D.A.V. School, Dabwali alongwith other Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 13 record as alleged by Shri V.K. Mittal. Moreover, even if there was any such receipt as has been categorically stated by Shri V.K. Mittal, there are no reasons as to why respondents No.4 & 5 would withhold the same from the Commission".
Having, thus, found the owners of Marriage Palace guilty of negligence leading to the fire incident, the Commission went on to hold that the relationship between respondents No.4 and 5, on the one hand, and respondent No.9, on the other, was that of Principal and Agent thereby rendering the former vicariously liable for the acts of negligence, omission and commission of the latter. Relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi and Others v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. And Another AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1735 and Minu B. Mehta and Another v. Balkrishana Ramchandra Nayan and Another AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1248 and a Full Bench of this Court in Pirthi Singh v. Binda Ram and Others AIR 1987 Punjab & Haryana 56, the Commission held that regardless whether or not payment of Rs.6,000/- was proved to have been made towards user charges by respondents No.4 and 5 to respondent No.9 the former were vicariously liable for any act of negligence, omission and/or commission of the latter. The Commission took the view that since the function in question had been arranged by respondents No.4 and 5 in the premises of respondent No.9 the inference was that negligence of respondent No.9 was in the course of Agency thereby making the Principal vicariously liable for such negligence. Reliance was also placed by the Commission upon the decision in M.S. Grewal & Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 14 Another v. Deep Chand Sood & Others 2001 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 1426 and Kooragang Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Richardson & Wrench Ltd. (1981) 3 AII ER 65 to hold that the liability of respondents No.4 and 5 could not be different from that of respondent No.9.
The Commission examined the question of negligence on the part of the Haryana Electricity Board also and on the basis of the evidence on the record, returned a specific finding to the effect that the officers of the Board were totally negligent in the discharge of their duties. The Commission held that there were two electric connections for the Marriage Palace and that although the sanctioned load was limited to 5.980 KW only, the owners of the Marriage Palace were found to be consuming 11.15 KW load, a fact that was established even in the investigation conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The Commission found that the terminal plate of the three-phase meter was intentionally left unsealed by the Junior Engineer, who had released the connection in favour of the owner of the Marriage Palace. This was done to facilitate illegal abstraction of electricity by the owners without making any payment to the Board. It also recorded a finding that welding-set lying at the spot appeared to have been utilized by the owners for the construction of steel structures of the main hall and that no meter reading was recorded in regard to both the electric connections. The bills issued by the Board Authorities were also for very petty amounts. In the opinion of the commission, had the officers/officials of the Board been vigilant and had they checked the premises, things would have been entirely different and the incident in Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 15 question may not have occurred. The Commission observed:
"From the above, the negligence of the officials of the Board respondent No.6 is proved. It is also proved that there were two electric connections installed in the Marriage Palace. One of the connections was Single-Phase while the other was a Three-Phase connection. Although the sanctioned load of Three-Phase connection was 5.980 KW but the owners were found consuming 11.10 KW load which was almost double the sanctioned load, which has clearly been established from the investigation of the C.B.I. as per their report Ex.P.1347/1-DFT. It has also come in the C.B.I. Report that the meter terminal plate of the Three- Phase meter was intentionally not sealed by the J.E., who had released the connection in favour of Kewal Krishan. This was done to facilitate undue consumption of the electricity by the owners without making any payment to the Board. It has also come in the evidence that the owners had taken the electric connection in the Pandal by unauthorisedly extending it from Three-Phase connection. The welding-set lying there appears to have been utilized by the owners for the construction of steel structures of the main Hall. As stated above, no meter reading was taken and the bills for both the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 16 electric connections were issued for very petty amount and even then no payment of the bills was ever made by the consumers. This further shows that the whole staff of the Board was in connivance with the owners. It has also been proved that four core of cable of the length of 66 meters was used by the J.E. against the instructions of the Board for the use of 30 meters cable only. The Meter Reader, Lineman, J.E. and other supporting staff of the Board were all highly negligent and not performing their duties intentionally in connivance with the owners of the premises, where connection was released and even the higher officers also cannot escape the liability, because they (higher officers) also failed in the performance of their duties as they never cared to inspect the site and get matters straight particularly when the consumer was not making payment of any bill for a considerable long time. Had they been vigilant and checked the premises and other record of the Board with regard to the payment qua the bills, the things would have been entirely different and the incident would not have perhaps occurred. In this view of the matter, the respondent No.6 and its officials were extremely negligent in the performance of their duties and for which they are certainly liable. Since the negligence Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 17 of the officials of the Board was in their public capacity as also in the discharge of their public duties during the course of employment and they being employees of the Board, the respondent No.6 i.e. The Board is vicariously liable for their negligence". (emphasis supplied) The Commission, on the above reasoning, found the officials of the Board to be negligent in the discharge of their duties and the Board to be vicariously liable for such negligence. Since the Board, during the intervening period, was converted into Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam, the Nigam was held liable for payment of compensation to the claimants. But keeping in view the fact that the Nigam was entirely controlled by the State Government, the Commission held the State of Haryana to be liable to pay the amount in the first instance and recover the same from the Nigam subsequently.
Dealing with the liability of the Municipal Committee, Dabwali, the Commission came to the conclusion that Rajiv Marriage Palace was constructed in complete violation of the sanctioned plans. No Completion Certificate was obtained by the owners and the building occupied without clearance from the Municipal Authorities. There were no fire fighting equipments nor any exit gate except one that was barely 10X12 feet wide. The owners of the Marriage Palace had never obtained "No Objection Certificate" from the Fire Officer nor made any arrangement for fire fighting equipment and other such essential services before putting the Marriage Palace to use. The Commission observed:-Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 18
"As stated by Shri Ramesh Chander, Assistant Engineer of the Municipal committee, he did not care to the inspect the site after the sanction of the building plan. He did not care to see as to whether the construction is being done according to the site plan and all the constructions made by the owners are according to the sanctioned site plan and that after completion of the construction, a completion certificate has been obtained or not and whether a 'no objection certificate' from the Fire Officer has been procured or not. In this view of the matter, the Municipal Committee (respondent No.7) was certainly negligent and so also respondents No.4 & 5 alongwith them".
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XX "This further shows that the Municipal Committee was also negligent in so far as the maintenance and upkeep of its fire station and the presence of the officials at the Fire Station is concerned. It appears that the Municipal Committee perhaps had no control or supervision on the staff of its Fire Station, so much so, that even the Fire Station Officer was found to be on "furlough" at the time when his presence was of utmost importance at the time of such an emergency".
The Commission then summed up its findings regarding the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 19 negligence of the Municipal Committee and its officials, in the following words:
"It has also been held in this report that the officials of the Municipal Committee, who were duty bound to check the unauthorized construction in the town and the construction of the Marriage Palace according to the sanctioned plan, miserably failed in the discharge of their duties. Had the officials of the Municipal Committee taken due and timely care, the tragedy might have been minimized. It has been held above that the building of respondent No.9 was constructed in violation of the sanctioned plan; that no completion certificate was obtained by the owners of the building before occupying the same nor any fire fighting equipment was installed and there was only one gate of entry and exit of the size of 10' x 12'. The Fire Officer of the Municipal Committee took no pains to see that the owners of the Marriage Palace had never obtained 'No Objection Certificate' from him nor made any arrangement for keeping fire-fighting equipment in the case of emergency. Under the circumstances and as held above the Municipal Committee (respondent No.7) and its officials were certainly negligent in the discharge of their duties".
Having regard to the gravity of the culpable negligence as also Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 20 the involvement of the officials of the Municipal Committee in the non- observance of statutory requirements, the Commission held the Municipal Committee to be liable to pay compensation to the extent of 5% of the whole amount and directed the said amount to be paid by the State Government on the ground that the latter was vicariously liable for the negligence of the former.
The Commission then examined whether the State of Haryana was liable to share the responsibility for the tragedy that occurred at Dabwali. Answering the question in the affirmative, the Commission held that Mr. M.P. Bidlan who happened to be the Head of the District Administration and was the Chief Guest for the function organized by the School did not take any care to see that proper arrangements for security, fire fighting equipment, ambulance and other public utility services were made for those who were invited to the function. The Commission rejected the explanation offered by Mr. Bidlan that such arrangements were not necessary to be made because the function was a private function. Relying upon the deposition of Mr.Norang Dass, Tehsildar, Dabwali, who was examined as a witness by respondents No.1 to 3, the Commission held that District Administration was duty bound to enforce and secure the enforcement of laws relevant to various departments. It also held that the District Administration had to look after the security, safety and welfare of its citizens and that the Deputy Commissioner had agreed to be the Chief Guest at the function in discharge of a public duty and not in his private capacity, which fact was admitted even by Mr. Bidlan in his own deposition. The Commission relied upon the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer against Mr. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 21 Bidlan, according to which the charge of dereliction of duty framed against Mr. Bidlan was proved. On the basis of the material on record comprising oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the Commission further held that Mr. Bidlan had left the place of incident hastily only to go to the security of a Police Station at Odhan some 28 Kms. from Dabwali and had in the process, failed to discharge his duties as the Head of the District Administration in which capacity he ought to have supervised the relief and rescue measures especially when people were crying for the same. The Commission also held that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer regarding the charge of dereliction of duties by Mr. Bidlan and the imposition of penalty upon him were perfectly justified. The Commission noted that the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, before whom the order of punishment imposed upon Mr.Bidlan was assailed, had upheld the order of punishment. After discussing the deposition of eight witnesses examined by Mr. Bidlan in his defence, the Commission concluded as under:-
"From the evidence of above witnesses examined by Shri M.P. Bidlan, he has tried to prove that he remained at the scene of occurrence for quite some time after the incident, tried to break the wall with the help of a tractor-trolley, sent for Haryana Roadways buses and also tried to use the telephone facility at Police Station Sadar, Dabwali and only thereafter, he went to Police Post, Odhan. But then it will be seen that no such plea has been taken by Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 22 him anywhere in his written statement. Obviously, therefore, the entire evidence led by him in support of his contention is certainly beyond the pleadings and cannot be looked into . Moreover, it appears that all this evidence has been led by Shri M.P. Bidlan in order perhaps to build up some sort of defence in his departmental enquiry or for any other reason best known to him. In any case, this evidence does not help him in any manner in view of the findings of the Enquiry Officer Shri Dharam Vir and the punishment awarded to him by the Government of India and his challenge against the same before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh, also met with no success. A perusal of written statement filed by Shri M.P. Bidlan shows that he has throughout accused respondents No.4, 5 and 9 for the tragedy and has asserted that the only liability for compensation falls upon respondents No.1, 2, 3 i.e. the Union of India, the State of Haryana and the Secretary Health and respondent No.9 besides respondents No.4 & 5. The only plea taken by him in the prayer clause of his written statement is that he never fled away from the place of incident and there is absolutely nothing against him as alleged by the claimants. It is thus evident that no such plea has been raised by him in Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 23 his written statement that he stayed at the scene of occurrence for quite some time, asked a driver of tractor-trolley to demolish the wall, sent directions to the Haryana Roadways Workshop for sending buses, went to Police Station Sadar, Dabwali and when all these efforts failed, he went to Police Post Odhan to do the needful. The evidence led by Shri M.P. Bidlan cannot, therefore, be looked into and is of no assistance to him in the absence of any plea in any of his written statements. As per his own statement, Shri M.P. Bidlan had already put in 21 years of service at that time, firstly as a Haryana Civil Service Officer for 13 years and thereafter, an Officer of the I.A.S. For the last about 8 years. Being an officer having 21 years administrative experience, it is indeed extremely sad to see that Shri Bidlan did not rise to the occasion and instead of taking control of the entire situation created by the unfortunate fire incident, chose to run away from the site only to take breath at a distance of 28 Kms. from Dabwali at Odhan. The conduct of Shri M.P. Bidlan was indeed most reprehensible and certainly deserves censure and for which he has been rightly penalized by the Appropriate Authority. The evidence led by him does not, in any manner, absolve him of the responsibility that fell upon him Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 24 on account of the fire incident. An officer of such a long administrative experience should have remained at the spot and organized the rescue operations, particularly when his Sub Divisional Officer had died in the fire incident while the Deputy Superintendent of Police had received extensive burns and there was no Senior Officer except him on the spot at that time". (emphasis is ours) The Commission further held that the version given by Mr. Bidlan that a large mob had gathered in front of Police Station Sadar Dabwali did not lend any support to the plea of innocence set up by him. It was, according to the Commission, all the more necessary for the Deputy Commissioner, who had long administrative experience, to stay put at Dabwali having regard to the extremely grave situation that had arisen out of the incident. The Commission held that when Mr. Bidlan left the place of occurrence, there was no responsible civil or police officer to take charge of the situation that had been created by the incident. He did not contact the local officers nor left any instructions before leaving the site although the Tehsildar, Dabwali was very much there, whose services could have been utilized by him. The Commission finally concluded as under:-
"From the entire material on the record, it is clearly established that Shri M.P. Bidlan was certainly negligent in the discharge of his duties as Head of the District Administration and he is, therefore, liable for the negligence on his part and for his act of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 25 omission to perform his duties as Head of the District Administration being the Deputy Commissioner of the District. Since Shri Bidlan was present as Chief Guest at the function in his public capacity as also in the discharge of his public duties during the course of employment and was an employee of the State Government, only the Haryana State Government respondent No.2 is 'vicariously' liable for his negligence".
The vicarious liability of the State Government was, on account of the neglect on the part of its officer Mr. Bidlan in the discharge of his duties properly, fixed at 10% of the amount awarded to the victims and their legal representatives. The Commission observed:-
"Having regard to the degree of negligence on the part of Shri Bidlan in the discharge of his public duties as public servant during the course of employment and being an employee of the State Government, it is held that the Haryana State Government (respondent No.2) shall be vicariously liable for his negligence and as such it is held that it shall be liable to pay compensation to the extent of Ten Percent of the whole".
For the purpose of award of compensation, the Commission categorized the claim petitions into following six distinct categories:-
1) Death cases involving children between the age group of one month to ten years;Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 26
2) Death cases involving children between the age group of ten to fifteen years;
3) Death cases involving children between the age group of sixteen to twenty two years;
4) Death cases involving housewives including working women;
5) Death cases involving working men; And
6) Claims based on injuries sustained by the victims
men, women and children.
Category 1 Cases
In so far as death cases involving children between the age group of one month to ten years, the Commission relying upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.K.Subramonia Iyer & Others v. T.Kunhikuttan Nair & Others AIR 1970 Supreme Court 376, New India Assurance Company Limited v. Satender & Others 2007 (1) Civil Court Cases 255 (SC), Lata Wadhwa & Others v.
State of Bihar & Others (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 197, M.S. Grewal & Another v. Deep Chand Sood & Others 2001 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 1426, awarded to the parents/next of kin of each child killed in the incident, a lump sum amount of Rs.2,00,000/- towards compensation. It is noteworthy that majority of the victims fell in this category, as out of a total of four hundred and forty six dead, 172 happened to be children in the age group of one month to ten years. Category 2 Cases In the case of children in the age group of 10 to 15 years, Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 27 numbering in all 38, the Commission relying upon the decisions referred to earlier, awarded a sum of Rs.4,10,000/- per child killed in the incident and apportioned the same between the parents/legal representatives of the deceased.
Category 3 Cases In the case of 20 children who lost their lives and fell in the age group of 16 to 22 years, the Commission awarded a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- for each child killed in the unfortunate incident and apportioned the amount of compensation suitably among those claiming the same.
Category 4 Cases As regards 136 house wives that included 47 working women killed in the fire incident, the Commission awarded compensation that ranged between Rs.44,000/- to Rs.10,82,000/- depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case which facts have been discussed by the Commission at considerable length. The amount of award has also been apportioned by the Commission suitably among the claimants. It is noteworthy that out of 47 working women nine victims who were killed in the incident were unmarried and were working with the DAV School on meager salaries offered to them. It is ironical that while in the case of children in the age group of 16 to 22 years, the Commission awarded Rs.5,00,000/- per child killed, in the case of nine young unmarried girls, who were working in the School, the compensation awarded ranges between Rs.44,000/- to Rs.2,30,000/- only. The petitioners/claimants have made a grievance against this anamolous situation and claimed enhancement of the compensation Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 28 awarded to the parents/next of kin of these nine victims by treating the victims as children in age group of 16-22 years. We shall presently examine that aspect when we come to the question of enhancement of the amount of compensation.
Category 5 Cases In so far as working men are concerned, the Commission determined compensation payable to the legal representatives of the victims ranging between Rs.61,200/- to Rs.16,11,000/- depending upon the income which the deceased was earning and the multiplier that was applicable to the case at hand.
Category 6 Cases In 88 cases of injured men, women and children, the Commission has adopted a method of awarding compensation based on the extent of disability that was suffered by the victims. For a better understanding of the method adopted by the Commission, we may present the picture emerging from the recommendations of the Commission in the following tabular form:-
S.No. No. of victims Extent of Disability Amount of comprising men, compensation women and children ranging from who suffered disability on account of burn injuries.
1 29 1% to 10% Rs.2,00,000/-
except in case of one person namely Surinder Pal Kaur alias Chhinder Pal Kaur who has been awarded Rs.1,00,000/-.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 29
S.No. No. of victims Extent of Disability Amount of
comprising men, compensation
women and children ranging from
who suffered disability
on account of burn
injuries.
2 8 11% to 20% Rs.2,50,000/- to
Rs.6,00,000/-
3 9 21% to 30% Rs.3,50,000/- to
Rs.6,00,000/-
4 12 31% to 40% Rs.3,00,000/- to
Rs.6,50,000/-
5 7 41% to 50% Rs.3,25,000/- to
Rs.6,50,000/-
6 4 51% to 60% Rs.5,00,000/- to
Rs.5,50,000/-
7 3 61% to 70% Rs.4,00,000/- to
Rs.6,50,000/-
8 3 71% to 80% Rs.7,00,000/- to
Rs.8,00,000/-
9 3 81% to 90% Rs.8,00,000/-
each
10 1 91% to 99% Rs.15,00,000/-
11 9 100.00% Rs.10,00,000/- to
Rs.16,00,000/-
Learned counsel for the parties have filed their objections to the report and recommendations made by the Commission. We may briefly refer to the said objections before proceeding further.
The Association and the victims have inter-alia raised the following objections to the report:-
I) The Commission committed an error in determining the amount of compensation payable in death cases involving children by following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) stricto senso. The Commission overlooked the fact that the amount of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 30 compensation awarded in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) for the children was determined on the basis of the price index then prevailing. The incident in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) having taken place on 3.3.1989 could not possibly provide a sound basis for awarding compensation in a claim arising out of an accident that took place seven years later on 23.12.1995 without adding to the amount awarded in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) the component of price escalation based on the National Price Index. In support of its claim for higher amount of compensation, the petitioner-Association has filed a separate calculation chart indicating the amount which the claimants would be entitled to after taking into consideration the Price Index. According to this chart, the compensation payable to the claimants for children of different age groups would be as under:
S. No. Age Group Amount awarded by Amount claimed by the of Children the Commission on Petitioner-Association the basis of Lata Wadhwa's case 1 One month Rs.2,00,000/- Rs.3,57,000/-
to ten years 2 Ten to 15 Rs.4,10,000/- Rs.7,33,684/-
years 3 15 to 22 Rs.5,00,000/- Rs.8,94,736/-
years II) The petitioner-Association has also found fault with the award of compensation by the Commission in the case of housewives. According to it, the Commission committed a mistake in ignoring the very essence of the decision in Lata Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 31 Wadhwa's case (supra), where the contribution of a housewife was assessed by their Lordships at Rs.3,000/- per month. The Commission has, while accepting that contribution in the form of services rendered by the housewives to their families wrongly deducted 1/3rd towards expenses of the victim on herself. This was not, according to the petitioner-Association, permissible having regard to the fact that the Supreme Court had determined Rs.3,000/- per month to be the value of the contribution of the housewives to their families. No deduction towards personal expenses was permissible out of the said contribution nor was any made by their Lordships. The Commission, thus, fell in error in taking the multiplicand at Rs.24,000/- per annum instead of Rs.36,000/- per year. The petitioner-Association has further asserted that the value of the contribution made by the deceased housewives ought to be proportionately raised to a higher figure having regard to the increase in the price index for the period between 1989 and 1995. According to the petitioner-Association, the multiplicand, after taking into consideration the escalation in the Price Index, could be determined at Rs.64,424/- for all housewives except the elderly ones between the age group of 62 to 72 years, qua whom the multiplicand would come to Rs.35,789/- as for that category of cases the Supreme Court had determined the contribution towards family to be Rs.20,000/- per annum only which could, on the basis of price index, be taken as Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 32 Rs.35,789/-. It is noteworthy that in both these cases namely housewives and the elderly women, the petitioner-Association or the claimants have not found any fault with the multiplier chosen by the Commission while determining the amount of compensation.
III) The conventional figure of Rs.50,000/- awarded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra), ought to be enhanced. According to the claimants, after taking into consideration the Price Index, the said amount could be fixed at Rs.89,473/- per person killed in the incident. IV) The petitioner-Association has also questioned the amount of compensation determined by the Commission qua nine young working girls in regard to whom the Commission has recommended different amounts of compensation ranging between Rs.44,000/- to Rs.2,88,000/- depending upon the evidence that was adduced to prove their monthly income. According to the petitioner-Association and the claimants, the award of compensation for such young victims of the tragedy could be more logically determined and awarded as in the case of children in the age group of 15-22 years. The approach adopted by the Commission in fixing a lower amount of compensation for working young girls has brought about an anomaly as those who were working at the time of tragedy would leave behind lesser amount for payment to their legal representatives than those who were not. The fact that young girls were working on the date of the incident could not, it is Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 33 asserted, become a disadvantage in the matter of determination of compensation. The amount in DFT Nos. 6, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63 and 342 would, thus, require to be enhanced suitably so as to be equivalent to the amount paid for non-working girls in the age group of 15 to 22 years. V) The petitioner-Association has also found fault with the amount of compensation determined in favour of legal representatives of deceased working women, 38 of whom had fallen victim to the tragedy. Most of them were, according to the Association, working as Teachers in the DAV School. Some of them were working even in Government Schools as Teachers. The salaries received by these working women ranged between Rs.1,800/- per annum to Rs.81,600/- per annum. The petitioner-Association states that while determining the compensation payable to the legal representatives of these victims, the Commission has not taken into consideration their future prospects and proceeded to determine the amount of compensation entirely on the basis of the amount they were receiving as salaries on the date of the incident. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Transport Corporation v. Susama Thomas 1994(2) PLR 1, the Association asserts that the Commission ought to have taken into consideration future prospects of the victims also while determining the multiplicand. Notably learned counsel did not question the correctness of the multiplier chosen by the Commission qua Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 34 these claims also. The Association asserts that the conventional figure of Rs.50,000/- has not been awarded in the above cases which ought to be awarded taking into consideration the escalation in the price index.
It is also asserted by the petitioner-Association that apart from the amount quantified on the basis of multiplier method evolved in Susama Thomas's case (supra) the claimants were entitled to an additional amount of compensation on account of the loss of contribution which such working women made in terms of services rendered by them to the family. The Association argues that while in the case of housewives, the Supreme Court has quantified the said amount at Rs.36,000/- per annum in the case of working women the said amount could be awarded over and above the amount quantified on the basis of the multiplier method as it was not disputed that working women were apart from supplementing the family income contributing in terms of services rendered to their families which could also be quantified.
VI) The same line of reasoning is urged by the petitioner-
Association in cases arising out of death of working men. The Association finds fault with the failure of the Commission in not taking the future prospects into consideration in the said cases. No conventional amount has been awarded to the claimants in cases involving death of working men. VII) In injury cases also, the claimants have found fault with the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 35 amount awarded in their favour and prayed for enhancement of the said amounts on several grounds.
The respondents have also filed their objections to the report submitted by the One Man Commission and questioned the findings as also the extent of liability fastened upon them. The objections filed by respondents No.4 and 5 upon whom the liability to pay has been fixed to the extent of 80% of the amount awarded by the Commission, challenge the final report of the Commission not only regarding the entitlement of some of the claimants to claim compensation but even the determination of the negligence of the parties and the apportionment of the liability arising out of the same among them. The objections assail even the quantum of compensation awarded to the claimants by the Commission. The case of these respondents is that they were not negligent in any manner and that no responsibility for the incident can be fixed upon them. According to these respondents, there was no statutory duty cast on them to take any preventive measures towards safety etc. nor was there any duty cast on them to take any other measures which, if taken, would have prevented the fire tragedy. The respondents allege that the statutory duty to provide measures, enforce compliance with the said measures regarding safety of the victims including compliance with the building bye-laws by the owners of the Marriage Palace, regulation of electric supply etc. was that of the Municipal Committee, Dabwali, and/or Haryana State Electricity Board. It was also the duty of the Marriage Palace Owners to ensure compliance with safety measures required for safety of any visitor/guest entering such a public place. Relying upon the provisions of the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 36 Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, Haryana Municipal Building Bye-laws, 1982, Haryana Municipal (Dangerous and Offensive Trades) Bye-laws, 1982, Haryana Municipal (Formation and Working of Fire Brigade) Rules, 1985, Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and Indian Electricity Rules, 1956, the respondents have tried to absolve themselves of their responsibility for the tragedy while accusing the statutory and public authorities of negligence in the performance of what, according to these respondents, were statutory duties cast upon them.
In the reply to the claim for enhancement of compensation payable to the victims, respondents No.4 and 5 have inter-alia alleged that the award of compensation in the case of children was on the basis of consensus arrived at between learned counsel for the parties appearing before the Commission. Compensation in the case of children was, on that basis, awarded at the rate of Rs.2,00,000/-, Rs.4,10,000/- and Rs.5,00,000/- in the three age groups of children between one month to ten years, ten to 15 years, and 16 to 22 years, respectively. The respondents argued that since the award of compensation was consensual qua the claims arising out of death of children, neither the petitioner-Association nor the claimants could seek any enhancement of the same.
The respondents further assert that the claim for enhancement in death cases involving housewives was also not justified and that deduction of 1/3rd of the amount in terms of the second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act by application of a suitable multiplier was legally correct. It is also alleged that compensation awarded was excessive. The decision in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) is even Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 37 otherwise not applicable as the same is, according to the respondents, based on a concession made before the Apex Court. It is also contended that the One Man Commission could award compensation taking the income of housewives to be Rs.15,000/- per annum keeping in view the second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and not on the assumption that the income of the deceased housewives was Rs.3,000/- per month.
