Allahabad High Court
Ravindra Kumar vs Rent Authority Additional District And ... on 19 February, 2026
Author: Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
Bench: Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD WRIT A No. - 19650 of 2025 Ravindra Kumar ..Petitioners(s) Versus Rent Authority/ Additional District Magistrate (City) Ghaziabad And Another ..Respondents(s) Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Kuldeep Kumar Sharma, Santosh Kumar Shukla Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C. AND WRIT-A No.19129 of 2025 Kapil Mohan Agarwal vs. Mohammad Ahmad AND WRIT-A No.371 of 2026 Ram Kumar Varshney vs. Smt. Anita Varshney & Another AND WRIT-A No.874 of 2026 Smt. Suman Dwivedi vs. Sanjeev Sahani & Another AND WRIT-A No.950 of 2026 Ravi Prakash Sahu vs. Rahman Court No. - 35 AFR HONBLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
Heard S/Sri Santosh Kumar Shukla, Anwar Hussain, K K Tripathi, and Pankaj Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. Sri Manish Goyal, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing along with S/Sri Harish Chandra Kesari, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, Vidya Kant Shukla, learned Standing Counsel and Ravi Anand Agarwal, Advocate, for the State of Uttar Pradesh, has also been heard at length on the question relating to interpretation of the provisions of the U.P. Act No.16 of 2021.
2. The present batch of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India have been filed, seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the orders dated 8.9.2025 (in Writ-A No.19650 of 2025), 20.3.2025 & 13.11.2025 (in Writ-A No.19129 of 2025), 12.11.2025 (in Writ-A No.371 of 2026), 16.9.2025 & 8.1.2026 (in Writ-A No.874 of 2026) and 9.12.2025 (in Writ- A No.950 of 2026) passed in proceedings instituted under the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 2021).
3. A question has arisen with regard to the maintainability of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution on the premise that an order passed in appeal by the appellate officer under the U P Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 is a judicial order passed by civil court and in view of the authoritative pronouncement made in the case of Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath1, the same would not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
4. Sri Santosh Kumar Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ-A No.19650 of 2025 has placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Chanda Devi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Misc. Single No. 6795 of 2014 (decided on 6.11.2025), to contend that only judgments and orders passed by Civil Courts governed by the Code of Civil Procedure would ordinarily attract objection as to maintainability under Article 226, and that such principle would not extend to every inferior court or tribunal.
5. Sri Anwar Hussain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ-A No.19129 of 2025 has sought to draw a distinction between courts and tribunals and has placed reliance upon the decision in State of Gujarat & Another vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association & Another2. It has been submitted that the High Courts power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 would extend to a tribunal or authority only if it performs judicial functions, and that the nature of the forum in question must therefore be examined in the light of the statutory scheme.
6. Per contra, Sri Pankaj Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ-A No.371 of 2026 has submitted that the controversy involved in the present batch of petitions stands concluded by the judgment of this Court in Radha Kishan vs. State of U.P. and Others, Writ-C No.9518 of 2001 (decided on 26.11.2021). It has been urged that the Rent Tribunal under the Act, 2021, being presided over by the District Judge or the Additional District Judge nominated by the District Judge, must be held to be a Civil Court exercising judicial powers and, consequently, subject to the superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
7. Learned Additional Advocate General has invited the attention of the Court to the scheme of the Act, 2021. He submits that under Section 32, the Rent Tribunal is to be presided over by the District Judge or by an Additional District Judge nominated by the District Judge. Under Section 34(1), the Tribunal is vested with the same powers as are conferred upon a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purposes specified therein. It has further been submitted that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Act, 2021, the District Judge or the Additional District Judge does not act as persona designata but in the capacity of a pre-existing judicial authority. The Tribunal performs adjudicatory functions of a judicial character and renders binding and reasoned determinations between contesting parties. It is, therefore, contended that the Rent Tribunal would not ordinarily be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and would instead be subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.
8. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contentions, the relevant provisions of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 would be required to be adverted to.
