Calcutta High Court - Port Blair
K. S. Alexander vs The Union Territory Of Andaman And ... on 15 December, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
[CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR]
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PRESENT: HON'BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL)
CRR/58/2025
K. S. Alexander ... Petitioner
Versus
The Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands ... Respondent
For the petitioner : Mr. Sumit Kumar
Mr. Roban Antony
For the Respondent : Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar
Heard on : 10.12.2025
Judgment on : 15.12.2025
SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.
1. The revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing of the proceedings in F.I.R. No. 92/2018 of PS Humfrygunj registered under Sections 282, 336, 304, 34 of Indian Penal Code and under Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Aboriginal Tribes (PAT) Regulation 1956 (amended in 2012).
2. The said case was registered when deceased John Allen Chau, a US citizen was went missing. The allegation against the present petitioner is that he was a friend of the deceased belonging to the same community and he assisted the deceased person's stay here.
23. As per the case of prosecution, on 15.11.2018, the deceased made initial contact with the tribe and was wounded by an arrow. With subsequent efforts to reach the island ended tragically with his death on 17.11.2018. On 17.11.2018, 5 fishermen (hereinafter referred as 'co-accused in FIR No:
92/2018) witnessed the deceased's body being dragged and buried by the Sentinelese on the island's shore.
4. Vide a circular dated 29.6.2018 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, the Restricted Area Permit (RAP) was lifted for foreigners wanting to visit the North Sentinel Island. An office memorandum was also released dated 01.10.2018 by the Government of India, Ministry of Tourism, Travel, Trade Division subject to Restricted Area permit (RAP).
5. It is stated by the petitioner that on 11.04.2025, a new FIR being No. 0012/2025 has allegedly been lodged by Accused no.
5 in F.I.R. No. 91/2018 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the same incident. This FIR was registered eight years of the incident. The prosecution had filed final/closure report in FIR No. 91/2018 and closed the investigation against the alleged murder of the deceased.)
6. It is the case of the prosecution that the new FIR being No. 0012 of 2025 was a number given in the computer when FIR No. 91 of 2018 was transferred to the CID and as a closure 3 report has been filed in F.I.R. No. 91 of 2018, the new F.I.R.
which is connected to F.I.R. No. 91 of 2018 also stood closed.
7. A report to that extent has been called for from the CID by this Court in a CRR/57/2025 which is not connected with the proceedings in this case being F.I.R. No. 92 of 2018 of PS Humfrygunj.
8. In the report dated 11.12.2025 filed in CRR/57/2025, it has been stated as follows :-
"The report pertains to the re-registration of FIR No. 91/2018 dated 20/11/2018 U/s 302/34 IPC of PS Humfrigunj as FIR No. 12/2025 dated 11/04/2025 U/s 302/34 IPC, upon its transfer to PS Crime and Economic Offence.
That as per the CCTNS procedure/module, when the investigation of FIR No. 91/2018 dated 20/11/2018 under Section 302/34 IPC of PS Humfrigunj was transferred to PS Crime & Economic Offence, a new internal FIR number-FIR No. 12/2025 dated 11/04/2025 under Section 302/34 IPC-was automatically generated for indexing and for updating case diaries, charge sheet, or final report within CCTNS. However, this newly generated FIR is solely for internal CCTNS processing and is not submitted to the court for registration. However, the newly generated (re-registered) FIR remains visible to the general public on the Citizen Portal.
That after completion of investigation of FIR.No.91/2018 dated 20/11/2018 U/s 302/34 IPC of PS Humfrigunj, a final report vide No.05/2025 dated 06/07/2025 as undetected has been submitted in court which was accepted by the Trial Court vide Order dated 22/09/2025 in GR.Case No.2173 of 2018.4
That the case diaries and final report submitted in FIR No. 91/2018 dated 20/11/2018 under Section 302/34 IPC of PS Humfrigunj have also been updated in the newly generated FIR No. 12/2025 of PS Crime & Economic Offence.".
9. Admittedly, the trial in the present case has progressed substantially. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner/ accused that though charge sheet has been filed in 2021, the trial is not being concluded expeditiously.
10. Considering the prima facie materials on record which includes the evidence and materials in the case diary, this Court finds that there is a prima facie case for the prosecution to proceed in the trial and as such a case for quashing has not been made out.