The claim for enhancement made in the case of working men, killed in the incident, has also been disputed by the respondents as the amount already awarded is, according to them, just and reasonable having regard to the evidence adduced on behalf of the claimants. The claim regarding future prospects is disputed by the respondents on the ground that there was no evidence to support any such claim. In the claims arising out of injury cases, the respondents have questioned the award of compensation by the Commission on the ground that the same is highly excessive and unsustainable. It is alleged that the question of taking future prospects into consideration in cases where the compensation is awarded on the basis of multiplier method does not arise.
Objections to the Commission's report have been filed even by the Haryana Electricity Board, now known as Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited. It is inter-alia alleged that the incident in question had occurred during a period when there was a regular power cut from 11.20 A.M. To 12.20 P.M. and that the power supply by the Board was in no way responsible for the unfortunate incident. The findings recorded by the Commission suggesting negligence on the part of the officers of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 38 the Board have also been assailed by the Nigam.
The Municipal Committee, Dabwali, has also similarly filed objections and assailed the findings recorded by the commission that the Committee and its employees were also to an extent responsible for the occurrence leading to a large scale human tragedy, hence liable to pay compensation to the claimants.
State of Haryana has not filed any objections to the findings recorded by the Commission. Objections, however, have been filed to the prayer for enhancement of compensation made by the petitioner and the claimants in which it is alleged that the prayer for enhancement is not justified as the Commission has determined the amount of compensation payable to the victims in a fair and reasonable manner.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length. We have also been taken through the material on record including the depositions recorded before the Commission. The following questions, in our opinion, fall for determination:
1) Whether the findings of fact recorded by the One Man Commission of Inquiry regarding the genesis of the fire incident and the concomitant negligence leading to 446 deaths and injuries to 200 suffer from any error of law or perversity to warrant interference from this Court?
2) If answer to Question No.1 above is in the negative, was the Commission of Inquiry legally correct in holding that respondent No.9-Rajiv Marriage Palace was an Agent of the D.A.V. School and Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 39 Management Committee, respondents No.4 and 5, so as to render the later vicariously liable for the acts of negligence committed by the former?
3) Is the apportionment of the responsibility and negligence for the fire tragedy in question and the liability flowing from the same fair and reasonable having regard to the acts of omission and commission and the role played by each one of those held responsible for the incident?
4) Are the claimants entitled to seek enhancement in the payment of compensation in the light of the consensus allegedly arrived at before the One Man Commission?
5) In case, answer to question No.3 is in the affirmative, what is the extent of enhancement to which the petitioner and claimants are entitled in each category and/or claim petition filed by them before the Commission and on what basis?
6) To what other reliefs are the claimants entitled?
We shall deal with the above questions ad seriatim. Re: Question No.1 Before we examine whether the findings of fact recorded by the Commission suffer from any error or perversity, we may briefly discuss the legal purport of what in law constitutes negligence in the realm of actionable tort. The term negligence has not been given a statutory definition. Black's Law Dictionary, however, describes Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 40 negligence to mean:-
"The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others' rights".
Judicial pronouncements have similarly described negligence to mean the breach of a duty caused by the omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of a person would do or not do. One of the earliest pronouncements as to the meaning of negligence came from the House of Lords in Donoghue Vs. Stevenson (1932) AC 562 (HL) where Lord MACMILLAN summed up the legal purport of negligence in the following words:-
"The law takes no cognizance of carelessness in the abstract. It concerns itself with carelessness only where there is a duty to take care and where failure in that duty has caused damage. In such circumstances carelessness assumes the legal quality of negligence and entails the consequences in law of negligence.
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX The cardinal principle of liability is that the party complained of should owe to the party Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 41 complaining a duty to take care, and that the party complaining should be able to prove that he has suffered damage in consequence of a breach of that duty''.
Lord ATKIN who delivered a separate opinion in the above case summarized the legal approach to be adopted in the case of negligence thus:-
"You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omission which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be , persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplations as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.'' The above view was affirmed by the House of Lords in Home Office Vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Limited (1970) 2 All England Reports 294 (HL). Later decisions that were delivered by English Courts and the Courts in this Country limit the "proximity principle" to persons to whom the defendant owes a duty referred to by Lord ATKIN as neighbours. At the bottom of the principle of proximity, thus, lies a relationship the nature whereof makes it reasonable to impose a liability in negligence. The relationship ought to be such as would in justice and fairness make it reasonable for the defendant to keep the plaintiff in contemplation while doing the act giving rise to the claim. The Principle of Proximity Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 42 does not have anything to do with physical proximity, as for instance in Donoghue's case (supra) the manufacturer had no proximity with the consumer of the product and yet it was held that the manufacturer owed a duty to the consumer.
Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (The Common Law Library No.3) (16th Edition) London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1989 while dealing with "Duty of Care Situation" states that no action lies in negligence unless there is damage. In cases of personal injuries, damage used to be understood to have been inflicted when injury was sustained by the plaintiff. The duty in negligence, therefore, is not simply a duty not to act carelessly, it is a duty not to inflict damage carelessly. Since damage is the gist of the action, what is meant by "duty of care situation" is that it has to be shown that the Courts recognize as actionable the careless infliction of the kind of damage of which the plaintiff complains, on the type of person to which he belongs and by the type of person to which the defendant belongs.
Reference may also be made to a Division Bench decision of High Court of Karnataka in M.N. Rajan and Others v. Konnali Khalid Haji and Another, III (2004) Accident & Compensation Cases 272, in which the Court held that in a case based on tort by negligence, it was imperative for the Court first to determine whether the defendant was under a legal duty to take care and whether there was sufficient reason of proximity between the defendant and plaintiff. In answering that question, the Court has to apply the test of foresight of a reasonable person to examine whether the injury to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the defendant's acts of omission or Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 43 commission. In Southern Portland Cement Limited Vs. Cooper (1974) 1 ALL ER 87, the court declared that in cases of tort by negligence the test applicable is the foresight of a reasonable man and not the hindsight of the Court for it is easy to become wiser after the event.
There is sufficient authority for the proposition that a public school educator's relationship to his/her student is one of those relationships in which one party (the educator) owes a duty to the other party (the student). In the context of "principle of proximity", the Courts have had several occasions to pronounce whether the School owes any duty towards its students in terms of the care that need be taken for their safety. In Virna Mirand et al. v. City of New York and Board of Education of the City of New York 92 Ed. Law Rep. 957, it was held:-
"A teacher owes it to his or her charges to exercise such care of them as a parent of ordinary prudence would observe in comparable circumstances; duty owed derives from simple fact that school, in assuming physical custody and control over students, effectively takes place of parents and guardians".
In M.S. Grewal's case (supra), one of the questions that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the School owed any duty of care towards its students on the principle of proximity of relationship. Answering the question in the affirmative, their Lordships observed:-
"Duty of care varies from situation to situation- Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 44 whereas it would be the duty of the teacher to supervise the children in the playground but the supervision, as the children leave the school, may not be required in the same degree as is in the play field. While it is true that if the students are taken to another school building for participation in certain games, it is sufficient exercise of diligence to know that the premises are otherwise safe and secure but undoubtedly if the students are taken out to playground near a river for fun and swim, the degree of care required stands at a much higher degree and no deviation therefrom can be had on any count whatsoever. Mere satisfaction that the river is otherwise safe for swim by reason of popular sayings will not be a sufficient compliance. As a matter of fact the degree of care required to be taken specially against the minor children stands at a much higher level than adults: children need much stricter care".
In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer and Another, III (2003) Accident & Compensation Cases 551 (SC): 2003 (4) Recent Civil Reports 764, the Supreme Court held:
"Negligence is omission of duty caused either by an omission to do something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations who ordinarily by reason of conduct of human affairs would do or Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 45 obligated to, or by doing something which a prudent or reasonable man would not do. Negligence does not always mean absolute carelessness, but want of such a degree of care as is required in particular circumstances. Negligence is failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of another person, the degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury. The idea of negligence and duty are strictly correlative. Negligence means either subjectively a careless state of mind, or objectively careless conduct. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. No absolute standard can be fixed and no matheatically exact formula can be laid down by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. What constitutes negligence varies under different conditions and in determining whether negligence exists in a particular case, or whether a mere act or course of conduct amounts to negligence, all the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances have to be taken into account. It is absence of care according to circumstances. To determine whether an act would be or would not be negligent, it is relevant to determine if any reasonable man would foresee that Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 46 the act would cause damage or not. The omission to do what the law obligates or even the failure to do anything in a manner, mode or method envisaged by law would equally and per se constitute negligence on the part of such person. If the answer is in the affirmative, it is a negligent act".
Let us now examine in the light of the above principles whether the Commission of Inquiry had correctly held that the School had committed a breach of the duty qua the students, their parents and other invitees to participate in the function. The foremost aspect that would require examination is whether the Commission had properly appreciated the evidence adduced before it and correctly applied the legal tests to which we have referred in the foregoing paragraphs.
Appearing for respondents No.4 and 5, Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, strenuously argued that the One Man Commission had not properly appreciated the evidence before it while recording its findings on the question of the nature and extent of negligence of each one of the respondents, their employees and agents. He made a valiant attempt to persuade us to hold that the findings were unsupported by any material and at any rate a contrary view was equally plausible on a proper re- appraisal of the material assembled before the Commission. He, in particular, laid considerable emphasis on certain aspects which, according to him, established that the School was in no way negligent in the discharge of its duty towards the children, their parents and members of the staff invited to attend the ill fated annual function; that the School premises was not big enough to permit the holding of such a Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 47 function which forced the School Authorities to take a reasonable and prudent decision to shift the function to another place; that Rajiv Marriage Palace was the only public place in Dabwali where the fateful function could be organized by the School; that the Marriage Palace comprised a steel structure used for making a permanent Pandal inside the premises thereby ensuring safety of the premises for any public function conducted in the same; that the wiring and fittings within the Pandal were permanent and had been got done by the Marriage Palace owner through a reputed Electrician; that several functions had already been held in the Marriage Palace over a period of three-four months before the incident; that nearly 1200 people were present at the venue none out of whom could foresee the possibility of fire breaking out and engulfing the entire area; that functionaries of the District Administration like the Deputy Commissioner, Tehsildar and Police Officers were also present at the spot which created a reasonable impression in the mind of everybody that the place was safe and nothing untoward could happen; that although the School had hired the Marriage Palace on payment of a sum of Rs.6,000/-, yet even if the premises had been offered by the Marriage Palace owner free to the School for the sake of commercial publicity, there was an element of quid pro quo in the arrangement which brought about a commercial relationship between the parties distinctly different from the jural relationship of a Principal and Agent. All these circumstances, argued the learned counsel, proved that respondents No.4 and 5 were in no way negligent in the discharge of the duty which they owed towards their invitiees, guests, students and staff attending the function.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 48
Relying heavily upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Manjulaben Jayantilal Nakum and Others (1997) 9 Supreme Court Cases 552, Mr. Atma Ram argued that the fact situation of the instant case did not satisfy the dual test of proximity of relationship between the School and the victims or the foreseeability of the incident in question. The Commission had, therefore, fallen in error in holding the School guilty of tort arising out of negligence.
On behalf of the petitioner/claimants, it was per contra argued that the findings recorded by the One Man Commission were based on a thorough appraisal of the evidence adduced before it and that it had given cogent reasons in support of its findings. There was, according to Mrs. Arora, nothing perverse about the said findings to call for interference of this Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. This Court cannot, it was contended, assume the role of a Court of appeal and sit in judgment over the correctness of the findings of fact recorded by the Commission presided over by none other than a former Judge of this Court.
On behalf of the State of Haryana, it was contended by Mr. H.S. Hooda, learned Advocate General, Haryana, and Mr. Randhir Singh, learned Additional Advocate General, Haryana, that the findings recorded by the One Man Commission regarding negligence on the part of the respondents leading to the fire incident had been accepted by the State of Haryana and that the State had challenged neither the said findings nor the apportionment of the liability arising out of the negligence established against them. Even otherwise, the findings Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 49 recorded by the Commission, argued the learned counsel, were justified on the material placed before it and any attempt by the School to shift its responsibility or accuse the statutory and other public authorities of negligence while underplaying its own fault was unwarranted and indeed unfortunate having regard to the magnitude of the tragedy that occurred only because the School was cutting corners without caring for the safety and security of a very large number of people whom it had invited to a place wholly unsuitable for a function that was to be attended by such a large number of people.
We have given our careful consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties.
Claims arising out of Tort ordinarily go for trial and adjudication before the competent Civil Courts except in cases where statutory fora are created for such adjudication as is the position in claim cases arising before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, or the Railway Claims Tribunal established under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. Even so, the High Courts and indeed the Apex Court exercising writ jurisdiction have, in exceptional circumstances, intervened with a view to providing immediate succour to those affected by tragedies involving heavy loss of human lives. That is precisely what happened in M.S. Grewal's case, in which 14 students studying in fourth, fifth and sixth standards in Dalhousie Public School, Badhani, Pathankot, were drowned in river Beas while out on a picnic. In a writ petition filed before it, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh held the School Management liable to pay compensation at the rate of Rs.5,00,000/- each to the parents of 14 students who died in the incident Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 50 with the interest at the rate of 12% per annum. In an appeal arising out of that decision, the Apex Court noted the shift in the judicial attitude from the old to new concept of providing expeditious relief in cases where the citizens' right to life and/or liberty has been affected. Making a departure from the conservative approach that damages must be left to the Civil Courts to determine, their Lordships observed:
"Currently judicial attitude has taken a shift from the old draconian concept and the traditional jurisprudential system - affectation of the people has been taken note of rather seriously and the judicial concern thus stands on a footing to provide expeditious relief to an individual when needed rather than taking recourse to the old conservative doctrine of civil courts obligation to award damages. As a matter of fact the decision in D.K. Basu, (1997) 1 SCC 416, has not only dealt with the issue in a manner apposite to the social need of the country but the learned Judge with his usual felicity of expression firmly established the current trend of 'justice oriented approach'. Law courts will lose its efficacy if it cannot possibly respond to the need of the society - technicalities there might be many but the justice oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on the basis of such technicality since technicality cannot and ought not to out-weigh the course of justice".Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 51
That is also what happened in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) in which as many as 60 persons including 26 children, 25 women and nine men died in a fire incident in a function held to celebrate the 150th birth anniversary of Sir Jamshedji Tata at Jamshedpur. Lata Wadhwa, who had lost both her children in the said incident, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court alleging inaction on the part of State in initiating proceedings against the officers because of whose negligence the tragedy had taken place. It was in that petition that the Supreme Court requested Mr. Y.V. Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India, to look into the matter and determine the compensation payable to the legal heirs of the deceased as well as compensation payable to the injured. Upon receipt of the report from Justice Chandrachud the Court directed payment of the amount of compensation to those affected by the tragedy.
Even in Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy and Others v. Union of India and Others 104 (2003) Delhi Law Times 234 (DB), the High Court of Delhi was dealing with a case for payment of compensation to victims of what was commonly known as Uphar Fire Tragedy. The determination of the negligence and the apportionment of liability was undertaken on the basis of broad principles applicable in such situations and the reports and material that was placed before the Court. The enquiry into the fire incident was in that case ordered by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and conducted by Mr. Naresh Kumar, Deputy Commissioner (South). It was meant to identify the causes and circumstances leading to the fire and examine whether the Cinema had taken the necessary safety measures. The petitioner Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 52 had, upon conclusion of the said enquiry, filed a writ petition seeking adequate compensation for the victims and punitive damages against the respondents for showing callous disregard towards their obligations to protect the fundamental and indefeasible rights of the citizens under Article 21 of the Constitution by failing to provide a premises that was safe and free from hazards, that could be reasonably foreseen. The approach adopted by the Court in that case if we may say with respect was in consonance with the law declared by the Supreme Court in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. (1997)1 Supreme Court Cases 416 where their Lordships made a distinction between a claim in public law for an unconstitutional deprivation of the fundamental right to life and liberty which proceeds on the doctrine of strict liability and a claim for damages for tortious act of public servants. The Court observed:
"The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizens that they live Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 53 under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen.
The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much, as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim - civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 54 perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family".
Having said that, we need to keep in mind is that the setting up of the One Man Commission of Inquiry for determination of the nature and the extent of negligence of the School or the public functionaries and for award of compensation to the victims does not constitute the Commission as a Civil Court nor does it constitute the High Court under whose order the Commission was set up as an Appellate Forum for the latter to sit in judgment over the findings of fact recorded by the Commission. The choice of the person who was to preside over the Commission was evidently guided by the solitary consideration that he is a trained and vastly experienced judicial mind familiar with the principles of law and procedure that need to be followed for any such determination. The report submitted by a Commission of Inquiry so chosen and appointed shall, therefore, have to be respected unless there is apparent on the face of the record an error of law or perversity of the kind that cannot be countenanced. Suffice it to say that this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by the Commission or undertake an exercise in re-appraisal of evidence and substitute its own finding for that of the Commission simply because a contrary or alternative view seems equally plausible. Keeping the above broad parameters in view, let us briefly refer to the material that was placed before the Commission for its appreciation and findings recorded on the basis thereof, not because we propose to re-appraise the entire Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 55 material adduced before the Commission to record our own findings but only to see whether the findings of fact recorded by the Commission are perverse in that they are unsupported by any evidence whatsoever.
The incident in question took place on 23.12.1995. On the very following day i.e. 24.12.1995, the then Secretary to Government of Haryana directed the Divisional Commissioner, Hisar Division, Hisar to hold a Magisterial enquiry into the facts relating to the fire incident. The first of the enquiries into the incident was, thus, conducted by the Divisional Commissioner, Hisar Division, Hisar, the report whereof was marked before the One Man Commission. In the course of the enquiry, the Divisional Commissioner had examined as many as 40 witnesses including Magistrates, Police Officials, Advocates, Doctors and the owners and employees of Rajiv Marriage Palace. Relations of the deceased persons present on the occurrence, a large number of the injured including Teachers of the D.A.V. Centenary Public School, technical experts of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Madhuban, Haryana State Electricity Board, Public Works Department, Municipal Committee and Chief Electrical Officer, Haryana, were also examined.
On the basis of statements made by the experts and eye witnesses including the police officials and public men, the Divisional Commissioner recorded a clear finding to the effect that the fire incident had not occurred on account of any sabotage or the use of any explosive substance whatsoever, as the physical or chemical clues available from the evidence and the opinion of the experts did not support any such possibility. The Commissioner then examined whether the fire could have been caused by leakage of gas cylinder or bursting of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 56 gas stove or burning of cigarettes etc. and ruled out the same also as a possible cause of the incident. He then turned to the possibility of fire having been caused because of electric wirings on account of the heat generated by the use of focus lights, mingling of supply of two generator sets at a common point and electrocution of the entire area through which PVC tubes covered wires passed in the Pandal and concluded that the available material, both documentary and oral, lent support to the possibility that the fire started from a height of 12 feet on the right side of the main entrance to the Pandal on account of use of crude material in the focus light fixed at that place. The wires passing through the welding machine was found as a second possibility from which the fire could have started. The Divisional Commissioner was also of the view that the fire had started while the two generating sets placed near the Pandal were in operation. The following passage from the report submitted by the Divisional Commissioner is, in this regard, relevant:-
In addition to the fire breaking out from the heating of the focus light which had crude material in it, according to Dr. M.B. Rao, the other possibility of quick burning of whole of the pandal along with factors like false roofing PVC material, the synthetic curtains and the like, could arise from the fact that even while the power of one generating set might have stopped on the breaking out of fire in the focus light, the other generating set was still in operation (as admitted in the statement of Rajinder Kumar) and thus heating caused by the live wires multiplied Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 57 with the burning of PVC covering with the outbreak of fire from one side which spread through the synthetic material available in the roof, and all this could have accelerated the speed of fire as witnessed by all".
The Divisional Commissioner also recorded the finding that the owners of the Marriage Palace had illegally taken a three-phase connection from the Electricity Board and the officers of the Board had made no effort to issue and recover any bill from the owners in regard to the three phase connection granted to them. The Commissioner also found fault with the construction of an unauthorized building in violation of the building plans sanctioned by the Municipal Committee and the casual manner in which the plans were sanctioned. He also found fault with the loose terminals of the wires drawn from the three phase meter which, according to him, showed the real motive behind the criminal intention of the owners of the Marriage Palace. Strictest criminal action against the owners and disciplinary proceedings against the employees was, therefore, recommended.
The enquiry by the Divisional Commissioner was followed by a charge sheet presented against the owners of the Marriage Palace by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The investigation conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation established that Rajiv Marriage Palace at Mandi, Dabwali was a partnership firm comprising three real brothers, named Kewal Krishan Dhameeja, Om Parkash Dhameeja and Chander Bhan Dhameeja. The place was named after Rajiv Dhameeja, eldest son of Kewal Krishan Dhameeja. A rectangular Pandal was constructed Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 58 in the Rajiv Marriage Palace covering an area measuring 100' X 90'. The Pandal comprising steel super structure of GI Sheets on the top and partially covered on the three sides with a false ceiling supported with bamboo sticks. The lowest false ceiling wall inside the Pandal was at a height of 12 feet from the ground. The entire ceiling was made of cotton clothes in colourful designs and in chunri style. All the three sides of the Pandal were covered with thick cotton curtains tightly fitted with the bamboo support from the ground level to the height of first ceiling. The upper portions of the three sides of the Pandal were covered with PV Sheets. The front portion of the Pandal was covered with PV Sheets from inside upto the height of 12 feet. Thick cotton curtains on both sides of the gate were also fixed right from the ground level upto the height of 12 feet leaving a vacant space of 12' X 12' as entrance/exit gate. Both inner and upper curtains in the front portion were tightly tied with bamboos placed in between the angle frames and steel poles. The curtains of D-China cloth were fixed in hanging order on both sides of the entrance/exit gate of the Pandal. The lighting arrangements in the Pandal were described in the charge sheet submitted by the Central Bureau of Investigation in the following words:
"The pandal was provided with 12 electrical circuits through the switch board installed in the switch room towards eastern side of the pandal. There were 25 jhumar lights with electric bulbs of 100 watts each hanging from the false ceiling of the pandal. Beside, two halogen lights over the stage and other two halogen lights near the entry/exit gate of the pandal Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 59 were also fixed. Due to frequent power tripping in Dabwali, the owners of the Rajiv Marriage Palace (Pandal) had arranged two generator sets to ensure uninterrupted power supply at the function on 23.12.1995 in the Pandal. The switch board fitted in the switch room of the premises had been provided with the arrangements of power supply from HSEB as well as from the generators.
In addition, the lighting arrangements inside the pandal also include an arc light in crude form fitted with two carbon electrodes and a reflector fitted above the first ceiling near the central portion of entrance gate facing the dias. Accused Rajender Kumar and Devi Lal of M/s Chacha Bhatija Light Service were deployed for manning the electrical arrangements, operating generators etc. on the day of function i.e. on 23.12.1995. Besides, a number of temporary/loose connections were also provided in the pandal on the date of function by Rajendra Kumar and Devi Lal by tampering with the electrical fittings inside the pandal".
The Charge sheet also referred to the seating arrangements inside the Pandal and suggested that as many as 725 chairs made of plastic were laid out on both sides of the central passage. The first three rows from the stage had blocked the central passage. In the front row there were sofa sets with extra chairs on both sides for VIPS and Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 60 special guests. There was a narrow passage in the southern, eastern and western side of the Pandal. The placement of chairs was at the end of the Pandal from the entrance, in diagonal shape because of provision of counter for serving tea and cold drinks to the invitees.
The Charge sheet further indicated that the organizers of the D.A.V. Public School, Dabwali, had hired Rajiv Marriage Palace for holding its annual function for a sum of Rs.6,000/- only. A huge crowd of around 1000 invitees including children and parents had gathered at the venue. The function started around 1200 hours on 23.12.1995 in which Mr. M.P.Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa, was the Chief Guest. While the function was going on, around 1.45 to 1.50 P.M., a fire was noticed at the entrance/exit gate. The fire spread so fast that it engulfed the whole Pandal within no time. Consequently, more than 441 persons majority of which were innocent children died due to burn injuries. Besides more than 145 persons sustained burn injuries. Among the dead were, Mr.Som Nath Kamboj, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dabwali, daughter of Mr. Anil Yadav, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Dabwali, and Mrs.Priti Kamra, Principal of D.A.V. School. The charge sheet placed reliance upon the report submitted by the Forensic Experts from Forensic Science Laboratory Madhuban, Haryana, the relevant portion dealing with the cause of incident may be extracted at this stage:-
"In the middle portion leading to stage a focus light connected by copper wire was connected temporarily by the two terminals of a welding machine. The welding machine in turn was connected to the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 61 mains through switch change over box. In one of the terminals of the welding machine, the copper wires were found melted leading to bead formation. This clearly indicates that there was high voltage due to which there could have been heavy sparking at the loose terminals. Because of this even the two fuse grips through which the focus light has been connected also had blackening resulting in the burning of copper wire. In the focus light two carbon electrodes are placed at a distance to produce spark which is transmitted on to reflector to give bright light. This process produces tremendous amount of heat which has burnt the bamboo poles as well as decorative cloth which was synthetic. The synthetic cloth caught fire instantaneously and fell down as fused mass with flames. The remaining plastic sheets and synthetic cloth caught fire and engulfed the entire area leading to death of several people".
The Charge sheet also relied upon the report submitted by Mr. V.B. Gupta, Superintending Engineer, North Regional Electricity Board, New Delhi, in which the cause of fire was summed up as under:-
"Based on the results of experiments conducted at site and discussions the most probable cause of fire appears to be the flash/spark created at the T-Joint above the main entrance to the pandal where a large number of loose electrical connections were Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 62 made by the electrical operators for fitting the lighting equipments. The T-Joint was very close almost touching the curtains spread horizontally at 12' height above the main entrance. The spark from this T-Joint could have caused the fire in the curtain clothes. Once the cloth caught fire, the fire spread all around within few minutes bringing the whole of pandal into burning simultaneously".
Relying upon the opinions given by the Central Forensic Science Laboratory Experts in the field of Ballistics, Physics and Chemistry the Central Bureau of Investigation concluded that the incident was not caused by any sabotage as no explosive substance had been detected in the residue. The fire, according to the Central Bureau of Investigation, was caused due to short circuiting. The charge sheet also concluded that Kewal Krishan Dhameeja and Chander Bhan Dhameeja, partners of M/s Rajiv Marriage Palace, were personally supervising the arrangements at the venue including the electrical fittings etc. and that the accused/owners had hurriedly provided several temporary electric connections in the Pandal employing untrained and unqualified Electricians in total disregard of the safety of human lives. The charge sheet stated:-
"During the course of investigation, it has been established that accused Kewal Krishan Dhameeja and Chander Bhan Dhameeja, Partners of M/s Rajiv Marriage Palace, were personally supervising the arrangements at the site of the function which Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 63 included electrical fittings etc. The electrical fittings etc. were made by accused Rajendra Kumar and Devi Lal who had no training. Accused Rajendra Kumar and Devi Lal also provided several temporary electrical connections at the Pandal. Temporary electrical connections were also provided by them for the arc light and also for the Halwai's Oven. These connections were made by these untrained and unqualified accused persons in a haste and hurry in total disregard to the safety of the human lives. Investigation has established that accused 'Kewal Krishan Dhameeja and Chanderbhan Dhameeja, apart from personally supervising these operations had taken the electrical connection in the Pandal in an illegal and unauthorised manner and, therefore, they are also liable to be prosecuted for their acts of omission and commission which resulted in loss of 441 lives and injuries to 145 others".
The Commission of Inquiry has referred to and partly relied upon the enquiry report submitted by the Divisional Commissioner and the conclusions drawn by the Central Bureau of investigation in its charge sheet. But apart from what was gathered by the Divisional Commissioner and the Central Bureau of Investigation in their respective enquiries/investigations, the One Man Commission had before it, the depositions of a very large number of witnesses examined in the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 64 course of enquiry proceedings. The Commission, among others, relied upon the statement of Vinod Bansal, one of the claimants, according to whom, the banquet hall had around 500 to 600 chairs for guests and visitors but about 1500 persons including men, women and children had gathered at the venue on the fateful day. The witness further stated that since the number of visitors was more than the capacity of the Marriage Palace and the Pandal, the main gate was closed from inside. The witness further stated that Pandal was made of curtains, synthetic cloth, polythene sheets and coconut ropes used for tying the curtains with bamboo sticks. The electrical fittings were all temporary and the joints of electrical wires were loose and naked. There were inside the Pandal nearly 15/16 Chandeliers fixed to the ceiling besides a large number of other lights. The witness goes on to state that the fire broke out at about 1.45 PM but an announcement was made from the stage that the fire had been brought under control and the visitors should remain calm, quiet and sitting. The fire all the same spread all around and could not be controlled and engulfed the entire Pandal within no time. According to the witness, the fire had broken out on account of short circuit of the electricity. Neither the District Administration nor the D.A.V. Management nor the Municipal Committee, the Electricity Board or the Management of Rajiv Marriage Palace had made any arrangement for fire fighting in the event of an emergency.
The witness further stated that as many as 442 persons had died and 200 persons suffered injuries on account of fire including the witness himself. That his wife and two children died in the incident. He also referred to the small exit gate in the dark room behind the stage out Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 65 of which Mr. M.P. Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, had made good his escape immediately on seeing the fire. The S.D.O. (Civil) and his wife had, however, died in the incident.
In the cross-examination, the witness inter-alia stated that the size of the Pandal was about 50' X 70', whereas the height of Pandal was nearly 15/16 feet. All the chairs in the Pandal were occupied by the visitors and the persons who could not get chairs were standing on all the three sides of the Pandal. The size of the banquet hall was 100' X 70' and there were walls all around the banquet hall with one gate about 10/11 feet wide for entrance to the banquet hall. There was another small gate with the size of 2 feet behind the stage. The witness further stated that there was only one gate to the Pandal whereas all the sides had been covered by curtains tied with bamboo and coir ropes. The bamboos were fixed at a distance of half a foot of each other. The fire started from the exit gate of the Pandal from where he was standing at a distance of 15/20 feet. He further stated that if there was no Pandal, the total capacity of banquet hall would have been around 1000 persons.
The Commission has similarly relied upon the statements of Satpal Chawla, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Dabwali, examined to prove the site plan and the documents pertaining to the Municipal Committee. So also the statement of M.R. Sachdeva, Assistant Engineer of the Haryana State Electricity Board has been relied upon to prove grant of electric connection to the Marriage Palace. The witness has stated that a three phase commercial supply connection had also been granted to the Marriage Palace owners with a sanctioned load of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 66 5.980 KW. Details of the consumption with regard to single phase electric connection were also given by the witness. The witness also tried to suggest that the incident took place at 13.45 P.M. during which time there was a power cut for about five minutes i.e. from 13.40 P.M. to 13.45 P.M. on account of some technical fault.
The Commission has similarly taken note of the depositions of Subhash Chander, Assistant in the office of the Financial Commissioner and Principle Secretary to Government Haryana, Ram Parkash, Superintendent in the office of Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa, Bahadur Singh, Deputy Superintendent in the office of the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil), Dabwali, examined by the claimants in support of their cases apart from proving a very large number of documents relevant for the issues that fell for consideration. Also noticed by the Commission are the documents that were proved in the course of the enquiry and relied upon by the Commission for recording its findings.
The Commission has also taken note of the depositions of the witnesses examined by the respondents. These include Norang Dass, Tehsildar, Dabwali, Om Parkash, Superintendent in the office of Civil Surgeon, Sirsa, and Subhash Chander, Assistant in the office of Financial Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government of Haryana, examined on behalf of respondents No.1 to 3. Out of these witnesses, Subhash Chander, Assistant in the office of Financial Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government of Haryana, produced before the Commission statements of 39 witnesses who were examined by Mr. K.C. Sharma, Divisional Commissioner, Hisar Division, Hisar, the then Commission of Inquiry.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 67
The statements of Chander Parkash Jain, Assistant, New India Assurance Company Limited, Lachhman Dass, Private Architect, Mrs. Neelam Wadhwa, Teacher of D.A.V. School, Mandi Dabwali, Jagdish Deol, Upper Division Clerk, D.A.V. Managing Committee, Chitragupta Road, New Delhi and V.K.Mittal, Principal of D.A.V. School, Mandi Dabwali, examined by respondents No.4 and 5, have also been noticed and discussed at great length by the Commission.
While discussing the statement of V.K. Mittal, Principal of D.A.V. Centenary Public School, Mandi Dabwali, the Commission has noticed that no receipt regarding payment of Rs.6,000/- to the Marriage Palace owners had been produced by the witness or any other official of the School nor was there any recital anywhere in the written statement about the alleged payment of Rs.6,000/- as hire charges to the owners of the Marriage Palace. The Commission has observed:-
"From the evidence of this witness, it is made out that although there is no recital in the written statement about the alleged settlement or payment of Rs.6000/- as hire charges to the owners of the Rajiv Marriage Palace but he has introduced the payment of Rs.6000/- to them by the School Authorities although he could not produce any such receipt and has stated that there is no such receipt in the School record as it was sent to the Head Office. Shri Jagdish Deol RW6/1-DFT is an Upper Division Clerk in the Head Office of the D.A.V. College Managing Committee. He has nowhere Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 68 stated about any such alleged receipt of Rs.6000/- having been sent by the D.A.V. School, Mandi Dabwali, to the Head Office nor has he produced any such receipt. It appears that this witness has introduced the factum of the alleged receipt on his own and the same does not find support from any documentary evidence. This witness has also introduced that the hiring charges of Rs.6000/- also included charges for making sitting arrangements, electricity, water, security, eatables and tent etc. but then he has added that there was an oral agreement in this respect and there was no written agreement".
The Commission has also noted and discussed the deposition or R.K. Sodha, Executive Engineer of the Electricity Board examined as RW9/1-DFT by respondent No. 6 and the documents marked in his deposition. The Commission has, upon a careful analysis of the deposition, observed that the witness was not able to satisfactorily explain the over-writing made in the log sheet in support of the case sought to be set up that the electric supply had tripped during the period the incident took place. The Commission observed:-
"The over-writing over the digits 42 into digits 50 to give the time as 13.50 PM has not only been admitted by this witness but it is also clear on the Log sheet even to the naked eye. This assumes significance in view of the fact that the fire broke out at 13.45 PM., and the plea of the Board is that there Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 69 was no electric supply at that time. But then in case the electric supply was restored at 13.42 PM., the plea of the Board pales into insignificance. However, in case the supply was not restored at 13.42 PM., what necessitated the Board officials to manipulate the entry of the time 13.42 PM by over-writing the digits 42 and making it into 50. This was done in order perhaps to give the impression to the Enquiry Officers concerned and the public at large that there was no electric supply at 13.45 PM. when the fire broke out. But in their over enthusiasm and anxiety to do so, they forgot that the digits 50 which they were manipulating by over-writing on the digits 42 may be detected at sometime and the factum of the electric supply having been restored at 13.42 PM. may be established".
The oral and documentary evidence adduced by the Municipal Committee, Dabwali, has been similarly examined by the Commission and the depositions of Ramesh Chander Kamboj, Assistant Engineer of the Improvement Trust, Mandi Dabwali, Balwant Singh, Assistant Fire Officer, Mandi Dabwali and Satpal Chawla, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Mandi Dabwali, discussed. The Commission has, on a careful analysis of their depositions, recorded a specific finding that Kartar Singh Chawla, Fire Station Officer, Mandi Dabwali, was absent from duty on 23.12.1995 when the occurrence took place. Although, attendance register produced showed him to be present the entry was Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 70 belied by the statement of his own Assistant Fire Officer Balwant Singh. The evidence adduced by Mr. M.P. Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa, comprising eight witnesses besides himself has also been discussed and evaluated by the Commission apart from four witnesses examined by Rajiv Marriage Palace in support of its defence.
On a careful and thorough appraisal of the evidence referred to above the Commission held that D.A.V. School Authorities held its Annual Prize Distribution Function at Rajiv Marriage Palace on 23.12.1995; that invitation Card marked P74/248-DFT was jointly issued by the Management, Staff and Students of D.A.V. Centenary Public School which is under the direct control of D.A.V. Managing Committee, New Delhi; that the invitation card so far as the same pertains to D.A.V. Centenary Public School was issued through its Principal Mrs. Naresh Kamra. In so far as D.A.V. Managing Committee, New Delhi was concerned, the same was issued by its Regional Director Mr. S.P. Rajput. The card was, thus, a joint invitation card issued by both the respondents; that D.A.V. Centenary Public School, Mandi Dabwali, was under the overall control of the Managing Committee, respondent No.4, and its affairs are run as per the directions of the said respondent including recruitment of the staff as well as the grant of funds etc.; that the venue of ill-fated function was Rajiv Marriage Palace, Mandi Dabwali, with Mr. M.P. Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, as the Chief Guest; that the function was an open public function and persons other than invitees could also attend the same; that the School had collected annual insurance premium from the students along with the annual fee; that respondents No.4 and 5 had nowhere claimed in the written Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 71 statement that the Marriage Palace was hired for the day for a sum of Rs.6,000/-; that even payment of Rs.6,000/- towards the hiring charges of the venue was not proved to have been made; that there was only one gate for entrance and exit to Rajiv Marriage Palace and the width of the gate was no more than 10' X 12'; that there was only one gate for entry and exit to the Pandal; that there were nearly 700 to 800 chairs placed inside the Pandal and the central passage inside the Pandal was blocked by the front rows of chairs and sofas; that no safety measures were taken by the School to prevent any untoward incident like fire or stampede in the course of the function; that when the entire Pandal was engulfed in fire, it was impossible for the children and the ladies to move out of a single exit gate provided for that purpose; that the respondents had not made any alternative arrangement for exit of visitors trapped inside the Pandal in case of emergency; and that no Fire Brigade or Ambulance or any other arrangement with regard to safety and security of the visitors especially ladies and children were made.
The Commission has on the above findings of fact held that the School had failed to exercise due care expected of a reasonable and prudent person in disregard of the safety of those who were invited to attend the function including students, parents and the staff. Relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.S. Grewal's case (supra), the Commission declared that the School was duty bound to take proper care for the safety of the children under its charge, which care the School had failed to take in the instant case. The School was, thus, negligent in the discharge of its legal obligations. The legal injury caused thereby was an actionable tort, observed the Commission. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 72
There is, in our opinion, no infirmity leave alone, any perversity in the findings of fact recorded by the Commission. The material on record was more than sufficient for the Commission to support the findings recorded by it and the legal inferences that inexorably flow from such findings. The very fact that the School did not have enough space in its own premises to organize the Annual Function, did not absolve it of the legal obligation to act prudently and to ensure that the children, staff and the parents invited to such a function are safe wherever the same may be held. That there was no other suitable place in Dabwali where the function could be held also did not mean that the School could hold the function in a Marriage Palace which admittedly had no safety measures whatsoever to take care of any emergency.
The argument that the place chosen by the School was functional and the School had no reason to believe that it would not have sufficient safety measures as required under law has not impressed us. The standard of care that may be required would vary from case to case and situation to situation. In the case of children of tender age, the care that the School Authorities were expected to take regarding their safety was much higher in comparison to the care which may be required qua adults. Children are under a disability. They need care and protection more than the grown ups. Parents who leave their children to the care of the School are entitled to rest assured that the School would act prudently while dealing with their wards and would do nothing that may in the slightest expose them to danger or compromise their safety and security. The choice of the venue for the function was, therefore, an onerous decision which the School ought to have taken Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 73 having regard to all the attendant risks, hazards and imponderables that could be reasonably foreseen in a public function attended not only by the children, parents and teachers but even the general public. The School ought to have realized that holding of a function in a Marriage Palace may not be the best option especially when the Marriage Palace, did not have the statutory completion certificate and was promoting its commercial interests by offering the place gratis to the School. The School ought to have known that in a function which is open to general public, a Pandal with a capacity of 500 to 600 persons spread over no more than an area measuring 100' X 70', a gathering of 1200 to 1500 persons could result in a stampede and expose to harm everyone participating in the function especially the children who were otherwise incapable of taking care of their safety. The school ought to have known that the availability of only one exit gate from the Marriage Palace and one from the Pandal would prove insufficient in the event of any untoward incident taking place in the course of function. The School ought to have taken care to restrict the number of invitees to what could be reasonably accommodated instead of allowing all and sundry to attend and in the process increase the chances of a stampede. The School ought to have seen that sufficient circulation space in and around the seating area was provided so that the people could quickly move out of the place in case the need so arose. Suffice it to say that a reasonably prudent School Management organizing an annual function could and indeed was duty bound to take care and ensure that no harm came to anyone who attended the function whether as an invitee or otherwise, by taking appropriate steps to provide for safety measures Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 74 like fire fighting arrangements, exit points , space for circulation, crowd control and the like. And that obligation remained unmitigated regardless whether the function was held within the School premises or at another place chosen by the Management of the School, because the children continued to be under the care of the School and so did the obligation of the School to prevent any harm coming to them. The principle of proximity creating an obligation for the School qua its students and invitees to the function would make the School liable for any negligence in either the choice of the venue of the function or the degree of care that ought to have been taken to prevent any harm coming to those who had come to watch and/or participate in the event. Even the test of foreseeability of the harm must be held to have been satisfied from the point of view of an ordinary and reasonably prudent person. That is because a reasonably prudent person could foresee danger to those attending a function in a place big enough to accommodate only 500 to 600 people but stretched beyond its capacity to accommodate double that number. It could also be foreseen that there was hardly any space for circulation within the Pandal. In the event of any mishap, a stampede was inevitable in which women and children who were attending in large number would be worst sufferers as indeed they turned out to be. Loose electric connections, crude lighting arrangements and an electric load heavier than what the entire system was geared to take was a recipe for a human tragedy to occur. Absence of any fire extinguishing arrangements within the Pandal and a single exit from the Pandal hardly enough for the people to run out in the event of fire could have put any prudent person handling such an event Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 75 to serious thought about the safety of those attending the function especially the small children who had been brought to the venue in large numbers. Applying the foresight of a reasonable person to the fact situation which the evidence established before the Commission, we have no hesitation in holding that the Commission was justified in declaring that the School was negligent in the matter of arranging the function and providing security qua those whom it owed the duty to take care.
The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Manjulaben Jayantilal Nakum and Others (1997) 9 Supreme Court Cases 552 heavy reliance upon which was placed by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior counsel for the School, does not, in our opinion, lend any assistance to the School or its Management. On a comprehensive review of the case law on the subject, the Court in that case observed:-
"The degree of carelessness in breach of duty would, therefore, vary from case to case and it should not unduly be extended or confined or limited or circumscribed to all situations. The attending circumstances require evaluation and application to a given set of facts in the case on hand".
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XX "The negligence lies in failure to take such steps as a reasonable, prudent man would have taken in the given circumstances. What constitutes carelessness is the conduct and not the result of inadvertence. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 76 Thus, negligence in this sense is a ground for liability in tort".
What is noteworthy is that the Court was, in that case, dealing with a claim arising out of the sudden fall of a tree causing death of a road user. The question was whether there was proximity of relationship between the parties, and foreseeability of danger and duty of care to be performed by the defendant to avoid the accident or to prevent danger to the person of the deceased. The Court answered all the three in negative and held that there was no proximity of relationship between the Corporation and a road user nor any foreseeability of danger where a healthy tree suddenly falls and injures a road user. Consequently, there was no failure to take care. The Court observed:
"If the duty of maintaining constant vigil or verifying or testing the healthy condition of trees at public places with so many other functions to be performed, is cast on it, the effect would be that the authority would omit to perform statutory duty. Duty of care, therefore, must be carefully examined and the foreseeability of damage or danger to the person or property must be corelated to the public duty of care to infer that the omission/non-feasance gives rise to actionable claim for damages against the defendant".
In the light of what we have stated above, we have no hesitation in answering question No.1 in the negative. Re: Question No.2 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 77 The Commission of Inquiry has recorded a clear finding that the School had failed to adduce any evidence to establish that Rajiv Marriage Palace was hired for use on payment of a sum of Rs.6,000/- as alleged by the School. It noted the denial of that allegation by one of the owners of the Marriage Palace, according to whom use of Marriage Palace was given gratis to gain commercial publicity for the place. The Commission has held that regardless whether the place had been hired for consideration or had been taken for use gratis, the Marriage Palace was, for purposes of the function organized by the School, its agent. The Commission has, relying upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi's case (supra), Minu B. Mehta's case (supra), and M.S. Grewal's case (supra) and a few English decisions, taken the view that the Principal is vicariously liable for the acts of his Agent performed during the course of the agency. The Commission observed that the vicarious liability of the Master does not depend upon whether the act is lawful or unlawful and that the Principal would be liable for the acts of his Agent committed in the course of the contract even though the Agent may have acted in contravention of some of the provisions of the statute or the rules thereunder.
Finding fault with the conclusion arrived at by the Commission, Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior counsel appearing for respondents No.4 and 5, strenuously argued that the School had only a commercial relation with the Marriage Palace and that the commission was in error in holding that the relationship of Master and Servant or Principal and Agent came about between the two. It was argued by Mr. Atma Ram that the School was like any other person in that position to be taken as Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 78 a client/customer of the Marriage Palace who was for all intents and purposes an independent Contractor engaged to render services in connection with the function in question. In the event of any mishap taking place in the course of function resulting in any damage or loss of lives, the School was in no way responsible for any such negligence. It was contended that the School had no reason to believe that the Marriage Palace was unauthorizedly built, did not have a completion certificate or that the arrangements made by it whether for lighting or other purposes were unsafe or unsatisfactory thereby jeopardizing the safety and security of the invitees. The School was, according to Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, supremely confident that once the Management of the event was placed in professional hands, the safety and security of the guests/participants would be taken care of by them.
On behalf of petitioner, it was per contra argued that the School had shifted the function from out of its premises for want of sufficient space and that according to the evidence on record all arrangements including the arrangements for fixing of chairs, lighting, standby generators, safety and security were that of the organizers of the function. The school was the sole organizer of the function who had cut corners to save expense and arranged an unsatisfactory and wholly insecure place for holding the function in total disregard of its legal obligations of taking care especially when children and women formed a major part of the audience qua whom special care had to be taken by the organizers. In the alternative, it was submitted that if the School had entered into any arrangement for holding the function with any other agency like the Marriage Palace on whatever terms that may have been Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 79 settled between the two, it would be liable for the consequences flowing from any act of negligence on its own part as much as it would be liable for the negligence of its Contractor for that function who would, in the eyes of law, be an Agent of the School. The Commission was, therefore, justified in holding the School liable for its own negligence and also the negligence of the Marriage Palace owners.
M/s H.S. Hooda, Advocate General, Haryana and Randhir Singh, Additional Advocate General, Haryana, also supported the same line of reasoning and contended that not only was the School itself negligent but even if it had engaged the services of any agent for holding that function and providing support needed for the same, negligence of any such person brought into the scheme of things had also to be treated as negligence of the School itself in the event of something going wrong. Learned counsel appearing for the Municipal Committee, Dabwali and Electricity Board pursued a similar line of reasoning.
On behalf of the Marriage Palace owners, respondent No.9, it was contended by Mr. Mohunta that the School was the occupier of the premises at the time of the unfortunate incident and since the control over everything relevant to the holding of the function lay in the hands of the School, it could not shift its responsibility to the Marriage Palace. Relying upon certain English decisions, Mr. Mohunta argued that although there was no comparable legislation in this Country to what in United Kingdom is called the Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, the principles underlying the said legislation were well recognized in common law and could be attracted to analogous situations. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 80
The fateful function was organized by the School and the Management at the helm of its affairs. Any such School function, would in the ordinary course, have been conducted within the School premises because it is the School that organizes and controls the function not only as to the content of the programme but also the manner in which the same may be performed and completed. So also the School had the complete freedom not only to decide about the venue for the function but also the manner and the conditions subject to which the same shall be conducted. That the School did not have sufficient space for holding of such a big function was admitted before us. This only meant that the function had to be organized outside the School premises, but the fact remained that the function continued to be a School function regardless of the venue at which it was held. It cannot be disputed that for holding of any such function, the School would have to make necessary arrangements not only for a tent/shamiana and the like but also arrange electricity, refreshment, tea, water etc. The School could make these arrangements of its own or employ an agency for doing so. In the present case, according to the School, it had engaged Rajiv Marriage Palace for providing the necessary support in terms of accommodation etc. required for holding of the function. The School alleges that the Marriage Palace had agreed to do the needful for a consideration of Rs.6,000/- only which fact has been disputed by the Marriage Palace Owners. But even assuming that the arrangements were for a payment, the legal relationship that arose between the School on the one hand and the Marriage Palace Owners on the other hand, was that of a Principal and Agent, the purpose underlying the agency being a Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 81 satisfactory conduct and conclusion of the entire programme. The function was for all intents and purposes a school function, controlled entirely by the School. The kind of sitting arrangement that was required to be made for the guests invited to the function, the kind of lighting arrangement that was required to be made in and around the Pandal, the size of the stage that was required to be prepared for the function and the kind of decoration that was required to be made were all matters that lay entirely in the discretion of the School Authorities. It is common knowledge that not only for marriage ceremonies but also other similar functions where venues are hired, the hiring clients of the premises have a free hand in deciding as to how the available space within the premises can be utilized and what facilities, safeguards, precautions and comforts need to be provided to those attending or invited to the function. The fateful function held on 23.12.1995 was not for that matter different from any other function in which the School remained in complete control of what it wanted to be arranged and the manner in which the same had to be arranged. The participation or presence of the owners of the Marriage Palace only suggests that they were carrying out the instructions given to them by the School Authorities. At any rate even if the School had given a free hand to the Marriage Palace to organize the function, the relationship between the School and the Marriage Palace did not undergo any change and continued to be that of a Principal and Agent.
The legal relationship between the School and the Marriage Palace as Principal and Agent apart, both were on the principles of common law liable to third parties as occupier of the premises which Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 82 went up in flames because of their negligence to take care. In Salmond on the Law of Torts (Tenth Edition), the Law on the point is stated/summarised as below:-
"In dealing with dangerous premises it is necessary to distinguish between the responsibilities of the owner and those of the occupier or possessor. Generally speaking, liability in such cases is based on occupancy or control, not on ownership. The person responsible for the condition of the premises is he who is in actual possession of them for the time being, whether he is the owner or not, for it is he who has the immediate supervision and control and the power of permitting or prohibiting the entry of other persons".
In Wheat v. E. Lacon & Co. (1966)1 All England Reports 582 (HL), Lord Denning declared that anyone exercising sufficient degree of control over the premises would as an occupier be under a duty of care towards those who came lawfully on the premises. The following passage is, in this connection, apposite:
"It was simply a convenient word to denote a person who had a sufficient degree of control over premises to put him under a duty of care towards those who came lawfully on to the premises. In order to be an 'occupier' it is not necessary for a person to have entire control over the premises. He need not have exclusive occupation. Suffice it that he has some Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 83 degree of control. He may share the control with others. Two or more may be occupiers. And whenever this happens, each is under a duty to use care towards persons coming lawfully on to the premises, dependent on his degree of control. If each fails in his duty, each is liable to a visitor who is injured in consequence of his failure but each may have a claim to contribution from the other".
In the instant case while the School had the absolute right to restrict the entry to the venue of the function being organized by it and everything that would make the function go as per its requirements, the owners had not completely given up their control over the premises, and were indeed present at the time the incident occurred. The facts and circumstances brought on record in the course of the enquiry establish that the School and the Marriage Palace owners were both occupying the premises and were, therefore, under an obligation to take care for the safety of not only the students, but everyone who entered the premises on their invitation or with their permission specific or implied. As to the obligation of an occupier to take care qua his invitees a long line of English decisions have settled the legal position. We may, at this stage, briefly refer to some of those decisions:
In Thomson v. Cremin and Others (1953)2 All England Reports 1185, it was observed:
"The duty of the invitor towards the invitee is,in my opinion, a duty personal to the former, in the sense that he does not get rid of the obligation by Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 84 entrusting its performance to independent contractors. It is true that the invitor is not an insurer: he warrants however, that due care and skill to make the premises reasonably safe for the invitee have been exercised, whether by himself, his servants, or agents or by independent contractors whom he employs to perform his duty. He does not fulfill the warranty merely by leaving the work to contractors, however, reputable or generally competent. His warranty is broken if they fail to exercise the proper care and skill. This is only an instance of the general rule which was stated by LORD BLACKBURN in another connection in Dalton v. Angus (6) (6 App. Cas. 829), where he distinguished the case of what has been called the collateral negligence of sub-contractor from their negligence in failing to perform a duty resting on the principal himself".