11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner places a letter dated 04.01.2019 issued to the petitioner/accused herein, wherein it appears that he has been suspended from service as Electronic Engineer (Grade-I) since 2019 and because of this pending trial, the petitioner is unable to get any engagement/work from any forum and for which he and his family are being severely prejudiced, having no source of income.
512. In The Central Bureau of Investigation - versus - Mir Usman @ ARA @ Mir Usman Ali reported in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. (s). 969/2025, the Supreme Court held that :-
"12. Section 309 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C.") reads as under:
"309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.-
(1) In every inquiry or trial the proceedings shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded:
Provided that when the inquiry or trial relates to an offence under section 376, section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA or section DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the inquiry or trial shall] be completed within a period of two months from the date of filing of the charge sheet. (2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may. from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody:
Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time:
Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing:6
Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused person to show cause against the sentence proposed to be imposed on him. Provided also that-
(a) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party:
(b) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another Court, shall not be a ground for adjournment;
(c) where a witness is present in Court but a party or his pleader is not present or the party or his pleader though present in Court, is not ready to examine or cross-examine the witness, the Court may, if thinks fit, record the statement of the witness and pass such orders as it thinks fit dispensing with the examination-in-chief or cross-
examination of the witness, as the case may be.
Explanation 1.-If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand.
Explanation 2. The terms on which an adjournment or postponement may be granted include, in appropriate cases, the payment of costs by the prosecution or the accused."
13. In a comprehensive decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Shambhu Nath Singh and Ors. reported in (2001) 4 SCC 667 the legal position on the aspect of delay in the examination of the witnesses and the purport of Section 309 of the 7 Cr.P.C. (now Section 346 of the BNSS, 2023) have been dealt with in extenso in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14 and 18 respectively. The relevant paragraphs read thus:
11. The first sub-section mandates on the trial courts that the proceedings shall be held expeditiously but the words "as expeditiously as possible" have provided some play at the joints and it is through such play that delay often creeps in the trials. Even so, the next limb of the sub-
section sounded for a more vigorous stance to be adopted by the court at a further advanced stage of the trial. That stage is when examination of the witnesses begins. The legislature which diluted the vigour of the mandate contained in the initial limb of the sub-section by using the words "as expeditiously as possible" has chosen to make the requirement for the next stage (when examination of the witnesses has started) to be quite stern. Once the case reaches that stage the statutory command is that such examination "shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined". The solitary exception to the said stringent rule is, if the court finds that adjournment "beyond the following day to be necessary"
the same can be granted for which a condition is imposed on the court that reasons for the same should be recorded. Even this dilution has been taken away when witnesses are in attendance before the court. In such situation the court is not given any power to adjourn the case except in the extreme contingency for which the second proviso to sub-section (2) has imposed another condition, "provided 8 further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing".
(emphasis supplied)
12. Thus, the legal position is that once examination of witnesses started, the court has to continue the trial from day to day until all witnesses in attendance have been examined (except those whom the party has given up). The court has to record reasons for deviating from the said course. Even that is forbidden when witnesses are present in court, as the requirement then is that the court has to examine them. Only if there are "special reasons", which reasons should find a place in confer the order for adjournment, that alone can confer jurisdiction on the court to adjourn the case without examination of witnesses who are present in court.
13. Now, we are distressed to note that it is almost a common practice and regular occurrence that trial courts flout the said command with impunity. Even when witnesses are present, cases are adjourned on far less serious or even on flippant grounds. Adjournments are granted even in such situations on the mere asking for it. Quite often such adjournments are granted to suit the convenience of the advocate concerned. We make it clear that the legislature has frowned at granting adjournments on that ground. At any rate inconvenience of an advocate is not a 9 "special reason" for bypassing the mandate of Section 309 of the Code.
14. If any court finds that the day-to-
day examination of witnesses mandated by the legislature cannot be complied with due to the non-
cooperation of the accused or his counsel the court can adopt any of the measures indicated in the sub-section i.e. remanding the accused to custody or imposing cost on the party who wants such adjournments (the cost must be commensurate with the loss suffered by the witnesses, including the expenses to attend the court). Another option is, when the accused is absent and the witness is present to be examined, the court can cancel his bail, if he is on bail (unless an application is made on his behalf seeking permission for his counsel to proceed to examine the witnesses present even in his absence provided the accused gives an undertaking in writing that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case).
18. It is no justification to glide on any alibi by blaming the infrastructure for skirting the legislative mandates embalmed in Section 309 of the Code. A judicious judicial officer who is committed to his work could manage with the existing infrastructure for complying with such legislative mandates. The precept in the old homily that a lazy workman always blames his tools, is the only answer to those indolent judicial officers who find fault with the defects in the system and the imperfections of the 10 existing infrastructure for their tardiness in coping with such directions."