In Hartwell v. Grayson Rollo and Clover Docks Limited and Others (1947) 1 King's Bench Division 901, similarly it was observed:
"In my opinion the true view is that when a person invites another to a place where they both have business, the invitation creates a duty on the part of the invitor to take reasonable care that the place does not contain or to give warning of hidden Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 85 dangers, no matter whether the place belongs to the invitor or is in his exclusive occupation. Although the rule has generally been stated with reference to owners or occupiers of premises, it is indicated by Lord Wright in the case of Glasgow Corporation v. Muir and others (I) that the occupation need not be exclusive. He said there: "Before dealing with the facts, I may observe that in cases of 'invitation' the duty has most commonly reference to the structural condition of the premises, but it may clearly apply to the use which the occupier (or whoever has control so far as material) of the premises permits a third party to make of the premises". Invitors, of course, do not as a rule invite others on business to premises in which the invitors have no business interest or control, but they may have an interest and control which falls short of exclusive occupation, and where they have such an interest and control and invite others to come to the spot on business they are bound, in my opinion, to warn the invitee against concealed dangers of which they know, or ought to know, even if such dangers are not created by their own positive acts".
In H & N Emanuel Ltd. v. Greater London Council and Another (1971) 2 All England Reports 835, the Court of appeal was dealing with a case where an independent contractor was negligent Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 86 resulting in the escape of fire and damage to the neighbouring building. The Court held the occupier liable and observed:
"An occupier was liable for the escape of fire caused by the negligence not only of his servant, but also of his independent contractor and anyone else who was on his land with his leave and licence; the only occasion when the occupier would not be liable for negligence was when the negligence was the negligence of a stranger, although (per Lord Denning MR) for this purpose a 'stranger' would include a person on the land with the occupier's permission who, in lighting a fire or allowing it to escape, acted contrary to anything which the occupier could anticipate that he would do; in the present case the council were 'occupiers' of the premises because they had a sufficient degree of control over the activities of persons thereon and K's men were not 'strangers' because, although they were forbidden to burn rubbish, it was their regular practice to do so; the council could reasonably have anticipated that the men would light a fire and ought to have taken more effective steps to prevent them".
In the light of the above, we have no hesitation in holding that the One Man Commission of Inquiry was perfectly justified in holding the School and the Marriage Palace liable for the act of tort arising out of their negligence and duty to take care about the safety of all those Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 87 invited to the function at Dabwali. Question No.2 is answered accordingly.
Re: Question No.3 On behalf of School, it was argued by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior counsel, that the Commission of Inquiry had not fairly apportioned the liability among the School and other tort-feasors. It was urged that the Commission was influenced only by the income of the School while fixing its liability at 80% of the total. The economic capacity of the School or the Managing Committee under whose control the School functions was not, according to learned senior counsel, determinative of the extent of the liability that could and ought to be fastened on the School. The liability fixed upon the Municipal Committee and the Electricity Board was unreasonably low even when the Commission has recorded a clear finding that the incident could have been avoided only if the employees of the Municipal Committee and the Electricity Board had performed their duties properly. So also the liability of the State had not been properly fixed having regard to the magnitude of the default on the part of its officers and employees. The present was, according to learned senior counsel, a fit case where the liability could be apportioned afresh having regard to the extent of negligence attributable to each one of the tort-feasors.
On behalf of the State, Municipal Committee, Dabwali, and the Electricity Board, it was argued that the major part of the liability arising out of the tragedy must fall on the School and its Agent, the Marriage Palace, and had been rightly placed by the Commission on them jointly and severally. There was, according to the learned counsel, no Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 88 comparison between an actual tort-feasor and tort-feasor who was being held responsible only because of its omission to take steps which could have prevented the tragedy.
The Commission of Inquiry has, no doubt, fixed the liability of the School at 80% of the total amount payable to the claimants but it is wrong to say that the higher percentage of liability fixed upon the School was only because it was in a position to pay the amount recoverable from it. Apportionment of liability arising out of act of tort would vary from case to case and situation to situation. There is no cut and dried formula that can be applied while fixing liability among several tort-feasors. Broadly speaking, the liability ought to be apportioned depending upon the nature and extent of the role played by the tort- feasor in the commission of the tort and the resultant loss to the claimants. In the opinion of the Commission, the School being the major player in the tort arising out of its negligence ought to shoulder the responsibility to the extent of 80%, while the State, the Municipal Committee and the Electricity Board would take only 10%, 5% and 5%, respectively. That ratio, in our opinion, is open to a slight correction in order to balance the equities and also to make the apportionment as nearly as possible proportionate to the extent of negligence and its effect. In the case of Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy's case (supra), the fire incident had claimed as many as 59 lives and caused injuries to 203 men, women and children who had gone to Uphar Cinema to watch a Hindi Movie. In a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the Association of Victims of the Tragedy, the Court had not only held the owners of the Cinema, Delhi Vidyut Board, Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 89 Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Licensing Authority guilty of negligence but awarded compensation against them to the claimants. The Court had, while fixing the liability to the extent of 55% of the total upon the owners of the Cinema, held Delhi Vidyut Board, the Licensing Authority and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, liable to the extent of 15% each. It is evident from a reading of the decision rendered by the Court that a distinction was made between the tort-feasors inter-se. A heavier liability was fastened on the person whose primary duty it was to take care about the safety of the Cinema goers. In the absence of any reason to the contrary we are inclined to adopt the same approach for apportionment of liability in the present case also. Consequently, while the School and its Agent namely respondent No.9-Rajiv Marriage Palace would be jointly and severally liable to pay 55% of the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants, the remaining tort-feasors, namely the State of Haryana, Haryana State Electricity Board (now named as "Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam) and the Municipal Committee, Dabwali, shall be liable to pay 15% each of the total amount. We make it clear that the State Government shall, as recommended by the Commission of Inquiry, pay the amount on its own behalf and on behalf of respondents Electricity Board and Municipal Committee, Dabwali, in the first instance but shall be free to recover the same from them to the extent of the liability that we have fixed for the said two respondents.
Question No.3 is answered accordingly.
Re: Question No.4 It was contended by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 90 counsel, appearing on behalf of respondents No.4 and 5, that the claimants were not entitled to make any claim for enhancement of amounts of compensation awarded in their favour. He argued that the amounts awarded by the Commission in favour of the claimants were based on a consensus arrived at before the Commission by not only the claimants but by the respondents also, which could not at this stage be displaced by the claimants. He drew our attention in this regard to the following passages appearing in the report submitted by the Commission while dealing with the claims arising out of death of minor children:-
"In fact, the learned counsel for the parties have all unanimously agreed and submitted at the Bar that there is a consensus between them that in view of the overwhelming case law on the subject and the principle laid down in Lata Wadhwa's case, an amount of Rupees two lacs may be held to be 'just' compensation to be paid to the claimants in each of these 76 cases. Accordingly, accepting their submissions and also finding the same to be just and reasonable as also keeping in view the principle laid down in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra), an amount of Rupees two lacs is hereby fixed to be payable by way of compensation to the claimant/claimants in each of these 76 cases".
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XX "In fact, the learned counsel for the parties have all Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 91 unanimously agreed and submitted at the Bar that there is a consensus between them that in view of the overwhelming case law on the subject and the principle laid down in Lata Wadhwa's case, an amount of Rupees 4.10 lacs may be held to be 'just' compensation to be paid to the claimants in each of these 38 cases. Accordingly, accepting their submissions and also finding the same to be just and reasonable as also keeping in view the principle laid down in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra), an amount of Rupees 4.10 lacs is hereby fixed to be payable by way of compensation to the claimant/claimants in each of these 38 cases".
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XX "In fact, the learned counsel for the parties have all unanimously agreed and submitted at the Bar stating that there is a consensus between them that in view of the overwhelming case law on the subject and the principle laid down both in M.S. Grewal's case and Lata Wadhwa's case, an amount of Rupees 5 lacs may be held to be the 'just' compensation to be paid to the heirs of all the 20 deceased children in the age group of 16 to 22 years. Accordingly, accepting their submissions and also finding the same to be just and reasonable, the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 92 amount of Rupees 5 lacs is hereby fixed to be payable by way of compensation to the claimant/claimants in each of these 20 cases".
Per contra, Mrs. Anju Arora, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Association argued that the claimants gave no consent like the one referred to in the report. All that was agreed before the Commission was that the principles of payment of compensation as set out in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) could be adopted while determining the amounts payable to the claimants where children of different age groups had been killed in the tragedy. The question as to what would be the amount of compensation on the said principles was a matter which had to be determined by the Commission and on which the claimants had made no concession. In support of that submission she placed on record affidavits sworn by her and by M/s Harpal Singh, President of Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victim Association, Sukhcharan Singh Sran, Dewan Chand Garg, Ravinder Kumar Tayal, Radhey Shyam Challana, Advocates, who appeared for the claimants before the Commission of Inquiry. All these affidavits emphatically deny making of any statement or concession on behalf of the claimants that a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- towards compensation in each one of the 172 cases arising out of death of children would suffice or was just and fair compensation. It was submitted that the alleged consensus was not evidenced by any statement recorded at any stage of the proceedings nor was the making of any such concession mentioned in the interim orders passed by the Commission. The concession attributed to the petitioners in the final report has, according to learned counsel, come as a surprise to the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 93 petitioner-Association and deserved to be eschewed from consideration.
Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior counsel, argued that in case the parties were to be relieved of the concessions made by them even the respondents ought to have the freedom of arguing that no such concession was made on their behalf either. No affidavit on behalf of the School has, however, been filed either by any School functionary or by the Advocates appearing on its behalf before the Commission repudiating or denying the concession attributed to the School. In the totality of these circumstances, therefore, and in the absence of any material to suggest that a concession was indeed made before the Commission, we are of the opinion that no such concession was made or can stand in their way in praying for a reasonable enhancement in the amount of compensation payable to them. What holds true about the concession attributed to the petitioner-Association must, however, be equally true about the concession attributed to the School also although there is no specific denial on its part. Consequently, all that, the parties shall be deemed to have agreed to, was that the amount of compensation payable to the petitioners shall be determined on the principles stated in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra). As to what amount would become payable on the application of those principles was not, however, covered by any concession and would, therefore, remain open to be determined on a proper appreciation of the matter by this Court.
Question No.4 is accordingly answered in the affirmative. Re:Question No.5 The One Man Commission of Inquiry has dealt with the claims in different categories and awarded compensation accordingly. We also Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 94 propose to similarly deal with the claims by reference to each category of cases.
Category 1 Cases In Category 1 fall cases involving children in the age group of one month to ten years. The Commission has, as noticed earlier, awarded to the parents/next of kin of each child killed in the incident a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- by way of compensation. The Commission has, while doing so, taken support from the decisions of the Supreme Court including those delivered in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) and M.S. Grewal's case (supra). Before us, while the claimants prayed for enhancement of the amounts awarded by the Commission, respondent- School has sought reduction of the amount already awarded. The plea for enhancement was made by the claimants primarily on the basis that the amount of Rs.2,00,000/- awarded on the analogy of Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) ignored the escalation in the price index between 1989 when the incident in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) occurred and 1995 when the incident relevant to these cases took place. In the intervening period, the consumer price index having risen considerably, any amount of compensation based on the decision in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) can be accurate, fair and reasonable only if the amount is proportionately enhanced to take care of the escalation in the price index during the intervening period. Relying upon a Single Bench decision of High Court of Delhi in Ashok Sharma and Others v. Union of India and Others II(2008) Accident and Compensation Cases 644, it was contended that the amount of compensation awarded to claimants Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 95 in Category 1 ought to be raised to Rs.3,57,000/-.
On behalf of respondent-School, it was, on the other hand, contended that the amount of compensation awarded by the Commission for children falling in the age group of one month to ten years was on the higher side and ought to be suitably reduced. In support of that submission, Mr. Rajive Atma Ram placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satender and Others AIR 2007 Supreme Court 324, where the Court had awarded a sum of Rs.1,80,000/- towards compensation for the death of a nine year child killed in a motor accident on 7.5.2002. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram upon the decision of Supreme Court in Kaushlya Devi v. Karan Arora and Others AIR 2007 Supreme Court 1912 where a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was awarded towards compensation for a 14 years old boy killed in a road accident. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Syed Ibrahim and Others AIR 2008 Supreme Court 103 relied upon by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, the amount of compensation awarded was limited to a sum of Rs.51,500/- only for the death of a seven year old child in a road accident that occurred in the year 1994. It was submitted by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram that the amount of Rs.2,00,000/- awarded by the Commission of Inquiry on the analogy of the decision of the Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) was already on the higher side and did not call for any further enhancement.
In State of Haryana and Another v. Jasbir Kaur and Others (2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 484, their Lordships of Supreme Court were dealing with a case involving determination of compensation for Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 96 loss of life. The Court observed that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales and that while compensation need not be a windfall for the victim or the dependents left behind the same cannot be a pittance also. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh various factors in quantifying the amount of compensation which appears to be just. No mathematical precision can, however, be expected in such calculations. Compensation would depend upon the facts and circumstances and special features of each individual case. What is to be remembered is that compensation is just implying thereby that it can neither be whimsical nor arbitrary. It must be equitable, fair and reasonable.
In New India Assurance Co. Ltd.'s case (supra), Arijit Pasayat, J., while dealing with the question of determination of compensation in cases where children are killed, observed:
"There are some aspects of human life which are capable of monetary measurement, but the totality of human life is like the beauty of sunrise or the splendour of the stars, beyond the reach of monetary tape-measure. The determination of damages for loss of human life is an extremely difficult task and it becomes all the more baffling when the deceased is a child and/or a non-earning person. The future of a child is uncertain. Where the deceased was a child, he was earning nothing but had a prospect to earn. The question of assessment of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer. The Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 97 figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents are claimants, relevant factor would be age of parents".
The Court further held that in the case of children of tender age, uncertainties abound making it difficult to quantify the prospects of the future increase in their income or the chances of advancement of their career. Uncertainties in regard to their academic pursuits, achievements in career and advancement in life are so many that nothing can be assumed with reasonable certainty.
Reference may also be made to the decision in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) in which the Supreme Court was dealing with claims arising out of a similar fire incident in which a large number of children had lost their lives. The Commission of Inquiry comprising Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India, had, in that case, awarded a sum of Rs.50,000/- towards compensation for the death of children in the age group of five to ten years. This amount was enhanced by the Supreme Court to Rs.1,50,000/- to which was added a conventional figure of Rs.50,000/- taking the total compensation to Rs.2,00,000/-. While doing so, the Court observed:
"Mr. Nariman, appearing for the TISCO on his own submitted that the compensation determined for the children of all age groups could be doubled, as in his view also, the determination made is grossly inadequate. Loss of a child to the parents is irrecoupable and no amount of money could Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 98 compensate the parents. Having regard to the environment from which these children were brought, their parents being reasonably well placed officials of the Tata Iron and Steel Company and on considering the submission of Mr. Nariman, we would direct that the compensation amount for the children between the age group of 5 and 10 years should be three times. In other words, it should be Rs.1,50,000 to which the conventional figure of Rs.50,000 should be added and thus the total amount in each case would be Rs.2,00,000/-".
It was argued on behalf of School by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram that the enhancement of compensation in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) was based on a concession made before the Apex Court and could not, therefore, be taken as a benchmark for adoption in other cases of similar nature. This may not be wholly correct, inasmuch as a reading of the passage extracted above would show that the concession made before the Court was to the extent of awarding double the amount recommended by the One Man Commission. The Court had, however, awarded three times the said amount taking the compensation from Rs.50,000/- to Rs.1,50,000/-. The conventional amount was also enhanced by the Apex Court from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.50,000/-. In that view, therefore, the decision in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) cannot be said to be based on consent alone.
Even so what would be the reasonable amount of compensation for claimants in Category 1 needs to be examined. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 99 According to the claimants, the amount cannot be less than Rs.3,57,000/- per child killed in the incident. In our opinion, even if the amount of compensation is not calculated with mathematical precision based on the consumer price index as was done in case decided by the Delhi High Court, the fact that there was a considerable time gap between the incident referred to in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) and that with which we are concerned in these cases cannot be overlooked. We are also of the opinion that the amount awarded in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) could only be a guiding factor and not a benchmark for all times to come especially with an ever increasing price index and falling value of the rupee. That apart determination of compensation in cases involving loss of life always involves some amount of guess work and speculation. What is important is that any such guess work is moderate, and tempered by realism, prudence and experience in life. Taking into consideration the totality of these factors we are of the opinion that while the amount of compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- awarded in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) for an incident that took place six years before the incident in question could be enhanced to Rs.2,75,000/-, the conventional figure of Rs.50,000/- awarded in the said case could also be revised to Rs.75,000/- in each one of the cases that fall in Category 1 to serve the ends of justice. The amount awarded by the One Man Commission of Inquiry would accordingly stand enhanced to Rs.3,50,000/- in 172 claim petitions of children in the age group of one month to ten years. The apportionment of the enhanced amount among the claimants shall be in the ratio recommended by the Commission.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 100Category 2 Cases The cases falling in this category comprised claims arising out of death of children in the age group of ten to 15 years. The One Man Commission had, relying upon the decisions referred to above, awarded a sum of Rs.4,10,000/- in each one of these cases. The claimants, however, seek enhancement of the same based on consumer price index to Rs.7,33,684/-.
The Commission has, while awarding the amount mentioned above, taken support from the decision in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) where the Court had awarded a sum of Rs.4,10,000/- for each claimant in said category. The basis of said calculation has been set out in the following passage appearing in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra):
"So far as the children between the age group of 10 and 15 years, they are all students of Class VI to Class X and are children of employees of TISCO.
The TISCO itself has a tradition that every employee can get one of his child employed in the company. Having regard to these facts, in their case, the contribution of Rs.12,000/- per annum appears to us to be on the lower side and in our considered opinion, the annual contribution should be Rs.24,000/- and instead of multiplier of 11, the appropriate multiplier would be 15. Therefore, the compensation, so calculated on the aforesaid basis should be worked out to Rs.3,60,000 to which an additional sum of Rs.50,000 has to be added, thus, Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 101 making the total compensation payable at Rs.4,10,000 for each of the claimants of the aforesaid deceased children".
It is evident from a careful reading of above that their Lordships of Supreme Court had adopted the multiplier method for calculating the amount of compensation payable to the claimants. The Court had taken the contribution of the deceased children as Rs.24,000/- per annum and adopted a multiplier of 15 to work out a sum of Rs.3,60,000/- towards compensation. To that amount is added Rs.50,000/- towards conventional figure, taking the total to Rs.4,10,000/-. What is significant is that one of the factors that the Court considered while awarding the compensation in this category was the fact that the TISCO had a tradition of providing employment to atleast one child of each one of its employees. There is, in the case in hand, no such assured employment to the children of the employees of respondent-School. The process of determination of compensation, therefore, remains a difficult task with all the uncertainties and other imponderables a galore. Even so while the multiplier chosen by the Supreme Court can be adopted for application in the present case also the question is whether the amount of contribution which the Supreme Court had adopted for purposes of calculation can be enhanced and, if so, to what extent.
In Lata Wadhwa's case (supra), the contribution of the victims was on a notional basis taken at Rs.24,000/-. That figure cannot remain static forever. Some escalation is inevitable having regard to all the relevant considerations, especially the time gap between the two Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 102 incidents. In our opinion, an annual increase of Rs.1,000/- in the contribution ought to be reasonable. This would mean that the annual contribution of the victims in this category could be taken at Rs.30,000/-. The amount of compensation would, accordingly, go to Rs.4,50,000/- by applying a multiplier of 15. To that figure should be added Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to take the total to Rs.5,25,000/- in each case falling in this category which amount we hereby award. Category 3 Cases The Commission had, taking support from the decision in M.S. Grewal's case (supra), awarded Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation to elderly children in the age group of 16 to 22 years. The claimants have, before us, claimed a sum of Rs.8,94,736/- in each one of the cases falling in this category. The enhancement of claim rests entirely on the consumer price index escalation during the period of six years that separates the two incidents. On the analogy of what we have said in Category 2 cases, we are inclined to take the contribution of the children falling in this category at Rs.35,000/- and adopt a higher multiplier of 16 for determining the compensation payable in these cases. The total amount payable by that method comes to Rs.5,60,000/- to which we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure taking the total to Rs.6,35,000/-. The award made by the Commission shall, to the above extent, stand modified. The enhanced amount shall also be apportioned among the claimants in the ratio indicated by the Commission. Category 4 cases:-
In this category fall cases of 136 women, who lost their lives in the fire incident. While 93 out of the victims in this category were simple Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 103 housewives, 4 were elderly ladies and 9 others were unmarried working girls. Another 9 were employed in Government service, while 12 were employed in Non-Government service. Remaining 9 were working women doing miscellaneous work. Since each one of these groups would stand on a different footing for purposes of payment of compensation due in their cases, it would be appropriate to deal with them separately, under the following sub-categories:-
i) Housewives;
ii) Elderly ladies;
iii) Unmarried working girls;
iv) Working women in Government service;
v) Working women in Non-Government service; and
vi) Working women (miscellaneous).
i) Housewives
A total of 93 victims fall in this sub-category. The one man Commission has dealt with 85 of these cases by treating their contribution to the family to be Rs.36,000/-, deducted 1/3 out of the same towards personal expenses, applied a multiplier appropriate in each one of the cases and awarded compensation accordingly. What is noteworthy is that the one man Commission has in 8 out of a total of 93 cases awarded a higher amount of compensation in comparison to other similar cases on the premise that the women in these 8 cases held high family status. Their contribution, in terms of services to the family, was on that basis assessed at a higher figure. We have not been able to persuade ourselves to accept that line of reasoning. So long as the deceased victims were housewives, the services rendered by them to the family ought to be assessed on an equal footing common to all. The Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 104 social status of the victim notwithstanding, the value of the services rendered by her may not make any difference vis-a-vis any other housewife, who was less qualified or held a relatively modest position in the social milieu. The proper course, therefore, would be to deal with the claims relating to all 93 housewives on a common basis and to award compensation payable to them depending on the multiplier applicable in each one of these cases.
As noticed in the earlier part of this order the claimants have found fault with not only the deduction made by the Commission but also claimed that a higher multiplicand ought to be chosen having regard to the rise in the consumer price index between the year 1989 and 1995.
Both these submissions have considerable merit in them. In Lata Wadhwa's case (supra), relied upon by the claimants, the contribution which a housewife makes to the family in the nature of services rendered by her was assessed at Rs.36000/- and compensation awarded on that bases by applying a suitable multiplier. No deduction towards the personal expenses was made nor was there any occasion to do so. That is because deduction towards personal expenses would be called for only when the deceased was earning and the Court is examining as to what would eventually accrue to the benefit of the family, out of the said earning. It has no application to a case where the value of the services rendered by the housewife was itself assessed at Rs.36000/- per annum. The Commission was, therefore, in error in deducting 1/3rd of the said amount while determining the amount of compensation payable to the claimants. A Single Bench decision of the High Court of Gujarat has in United India Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 105 Virambhai Ranchhodbhai Patel and others, 2007 (4) RCR (Civil) 436, taken a similar view and observed:-
"6. In Lata Wadhwa V. State of Bihar, 2001(4) RCR (Civil) 673: 2001 ACJ 1735: (AIR 2001 SC 3218), the Apex Court awarded compensation to the family members of the deceased-housewives by assessing the value of their services at Rs.3,000/-
per month, albeit on a concession from the TISCO.
The Tribunal has valued the services rendered by the deceased to the family at only Rs.1500/- per month and with fall in the value of money, such income could certainly be valued at Rs.2250/- per month. In fact, when such services are being valued in terms of money, the question of deducting one-
third amount therefrom may not arise. Hence, even if only Rs.1500/- per month is taken as the value of such services, which were being rendered by the deceased, the same can certainly be adopted as the datum figure for determining the amount of compensation payable under the head".
The second aspect relates to the choice of the multiplicand in as much as according to the claimants the amount of Rs.36000/- was in Lata Wadhawa's case (supra) assessed as the contribution of a housewife in connection with an incident of the year 1989. The incident in the present case had occurred six years later. This time gap ought to be suitably provided for in terms of a suitable increase argued Mrs. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 106 Arora, appearing for the claimants.
That assessment of the contribution made by a housewife in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) must be taken with reference to the incident in that case was not and cannot be disputed. It is not as though regard less of the rise in the consumer price index, inflation and the ever decreasing purchasing power of the rupee, the value of the contribution made by a housewife would forever remain static at Rs.36000/- per annum. The value must of necessity go up with passage of time on the common sense principle that what could be purchased for Rs.36000/- in the year 1989, was no longer purchasable at the same price in the year 1995. As to what ought to be the escalation over the base figure of Rs.36000/- per annum is the real question.
According to the claimants, the inflation corrected value of Rs.36000/- in the year 1989 would rise to Rs.64,424/- in the year 1995. In the case of elderly ladies in the age group of 62 to 72 years the amount of contribution assessed by the apex Court of Rs.20,000/- would rise to Rs.35,789/-. This means a rise of over 75% of the base amount. which in our view may be on the higher side. The rise can in our opinion be on a uniform basis applicable to all the claimants taken at 25% of the base figure which would add to the amount of Rs.36000/- an amount of Rs.9000/- taking the total to 45000/- per annum. In the case of elderly ladies in the age group of 62 years to 72 years the amount of contribution would stand enhanced from Rs.20,000/- to Rs.25000/- per annum. We have already noticed in the beginning of this order that the parties have not assailed before us the choice of the multiplier applied by the Commission in each one of these cases. In the result in the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 107 cases of 93 housewives who died in the fire incident the amount of compensation awarded shall stand enhanced to the extent indicated below. The conventional amount of Rs.50,000/- shall also stand enhanced to Rs.75,000/- as determined by us in category 2 cases above. The final picture that would thus emerge shall be as under:-
Sr. Case Name & Age of Amount Multiplier Value ofRevised Conventional Total No. No. the Deceased awarded by Applied services amount of Figure (InAmount the rendered compensation Rs.) {7+8} Commission to theheld payable (In Rs.) (In Rs.) family (In{Rs.45000/-X Rs.) multiplier applicable} (In Rs.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 65-DFT Mrs. Meera 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000 Kumari 28 years 2 67-DFT Mrs. Rameshwari 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 30years 3 77-DFT Mrs. Amarjit 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Kaur 37 years 4 79-DFT Mrs. Kanta 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 Bathla 43 years 5 82-DFT Mrs. Kaushalya 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Devi 20 years 6 83-DFT Mrs. Narinder 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Kaur 21 years 7 84-DFT Mrs. Rekha 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 Rani 22 years 8 85-DFT Mrs. Vandna 120000 5 45000 225000 75000 300000 Rani 22 years 9 86-DFT Mrs. Jasbir Kaur 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 22 years 10 87-DFT Mrs. Saroj Devi 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 25 years 11 89-DFT Mrs. Dimple 24 120000 5 45000 225000 75000 300000 years 12 90-DFT Mrs. Mishu Bala 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 24 years 13 91-DFT Mrs. Lata Rani 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 30 years 14 92-DFT Mrs. Neelam 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Rani 25 years 15 93-DFT Mrs. Kailash 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Rani 26 years 16 94-DFT Mrs. Champa 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Rani 33 years 17 95-DFT Mrs. Madhu 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Rani 26 years Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 108 18 96-DFT Mrs. Vanita alias 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 Pooja Rani 27 years 19 97-DFT Mrs. Harinder 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 Kaur 27 years 20 98-DFT Mrs. Madhu 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 Bala alias Neena 27 years 21 99-DFT Mrs. Paramjit 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 Kaur 27 years 22 100-DFT Mrs. Sunita Rani 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 27 years 23 101-DFT Mrs. Seema 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Rani 27 years 24 102-DFT Mrs. Surinder 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 Kaur 28 years 25 103-DFT Mrs. Raj Rani 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 28 years 26 104-DFT Mrs. Anjna 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Kumari 28 years 27 105-DFT Mrs. Sushma 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Chugh 28 years 28 106-DFT Mrs. Sunita 25 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 years 29 107-DFT Mrs. Shalu 19 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 years 30 108-DFT Mrs. Harinder 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 Kaur 27 years 31 110-DFT Mrs. Saroj Rani 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 29 years 32 111-DFT Mrs. Suman 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Jain 30 years 33 112-DFT Mrs. Santosh 38400 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Kumari 30 years 34 113-DFT Mrs. Usha Rani 36000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 30 years 35 114-DFT Mrs. Shashi 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 Bala 30 years 36 115-DFT Mrs. Rajinder 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Kaur 30 years 37 116-DFT Mrs. Anita Rani 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 30 years 38 117-DFT Mrs. Kiran 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 Gupta 30 years 39 118-DFT Mrs. Kulvinder 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Kaur 30 years 40 119-DFT Mrs. Neelam 31 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 years 41 120-DFT Mrs. Neelam 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 Rani 30 years 42 121-DFT Mrs. Nirmla 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Devi 31 years 43 122-DFT Mrs. Suman 31 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 years Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 109 44 123-DFT Mrs. Nina 31 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 years 45 125-DFT Mrs. Satbir Kaur 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 31 years 46 128-DFT Mrs. Sunita Rani 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 32 years 47 129-DFT Mrs. Sarita Rani 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 alias Prem lata 32 years 48 130-DFT Mrs. Jaswinder 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Kaur 32 years 49 132-DFT Mrs. Bhupinder 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 Kaur 33 years 50 133-DFT Mrs. Sangeeta 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Bhateja 33 years 51 134-DFT Mrs. Veena 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000 Kumari 32 years 52 136-DFT Mrs. Arun Bala 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 34 years 53 137-DFT Mrs. Shardha 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Rani, 33 years 54 139-DFT Mrs. Ranjit Kaur 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000 35 years 55 140-DFT Mrs. Basant 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Kaur alias Sant Kaur 35 years 56 141-DFT Mrs. Krishna 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Devi 35 years 57 142-DFT Mrs. Anita alias 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 Krishna 35 years 58 144-DFT Mrs. Amarjeet 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Kaur 38 years 59 145-DFT Mrs. Sudarshan 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 alias Sukhdarshan 36 years 60 146-DFT Mrs. Charanjit 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Kaur 37 years 61 148-DFT Mrs. Harbans 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Kaur 38 years 62 149-DFT Mrs. Manju 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Grover 37 years 63 150-DFT Mrs. Neeta 40 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 years 64 151-DFT Mrs. Raj Rani 264000 11 45000 495000 75000 570000 41 years 65 153-DFT Mrs. Nirmal 43 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000 years 66 154-DFT Mrs. 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000 Rameshwari 49 years 67 155-DFT Mrs. Roopan 264000 11 45000 495000 75000 570000 Devi 50 years Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 110 68 156-DFT Mrs. Veena 192000 8 45000 360000 75000 435000 alias Veera 57 years 69 157-DFT Mrs. Satya Devi 264000 11 45000 495000 75000 570000 50 years 70 161-DFT Mrs. Kuldeep 192000 8 45000 360000 75000 435000 Kaur 25 years 71 347-DFT Mrs. Parmjit 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Kaur 28 years 72 349-DFT Mrs. Sunita 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Sachdeva 32 years 73 350-DFT Mrs. Shikha 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Midha 20 years 74 352-DFT Mrs. Jasvinder 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 Kaur 28 years 75 354-DFT Mrs. Anju Sethi 120000 5 45000 225000 75000 300000 28 years 76 357-DFT Mrs. Asha Rani 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 32 years 77 359-DFT Mrs. Sanjana 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 alias Suman Lata 24 years 78 360-DFT Mrs. Gitika Rani 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 25 years 79 367-DFT Mrs. Parveen 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Rani widow of Ravi Kumar, 32 years 80 370-DFT Mrs. Suraksha 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 40 years 81 468-DFT Mrs. Preetpal 120000 5 45000 225000 75000 300000 Kaur (widow) 42 years 82 469-DFT Mrs. Neena 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000 Rani 36 years 83 470-DFT Mrs. Santosh 40 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 years 84 473-DFT Mrs. Chanchal 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 44 years 85 481-DFT Mrs. Sunita 28 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000 years 86 88-DFT Mrs. Rama 652800 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 Chaudhary 23 years 87 126-DFT Mrs. Meena 693600 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Kumari 32 years 88 127-DFT Mrs. Priti Midha 693600 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 32 years 89 131-DFT Mrs. Sanjivan 693600 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Lata 33 years 90 143-DFT Mrs. Sonia Rani 612000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000 26 years 91 147-DFT Mrs. Som Lata 450000 11 45000 495000 75000 570000 37 years Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 111 92 348-DFT Mrs. Anupam 38 653000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000 years 93 493-DFT Mrs. Kamlesh 816000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000 Rani 33 years TOTAL 71280000
ii) Elderly Ladies Case No.21-DFT In Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) the value of services rendered to the family by elderly ladies was assessed at Rs.20,000/- per annum. That amount can and ought to be revised to Rs.25,000/- in respect of an incident that took place six years later. Applying a multiplier of 5, which the one-man Commission has chosen in the present case the amount payable to the claimants would come to Rs.1,25,000/-. To that amount we need to add Rs.82,000/-, which the Commission has determined as the loss of dependency on account of pension drawn by the deceased at the time of death. Adding to these two figures the conventional amount Rs.75,000/-, the total amount of compensation payable to the claimant in this case would come to Rs.2,82,000/-.
Cases No.158-DFT, 159-DFT and 353-DFT The deceased in Claim Petitions No.158-DFT, 159-DFT and 353-DFT, namely Mrs. Lakshmi Devi aged 70 years, Mrs. Reshma Devi, aged 67 years and Mrs. Sumitra Devi aged 62 years, were simple housewives, whose contribution has been taken by the Commission to be Rs.36,000/- per annum as against Rs.20,000/- awarded in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra). Deducting 1/3rd towards their personal expenses and applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission has awarded a Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 112 sum of Rs.1,20,000/- to the claimants in each one of these cases. That figure would stand enhanced even after a correct application of the norms fixed in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra). Taking the contribution of the deceased elderly ladies, mentioned above, to be Rs.25,000/- per annum and applying a multiplier of 5, the claimants in each one of these cases would be entitled to Rs.1,25,000/-. To that shall be added a sum of Rs.75,000/- each towards conventional amount, taking the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants in each one of these cases to Rs.2,00,000/-.
The final picture regarding the amounts payable in this category, therefore, may be summed up as under:-
Sr. Case Name & AgeAmount Multiplier Value of Loss of Revised Conventional Total No. No. of theawarded by applied Services Depen- amount ofFigure Amount Deceased the rendered dency compensation (In Rs.) {8+9} Commission to the (In Rs.) held payable (In Rs.) (In Rs.) family (In {5x6+7} (In Rs.) Rs.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 21-DFT Mrs. Shanta 82000 5 25000 82000 207000 75000 282000 Relan 73 years 2 158-DFT Mrs. Lakshmi 120000 5 25000 0 125000 75000 200000 Devi 70 years 3 159-DFT Mrs. Reshma 120000 5 0 125000 75000 200000 Devi 67 years 25000 4 353-DFT Mrs. Sumitra 120000 5 25000 0 125000 75000 200000 Devi 62 years TOTAL 882000
iii) Unmarried Working Girls Apart from the housewives and elderly ladies dealt with in the foregoing paragraphs, the deceased included 9 unmarried working girls, most of whom were at that point of time, employed in the DAV School at Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 113 meager salaries. The Commission of Inquiry has, based on the salaries received by the girls, assessed and awarded compensation that varies between Rs.44,000 to Rs.2,88,000/-.
It was contended on behalf of the claimants that the approach adopted by the Commission has brought about an anomalous situation in as much as in cases involving children in the same age group the Commission has awarded a higher amount of compensation than what is awarded in cases where the victims were in some employment or the other. Mrs. Arora, Learned Counsel for the Association argued that the anomaly could be removed by awarding to the working girls the same amount of compensation as is awarded to children in the comparable age group. There is in our opinion merit in that contention. That young and un-married girls had taken up jobs at meager salaries need not put the victims or the claimants at a disadvantage which would be obvious if the mere fact that the young girl was working results in the assessment of a lower amount of compensation than that payable for a non-working one. The fact that the girls had taken up small time and temporary jobs in the school or elsewhere was even otherwise not a sound reason why the compensation should be determined on the basis of the income they derived from such engagements. The nature of the employment and remuneration paid for the same sufficiently indicates that the same were more in the nature of pastime for spending the time available with them usefully than an estimate or indication of their true potential in life. In the circumstances, we deem it fit to award in each one of the following cases the same amount as is determined for payment in category 3 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 114 cases.
The final picture regarding the amounts payable in this category, therefore, may be summed up as under:-
Sr. No. Case No. Name & Age of theAmount awarded by Revised amount of Deceased the Commission (In compensation held Rs.) payable (In Rs.) 1 2 3 4 5 1 6-DFT Ms. Maninder Kaur 19 230400 635000 years 2 56-DFT Ms. Manju Bala 19 years 88000 635000 3 57-DFT Ms. Meera 21 years 288000 635000 4 58-DFT Ms. Anju Rani 22 years 72000 635000 5 59-DFT Ms. Sunita Mehta 27 years 44000 635000 6 60-DFT Ms. Rita 22 years 60000 635000 61-DFT Ms. Babita Wadhera 23 150000 635000 7 years 8 63-DFT Ms. Sandeep kaur 25 years 105600 635000 9 342-DFT Ms. Rekha Rani 21 years 60000 635000 TOTAL 5715000
iv) Working Women in Government Service As already noticed above, nine out of the female victims were working women employed in Government service. The one man Commission has based on the salary drawn by these victims, determined the contribution towards their families and, awarded compensation by adopting the multiplier method. The claimants have found fault with the end result for two precise reasons. Firstly it is contended that even when the women were working on a full time basis, they also rendered services to their respective families as is normally done by a housewife. Determination of any compensation must, therefore, take note of the said contribution also, argued the learned counsel for the claimants.Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 115
The second reason advanced by the claimants for an upward revision is that the Commission had not taken into consideration the future prospects while determining the amount of compensation in these cases and other cases where women are not working in Government Departments. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Susamma Thomas's case (supra) and Smt. Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav 1996(2) The Punjab Law Reporter 656, it was argued that future prospects must be one of the inputs for determining the multiplicand. Any award which ignores that input would not be fair and reasonable contended the learned counsel for the claimants.
On behalf of the respondent-school it was per contra argued by Mr. Atma Ram, that future prospects could not be taken into consideration except in cases and situations which the Apex Court has identified in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121. The cases at hand do not, according to the learned counsel, fall in anyone of the situations in which future prospects could be taken into consideration. It was also argued that once compensation was awarded by applying the multiplier method there was no room for adoption of any other method nor could two methods be applied to produce results favourable to the claimants.
In Sarla Verma's case (Supra), relied upon by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, the Supreme Court has on a review of its pronouncements dealing with the relevance and the necessity of adding the future prospects for determination of compensation payable in Motor Accident Claim cases declared that as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 116 actual salary income of the deceased could be added towards future prospects, in cases where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years of age. The addition should however be only 30% of the actual salary income in cases where the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In cases where the age of the deceased was more than 50 years no addition towards future prospects could be made. It was further held that where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increments etc. the Courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death, a departure being permissible only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. The following passage from the decision is apposite in this connection: -
"24: In Susamma Thomas this Court increased the income by nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit the income was increased only by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah the income was increased by a mere 7%. In view of the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words "actual salary" should be read as "actual salary less tax"). The addition should be only 30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years.
There should be no addition, where the age of the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 117 deceased is more than 50 years. Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardise the addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different methods of calculation being adopted. Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments etc.) the courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances."
It is in the light of the above pronouncements clear that the addition to the salary income of the deceased victims would depend on whether the victims held a permanent job. The extent of addition would also depend upon the age of the victims. In the case of working women in Government Service, an addition towards future prospects would be perfectly justified, on the principles laid down in Sarla Verma's case (Supra).
That brings us to the question whether working women were also rendering services to the family that could be evaluated in terms of money and, if so, what is the monetary value of such services. Our answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. Working women not only support the income of the family but are at times the main bread winners of the family. That does not, however, mean that they neglect duties towards the family that are otherwise enjoined upon them as ladies of the house. In the social and cultural milieu that we Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 118 have in this Country, the very fact that a woman is employed does not necessarily mean that she does not perform any other duty towards her family. The only difference between a housewife simpliciter and a working woman is that while a housewife may be working and rendering services to the family for a greater part of the time available to her, a working woman by reason of her commitment to the job is not able to spare that much time. On an average, if we take the contribution of a housewife, in terms of services rendered to the family stretched over a period of 15 hours a day, the services rendered by a working woman may be limited to only five hours, for she would be at her work place for atleast 8 hours and travelling to and fro for atleast two hours everyday. On a rough basis one can safely assume that the value of services rendered for 5 hours would be proportionately less than the value of the services rendered by a whole time housewife. Proportionate to the time spent by the working woman the value of her services may be only 1/3rd of the value at which the services of a housewife have been assessed i.e. 45,000X1/3= Rs.15,000/- per annum. Consequently, with the death of a working female, the family not only looses in terms of the monetary supplement which she was providing but also in terms of loss of services that the family was enjoying on account of her presence. The One Man Commission has not taken this into consideration except in 64-DFT arising out of the death of Mrs. Neelam Kumari, where the Commission has taken into account not only the income being earned by her at the time of death but also added the value of services to the family at Rs.36,000/- less 1/3rd deducted by the Commission towards personal expenses. Suffice it to say that the correct approach appears to us to Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 119 determine the net loss of dependency on the basis of the income of the deceased from her employment after taking into consideration the future prospects in terms of Sarla Verma's case (supra) and add to the same a sum of Rs.15,000/- per annum towards the value of services which she was rendering to the family. This could provide the true multiplicand applicable in each one of these cases and provide a uniform and non- discriminatory basis for determination of compensation payable to the claimants. The position that would, on that basis, emerge in each one of the nine cases of the working women in Government service, would be as under:-
Sr. Case Name & Age ofSalary at Future Annual loss Value of Revised Conventional Total No. No. the Deceased the time prospects of services amount offigure @ amount of death (In Rs.) dependency rendered compensation Rs.75,000/- {8+9} (In Rs.) {4+5-1/3rd to the held payablep.a. (In Rs.) towards family @ {6+7x multiplier personal Rs.15,000 applied} (In expenses} p.a. Rs.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 64-DFT Mrs. Neelam 3661 1831 43936 15000 766168 75000 841168 Kumari 34 years 2 71-DFT Mrs. Krishna 3159 1580 37912 15000 264560 75000 339560 Kamboj 34 years 3 72-DFT Mrs. Karamjit 5500 2750 66000 15000 1296000 75000 1371000 Kaur 35 years 4 74-DFT Mrs. Lakhvinder 4811 2406 57736 15000 945568 75000 1020568 34 years 5 75-DFT Mrs. Sneh Lata 3845 1923 46144 15000 794872 75000 869872 32 years 6 78-DFT Mrs. Neelam 6800 3400 81600 15000 1545600 75000 1620600 Kumari 39 years 7 80-DFT Mrs. Sushil 3337 1001 34704 15000 646152 75000 721152 Jattana 45 years 8 81-DFT Mrs. Geeta 5100 1530 53040 15000 1020600 75000 1095600 Devi 44 years 9 471-DFT Mrs. Sunita 2843 0 22744 15000 301952 75000 376952 Devi 57 years TOTAL 8256472 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 120
v) Working Women in Non-Government Service Out of 12 working women in Non-Government service, all the victims except four viz. Mrs. Naresh alias Preeti Kamra, deceased, in case No. 17-DFT, Mrs. Santosh, deceased, in case No. 76-DFT, Mrs. Sarita Bansal, deceased, in case No. 135-DFT and Mrs. Nirmal Sharma, deceased, in case No. 374-DFT were employed as Teachers in DAV School on payment of salary ranging from Rs.900/- to Rs.1,500/- per month. The Commission has while awarding compensation in these cases taken the contribution of the deceased as a housewife for services rendered to her family to be Rs.3,000/- per month and added to the same the salary, which the deceased was drawing from the school.
From the figure thus available the Commission has deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses, applied an appropriate multiplier and made its award accordingly. In principle we do not see any error in the method adopted by the Commission except that there should have been no deduction towards personal expenses, from out of the value of services rendered by the deceased to her family. Even though the deceased employee victims were working with the DAV School there is nothing on record to suggest that they had any security of tenure or any other benefits like Assured Career Progression or increments so as to call for award of compensation on the basis of their salary income alone. In reality, they were not only rendering services to their family but were working in the school to supplement the family income, the former being the dominant of the two engagements. In the process of determination of compensation payable for their death the proper course would be to treat them primarily as housewives and add to the value of the services Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 121 rendered by them the additional amount which they were earning from the school out of their employment. We have in the foregoing part of this judgment valued the services rendered by the housewives to the family at Rs.45,000/-. To that amount we need to add the annual income of the victims from the salary drawn from the school less 1/3rd deducted towards personal expenses, which would then be the multiplicand for purposes of applying a suitable multiplier to arrive at a correct figure, to which we need to add a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure. The position that would emerge by adoption of this process would be as under: -
Sr. Case Name & AgeAmount Annual Value of Multiplier Revised ConventionalTotal No. No. of theawarded byloss ofServices Applied amount of figure (InAmount Deceased the dependen rendered compensation Rs.) {8+9} (In Commission cy afterto the held payable Rs.) (In Rs.) deducting family @ {5+6x7} (In 1/3rd Rs.45000/- Rs.) thereof (Inp.a.
Rs.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 62-DFT Mrs. Manju 544000 8000 45000 17 901000 75000 976000 Bala 24 years 2 66-DFT Mrs. Mamta 609000 9840 45000 18 987120 75000 1062120 Midha 26 years 3 68-DFT Mrs. Upma 544000 8000 45000 17 901000 75000 976000 30 years 4 69-DFT Mrs. Renu 468000 7200 45000 15 783000 75000 858000 Bala 32 years 5 70-DFT Mrs. Bimla 512000 8000 45000 16 848000 75000 923000 Devi 37 years 6 324-DFT Mrs. Anita 524800 8800 45000 16 860800 75000 935800 Sharma 33 years 7 478-DFT Mrs. Sunita 590000 8800 45000 18 968400 75000 1043400 Rani 28 years 8 482-DFT Mrs. Maya 576000 12000 45000 16 912000 75000 987000 Devi 35 years Total 7761320 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 122 In 76-DFT the deceased, Mrs. Santosh aged about 38 years, was working as a teacher in Arya School, Dabwali at a salary of Rs.5716/- per month. So also in 17-DFT the deceased, Mrs. Naresh alias Preeti Kamra, was working as Principal in DAV School, Dabwali at a salary of Rs.4,400/- per month. Mrs Nirmal Sharma, deceased in 374-
DFT, was working as Principal in Satluj School, Dabwali at a salary of Rs.3,000/- per month. Mrs. Sarita Bansal, aged about 34 years, deceased in 135-DFT, was also working as Lecturer in M.P. College, Dabwali at a salary of Rs.5,000/- per month. These four cases appear to be distinguishable from other employees referred to above inasmuch as they were holding regular and permanent jobs and drawing the salary attached to the same and were, therefore, more comparable to those holding permanent jobs in the Government. They were at the same time rendering services to their respective families, the value whereof cannot be less than Rs.15,000/- per annum as held by us while dealing with the cases of Government employees. Award of compensation would, therefore, be more rational, if these regular employees holding permanent jobs in their respective establishments are placed at par with the Government employees in the matter of award of compensation. In the case of Mrs. Nirmal alias Preeti Kamra, the Commission has also found that she was drawing an income of Rs.6,393/- per annum from the LIC agency work that she was doing. The said amount can, therefore, be added to her income from salary while determining the amount of compensation payable to claimants in her case. The final picture, that would emerge, can be summarised in a tabular form as under: - Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 123
Sr. Case Name & AgeAmount Annual Value of Multiplier Revised ConventionalTotal No. No. of theawarded byloss ofServices Applied amount of figure (InAmount Deceased the dependen rendered compensation Rs.) {8+9} (In Commission cy (In Rs.) to the held payable Rs.) (In Rs.) family @ {5+6x7} (In Rs.15000/- Rs.) p.a. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 17-DFT Mrs. Naresh 632416 57158 15000 16 1154528 75000 1229528 @ Preeti Kamra, 39 years 2 76-DFT Mrs. 731650 68592 15000 16 1337472 75000 1412472 Santosh, 38 years 3 135-DFT Mrs. Sarita 1088000 60000 15000 17 1275000 75000 1350000 Bansal, 34 years 4 374-DFT Mrs. Nirmal 816000 36000 15000 17 867000 75000 942000 Sharma Total 4934000
vi) Working women (Miscellaneous) In this category fall nine cases in which the deceased were said to be working women doing miscellaneous work. Having regard to the nature of employment and the amount earned from the same, the Commission has treated them as housewives but added the income derived by them from their respective vocations to the multiplicand for determining the amount of compensation payable to the claimants. We shall briefly deal with each one of these cases and re-assess the amount of compensation by reference to the findings recorded by the Commission.
Case No. 14-DFT This case arose out of the death of Mrs. Asha Rani, an Anganwari Worker who was drawing a salary of Rs.450/- per month. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount towards personal expenses, the net contribution to the family can be taken to be Rs.3,600/- per annum. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 124 To that amount shall be added Rs.45,000/- towards value of the services rendered to the family taking the total loss of dependency to Rs.48,600/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, the claimants would be entitled to a compensation of Rs.8,26,200/-. Adding to that figure the conventional amount of Rs.75,000/-, the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants would come to Rs.9,01,200/-. Case No. 109-DFT This case arose out of the death of Mrs. Rekha Rani, who was, according to the findings recorded by the Commission, doing tuition work and earning Rs.36,260/- per annum from the same. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount towards her personal expenses, her net contribution to the family would come to Rs.24,174/- per annum. Adding to that amount the value of the services to the family amounting to Rs.45,000/-, the multiplicand would rise to Rs.69,174/-. It is noteworthy that before the Commission, the claimants had produced the Income-tax return filed by the deceased for the financial year 1994- 95 which supported the claim made by them that the deceased was doing tuition work during her life time. Applying a multiplier of 18 to that amount, the claimants would be entitled to Rs.12,45,132/-. To that figure we add the conventional amount of Rs.75,000/- taking the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.13,20,132/-. Case No. 124-DFT Mrs. Renu Bala, deceased, in this case was said to be a Social Worker. The Commission has taken her income from social work at Rs.2,100/- per month. We, however, see no reason to assume that a Social Worker does such work for any monetary gain. Addition of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 125 Rs.2,100/- per month to the monthly income of the deceased was, therefore, not justified. All the same, if the value of the services rendered by the deceased, who was a young lady of 31 years, is taken at Rs.45,000/- per annum and a multiplier of 17 applied to the same, the amount payable to the claimant would work out to Rs.7,65,000/-. To that figure is added Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount taking the total amount payable to the claimants to be Rs.8,40,000/-, which amount we hereby award to the claimants in this case.
Case No. 138-DFT Mrs.Sushma Gupta, deceased, in this case, was aged 34 years. The Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.6,12,000/- by taking her income to be Rs.1,500/- per month from tuition/coaching work in addition to Rs.3,000/- per month towards services rendered to the family. Taking the value of services rendered to the family at Rs.45,000/- and adding the net income of Rs.12000/- per annum after deducting 1/3rd towards her personal expenses earned by her from tuition/coaching work, the multiplicand would come to Rs.57,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, the amount of compensation payable to the claimants in this case would come to Rs.9,69,000/-. Addition of a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount would take the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.10,44,000/-, which is hereby awarded.
Case No. 152-DFT Mrs. Kiran Pal Grover, deceased in this case was, according to the evidence adduced before the Commission, engaged in tailoring work and earned Rs.100/- to Rs.200/- per month. The Commission has Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 126 taken her earning to Rs.150/- per month or Rs.1,800/- per annum and added a sum of Rs.36,000/- per annum towards the value of the services rendered by her to the family, deducted 1/3rd towards her personal expenses and determined the multiplicand at Rs.25,200/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.3,78,000/- to the claimants who happen to be the husband and minor daughter of the deceased. We see no reason to interfere with the determination made by the Commission towards the income of the deceased from tailoring work. The value of the services rendered to the family shall, however, stand enhanced to Rs.45,000/- without any deduction as has been the position in all such cases. The total loss of dependency would, therefore, come to Rs.46,200/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 15 to that figure, the claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.6,93,000/-. Adding conventional amount of Rs.75,000/- to the same the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants would come to Rs.7,68,000/-.