14. In the aforesaid context, we may recapitulate a passage from Gurnaib Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2013) 7 SCC 108 as follows:
"1 ...... We are compelled to proceed to reiterate the law and express our anguish pertaining to the manner in which the trial was conducted as it depicts a very disturbing scenario. As is demonstrable from the record, the trial was conducted in an extremely haphazard and piecemeal manner. Adjournments were granted on a mere asking. The cross- examination of the witnesses was deferred without recording any special reason and dates were given after a long gap. The mandate of the law and the views expressed by this Court from time to time appears to have been totally kept at bay. The learned trial Judge, as is perceptible, seems to have ostracised from his memory that a criminal trial has its own gravity and sanctity. In this regard, we may refer with profit to the pronouncement in Talab Haji Hussain v.
Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar2 wherein it has been stated that an accused person by his conduct cannot put a fair trial into jeopardy, for it is the primary and paramount duty of the criminal courts to ensure that the risk to fair trial is removed and trials are allowed to proceed smoothly without any interruption or obstruction."
15. Be it noted, in the said case, the following passage from Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab 11 reported in (2000) 5 SCC 668, was reproduced. "It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal case adjourned again and again till the witness tires and gives up. It is the game of unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for one excuse or the other till a witness is won over or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened, he is abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or even bribed. There is no protection for him. In adjourning the matter without any valid cause a court unwittingly becomes party to miscarriage of justice."
16. In this regard, it is also fruitful to refer to the authority in Shambu Nath Singh (supra) wherein this Court deprecating the practice of a Sessions Court adjourning a case in spite of the presence of the witnesses willing to be examined fully, opined thus:
"9. We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present in court he must be examined on that day. The court must know that most of the witnesses could attend the court only at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their own avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income. The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness may be paid by the court is generally a poor solace for the financial loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight in the trial courts that witnesses who are called through summons or other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case is adjourned to another day. This primitive practice must be reformed by the presiding officers of the trial courts and it can be reformed by everyone provided the 12 presiding officer concerned has a commitment towards duty."
17. This Court in Doongar Singh and ors. v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2017) INSC 1154 after referring to all the aforesaid decisions of this Court observed as under:
"9. In spite of repeated directions of this Court, the situation appears to have remained unremedied.
10. We hope that the Presiding Officers of the trial courts conducting criminal trials will be mindful of not giving such adjournments after commencement of the evidence in serious criminal cases.
11. We are also of the view that it is necessary in the interest of justice that the eye-witnesses are examined by the prosecution at the earliest.
12. It is also necessary that the statements of eye-witnesses are got recorded during investigation itself under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. In view of amendment to Section 164 Cr.P.C. by the Act No. 5 of 2009, such statement of witnesses should be got recorded by audio-video electronic means.
13. To conclude: (i) The trial courts must carry out the mandate of Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. as reiterated in judgments of this Court, inter alia, in State of U.P. versus Shambhu Nath Singh and Others (2001) 4 SCC 667 , Mohd. Khalid versus State of W.B. 13 (2002) 7 SCC 334 and Vinod Kumar versus State of Punjab (2015) 3 SCC
220. (ii) The eye-witnesses must be examined by the prosecution as soon as possible. (iii) Statements of eye-
witnesses should invariably be recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. as per procedure prescribed thereunder.
14. The High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the trial courts for compliance of the above."
18. Thus, in Doongar Singh (supra) this Court in no uncertain terms had conveyed that the trial courts must carry out the mandate of Section 309 of the CrPC (now Section 346 of the BNSS, 2023) as reiterated in Shambhu Nath Singh (supra), Mohd. Khalid (supra) and Vinod Kumar (supra).
19. There are various other provisions in the Cr.P.C. (now BNSS, 2023) which ensure speedy trial and an early investigation:
I. Under Section 157(1) of Cr.P.C. (now Section 176 of the BNSS, 2023) every officer in charge of a police station is bound to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender.
II. Section 167(2)(a) of Cr.P.C. (now Section 187 of the BNSS, 2023) provides that no magistrate shall authorize the detention of the accused person in custody for total period exceeding;14
(i) 90 days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, life imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years;
(ii) 60 days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and on the expiration of such period as case may be the accused shall be released on bail.
III. Section 173(1) of Cr.P.C. (now Section 173(1) of the BNSS, 2023) provides that every investigation under chapter XII shall be completed without unnecessary delay.
IV. Section 173(1A) of Cr.P.C. (now Section 173 of the BNSS, 2023) provides that the investigation in relation to rape of a child may be completed within three months from the date on which the information was recorded by the officer in charge of the police station.
V. Section 207 of Cr.P.C. (now Section 230 of the BNSS, 2023) casts a duty on the magistrate that a copy of (i) the police report;(ii) FIR recorded under section 154
(iii) statement recorded under section 161(3) of all persons(iv)confession and statement recorded under section 164(v) any other document forwarded to the magistrate with the police report under section 173(5), shall be given to the accused free of coast.
VI. Chapter XXI of Cr.P.C. provides provisions (from Section 260 to 265, now Sections 283 to 287 of the BNSS, 2023) for summary trial in certain petty offences.
15VII. Chapter XXIA of Cr.P.C. provides provisions (from Section 265-A to 265-L, now Sections 289 to 303 of the BNSS, 2023) for Plea Bargaining. This chapter is applicable to other than an offence which punishment of death or of imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years has been provided under the law time being in force but does not apply where such offences affects the socio economic condition of the country or has been committed against a woman, or a child below age of fourteen years.
VIII. Section 309(1) of Cr.P.C. (now Section 346 of the BNSS, 2023) provides that in every inquiry or trial the proceeding shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined. It also provides that when the inquiry or trial relates to an offence under section 376, or 376-A or 376-B or 376-C or 376-D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the inquiry or trial shall, as far as possible be completed within a period of two months from the date of filing of the chargesheet.
IX. Section 468 of Cr.P.C. (now Section 514 of the BNSS, 2023) Provides bar in taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. Sub section (2) provides limitation period as (a) 6 months, if the offence is punishable with fine only (b) 1 year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year (c) 3 year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
1620. Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 346 of the BNSS, 2023) contains a mandatory provision that in every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day basis until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined unless the Court finds the adjournment of the case beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. The emphasis of this Section cannot be overlooked and must not be overlooked by any Judicial Officer who tries a criminal case, much less by the higher officers, like the Sessions Judges presiding over the Sessions Court, where serious offences are being tried day in and day out.
21. It is true that the court has the discretion to defer the cross-examination. But we do not approve the practice prevailing in the trial courts across the country that the examination-in-chief of a particular witness is recorded in a particular month and his cross-examination would follow in particular subsequent month. The legal position is that once the examination of witnesses starts the court concerned must continue the trial from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined (except those whom the public prosecutor has given up). We are at pains to note that it is almost a common practice and regular occurrence that the trial courts flout the said mandate with impunity. Even when witnesses are present, cases are adjourned on far less serious reasons or even on flimsy grounds. The legislature itself has frowned at granting adjournment on flimsy grounds.
1722. In Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. reported in 2002 (7) SCC 334, a three Judge Bench of this Court did not approve the deferment of the cross- examination of the witness for a long time and, deprecating the said practice, it observed as follows:
"Unnecessary adjournments give a scope for a grievance that the accused persons get a time to get over the witnesses. Whatever be the truth in this allegation, the fact remains that such adjournments lack the spirit of Section 309 of the Code. When a witness is available and his examination in chief is over, unless compelling reasons are there, the trial court should not adjourn the matter on the mere asking."
23. In Akil alias Javed v. State of Delhi reported in 2012 (11) SCALE 709, this Court, after surveying the earlier pronouncements, has stressed on the compliance of the procedure and expressed its anguish that the Trial Courts are not strictly adhering to the procedure prescribed under the provisions contained in Section 231 along with Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. respectively and further emphasised that such adherence can ensure speedy trial of cases and also rule out the possibility of any maneuvering taking place by granting undue long adjournment for mere asking.
24. In Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna reported in (1980) 1 SCC 81, this Court held that an expeditious trial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.
1825. In A.R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225, this Court declared that speedy trial is not only the right of the accused but is also in public interest and that the right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial.
26. In Sher Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1983) 2 SCC 344, this Court sounded the following note of caution against delay of criminal trials:
"16... The essence of the matter is that all procedure, no matter what the stage, must be fair, just and reasonable...Article 21 stands like a sentinel over human misery... It reverberates through all stages the trial, the sentence, the incarceration and finally, the execution of the sentence."
27. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1985) 1 SCC 275 and Triveni Ben v. State of Gujarat reported in (1989) 1 SCC 678. Even in cases where the accused had been enlarged on bail the right to a speedy trial was held to be a part of the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The decisions of this Court in Biswanath Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar reported in 1994 Supp.(3) SCC 97 and Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 149 may be referred to in this regard.
28. It is in the light of the settled legal position that it is no longer possible to question the legitimacy of the right to speedy trial as a part of 19 the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. The essence of Article 21 of the Constitution lies not only in ensuring that no citizen is deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, but also that such procedure ensures both fairness and an expeditious conclusion of the trial.
29. In Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Administration) reported in AIR 1984 SC 618, it was held that it is most expedient that the trial before the Court of Session should proceed and be dealt with continuously from its inception to its finish. Not only will it result in expedition, it will also result in the elimination of manoeuvre and mischief. It will be in the interest of both the prosecution and the defence that the trial proceeds from day to day. It is necessary to realise that Sessions cases must not be tried piecemeal. Once the trial commences, except for a very pressing reason which makes an adjournment inevitable, it must proceed de die in diem until the trial is concluded.
30. In Gurnaib Singh (supra) this Court observed in para 34 as under:
"We have expressed our anguish, agony and concern about the manner in which the trial has been conducted. We hope and trust that the trial courts shall keep in mind the statutory provisions and the interpretation placed by this Court and not be guided by their own thinking or should not become mute spectators when a trial is being conducted by allowing the control to the counsel for the parties. They have their roles to perform. They are required to monitor. They cannot abandon their 20 responsibility. It should be borne in mind that the whole dispensation of criminal justice system at the ground level rests on how a trial is conducted. It needs no special emphasis to state that dispensation of criminal justice system is not only a concern of the Bench but has to be the concern of the Bar. The administration of justice reflects its purity when the Bench and the Bar perform their duties with utmost sincerity. An advocate cannot afford to bring any kind of disrespect to fairness of trial by taking recourse to subterfuges for procrastinating the same."
31. The right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the constitution of India. The first written articulation of the right to speedy trial appeared in 1215 in the Magna Carta: "We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." Article 21 of the Indian constitution declares that "no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure laid by law." Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Babu Singh v. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1978 SC 527 remarked, "Our justice system even in grave cases, suffers from slow motion syndrome which is lethal to "fair trial" whatever the ultimate decision. Speedy justice is a component of social justice since the community, as a whole, is concerned in the criminal being condignly and finally punished within a reasonable time and the innocent being absolved from the inordinate ordeal of criminal proceedings." In the case of Sheela Barse v. Union of India reported in (1986) 3 SCR 562, this Court has held that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right. Further it was stated by this Court that the consequence of violation of the 21 fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of fundamental right.
32. Section 309 has been inserted in the Cr.P.C. keeping in view this constitutional mandate of speedy trial.
33. In the decision reported in Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Administration) reported in (1984) 1 SCC 722, this Court in paras 2 and 3 respectively has held as under:
"2. We think it is an entirely wholesome practice for the trial to go on from day to day. It is most expedient that the trial before the Court of Session should proceed and be dealt with continuously from its inception to its finish. Not only will it result in expedition, it will also result in the elimination of manoeuvre and mischief. It will be in the interest of both the prosecution and the defence that the trial proceeds from day to day. It is necessary to realise that Sessions cases must not be tried piecemeal. Before commencing a trial, a Sessions Judge must satisfy himself that all necessary evidence is available. If it is not, he may postpone the case, but only on the strongest possible ground and for the shortest possible period. Once the trial commences, he should, except for a very pressing reason which makes an adjournment inevitable, proceed de die in diem until the trial is concluded.
3. We are unable to appreciate the difficulty said to be experienced by the Petitioner. It is stated that his Advocate is 22 finding it difficult to attend the court from day to day. It is the duty of every Advocate, who accepts the brief in a criminal case to attend the trial from day to day. We cannot overstress the duty of the Advocate to attend to the trial from day to day. Having accepted the brief, he will be committing a breach of his professional duty, if he so fails to attend. The criminal miscellaneous petition is, therefore, dismissed."