Case No. 160-DFT Mrs. Manju Bala, deceased, in this case was also a 31 years old housewife who was engaged in Life Insurance Corporation Agency work. The Commission has, on the basis of the material placed before it, taken her income from the Agency's work to be Rs.2,000/- per month or Rs.24,000/- per annum and added to the same the value of services rendered to the family. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount towards personal expenses, the Commission has taken the loss of dependency to be Rs.40,000/- per annum. The Commission has, accordingly, awarded Rs.6,40,000/- to the claimants. While we see no reason to Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 127 interfere with the amount determined by the Commission towards the earning from the Agency work undertaken by the deceased, the deduction of 1/3rd towards personal expenses must be confined only to said amount. This would mean that the net loss of dependency, on account of the income from the Agency's work, would come to Rs.16,000/- per annum. Adding to the said amount, the value of services rendered to the family assessed at Rs.45,000/-, the loss of dependency would come to Rs.61,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 16 to the said amount, the compensation works out to Rs.9,76,000/-. Adding Rs.75,000/- to the said figure towards conventional amount, the total compensation payable to the claimants comes to Rs.10,51,000/-. Case No. 346-DFT In this case the deceased Mrs. Sakshi alias Rakesh Rani was a 25 years old housewife who used to take cooking classes at the time of her death in the fire tragedy. Her husband and son Bobby had claimed a sum of Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation before the Commission. The evidence before the Commission comprised documents showing her academic qualification and other achievements. The Commission has, on the basis of the said evidence, taken the income of the deceased at Rs.2,100/- per month and deducted 1/3rd towards her personal expenses taking the loss of dependency to be Rs.40,800/- per annum. The Commission has applied a multiplier of 18 and awarded a sum of Rs.7,34,400/-. The value of the services rendered by the deceased to the family should in our opinion be taken at Rs.45,000/- per annum to which amount could be added Rs.16,800/- per annum towards income earned from cooking classes. The total loss of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 128 dependency would, therefore, come to Rs.61,800/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 18 the amount of compensation payable to the claimants would come to Rs.11,12,400/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount would take the figure to be Rs.11,87,400/-. Case NO. 351-DFT In this claim petition, the deceased Mrs. Nirmla alias Rani was a 34 years old housewife who was imparting training for tailoring and stitching work at the time of her death in the fire tragedy. A claim of Rs.60,00,000/- was made by her husband and son Mohinder Kumar. The evidence adduced before the Commission suggested that the deceased was a diploma holder from Industrial Training Institute in Cutting and Tailoring as per National Trade Certificate issued by the Ministry of Labour, Government of India. The Commission had, on the basis of the material placed before it, taken the income of the deceased to be Rs.2,100/- per month from her vocation and determined the total loss of dependency at Rs.40,800/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, the Commission awarded a sum of Rs.6,94,000/- towards compensation and directed its apportionment between the two claimants. In our opinion, while the income earned by the deceased from her tailoring work could be taken at Rs.1,400/- per month or Rs.16,800/- per annum after deduction of 1/3rd towards her personal expenses, the value of the services rendered to the family could be assessed at Rs.45,000/-. This would take the multiplicand to Rs.61,800/-. Applying a multiplier of 17, the amount of compensation payable to the claimants would come to Rs.10,50,600/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount would take the total to Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 129 Rs.11,25,600/- which shall be apportioned between the claimants equally.
Case No.486-DFT Deceased Mrs. Tulsi Devi, in this case was, a housewife, aged about 19 years working as a Domestic Servant at the time of her death in the fire tragedy. The Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.18,000/- per annum, deducted 1/3rd from the same towards personal expenses, added the amount so determined to the value of services rendered to the family to award a sum of Rs.6,122,000/- to the claimants. Taking the value of services of the deceased at Rs.45,000/- and the net income after deduction of 1/3rd towards her personal expenses to be Rs.12,000/-, the multiplicand comes to Rs.57,000/-. Applying a multiplier of 17 to the said amount, the amount of compensation comes to Rs.9,69,000/- to which is added Rs.75,000/- towards conventional charges to take the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.10,44,000/-.
The final picture regarding the amounts payable in this category, therefore, may be summed up as under:-
Sr. Case Name & AgeAmount Annual Value of Multiplier Revised ConventionalTotal No. No. of theawarded byloss ofServices Applied amount of figure (InAmount Deceased the dependen rendered compensation Rs.) {8+9} (In Commission cy afterto the held payable Rs.) (In Rs.) deducting family @ {5+6x7} (In 1/3rd Rs.45000/- Rs.) thereof p.a. (In Rs.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 14-DFT Mrs. Asha 469200 3600 45000 17 826200 75000 901200 Rani 32 years 2 109-DFT Mrs. Rekha 867000 24174 45000 18 1245132 75000 1320132 Rani 29 years Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 130 3 124-DFT Mrs. Renu 693600 -- 45000 17 765000 75000 840000 Bala 31 years 4 138-DFT Mrs. 612000 12000 45000 17 969000 75000 1044000 Sushma Gupta 34 years 5 152-DFT Mrs. Kiran 378000 1200 45000 15 693000 75000 768000 Pal Grover 41 years 6 160-DFT Mrs. Manju 640000 16000 45000 16 976000 75000 1051000 Bala 31 Years 7 346-DFT Mrs. Sakshi 734400 16800 45000 18 1112400 75000 1187400 alias Rakesh Rani 25 years 8 351-DFT Mrs. Nirmla 694000 16800 45000 17 1050600 75000 1125600 alias Rani 34 years 9 486-DFT Mrs. Tulsi 612000 12000 45000 17 969000 75000 1044000 Devi 19 years TOTAL 9281332 Category 5 cases:-
This category comprises claims in connection with 39 adult males of different age groups who lost their lives in the fire incident. The Commission of Inquiry has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Susamma 's case (supra), Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) and the English decisions in Mallett Vs. Mc.Monagle, 1970 A.C. 166, Davies Vs. Taylor, 1974 A.C. 207, Davies Vs. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd. (1942) A.C. (Privy Council) 601 as also the decisions of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Chairman, A.P.SRTC Vs. Shafiya Khatoon's case (supra), Bhagwan Dass Vs. Mohd. Aref's case (supra) and A.P.STRC Vs. G.Ramanaiah's case (supra), observed that the multiplier method for determining compensation in cases of death is legally well established and ensures not only `just' Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 131 compensation but certainty of the awards also. A departure from the method could be justified only in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases. The legal position as set out in the recommendations made by the Commission is, in our opinion, unexceptionable and does not call for any addition or any further discussion by us in this judgment. We may only add that the Supreme Court has in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121, on a review of the case law on the subject, restated the legal principles governing determination of compensation in cases under the Motor Vehicles Act. The decision lucidly reiterates the approach to be adopted for determination of compensation, addition of income towards future prospects, deduction of living expenses, selection of multiplier and computation of compensation etc. We have, while dealing with the cases falling in other categories, already made a reference to the said decision in so far as the same lays down the principles governing addition of income towards future prospects. We need only add that the legal position as stated by the Supreme Court in the cases of Susamma Thommas (supra) and other cases referred to above, remains firmly established and has indeed been reiterated by their Lordships in Sarla Verma's case (Supra).
The Commission, in category 5 cases, has awarded compensation ranging between Rs.61,200/- to Rs.16,11,000/-.
We propose to take up each one of these cases for a close scrutiny ad seriatim.Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 132
Case No. 8-DFT In this case arising out of the death of Gurdeep Singh, the Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.3,000/- and applied a multiplier of 13. The Commission found no evidence to support the claim for payment of Rs.70,00,000/- made by the mother of the deceased. What is significant, however, is that the deceased was just about 19 years old at the time of his death. He was employed as a School Van Driver with Satluj Public School. The amount being earned by him could not, therefore, be said to be the optimum of what he was capable of earning with better experience in the years to come. It is common knowledge that a driver during the relevant period could earn upto Rs.6,000/- per month depending upon his experience and good conduct. Deceased Gurdeep Singh had just started his career. A salary of Rs.3,000/- could not, therefore, be said to be a real Index of what he would have earned in times to come. Super added to this is the fact that a housewife who simply renders services to the family is taken to be contributing upto Rs.45,000/- per annum. An adult male who is bodily fit and gainfully employed as a driver could earn more than that amount. Having regard to all these circumstances and even when the income of the deceased was on the date of the fire incident said to be Rs.3,000/- per month, we are inclined to accept his income to be Rs.4,500/- per month. Deducting 1/3rd of said amount towards personal expenses of the deceased the contribution to the family would work out to Rs.3,000/- per month or Rs.36,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 13 to that figure, the amount of compensation works out to Rs.4,68,000/-. We see no reason to deny conventional figure of Rs.75,000/-, awarded by us in Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 133 cases falling in other categories. We accordingly award the conventional amount of Rs.75,000/- to the claimants in this case, which would take the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.5,43,000/-. Cases No. 9-DFT and 12-DFT Ravinder Kumar and Ashwani Kumar, deceased were brothers. The Commission has awarded to the claimants in both these cases a sum of Rs.3,90,000/- in each case to be apportioned equally between the parents of the deceased. While doing so, the Commission has taken the income of the two brothers at Rs.10,500/- each, deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses and applied a multiplier of 5.
In his testimony Roshan Lal, father of the deceased victims, stated that his sons were earning Rs.30,000/- each every month which figure the Commission had disbelieved as according to it, business in a small town like Dabwali could not, in its opinion, yield that kind of return. It is true that apart from the statement of the father of the deceased, there is no other evidence to establish the true income of his sons from the business being carried on by them, even so, keeping in view the fact that both the boys were engaged in photography business, we see no reason why their income should not be taken at Rs.12,000/- per month per person, instead of Rs.10,500/- determined by the Commission. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount towards personal expenses, the net contribution to the family would come to Rs.8,000/- per month or Rs.96,000/- per annum per person. Taking into consideration the age of the parents, the multiplier of 5 chosen by the Commission is, in our opinion, appropriate which would take the amount payable to the parents to be Rs.4,80,000/- in each case. Over and above the said Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 134 figure we award Rs.75,000/- towards conventional charges taking the total amount of compensation to Rs.5,55,000/- in each one of these two cases to be apportioned equally between the parents. Case No.10-DFT This case arises out of the death of Balbir Singh, who was working as a Cameraman. The Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.3,000/- per month against Rs.4,000/- or Rs.5,000/- per month stated to be his income according to the mother of the victim. In our opinion, the income of the deceased could have been taken to be Rs.4,000/- per month in which case the net loss of dependency to the family would come to Rs.2,667/- per month or Rs.32,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, chosen by the Commission to the said figure, the amount payable as compensation would work out to Rs.5,44,000/-. Adding Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure, the total amount payable to the claimants in this case would come to Rs.6,19,000/-.
Since the deceased has left behind his mother and a minor daughter, a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- out of the said amount shall be paid to the mother, while the remaining amount shall be deposited in a Fixed Deposit Receipt till the daughter attains majority. The interest income accruing from the Fixed Deposit can, however, be withdrawn by the minor through her grand mother, the guardian periodically, to be spent on her upbringing and education etc. Case No. 11-DFT This case arose out of the death of Ashok Gill aged 26 years who was working as a Music Teacher at the time of his death in the fire tragedy. The claimants are his widow and a minor daughter. The Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 135 Commission has accepted the version given by the claimants that the deceased was earning Rs.150/- per day by teaching music to school children. The income of the deceased has been determined at Rs.4,500/- per month or Rs.54,000/- per annum. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount, towards his personal expenses, the Commission has determined the loss of dependency at Rs.36,000/- per annum. Keeping in view the age of the claimants, the Commission has correctly applied a multiplier of 18 and awarded Rs.6,48,000/- to the claimants. There is in our opinion no reason to interfere with the said amount except that the claimants would be entitled in addition to the amount awarded by the Commission to an amount of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure. The total amount thus payable to the claimants in this case would come to Rs.7,23,000/-.
Case No. 13-DFT This claim arises out of the death of Bhagirath aged about 31 years on the date of incident who was working as a Constable in the Police Department. His widow Smt.Uma Devi and minor son Baldev claimed Rs.70,00,000 as compensation before the Commission. The Commission has, however, determined the gross salary of deceased as Rs.3,134/- per month on the basis of his certificate issued by the office of the Superintendent of Police, Sirsa. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount, the loss of dependency to the family has been determined as Rs.25,027/- per annum. The Commission has applied a multiplier of 17 to award Rs.4,26,224/- which amount in our opinion deserves to be enhanced having regard to the fact that the deceased was holding a permanent job in the Police Department and had prospects of rising Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 136 higher in the police department. Applying the principles stated by the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma's case (supra), the income of the deceased can be taken to be Rs.4,701/- per month. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount towards personal expenses of the deceased, the net loss of dependency can be taken as Rs.3,134/- per month or Rs. 37,608/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17 chosen by the Commission, the compensation payable to the claimants comes to Rs.6,39,336/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to that figure would take the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.7,14,336/-.
Case No. 15-DFT This claim arises out of the death of Shri Ashok Wadhera, who was a Press Reporter running a News Agency at the time of his death in the fire tragedy. His wife and minor son and daughter made a claim for Rs.70,00,000/- before the Commission. The Commission has determined the income of the deceased to be Rs.6,000/-per month and the loss of dependency to be Rs.4,000/- per month or Rs.48,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, the Commission has awarded Rs.8,16,000/- towards compensation in this case and directed that out of the said amount, a sum of Rs. 3,16,000/- be paid to Mrs. Usha Wadhera while a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- each be paid to their son and daughter left behind by the deceased. It appears that the income of the deceased was stated to be between Rs.5,000/- to Rs.7,000/- per month. The Commission has therefore rightly taken the mean figure while determining the loss of dependency. We see no reason to interfere with the said determination or the multiplier chosen by the Commission. All Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 137 that we need add is a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to take the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.8,91,000/-. A sum of Rs.3,50,000/- out of the said amount shall be paid to the widow of the deceased while the remaining amount can be deposited in the Fixed Deposits in the name of the minor son and daughter of the deceased till the time they attain majority. The interest accruing from the said income can be withdrawn by the mother/guardian of the children for upbringing and education of the children.
Case No. 16-DFT This case arises out of the death of Radhey Shyam Shastri who was 36 years old at the time of incident and had been engaged in performing religious and pooja ceremonies to earn his livelihood. The evidence adduced by the Commission suggests that the deceased was earning Rs.15,000/- per month from such Pooja and other ceremonies. The Commission, has, however, taken the income of the deceased to be Rs.7,500/- per month, deducted 1/3rd amount towards his personal expenses and taken the loss of dependency for the family to be Rs.5,000/- per month or Rs.60,000/- per year. Applying a multiplier of 15, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- to the claimant in this case, to which we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure, taking the total amount of compensation to Rs.9,75,000/-. There is, in our opinion, no room for making any other alteration in this case. Case No. 18-DFT This case arises out of the death of Ravinder Kumar, aged 40 years, who was a registered Medical Practitioner at the time of his death. The claimants happen to be his wife and two sons and a Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 138 daughter. A claim of Rs.70,00,000/- was made before the Commission. The Commission has eventually awarded a sum of Rs.1,16,000/- only. The Commission has noted that the deceased had passed Ayurveda Rattan Examination and was a registered Medical Practitioner since 1976 as per the certificate marked as Ex.P232/18-DFT. The Commission also noted that the deceased was working as a Press Correspondent with a local newspaper. The Commission, has, however, come to the conclusion that the claim for payment of compensation was unsupported by any evidence and has accordingly taken the monthly wages fixed by the Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa for the years 1995-96 and determined the monthly earning of deceased as Rs.1,322/- or Rs.15,864/- per year. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount towards personal expenses, the Commission has taken the loss of dependency to be Rs.10,576/- per annum. The Commission has in our opinion failed to take into consideration the fact that the deceased was a Registered Medical Practitioner for a number of years and was qualified to practice medicine in that capacity. The absence of any specific figure mentioned in the statement of the widow left behind by the deceased could not be taken as conclusive of the deceased not being gainfully employed in the profession for which he was trained. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the income of the deceased could be taken to be Rs.4,500/- per month. Deducting 1/3rd towards personal expenses, the net loss of dependency would come to Rs.36,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 15 to the said figure, the claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.5,40,000/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to that figure would take the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 139 total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.6,15,000/-. Case No. 19-DFT This case arises out of the death of Om Parkash Mehta aged 43 years on the date of fire tragedy. His wife and two sons claimed Rs.70,00,000/- towards compensation and adduced evidence to show that the deceased was earning a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- per annum from agricultural land and running the business of a Commission Agent in the name of M/s Mehta Brothers, from which he was earning Rs. 2,00,000/-
per annum. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and another V. Jasbir Kaur and others, III(2003) Accident and Compensation Cases 90, the Commission held that there was no loss of income to the family by reference to the agricultural land owned and cultivated by the deceased. The Commission has also held that there was no evidence to show that after the death of the deceased Om Parkash Mehta, the family had engaged anyone to look after the land mutated in their favour. As regards the income from the Commission Agency, the Commission has determined Rs.36,490/- per annum as income of the deceased. Deducting 1/3rd towards personal expenses, the net loss of dependency has been determined at Rs.24,327/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 13, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.3,16,251/- to the claimants to be distributed equally among all the three claimants.
There are only two aspects which we propose to highlight in this case, one relating to the money value of the contribution which the deceased was making towards cultivation of the agricultural land and managing the affairs concerning the same and the other regarding the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 140 payment of conventional amount of Rs.75,000/-. It may be true that the claimants have not established that any one has been engaged by them after the death of Om Parkash Mehta to manage the agricultural land, but the mere absence of any such alternative arrangement may not suggest that the deceased was not contributing anything towards the cultivation of land and the resultant income from the same. In our opinion, the monetary equivalent of the contribution made by the deceased in the matter of cultivation of the land held by him could not be less than Rs.1,000/- per month or Rs.12,000/- per year which amount could be added to the annual loss of dependency by reference to the Commission Agency business that the deceased was doing during his lifetime. Viewed thus, the annual loss of the dependency would work out to be Rs.36,327/-. Applying a multiplier of 13 to the said figure, the claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.4,72,251. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to that figure would take the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.5,47,251. Case No. 20-DFT The claim, in this case, arose out of the death of Des Raj who was, at the time of the incident, a 68 years old Pensioner. His widow Raj Rani and son Palwinder made a claim of Rs.50,00,000/- towards compensation before the Commission who arrived at the conclusion that the Pensioner was drawing a pension of Rs.4,000/- per month only and that the net loss of dependency after deduction of 1/3rd towards his personal expenses would come to Rs.32,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission awarded a sum of Rs.1,60,000/- to be paid to both the claimants in equal share. In the absence of any material Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 141 to show that the deceased was having any additional income from any other source, we are inclined to accept the view taken by the Commission that the deceased was, as Pensioner, earning only Rs.4,000/- and that the net loss of dependency was Rs.32,000/- per annum. The Commission has not, however, awarded to the claimants the conventional figure of Rs.75,000/- which we see no reason to deny them. We, accordingly, enhance the amount of Rs.1,60,000/- awarded by the Commission to Rs.2,35,000/- to be paid to both the claimants in equal shares.
Claim No. 22-DFT In this case, deceased Surinder Kumar was 37 years old and working as a Bank Collection Agent. The claimants before the Commission happened to be the widow, daughter, son and father of the deceased. The evidence adduced before the Commission attempted to prove that the Commission Agent was earning between Rs.30,000/- to Rs.40,000/- per annum apart from a sum of Rs. 5,000/- per month from tuition work. The One Man Commission has, however, found no evidence to support the claim of income from the tuition work. The Commission has, all the same, accepted the version given by the claimants that the deceased was earning, from the Commission Agency, a sum of Rs.32,314.90 ps. in the year 1995. Making that income as the basis, the Commission deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses and determined the net loss of dependency to the family at Rs.21,550/- per annum. The Commission has, it appears, gone entirely by the amount earned by the deceased from the Commission Agency in the year 1995 ignoring the assertion made by the claimants that the income was Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 142 between Rs.30,000/- to Rs.40,000/- per annum. On an average, therefore, the income of the deceased could have been taken to be Rs.35,000/- per annum instead of Rs.32,314.90 ps., as was done by the Commission. To that amount, we are inclined to add a sum of Rs.15,000/- towards income from tuition work, keeping in view the fact that the deceased was an academically qualified young man, for whom Commission Agency work could leave enough spare time to be spent on providing tuition for supplementing his income. The gross annual income of the deceased could, therefore, be taken to be Rs.50,000/-. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount towards his personal expenses the net loss of dependency would come to Rs.33,300/-. Applying a multiplier of 16 chosen by the Commission, the amount payable to the claimants comes to Rs.5,32,800. To that amount, we need to add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount taking the compensation to Rs.6,07,800/- which we hereby award to the claimants.
Case No. 23-DFT This case arose out of the death of Ramesh Chugh, aged 46 years, who was an Agriculturist by profession and who was also one of the unfortunate victims of the fire incident. The claimants before the Commission comprised widow of the deceased and his two children. The claim for payment of a sum of Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation was sought to be supported on the basis that the death of deceased had deprived the family of the entire income earned by him from 29 acres of cultivable land owned by him in village Lohgarh, Tehsil Dabwali. The Commission has, however, discussed the evidence and relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and Another v. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 143 Jasbir Kaur and Others III (2003) Accident and Compensation Cases 90 (SC) came to the conclusion that the source of income remains available to the family since the landed property held by the deceased continues to remain available and stands mutated in favour of the claimants. The contribution made by the deceased towards management and cultivation of the said land could, however, be evaluated and an appropriate amount awarded as the family was forced to engage someone else to do what the deceased was doing during his life time. The Commission has, accordingly, taken the contribution of the deceased to be Rs.7,000/- per month, deducted 1/3rd amount out of the same towards his personal expenses to award a compensation of Rs.7,28,000/- by applying a multiplier of 13. The Commission has, in our view, committed a mistake on both counts, viz. taking the contribution of the deceased at Rs.7,000/- per month as also deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount. In the first place, there was no cogent evidence to establish that the family was indeed spending Rs.7,000/- per month except engagement of one Bihari Lal,a graduate who had passed away in August 2003. Be that as it may, the engagement of a person to look after the lands could not be said to be improbable and unnatural having regard to the fact that ownership of the land and its cultivation was firmly established. In our opinion, the contribution of the deceased which now would necessitate the engagement of someone else to do what the deceased was doing could be assessed at Rs.5,000/- per month. The net loss on account of the death of the deceased could, therefore, be Rs.60,000/- per annum and no more. Applying a multiplier of 13 to the said figure, the amount of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 144 compensation would come to Rs.7,80,000/-. To that amount should be added the conventional figure of Rs.75,000/- to take the total amount of compensation to Rs.8,55,000/- to be paid to the claimants in equal proportions.
Case No. 24-DFT This case arose out of the death of Sanjay Kwatra, a 26 years old businessman who was also one of the victims of the fire incident. The claim was made by his minor daughter Simmy Kwatra for a sum of Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation. The claimant had lost both her parents in the incident. The claim proceeded on the assertion that the deceased was earning Rs.1,50,000/- per annum from his readymade garments business. The Commission has, however, taken the monthly income of the deceased to be Rs.8,000/-, deducted 1/3rd out of the same towards personal expenses of the deceased and determined the annual loss of dependency at Rs.64,000/-. Applying a multiplier of 18, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.11,52,000/- with which we can find no fault except that, we need to add Rs.75,000/- to the said amount as conventional figure taking the total amount payable to the claimant to Rs.12,27,000/.
Case No. 25-DFT This case arose out of the death of Niranjan Dass Bansal, Advocate, aged 60 years and a Member of the Executive Committee of D.A.V. School. The claimants happen to be his widow and two sons. The deceased was also invited to the function and was, according to the statements made before the Commission, earning upto Rs.12,000/- to Rs.15,000/- per month from his law practice. The Commission has Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 145 taken the income of the deceased at Rs.12,500/- per month and after deducting 1/3rd towards his personal expenses assessed the loss of dependency at Rs.1,00,000/- per annum. To that amount, the Commission has applied a multiplier of 5 having regard to the age of the deceased and awarded a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to the claimants. The award is, in our opinion, justified and does not call for any alteration except addition of a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount. The total amount would, thus, stand enhanced to Rs.5,75,000/- out of which a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- shall be paid to the widow of the deceased while the remaining shall be distributed equally among the two sons. Case No. 26-DFT This claim arose out of the death of Sanjay Grover, aged 30 years, working as a Chemist, who too had lost his life in the fire incident. The claim made by his widow and two sons was to the extent of Rs.70,00,000/- on the basis that the deceased was earning about Rs.10,000/- to Rs.12,000/- per month from his Medical Store business. The deceased was a graduate and was also said to be taking part in social and extra curricular activities. The Commission has, however, taken the income of the deceased at Rs.9,000/-, deducted 1/3rd out of the said amount towards his personal expenses and determined the loss of dependency at Rs.72,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, the Commission has awarded Rs.12,24,000/- out of which Rs.3,24,000/- was to be paid to the widow, while remaining amount is to be distributed equally among the sons. There is nothing wrong with the amount awarded by the Commission. All that we need to do is to add a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure which takes the total amount of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 146 compensation to Rs.12,99,000/-, rounded off to Rs.13,00,000/-. A sum of Rs.5,00,000/- out of the said amount shall be paid to the widow and the balance distributed equally among the other two claimants. Case No. 27-DFT This case arises out of the death of Gurdas Singh, aged 25 years, who was working as a Constable. The One Man Commission of Inquiry has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.3,000/- and the net accretion to the family at Rs.2,000/- per month or Rs.24,000/- per annum. That amount, in our opinion, appears to be on the lower side having regard to the fact that the deceased was holding a permanent job and had future prospects of rise in the police force. Adding 50% towards future prospects in the light of the decision in Sarla Verma's case (supra) the income determined by the Commission would go to Rs.4,500/-. Deducting 1/3rd towards his personal expenses, the loss of dependency to the family would work out to Rs.3,000/- per month or Rs.36,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 18, chosen by the commission, the total amount payable to the claimants comes to Rs.6,48,000/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional charges would take the figure to Rs.7,23,000/-.
Case No. 28-DFT This claim was made by Master Venus Sethi and parents of Surinder Kumar, deceased, aged 30 years, who also lost his life in the fire incident. The deceased was, according to the claimants, running a Karyana Shop at Dabwali and earning Rs.20,000/- to Rs.30,000/- per month. The Commission has, however, declined to accept that version and determined the monthly income of the deceased at Rs.10,000/-, Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 147 deducted 1/3rd out of the said amount and determined the loss of dependency at Rs.80,000/- per annum. The Commission has then applied a multiplier of 17 to award a sum of Rs.13,60,000/- towards compensation. There is, in our opinion, no room for any enhancement in the amount awarded by the Commission. All that we need to do is to add a sum of Rs.75,000/- as conventional figure to that amount, which would take the total to Rs.14,35,000/-, out of which a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- each shall be paid to the parents of the deceased while the remaining shall be invested in a Fixed Deposit in the name of his minor son Venus Sethi till the time he attains majority. The interest accruing on the investment can, however, be withdrawn by the guardians for upbringing and education of the minor. Case No. 29-DFT The claim, in this case, was made by the daughter of the deceased being the only surviving member of the family who perished in the incident. Ashok Kumar Sikka, the deceased father of the claimant, was a Rural Development Officer-cum-Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Dabwali. He, accompanied by his wife and the sister of the claimant, was attending the ill fated function only to meet a fiery end. The claim proceeded on the basis that the deceased was, at the time of his death, earning Rs. 13,424/- per month as salary from the bank. The Commission deducted 1/3rd out of the said amount and determined the loss of dependency at Rs.8,950/- per month or Rs.1,07,400/- per annum. The Commission has then applied a multiplier of 15 to award a sum of Rs.16,11,000/-. Addition of a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure meets the ends of justice as there is nothing wrong Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 148 either with the multiplicand or the multiplier chosen by the Commission. The addition of a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount shall take the total amount of compensation payable to the claimant to Rs.16,86,000/-.
Case No. 30-DFT In this case arising out of the death of Jagwinder Singh, the deceased was engaged in tent house business at the time of incident. The Commission had taken the income of the deceased to be Rs.3,000/- per month only and loss of dependency at Rs.24,000/- per annum. This amount, in our opinion, is on the lower side having regard to the fact that the deceased was, as per the evidence on record, engaged in tent house business and was, on the fateful day, at the venue to arrange the public address system for the ill fated function. The income of the deceased can, in our view, be taken to be Rs.4,500/- per month. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount towards personal expenses, the loss of dependency to the family would work out to Rs.3,000/- per month or Rs.36,000/- per year. Applying a multiplier of 13, chosen by the Commission, the total amount payable to the claimants would work out to Rs.4,68,000/-. Adding a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to that figure, the total compensation payable to the claimants would come to Rs.5,43,000/-. Case No. 31-DFT The claim in this case was made by Saloni Bhateja, daughter of Ravi Bhateja, who was a qualified doctor holding a MBBS degree, and posted as Medical Officer in Primary Health Center, Village Lambi, District Muktsar (Punjab). The deceased was aged 42 years drawing at Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 149 the time of his death Rs.6,742/- per month and was an income-tax assessee. He had, during the financial year preceding the year of his death, earned an annual income of Rs.62,250/-. It was also alleged that the deceased was earning Rs.7,000/- to Rs.8,000/- from private practice. The Commission has, however, refused to accept that the deceased had any income from private practice and taken the income of the deceased at Rs.6,742/- per month, deducted 1/3rd out the same towards his personal expenses rounded off the net loss of dependency to Rs.4,500/- per month or Rs.54,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.8,10,000/-. The Commission does not appear to have taken into consideration the future prospects of the deceased having regard to the fact that the deceased was holding a permanent Government job and had prospects of further rise in service. Applying the principles laid down in Sarla Verma's case (supra) addition of 30% of the salary income to the gross income at the time of incident would be perfectly justified. The gross monthly income of the deceased would, therefore, come to Rs.8,756/- per month. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount, the net loss of dependency to family would come to Rs.5,843/- per month or Rs.70,120/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the total amount of compensation payable to the claimant would work out to Rs.10,51,800/-. To that amount, we add a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure to take the total amount of compensation payable to the claimant to Rs.11,26,800/-. Case No. 32-DFT In this case, the deceased Sukhbir Singh was a 31 years old Contractor who left behind his parents to make a claim before the Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 150 Commission for payment of Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation. The deceased was, according to the evidence led before the Commission, a graduate and had gone to the function along with his daughter and his wife where all of them got burnt to death. The deceased was, as per the evidence on record, a liquor contractor as well as a Property Dealer, earning between Rs.20,000/- to Rs.25,000/- per month. The Commission has, however, declined to accept that version and taken the income of the deceased to be Rs.10,000/- to Rs.12,000/- jointly with his father. The share of deceased in that income has been taken as Rs.6,000/- per month or Rs.72,000/- per annum. Deduction of 1/3rd of the said amount has reduced the loss of dependency to Rs.48,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.2,40,000/- to the claimants. The Commission has, in our opinion, assessed the income of the deceased at a lower figure. In the absence of any evidence in rebuttal, the income of the deceased could be taken to be Rs.12,000/- per month, if not more. The net loss of dependency could, therefore, be taken at Rs.8,000/- per month or Rs.96,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount payable to the parents would come to Rs.4,80,000/-. To that we add a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to take the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.5,55,000/- in equal proportion. Case No. 33-DFT This case arises out of the death of Radhey Shyam, aged 27 years. The Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.8,100/- per month on the date of incident and after deducting 1/3rd of the said amount towards personal expenses, determined the loss of Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 151 dependency for the family at Rs.64,800/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission had awarded a sum of Rs.3,24,000/-. In our opinion, the income of the deceased could be taken at Rs.9,000/- per month keeping in view the fact that the deceased was a Trained Graduate Teacher. We accordingly take the income of deceased at Rs.9,000/- deduct 1/3rd of the same towards personal expenses and determine the loss of dependency for the family at Rs.72,000/- per annum. Applying the multiplier of 5, the total amount payable to the claimants would come to Rs.3,60,000/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount would take the amount of compensation to Rs.4,35,000/-.
Case No. 34-DFT This claim arose out of the death of Gurdev Singh Shant, 63 years old Freedom Fighter and Chairman of Improvement Trust, Dabwali. The claim was made by his wife Surjit Kaur for payment of Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation. The claimants had stated that the deceased was earning Rs.10,000/- per month from the jewellery shop of his brother. The Commission has, however, taken the income to be Rs.5,100/- per month, deducted 1/3rd to determine the loss of dependency to Rs.3,400/- per month or Rs.48,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission has awarded Rs. 2,04,000/- to be paid to the widow of the deceased and son Iqbal Singh in equal shares. The assessment of the income of the deceased has not been, in our opinion, fair and reasonable in this case. The Commission could and indeed ought to have assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.9,000/- per month and awarded compensation on that basis. We, Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 152 accordingly, determine the loss of dependency in this case at Rs.6,000/- per month after deduction of 1/3rd towards his personal expenses. The annual loss of dependency would, thus, come to Rs.72,000/-. Applying a multiplier of 5, we award a sum of Rs.3,60,000/- to the claimants. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure would take the amount of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.4,35,000/-, out of which a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- shall be paid to the widow of the deceased, while the balance shall be paid to his son Iqbal Singh. Case No.35-DFT In this claim petition, deceased Pawan Kumar was a 40 years old bank employee. The claim was made by his wife and daughter for a sum of Rs.70,00,000/-. The Commission has taken the income of deceased as Rs. 7685.39 ps., deducted 1/3rd out of the said amount and determined the loss of dependency at Rs.5,124/- per month or Rs.61,488/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the Commission has awarded Rs.9,22,320/-, rounding it off Rs.9,22,500/-, with which we find no fault, except that, we add a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure to that amount taking the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.9,97,500/-. The amount shall be paid in equal shares to both the claimants.
Case No.36-DFT In case No. 36-DFT arising out of the death of Rajbir Singh, the Commission had taken the income of the deceased at Rs.1,530/- and determined the loss of dependency to the family at Rs.12,240/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission had awarded a meager amount of Rs.61,200/- to the claimants. The Commission has in Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 153 the process disbelieved the version given by the mother of the deceased that he was working as a Contractor and was earning Rs.15,000/- to Rs.20,000/- per month. The Commission has instead chosen to rely upon the minimum wages payable under the Minimum Wages Act as on the date of incident while determining the compensation payable to the claimants. The Commission, in our opinion, was not justified in doing so. The evidence on record may not have been conclusive, but in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the same could give an indication of the amount which he was earning. The deceased had passed the Senior Secondary Examination and was an invitee at the function. In the totality of these circumstances, therefore, we are of the view that the income of the deceased could be taken to be Rs.15,000/- per month which happens to be the lower of the figure mentioned by his mother who appeared as witness. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount, the net loss of dependency to the family would come to Rs.10,000/- or Rs.1,20,000/- per year. Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount of compensation payable to the claimants would work out to Rs.6,00,000/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount would take the amount of total to Rs.6,75,000/-.
Case No. 37-DFT In this case arising out of the death of Naresh Kumar, the Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.6,000/- and determined the loss of dependency at Rs.4,000/- per month. The Commission had then applied a multiplier of 11 and awarded a sum of Rs.5,28,000/- to the claimants. The income of the deceased was, according to the evidence adduced before the Commission between Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 154 Rs.5,000/- to Rs.7,000/- per month. The Commission has, therefore, taken a mean figure while determining the amount of compensation. There is no error in that approach to warrant any interference from this Court. All that we need say is that Rs.75,000/- shall stand added to that figure as conventional amount taking the amount of compensation to Rs.6,03,000/-.
Case No. 73-DFT In this claim, deceased Manphool Chand was a Science Teacher in Government service at the time of his death. The claim was filed by his mother Jamuna Bai for payment of Rs.70,00,000/- towards compensation. The deceased was, according to the claimant, getting a salary of Rs.5,000/- per month as per the salary certificate issued by the Principal of the School. He was a trained Teacher and had gone to the function his son and daughter were also attending. The Commission has, taking the income of the deceased to be Rs.4,800/- per month, awarded compensation of Rs.1,92,000/- to the mother. In the process, the Commission has overlooked the fact that the deceased had future prospects of higher income on the principles stated in Sarla Verma's case (supra). We, therefore, add 50% of the salary income to his gross monthly income which takes the total monthly income of the deceased to Rs.7,200/- per month. Deducting 1/3rd of the amount towards his personal expenses, the net loss of dependency would come to Rs.4,800/- per month or Rs.57,600/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount of compensation would work out to Rs.2,88,000/-. To that amount, we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount, to take the total amount of compensation payable to the claimant to Rs.3,63,000/-. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 155 Case No. 343-DFT This case arose out of the death of Shalbh Juneja. The Commission has taken the monthly income of the deceased at Rs.2,352/-, deducted 1/3d of the said amount, and determined the loss of dependency at Rs.18,816/-. Applying a multiplier of 13, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.2,44,608/-. The deceased, in this case, was working as a Teacher in St. Joseph School at Dabwali at the time of his death and earning a salary of Rs.2,300/- per month. He was B.Sc., B.Ed. He was at the ill fated venue with his nephew Vivek who was a student of D.A.V. School. The claimant in the case who happens to be the elder brother of the deceased was the only legal heir left behind. Taking into consideration all these circumstances, the loss of dependency to the family would indeed come to Rs.18,816/- per month. Applying a multiplier of 13 the amount of compensation comes to Rs.2,44,608/-. We need only to add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to take the total amount payable to the claimant to be Rs.3,19,608/-.
Case No. 344-DFT Suresh Kumar Sethi aged 33 years was in private employment on the date of his death in the fire incident. The parents made a claim for the payment of Rs.70,00,000/- towards compensation. The deceased, according to them, was a graduate and was working at a shop at a monthly salary of Rs.2,000/-. The Commission has accepted that version, deducted 1/3rd of the income towards his personal expenses, determined the loss of dependency at Rs.16,000/- per annum and awarded a sum of Rs.80,000/- as compensation by applying a Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 156 multiplier of 5. The amount so determined does not appear to be just and reasonable and is more in the nature of pittance than reasonable compensation to which the parents of the deceased were entitled. The deceased, it is proved on the record, was a graduate. His employment in a shop at a paltry sum of Rs.2,000/- per month was, therefore, only a temporary feature in life which was not an index of his real potential to earn a higher amount. We have, as seen earlier, taken even the value of the services rendered by a housewife to be Rs.45,000/- per annum. We see no reason why we should not adopt that amount for a person who happened to be the only life support for the old parents. He was not only serving his parents but also earning Rs.2,000/- per month to supplement the income which take the loss of dependency to Rs.45,000/- + Rs.1,6000/- = Rs.61,000/-. Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount of compensation would come to Rs.3,05,000/-. To that figure, we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount taking the total to Rs.3,80,000/-.
Case No. 345-DFT The deceased, in this case, was 35 years old Rakesh Kumar. His parents made a claim for Rs.70,00,000/- towards compensation for his death in the fire incident. According to the claimant, deceased was earning Rs.1,00,000/- to Rs.1,50,000/- per annum from his mobile oil business in the name and style of M/s Gupta Auto Store, Dabwali. He was also an income-tax assessee and used to file his annual returns. A tax challan for payment of tax was also produced during the hearing before the Commission. The Commission has accepted that version and taken the income of the deceased at Rs.1,00,000/- per annum. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 157 Deducting 1/3rd of the same determined the loss of dependency to Rs.67,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount of compensation came to Rs.3,35,000/- to be apportioned equally between the parents. This amount, in our opinion, needs to be suitably enhanced especially when the deceased was not only proved to be gainfully employed in business but was earning a substantial amount from the same. Instead of Rs.1,00,000/-, the income of deceased could be taken at Rs.1,25,000/- per annum. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount, the net loss of dependency would come to Rs.83,334/- per annum. Applying the multiplier chosen by the Commission, the amount of compensation would work out to Rs.4,16,670/-. To that, we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure to take the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants to 4,91,670/-, rounded off to Rs.4,92,000/-. Case No. 362-DFT In this case, deceased Bhim Sain aged 33 years was engaged in oil mill business. His father and widow filed the claim petition before the Commission in which it was alleged that the deceased was a partner in the Jyoti Oil Mills, Dabwali earning between Rs.40,000/- to Rs.50,000/- per annum. The Commission has accepted the income of the deceased to be Rs.45,000/- per annum and after deducting 1/3rd, taken the loss of dependency to be Rs.30,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, an amount of Rs.5,10,000/- has been awarded to the claimants with which we cannot find any fault, except that the Commission ought to have awarded a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure also which we hereby award taking the amount of compensation payable to Rs.5,85,000/-. The widow shall receive a sum Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 158 of Rs.4,00,000/- out of the said amount, while the balance shall go to the father of the deceased.
Case No. 366-DFT In this case, deceased Ravi Kumar aged 34 years was engaged in business. The claim for payment of compensation was made by his brother, his wife and his niece. Evidence adduced before the Commission suggested that the deceased was working as a Commission Agent at Dabwali in the name and style of M/s Ravi Trading Company, Mandi Dabwali and earning an annual income of Rs.40,000/- to Rs.50,000/-. The Commission has also noted that the income of M/s Ravi Trading Company was assessed at Rs.41,170/- for the financial year 1995-96. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount, the loss of dependency has been worked out at Rs. 27,447/-, rounded off to Rs.27,450/-. Applying a multiplier of 16, the Commission has awarded Rs. 4,39,200/- and directed the apportionment of the same among the claimants with which we can find no fault. We only add Rs.75,000/- to that figure towards conventional amount to take the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.5,14,200/- to be proportionately distributed among the claimants.
Case No. 368-DFT This case arose out of the death of Ashok Kumar, a 44 years old Brick-Kiln Owner. The claim was made by his widow, daughter and his son for a sum of Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation. The evidence adduced before the Commission suggested that the deceased was an income-tax assessee and his income for the year 1994-95 was assessed at Rs.1,59,600/-. The Commission deducted 1/3rd of the same Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 159 towards personal expenses of the deceased determining the loss of dependency for the family at Rs.1,06,400/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 13, the Commission awarded a sum of Rs.13,84,000/- as compensation. There is, in our opinion, no room for enhancement in this case except that we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure which would take the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.14,58,200/-.
Case No. 373-DFT In this case, deceased Kishori Lal was 67 years old. He was an Income-tax Practitioner who left behind three sons, the claimants in the case. The evidence adduced before the Commission established that the deceased was earning an income of Rs.50,000/- per annum. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount, the Commission has taken the loss of dependency at Rs.33,334/- per annum and applied a multiplier of 5 to the same to award a sum of Rs.1,70,000/-. Keeping in view the fact that income of the deceased as disclosed by the claimants has been accepted by the Commission and an appropriate multiplier applied to the same, we find no room for any enhancement in this case except that we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure to the amount awarded by the Commission which takes the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.2,45,000/- to be shared equally among the three claimants.
Case No. 377-DFT This case pertains to the death of 60 years old pensioner named Sutanter Singh Bhatti who died in the fire incident. The claim was made by his wife and two sons for payment of a sum of Rs.70,00,000/-. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 160 The evidence on record established that the deceased was getting a pension of Rs.38,400/- per annum, out of which the Commission has deducted 1/3rd of the said amount and determined the loss of dependency to Rs.25,600/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission has awarded Rs.1,28,000/-. We see no reason to enhance the said amount except adding a sum of Rs.75,000/- as conventional amount. The total compensation payable to the claimants would, thus, come to Rs.2,03,000/-, out of which 75% shall be paid to the widow of deceased, while the remaining 25% shall be apportioned equally among the sons.
Case No. 472-DFT In this case arising out of the death of Satkartar Singh, the Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.2,712/-, deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses and determined the loss of dependency at Rs.21,768/-. Keeping in view the age of the claimant, the Commission has chosen a multiplier of 8 and awarded a sum of Rs.1,75,000/-. The claimants happen to be the parents of the deceased who was serving as a Teacher in the private School at the salary mentioned above. The Commission has while doing so disbelieved the version given by the father that the deceased was also earning Rs.12,000/- per month from tuition work. The deceased was a Trained Teacher which fact has not been disputed and stands firmly established by the certificates marked in the course of the inquiry. It would not, therefore, be incorrect to assume that the deceased may have been offering tuition to the students and supplementing his income. In the absence of any documentary evidence, we are inclined to hold that over Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 161 and above Rs.2,712/- per month towards salary, the deceased was also earning atleast Rs.3,300/- per month from tuition taking his gross income to be Rs.6,000/-. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount, the loss of dependency would come to Rs.4,000/- or Rs.48,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 8 to that figure the amount payable to the claimants would come to Rs.3,84,000/-. Addition of the conventional figure of Rs.75,000/- would take the amount of compensation to Rs.3,84,000/- + Rs.75,000/- = Rs.4,59,000/-.
Case No. 490-DFT This case arose out of the death of Shri Dharam Singh. The Commission has assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.2,100/- per month and determined the loss of dependency to the family at Rs.16,800/-. Applying a multiplier of 8, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.1,35,000/- to the mother of the deceased who was 60 years old at the time of her statement before the Commission.
The deceased, in this case, was a young boy of 23 years and was not engaged in any vocation. The evidence on record shows that the deceased was a Matriculate and had completed two years Diploma Course in Agriculture D-Pharma from Sirsa. He was an able bodied person and could have well started a career in due course. The commission has applied to him the minimum wage payable to a skilled worker and attributed to him an income of Rs.2,200/- only. That amount appears to us to be on the lower side. Keeping in view the professional qualification which the deceased had acquired his gainful employment was only a matter of time. In our opinion, the notional income of the deceased could be taken for purposes of award of compensation at Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 162 Rs.4,200/-. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount, the loss of dependency would come to Rs.2,800/- per month or Rs.33,600/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 8 to the said figure, the amount payable to the claimant would come to Rs.2,68,800/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to that figure would take the total amount payable to the claimant to Rs.3,43,800/-.
Case No. 492-DFT In this case, the claim was made by the sons of deceased Som Nath Kamboj who was 40 years old serving in Haryana Civil Services and posted as Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dabwali. The evidence adduced before the Commission suggested that the deceased was a highly qualified officer and was selected for appointment in the Haryana Civil Services on the basis of a competitive examination. He was drawing a salary of Rs.9,668/- per month on the date of his death. The Commission has deducted 1/3rd out of the said amount towards personal expenses of the deceased and taken the loss of dependency to the family to be Rs.77,344/- per annum. It has then applied a multiplier of 15 to award a sum of Rs.11,60,000/-. This amount, in our opinion, needs to be suitably enhanced keeping in view the fact that the deceased was holding a permanent job in the State Government and had prospects of further rise. On the principles stated in Sarla Verma's case (supra), an amount equivalent to 30% of the salary income of the deceased could be added to the gross income of the deceased which would take the gross monthly income of the deceased to Rs.12,568/- per month or Rs.1,50,816/- per annum. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount, the loss of dependency would come to Rs.1,00,544/- per Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 163 annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the total amount of compensation would work out to Rs.15,08,160/-. To that figure, we add Rs.75,000/- taking the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.15,83,160/-.
The amounts of compensation payable to the claimants in the cases discussed above may now be summarised as under:-
Sr. Case Name &Amount Annual Future Annual lossRevised ConventionalTotal No. No. Age of theawarded byIncome prospects of amount offigure (InAmount Deceased the at the(In Rs.) dependencycompensationRs.) {8+9} (In Commissiontime of {5+6-1/3rd payable Rs.) (In Rs.) death towards {7xmultiplier Iin Rs.) personal applied} (In expenses} Rs.) (In Rs.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 8-DFT Gurdeep 312000 54000 0 36000 468000 75000 543000 Singh, 19 years 2 9-DFT Ravinder 390000 144000 0 96000 480000 75000 555000 Kumar 20 years 3 12-DFT Ashwani 390000 144000 0 96000 480000 75000 555000 Kumar, 29 years 4 10-DFT Balbir Singh, 408000 48000 0 32000 544000 75000 619000 24 years 5 11-DFT Ashok Gill, 648000 54000 0 36000 648000 75000 723000 26 years
6 13-DFT Bhagirath, 426300 37608 18804 37608 639336 75000 714336 32 years 7 15-DFT Ashok 816000 72000 0 48000 816000 75000 891000 Wadhera 32 years 8 16-DFT Radhey 900000 90000 0 60000 900000 75000 975000 Shyam Shastri, 36 years 9 18-DFT Ravinder 160000 54000 0 36000 540000 75000 615000 Kumar 40 years 10 19-DFT Om Parkash 316251 36490 0 36327 472251 75000 547251 Mehta, (24327+ 43years 12000) 11 20-DFT Des Raj, 68 160000 48000 0 32000 160000 75000 235000 years 12 22-DFT Surinder 345000 50000 0 33300 532800 75000 607800 Kumar 39 years Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 164 13 23-DFT Ramesh 728000 60000 0 60000 780000 75000 855000 Chugh, 46 (Contribut (Contribution years ion 14 24-DFT Sanjay 1152000 96000 0 64000 1152000 75000 1227000 Kwatra, 26 years 15 25-DFT Niranjan 500000 150000 0 100000 500000 75000 575000 Dass Bansal, 60 years 16 26-DFT Sanjay 1224000 108000 0 72000 1224000 75000 1300,000 Grover 30 (rounded years off) 17 27-DFT Gurdas 432000 36000 18000 36000 648000 75000 723000 Singh, 25 years 18 28-DFT Surinder 1360000 120000 0 80000 1360000 75000 1435000 Kumar, 30 years 19 29-DFT Ashok 1611000 161088 0 107400 1611000 75000 1686000 Kumar (Rounded Sikka, 43 off) years 20 30-DFT Jagwinder 362000 54000 0 36000 468000 75000 543000 Singh 21years 21 31-DFT Ravi 810000 80904 24276 70120 1051800 75000 1126800 Bhateja, 40 years 22 32-DFT Sukhbir 240000 144000 0 96000 480000 75000 555000 Singh, 31 years 23 33-DFT Radhey 324000 108000 0 72000 360000 75000 435000 Sham, 27 years 24 34-DFT Gurdev 204000 108000 0 72000 360000 75000 435000 Singh Shant, 63 years 25 35-DFT Pawan 922500 92232 0 61488 922500 75000 997500 Kumar (Rounded (Rounded Off) Sharma, 40 off) years 26 36-DFT Rajbir 61200 180000 0 120000 600000 75000 675000 Singh, 25 years 27 37-DFT Naresh 528000 72000 0 48000 528000 75000 603000 Kumar, 25 years 28 73-DFT Manphool 192000 57600 28800 57600 288000 75000 363000 Chand, 35 years 29 343-DFT Shalbh 245000 28224 0 18816 244608 75000 319608 Juneja, 26 years Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 165 30 344-DFT Suresh 80000 24000 0 61000 305000 75000 380000 Kumar (45000 + Sethi, 33 16000) years 31 345-DFT Rakesh 335000 125000 0 83334 416670 75000 492000 Kumar, 33 (Rounded years off) 32 362-DFT Bhim Sain, 510000 45000 0 30000 510000 75000 585000 33 years 33 366-DFT Ravi Kumar, 439200 41170 0 27450 439200 75000 514200 34 years (Rounded off) 34 368-DFT Ashok 1384000 159600 0 106400 1384000 75000 1458200 Kumar, 44 (Rounded off) years 35 373-DFT Kishori Lal, 170000 50000 0 33334 170000 75000 245000 67 years (Rounded off) 36 377-DFT Sutanter 128000 38400 0 25600 128000 75000 203000 Singh Bhatti, 60 years 37 472-DFT Satkartar 175000 72000 0 48000 384000 75000 459000 Singh, 26 (Rounded years off) 38 490-DFT Dharam 135000 50400 0 33600 268800 75000 343800 Singh 23 years 39 492-DFT Som Nath 1160000 116016 34800 100544 1508160 75000 1583160 Kamboj, 40 years TOTAL 27697655 Category 6 In this category of cases fall 88 claim petitions filed by those injured in the fire incident. The Commission has categorized these cases into different groups depending upon the extent of disability suffered by them and awarded compensation accordingly. The first of these groups comprises cases in which the victims suffered disability on account of burn injuries ranging between 1% to 10%. In Table "A" to the report submitted by the Commission are enumerated 29 such cases. The second group comprises cases where the disability reported ranges between 11% to 20% enumerated in Table "B" to the report. Similarly, Table "C" to the report enumerates cases where the disability suffered is Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 166 between 21% to 30%, while Table "D" enumerates cases in which the disability reported is between 31% to 40%. Tables "E", "F", "G", "H", "I" and "J" similarly enumerate cases with disabilities ranging between 41% to 50%, 51% to 60%, so on and so forth. Table "K" is the last of the tables enumerating 9 cases in which the percentage of disability is reported to be 100%.
The Commission of Inquiry has, while dealing with the claims in question, referred to certain text books and articles dealing with "Burn Injuries", "Burn Trauma" and their treatment. It has also referred to several judicial pronouncements that lay down the approach to be adopted by the Courts while awarding compensation in injury cases. While we see no error or misdirection on the part of the Commission in identifying and applying the principles governing assessment and award of compensation in injury cases, we may briefly refer to some of the decisions on the subject only to emphasise that the task and process of assessment of compensation in injury cases is by no means an easy task and that some amount of speculation and guess work is inherent in the process of adjudication of such claims.
In Wards v. James (1965) I All England Reports 563, Lord Denning while dealing with the principles governing award of compensation for personal injury identified three distinct matters that need to be kept in mind while undertaking any such exercise. He said:-
"Firstly, Accessibility: In case of grave injury, where the body is wrecked or the brain destroyed. It is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in money, so difficult that the award must basically be Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 167 a conventional figure, derived from experience or from awards in comparable cases.