(emphasis supplied)
34. Again, in Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab reported in 2015 (1) SCALE 542, this Court expressed the agony and anguish by observing as under:
"41. ....Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, after the examination in chief of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for cross- examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note of. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurize the witness and to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. There is no cavil over the proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the trial to be guided by the mandate of the law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on 23 the basis of the material brought on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected in law to follow the command of the procedure relating to trial and not yield to the request of the counsel to grant adjournment for nonacceptable reasons. In fact, it is not all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination after such a long span of time. It is imperative if the examination in chief is over, the cross- examination should be completed on the same day. If the examination of a witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned to the next day for cross- examination. It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such a long time. It is anathema to the concept of proper and fair trial. The duty of the court is to see that not only the interest of the accused as per law is protected but also the societal and collective interest is safeguarded. It is distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues. How long shall we say, "Awake! Arise!". There is a constant discomfort. Therefore, we think it appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating the same among the learned trial Judges with a 24 command to follow the principles relating to trial in a requisite manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, for it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be remembered that law cannot allowed to be lonely; a destitute."
(emphasis supplied)
35. The practice of conducting trials on a day to day basis more particularly in important or sensitive cases as was the tradition about thirty years ago has been given a complete go-by. We sincerely believe that it is high time that the courts revert to that practice. For the purpose of reverting to the old practice, it is necessary to understand the current social, political and administrative scenario including the way the Police are functioning. All the High Courts need to constitute a Committee to discuss this issue very seriously for the benefit of their respective district judiciaries.
36. One of the significant factors contributing to delays in the justice system is the discretionary practice of noncontinuous criminal trials, where evidence is heard by the court in piecemeal fashion, with cases effectively spread out over the course of many months or even years. While limited judicial or court resources and a shortage of available court time due to the volume of cases are often cited for the use of this discretionary practice, the costs of non-continuous trials to both parties and to the justice system as a whole can far outweigh the perceived benefits.
25Necessity for the High Courts to issue a Circular
37. The Chief Justices of the High Courts may direct their administrative side to issue a circular to the respective district judiciaries stating as under:
[1] The proceedings in every inquiry or trial shall be held expeditiously.
[2] When the stage of examination of witnesses starts such examination shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in the attendance have been examined except for special reasons to be recorded in writing.
[3] When the witnesses are in attendance before the Court no adjournment or postponement shall be granted without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing.
[4] The Court should not grant the adjournment to suit the convenience of the advocate concerned except on very exceptional grounds like bereavement in the family and similar exceptional reasons duly supported by memo. Be it noted that the said inconvenience of an advocate is not a "Special Reason" for the purpose of bypassing the immunity of Section 309 of the Cr.P.C.
[5] In case of non-cooperation of accused or his counsel, the following shall be kept in mind:26
a. In case of non-cooperation of the counsel, the Court shall satisfy itself whether the non-cooperation is in active collusion with the accused to delay the trial. If it is so satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing, it may, if the accused is on bail, put the accused on notice to show cause why the bail cannot be cancelled.
b. In cases where the accused is not in collusion with lawyer and it is the lawyer who is not cooperating with the trial, the Court may for reason to be recorded, appoint an amicus curiae for the accused and fix a date for proceeding with cross-examination/ trial.
c. The Court may also in appropriate cases impose cost on the accused commensurate with the loss suffered by the witness including the expenses to attend the court.
d. In case when the accused is absent and the witness is present for examination, in that case the Court can cancel the bail of accused if he is on bail. (Unless an application is made on his behalf seeking permission for his counsel to proceed to examine the witness present even in his absence, provided the accused gives an undertaking in writing that, he would not dispute, his identity as a particular accused in the case.) 27 [6] The Presiding Officer of each Court may evolve the system for framing a schedule of constructive working days for examination of witnesses in each case, well in advance, after ascertaining the convenience of counsel on both sides.
[7] The summons or process could be handed over to the Public Prosecutor in- charge of the case to cause them to be served on the witnesses, as per schedule fixed by the Court.
This order may be made part of the circular as an annexure.".
13. Considering the facts following the guidelines as laid down in the above judgments and circumstances herein this Court finds that this a fit case where the Trial Court should be directed to conduct day to day trial ensuring that the proceedings in the present case is concluded by way of passing final judgment expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of this order as 07 (seven) long years have passed since the incident in this case.
14. The Trial Court on putting both parties to notice shall conduct day to day hearing following the guidelines of the Supreme Court on and from 17.12.2025 and proceed to 28 conclude the trial without granting any unnecessary adjournment to either of the sides.
15. The revisional application stands disposed of along with all connected application, if any.
16. The interim order, if any, stands vacated.
17. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, may be supplied to the parties upon compliance of usual formalities.
[ SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. ]