Secondly, Uniformity: There should be some measure of uniformity in awards so that similar decisions are given in similar cases; otherwise there will be great dissatisfaction in the community and much criticism of the administration of justice. Thirdly, Predictability: Parties should be able to predict with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for by this means cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to be public good".
It was further said:
"Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured much for his 'lost year', you can, however, compensate him for his loss during his shortened span, that is, during his expected 'years of survival'. You can compensate him for his loss of earnings during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursing and attendance. But how can you compensate him for being rendered a helpless invalid? He may, owing to the brain injury, be rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or, owing to a back injury, be unable to rise from his bed. He has lost everything that makes life Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 168 worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet Judges and Juries have to do the best they can and give him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it wellnigh insoluble. They are being asked to calculate the incalculable. The figure is bound to be for the most part a conventional sum. The Judges have worked out pattern and they keep it in line with the changes in the value of money".
Reference may also be made to Thomas v. British Railway Board, 1977 ACJ 222 (CA. England), where Scarman, L.J. Observed:-
"...the greatest element of damage in a case such as this is the pain, the suffering and the loss of the ordinary pleasures and convenience associated with healthy and mobile limbs. All that the court can do is to award such a sum as will enable the plaintiff to acquire some material possessions or to develop a lifestyle which will offset to some extent her terrible disability".
In H.West & Son Limited v. Shephard 1958-65 ACJ 504 (HL, England) the House of Lords emphasised the need for uniformity in the method and the approach to ensure that awards are reasonable, assessed with moderation and also to ensure that comparable injuries are compensated by comparable awards.
In Fowler v. Grace (1970) 114 Sol Jo 1993, the difficulty in the assessment of monetary compensation notwithstanding the need for valuation in terms of money was emphasized to avoid a situation where Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 169 the law became sterile and incapable of giving any remedy at all. The Court observed:
"If a person in an accident loses his sight, hearing or smelling faculty or a limb, value of such deprivation cannot be assessed in terms of market value because there is no market value for the personal asset which has been lost in the accident, and there is no easy way of expressing its equivalent in terms of money. Nevertheless a valuation in terms of money must be made, because, otherwise the law would be sterile and not able to give any remedy at all. Although accuracy and certainty were frequently unobtainable, a fair assessment must be made. Although undoubtedly there are difficulties and uncertainties in assessing damages in personal injury cases, that fact should not preclude an assessment at best as can, in the circumstances be made". (emphasis supplied) To the same effect are the observations made by Lord Morris in Perry v. Cleaver 1969 ACJ 363 (H.L. England) where the Court stated:
"To compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but it is recognized that no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment".
Back home, the pronouncements of the Supreme Court have Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 170 laid down the norms to be adopted in assessing compensation in injury cases and broadly classified damages payable under two distinct heads, namely pecuniary damages and non-pecuniary damages. The distinction between the two was pointed out by the Supreme Court in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others 1995 ACJ (Supreme Court) 366 in the following words:-
"Broadly speaking, while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as, pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non- pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may includes expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far as non pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages of compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e., on account of injury the claimant may not be able to Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 171 walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e. on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life".
The difficulties besetting the process of calculating damages were recognized by the Supreme Court even in Susamma Thomas's case (supra) where the Court observed that calculation of damages necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis in which reason, arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master. The overall picture is what matters. The amount of award, observed their Lordships, must not be niggardly since the law values life and limb in the free society in generous scales. To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Concord of India Insurance Co. Limited v. Nirmala Devi 1980 ACJ 55 (SC).
Let us, in the light of the above pronouncements, now take up for consideration the first group of 29 cases appearing in Table "A" of the report in which percentage of disability suffered by the victims ranges between 1% to 10%. Table "A" contained in the report gives the particulars of the victim and the percentage of burns sustained by him/her as also the percentage of disability reported by the doctors examined in each one of the cases. A closer look at the percentage of burns and the percentage of disability suffered by each victim would show that except in Claim Petition No. 426-DFT filed by Mrs. Surinderpal Kaur alias Shinder Pal Kaur where no burns or disability is reported, in all other cases set out in Table "A", the disability reported is not Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 172 necessarily equivalent to the extent of burns suffered by the victim. For instance, in Claim Petition No. 379-DFT against 2% burns, the disability suffered is 3%. A converse situation is found in Claim Petition No. 389- DFT where the percentage of burns is 10% but the disability is only 2%. In the case of Mehak claimant in Claim Petition No. 420-DFT the percentage of burns was reported to be 35% but the disability is only 6%. Having said that, we must mention that in as many as 9 cases out of 29, enumerated in Table "A", the extent of burn injuries and the percentage of disability are exactly the same. In the remaining, it is either more or less than the percentage of burns. The position is similar in cases enumerated in Table "B" also where the disability suffered is between 11% to 20%. The extent of burns and the disability are more or less comparable though not in all cases. That is true even in Table "C" with a few exceptions in which cases of disability ranging between 21% to 30% have been enumerated. In Table "D", the disparity between the percentage of burns and the percentage of disability becomes more prominent. For instance, in Claim Petition No. 355-DFT filed by Vinod Bansal 25% burns give rise to 36% disability. So also in Claim Petition No. 432-DFT filed by Mrs. Shashi Bala 11% burns give rise to 40% disability. A converse situation is noticed in Claim Petition No. 435-DFT filed by Sanjay Midha where 65% burns have given rise to only 35% disability.
The inference that one can draw from the above state of affairs is that while burns and disability go hand in hand, one need not necessarily be proportionate to the other. No definite co-relation is discernible between the extent of burns and the extent of disabilities Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 173 suffered by the victims. Lesser burns have at times resulted in higher disability. The converse is also noticed in many cases where higher percentage of burns have resulted in relatively lower disability. It will not, therefore, be possible to adopt a norm or formula for calculation of compensation by reference to both i.e. Burns and disability. Any such attempt may lead to anomalous and at times absurd results. The proper course, therefore, appears to be to make the extent of disability as the solitary basis for award of compensation regardless of the extent of burns suffered by the victim except may be in exceptional cases where the disability may be less but non pecuniary damages become awardable on account of loss of amenities such as marriage prospects for young girls and boys. Subject to that exception, we shall proceed to determine the amount of compensation payable on the basis of the extent of disability suffered by the victims on account of the burn injuries sustained by them.
The One Man Commission has, in cases appearing in Table "A" where the disability is between 1% to 10% awarded on a uniform basis a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- towards compensation. It has, while doing so, drawn support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) where the Court noted that Justice Chandrachud had not awarded any compensation in cases where the burns were less than 10% but considered payment of Rs.2,00,000/- in favour of each such victim to be just and reasonable. What is significant is that the report submitted by Justice Chandrachud and the judgment delivered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court have both taken the extent of burns as the basis for award of compensation. There was, it Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 174 appears, no material before the Supreme Court or before Justice Chandrachud for that matter to indicate the extent of disability suffered by the victims on account of the burn injuries sustained by them. Two questions, in the above backdrop, arise at the threshold, namely:-
i) Whether award of Rs.2,00,000/- in 28 cases appearing in Table "A" to the report is just and reasonable compensation in cases where the victims have suffered 1% to 10% disability (not burns); And
ii) If a higher amount than what has been awarded in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) is to be awarded what should that amount be, having regard to the time period that separates the two incidents.
As noticed earlier, in cases enumerated in Table "A" of the report, the extent of disability in comparison to the percentage of burns is lower except in one case where 2% burns have resulted in 3% disability. It is also noteworthy that in Claim Petition No. 420-DFT while the disability is only 6%, the burns sustained were 35%. We, therefore, consider it reasonable to hold that if the extent of disability is the basis for award of compensation, the amount should be higher than what was awarded in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) for a comparable percentage of burns. This means that for disability between 1% to 10% a higher amount of compensation ought to be payable than what was paid for burns sustained between 1% to 10%.
We are also of the view that payment of compensation to a victim who has suffered 10% disability at the same rate at which a Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 175 victim who has suffered only 1% disability would also not be fair and reasonable. While the Supreme Court has accepted the classification of victims by reference to the extent of burns between 1% to 10% in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) we see no reason why victims cannot be classified more closely to reduce the disparity in the award of the amount as far as possible. The proper course, in our opinion, would be to classify the victims in Table "A" into two groups, one who have suffered injuries between 1% to 5% and the other comprising victims who have suffered injuries between 6% to 10%.
Coming to the second question, viz. what is the reasonable amount of compensation payable to the victims in the two categories mentioned above, we are of the view that having regard to the totality of the circumstances, the nature of the evidence led and taking support from what the Supreme Court has awarded in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) award of a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- to victims who suffered 1% to 5% disability should meet the ends of justice. The higher amount awarded by us would not only take care of the qualitative difference between the extent of burns and the resultant disability but also the time gap between the incident in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) and the one we are concerned with.
In so far as victims falling in second category namely those who suffered disability between 6% to 10% are concerned award of a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- to each one of them would be just and fair in our opinion. This amount would include payment for shock, pain and suffering which the victims have gone through or may have to go through for the rest of their lives.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 176
The second head under which amounts have been awarded to the victims is on account of loss of marriage prospects. The Commission has even for that purpose taken support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) where compensation for loss of marriage prospects was related to the extent of burn injuries The compensation awarded, accordingly, ranged between Rs.3,00,000/- to Rs.10,00,000/- in the case of unmarried young girls and Rs.3,00,000/- to Rs.5,00,000/- in the case of unmarried young boys. It is noteworthy that in the case of victims who had 1% to 10% burns Justice Chandrachud had not awarded any amount by way of compensation. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had, however, awarded a consolidated sum of Rs.2,00,000/- to such victims ex-gratia. We have raised that amount to Rs.3,00,000/- in cases where the disability is between 1% to 5% and to Rs.4,00,000/- in cases where the disability is between 6% to 10%. We are of the opinion that every disability must in the case of unmarried girls and boys affect their marriage prospects also. The difficulty arises only in quantifying the amount of compensation payable on that account. Taking a cue from the amount awarded in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) on account of loss of marriage prospects, we are of the opinion that the amount of compensation could start at the base figure of Rs.2,00,000/- in cases where the percentage of disability among girls was between 1% to 5% and rise by Rs.50,000/- in every slab of 5% higher disability. This would mean that for the first category of cases involving young girls who suffered disability between 1% to 5% the total amount of compensation would be Rs.3,00,000/- for disability in addition to Rs.2,00,000/- for loss Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 177 of marriage prospects taking the total to Rs.5,00,000/-. For boys in that category the loss of prospects of marriage could be compensated by award of Rs.1,00,000/- with Rs.50,000/- additional amount for every slab of 5% next above the first slab of 1% to 5%.
Adoption of the above method would, in our opinion, make the entire process uniform, transparent and predictable at the same time reduce the possibilities of any discrimination or unfair treatment in the matter of award of compensation. It goes without saying that in cases where the claimants are married men and women, the amount of compensation towards marriage prospects would not be due and payable. Applying the above norms, the final picture as regards compensation payable to the victims would be as under:-
Sr. Case Name of Extent of Amount of non Amount of Total Amount No. No. Injured disability pecuniary/ compensation (In Rs.) (in %age) disability for loss of compensation marriage (In Rs.) prospects (In Rs.) UNMARRIED GIRLS 1 379-DFT Ramandeep 3 300000 200000 500000 2 450-DFT Pooja alias 4 300000 200000 500000 Shweta 3 444-DFT Anju Rani 4 300000 200000 500000 4 415-DFT Prabhleen Kaur 4 300000 200000 500000 alias Heena 5 384-DFT Pooja Parihar 5 300000 200000 500000 6 420-DFT Mehak 6 400000 250000 650000 7 425-DFT Manju 6 400000 250000 650000 8 405-DFT Ritu Bala 7 400000 250000 650000 9 407-DFT Priya 8 400000 250000 650000 386-DFT Neha alias 8 400000 250000 650000 10 Nikita 11 453-DFT Simmi Monga 9 400000 250000 650000 12 434-DFT Saniya 11 500000 300000 800000 13 429-DFT Gunjan Kamra 12 500000 300000 800000 14 381-DFT Rekha Rani 17 600000 350000 950000 15 421-DFT Bhavik 24 700000 400000 1100000 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 178 16 393-DFT Pooja 26 800000 450000 1250000 17 411-DFT Gagan Monga 37 1000000 550000 1550000 18 439-DFT Sakshi 38.5 1000000 550000 1550000 394-DFT Varsha alias 38.5 1000000 550000 1550000 19 Anjli 20 441-DFT Saloni Bhateja 40 1000000 550000 1550000 21 454-DFT Chanda Rani 45 1100000 600000 1700000 22 383-DFT Anmol Parihar 45 1100000 600000 1700000 23 437-DFT Rinku Sethi 60 1400000 750000 2150000 24 458-DFT Partima 68.5 1600000 850000 2450000 25 436-DFT Neha Midha 100 2200000 1150000 3350000 431-DFT Gagandeep 100 2200000 1150000 3350000 26 Butter 27 410-DFT Seema Rani 100 2200000 1150000 3350000 28 402-DFT Sarabjit Kaur 100 2200000 1150000 3350000 29 396-DFT Suman Kaushal 100 2200000 1150000 3350000 30 392-DFT Geeta Rani 100 2200000 1150000 3350000 UNMARRIED BOYS 1 451-DFT Abhishek 1 300000 100000 400000 2 457-DFT Harsimranjit 2 300000 100000 400000 Singh 3 418-DFT Rajinder Kumar 2 300000 100000 400000 4 389-DFT Dikshant 2 300000 100000 400000 5 475-DFT Rakesh Kumar 2.5 300000 100000 400000 6 438-DFT Sumit 3 300000 100000 400000 7 422-DFT Lalit Kumar 3 300000 100000 400000 8 390-DFT Deepak 3 300000 100000 400000 9 452-DFT Gaurav 4 300000 100000 400000 10 445-DFT Akash 6 400000 150000 550000 11 380-DFT Pankaj Mehta 10 400000 150000 550000 12 446-DFT David 13.5 500000 200000 700000 13 417-DFT Rahul Grover 15 500000 200000 700000 14 459-DFT Pawan Kumar 17 600000 250000 850000 15 378-DFT Navdeep Singh 21.5 700000 300000 1000000 16 403-DFT Subhash 26 800000 350000 1150000 Munna 17 428-DFT Rohit Joshi 27.5 800000 350000 1150000 18 385-DFT Sanjay Kumar 30 800000 350000 1150000 19 395-DFT Vikku 40 1000000 450000 1450000 20 404-DFT Ashish Kumar 50 1200000 550000 1750000 Bansal 21 433-DFT Sahil 54 1300000 600000 1900000 22 419-DFT Rajan 80 1800000 850000 2650000 23 412-DFT Prabhjot 80 1800000 850000 2650000 Vishwas 24 398-DFT Ankit Chugh 80 1800000 850000 2650000 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 179 25 442-DFT Iqbal Singh 85 1900000 900000 2800000 26 424-DFT Navjeet Sethi 85 1900000 900000 2800000 27 387-DFT Venus Sethi 88 2000000 950000 2950000 28 456-DFT Boby Girdhar 95 2100000 1000000 3100000 29 399-DFT Umesh Kumar 100 2200000 1050000 3250000 MARRIED WOMEN 1 426-DFT Surinderpal 0 150000 0 150000 Kaur alias Shinder Pal Kaur 2 423-DFT Sudha Rani 3 300000 0 300000 3 474-DFT Poonam Rani 7 400000 0 400000 4 449-DFT Kiran 7 400000 0 400000 5 460-DFT Veena Rani 8 400000 0 400000 6 406-DFT Savita Angi 15 500000 0 500000 7 448-DFT Alka 17.5 600000 0 600000 8 408-DFT Seema 28 800000 0 800000 9 447-DFT Sushma Rani 32.5 900000 0 900000 10 432-DFT Shashi Bala 40 1000000 0 1000000 11 416-DFT Kamlesh Rani 40 1000000 0 1000000 12 443-DFT Rajni 50 1200000 0 1200000 13 391-DFT Mitu Bala 50 1200000 0 1200000 14 382-DFT Anju Rani 50 1200000 0 1200000 15 427-DFT Savita Sharma 52 1300000 0 1300000 16 455-DFT Madhu Bala 55 1300000 0 1300000 17 413-DFT Veena Rani 70 1600000 0 1600000 18 440-DFT Neera Jagga 100 2200000 0 2200000 19 400-DFT Saroj Rani 100 2200000 0 2200000 MARRIED MEN 1 430-DFT Mukesh Kamra 8 400000 0 400000 2 388-DFT Bir Singh 8 400000 0 400000 3 477-DFT Anil Kumar 22 700000 0 700000 4 356-DFT Ramesh 800000 0 800000 Sachdeva 30 5 435-DFT Sanjay Midha 30.5 900000 0 900000 6 414-DFT Jai Muni Goel 35 900000 0 900000 7 401-DFT Keshav 35 900000 0 900000 Sharma 8 355-DFT Vinod Bansal 36 1000000 0 1000000 9 397-DFT Nazir Singh 50 1200000 0 1200000 10 409-DFT Girdhari Lal 70 1600000 0 1600000 TOTAL 112400000 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 180 Re: Question No.6 There are three distinct aspects which need to be addressed while dealing with this question. The first relates to payment of interest on the amount awarded in favour of the claimants. Whether any interest is at all awardable, and, if so, from what date and at what rate would fall for determination while dealing with this aspect. The second aspect relates to the mode of recovery to be adopted in the event of a default in the payment of the amount by those held liable. The third aspect that needs to be addressed is whether the injured victims are entitled to a direction for treatment at the expense of the State in future.
Coming to the question of award of interest, it was argued on behalf of the School by Mr. Rajiv Atma Ram that the One Man Commission had not awarded any interest in favour of the claimants, which aspect has been left to be determined by this Court. He urged that no interest had been awarded even in Lata Wadhwa's case (Supra) either by Justice Chandrachud, who conducted an Inquiry into the claims or by the Apex Court. This, according to the learned counsel, implied that award of interest was not an essential part of the award of compensation for the Torts suffered by the claimants.
On behalf of the claimants, it was per-contra argued that since the amount of compensation was being awarded on the principles governing claims made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there was no reason why it should be denied to the claimants especially when Section 171 of the Act empowers the Tribunal to award interest at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 181 may be specified by the Tribunal. It was contended that interest was awarded in M.S. Garewal's case (Supra) and is invariably awarded in all Motor Vehicle Accident Claim cases.
Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 makes a specific provision for award of interest where any claim is allowed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The rate of interest and the date from which the same is payable is, however, in the discretion of the Tribunal, subject to the condition that the date of award of interest cannot be earlier to the date of making of the claim. As seen by us in the earlier part of this judgment award of compensation to the claimants in death and injury cases has been guided by the broad principles applicable to cases arising under the Motor Vehicles Act. The multiplier method of determination of compensation in death cases and the broad principles on which amounts have been determined by us in injury cases are not different from those applied and determined under the said Act. Such being the position, there is no reason why award of interest should be denied to the claimants especially when the right to claim and receive the amount relates back to the date on which the incident had taken place and the award of interest to the date on which a claim for payment of compensation filed. That apart award of interest simply ensures that the claimants are not prejudiced on account of the delay in determination of their claims by suitably compensating them, for such delay. No juristic principle has been cited by the respondents on which award of interest may be said to be impermissible in a case like the one at hand. Indeed even in M.S. Garewal's case (Supra) the Court had awarded interest at the rate of 6% in favour of the claimants. The fact Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 182 that no interest was awarded in Lata Wadhwa's case (Supra) also cannot in our opinion, be construed as a declaration of law especially when the question whether interest was payable and if so, from what date and at what rate had not been urged before their Lordships for determination. If the judgment in Lata Wadhwa's Case (Supra) is silent on the question of interest, the same cannot be cited as an authority for denial of interest to the claimants in the present case.
That brings us to the question as to what should be the rate of interest and from what date. Insofar as the date from which the interest is to be awarded is concerned, we see no reason to go against the provisions of the Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no matter that provision may have no direct application to the case at hand. It would be just and proper in our opinion to award interest only from the date of the filing of the claim petitions before the One Man Commission. The rate at which the said interest ought to be paid to the claimants also should not present any serious difficulty. Although there are decisions in which rate of interest has been as high as 12% per annum, as in the case of Kaushlya Devi Vs. Karan Arora & Ors. AIR 2007 SC 1912 and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Shri Laxman Iyer and Anr., 2003(4) RCR (Civil) 764, we are of the view that simple interest at the rate of 6% from the date of filing of the claim petition would serve the ends of justice.
The next question relates to the mode of recovery of the amount awarded against the respondents in the event of their default in making the payment. It may be recalled that out of the total amount awarded by us, 45% has been made payable by the State Government Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 183 out of which 15% is its own liability while the remaining 30% is the liability of the Dakshin Haryana Bijli Virtran Nigam and Municipal Committee, Dabwali with liberty to the State to recover the same from the Board and Municipal Committee, Dabwali. A direction issued to the State Government to pay the said amount within the time stipulated by us, would in our opinion, suffice as a violation of the said direction may itself be the subject matter of contempt proceedings before this Court. What is significant is that 55% of the amount awarded by us is payable by respondents No. 4, 5 and 9. While proceedings for disobedience of the direction to pay may be permissible even for enforcement of the said direction against the said respondents also we need to clarify that apart from recourse to those proceedings, the amount held recoverable from respondents No. No. 4, 5 and 9 shall be recoverable both as fine and/or as arrears of land revenue. In the event of default in payment of the amount within the time that we are granting for such payment or in the event of a dispute as to the exact sum payable in terms of our order, the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali, shall be competent to determine the question and direct payment which direction/order shall tantamount to a certificate for recovery of the amount so determined from the said respondents, as fine and/or as arrears of land revenue by the concerned revenue authority.
That leaves us with the only other aspect viz. whether directions for treatment at the expense of the State need to be issued for the benefit of the injured victims. All that we need say in that regard is that this Court had, vide its orders dated 10.12.1996, 24.09.2001 & 18.02.2002 directed such treatment. Treatment has been accordingly Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 184 provided to the injured as and when required. All that we need say is that in case the State-run hospitals in Haryana are not equipped to provide the requisite treatment to the victims, such treatment may be provided either at the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh, or at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, at the Cost of the State Government upon satisfaction of the Director, Health Services, Government of Haryana that such treatment cannot be provided in the State run Hospitals.
Before concluding, we need to point out that while the hearing of these cases was, at an advanced stage, Civil Miscellaneous No. 1011 of 2009 was filed by applicant Vinod Kumar claiming compensation on account of death of his wife and daughter namely Smt. Asha, aged 28 years and Ganga alias Kunjan Rani aged about 3½ years and Civil Miscellaneous No.16045 of 2009 was filed by applicant Smt. Anil Arora wife of Vijay Arora claiming compensation on account of death of her husband Vijay Kumar and sons namely Ankit aged six years and Archit aged seven years. It was submitted by Ms. Anju Arora, Advocate, that these claims could be entertained by this Court at this stage also and suitable directions be issued for claiming compensation. We regret our inability to do so. The proceedings before the Commission had remained pending for nearly six years. No claim petition was, however, filed by the applicants before the One Man Commission. The applicants have attempted to offer an explanation for their failure. We do not, however, consider it necessary to examine either the explanation or the claim for the present proceedings, at this stage, which remained confined only to cases that were filed before the One Man Commission Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 185 and in which evidence was adduced by the claimants in proof of their respective claims. Whether or not the applicants can maintain the claims at this distinct point of time and, if so, whether the allegations forming the basis of claim are supported by any material and, if so, what is the amount which can be awarded by way of compensation, are mixed questions of law and facts which we cannot, in these proceedings, entertain at this stage. To that we can say that the applicants shall be free to file appropriate proceedings permissible in law for such relief as may be due to them but subject to all just exceptions including maintainability and limitations.
In the result we pass the following order:
1) The amounts determined in each one of the cases referred to in the body of this judgment are hereby awarded in favour of the claimants with interest at the rate of 6% per annum w.e.f. date of the filing of the claim petition before the One Man Commission.
2) Out of the total amount payable to each one of the claimant, the State of Haryana shall pay 45% of the total amount of compensation awarded in each one of the cases dealt with by us with liberty to recover 15% each of the amount so paid from Dakshin Haryana Bijli Virtran Nigam and Municipal Committee, Dabwali. The balance 55% of the amount awarded shall be payable by respondents No.4, 5 and 9 jointly and severally.Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 186
3) The apportionment for the enhanced amount of compensation among the claimants shall be in the same ratio as recommended by the One Man Commission subject only to modifications and/or further directions indicated by us in the body of this judgment. We make it clear that in cases where we have directed deposit of the amount of compensation in the name of minor claimants, the same shall be disbursed to the claimants in case they have already attained majority.
4) The amount awarded by us together with interest shall be deposited by the respondents in the ratio indicated in para 2 above with the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali for disbursement among the claimants within a period of 4 months from today, failing which the rate of interest awarded by us on the principal amount held payable, shall stand enhanced from 6% to 10% per annum from the date the period of 4 months expires till actual payment is made.
5) In the event of any default by the respondents in the making of the payment, the claimants shall be free to not only institute proceedings for the breach of the direction of this Court but also approach the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali for effecting recovery of the amount remaining unpaid. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 187
6) The Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali, shall, in any such event, initiate proceedings for recovery of the amount that remains unpaid as if the same was recoverable as fine and/or as arrears of land revenue for which purpose he shall be competent to issue certificates and instructions to the Collector(s) concerned for recovering the amount outstanding.
7) Treatment for the burn injury sustained by the injured victims shall be provided free of cost. In case the same is not available in the State-run hospitals in Haryana, the same shall be arranged in Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh or at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi upon satisfaction by the Director, Health Services, Government of Haryana that such treatment is essential but cannot be provided in the State-run hospitals.
8) Liberty is given to the petitioners to seek further clarification of this order at any stage, should the need so arise.
9) Civil Miscellaneous Nos.1011 and 16045 of 2009 are dismissed with liberty to the applicants to file appropriate proceedings for payment of amount of compensation and/or other reliefs due to them subject to just exceptions including maintainability of claims and limitations etc. Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 188
10) The costs involved in the setting up of the Commission from beginning till end shall be borne by the State of Haryana.
11) The parties shall bear their own costs in this Court,
and in the proceedings before the One Man
Commission.
(T.S.Thakur)
Chief Justice
(Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia)
Judge
November 9th, 2009
"Deepak"