9. The U.P. Regulation Of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 20213 [Act no. 16 of 2021 dated 11 January, 2021] is an Act to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters. The provisions of the aforesaid Act which would be relevant for the purposes of the controversy involved in the present case are extracted below:
2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(e) "Rent Authority" means an officer appointed under section 30;
(f) "Rent Tribunal" means a Tribunal within the meaning of section 32;
30. Rent Authority. The District Collector shall appoint an officer, not below the rank of Additional District Collector, to be the Rent Authority within his jurisdiction.
32. Rent Tribunal. The Rent Tribunal shall be presided over by the District Judge himself or by Additional District Judge nominated by the District Judge in each district.
33. Procedure to be followed in Rent Authority and Rent Tribunal.
(1) Save as provided in this Act, nothing contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. 5 of 1908) shall apply to the Rent Authority and Rent Tribunal, which shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and shall have power to regulate their own procedure in the following manner, namely:
(a) the landlord or the tenant may file an application or appeal before the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal, as the case may be, accompanied by affidavit and documents, if any;
(b) the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal, as the case may be, shall then issue notice to the opposite party, accompanied by copies of application or appeal, affidavit and documents;
(c) the opposite party shall file a reply accompanied by affidavit and documents, if any, after serving a copy of the same to the applicant;
(d) the applicant may file a rejoinder, if any, after serving the copy to the opposite party;
(e) the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal, as the case may be, shall fix a date of hearing and may hold such summary inquiry as it deems necessary.
(2) The Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal, as the case may be, shall endeavor to dispose the case as expeditiously as possible, not exceeding a period of more than sixty days from the date of receipt of the application or appeal:
Provided that where any such application or appeal, as the case may be, could not be disposed of within the said period of sixty days, the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal, as the case may be, shall record its reasons in writing for not disposing of the application or appeal within that period.
(3) In every application or appeal, before the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal, as the case may be, the evidence of a witness shall be given by affidavit:
Provided that the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal, as the case may be, may, where it appears to it that it is necessary in the interest of justice to call a witness for examination or cross-examination, order attendance of such witness to be present for examination or cross-examination.
(4) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. 5 of 1908) regarding service of summons shall be applicable mutatis mutandis for service of notice by the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal. In addition to the said mode of service, the service of notice to landlord or tenant may also be effected through e-mail, Whatsapp, SMS or other recognized electronic mode.
(5) Every application or appeal shall be in such form as may be prescribed.
(6) The Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal, as the case may be, shall not allow more than three adjournments at the request of a party throughout the proceedings and in case of reasonable and sufficient cause to do so, it shall record the reasons for the same in writing and order the party requesting adjournment to pay a reasonable cost.
(7) Every application under clauses (a), (b), (e), (f) and (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 21 or under Section 22 shall be decided within ninety days from the date of filing of such application before the Rent Authority.
(8) The Rent Authority shall decide every application filed under clause (c) and (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 21 within thirty days from the date of filing of such application.
34. Powers of Rent Authority and Rent Tribunal.
(1) The Rent Authority and the Rent Tribunal shall, for discharging their functions under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. 5 of 1908) for the purposes of:
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) issuing commission for examination of the witnesses or documents;
(d) issuing commission for local investigation;
(e) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(f) dismissing an application or appeal for default or deciding it ex parte;
(g) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application or appeal for default or any other order passed by it ex parte;
(h) any other matter, which may be prescribed.
(2) Any proceedings before the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and 228, and for the purpose of Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860); and the Rent Authority and the Rent Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974).
(3) For the purposes of holding any inquiry or discharging any duty under this Act, the Rent Authority may:
(a) after giving not less than twenty-four hours' notice in writing, enter and inspect or authorize any officer, subordinate to it, to enter and inspect, any premises at any time between sunrise and sunset;
(b) by a written order, require any person to produce for its inspection such books or documents relevant to the inquiry, at such time and at such place as may be specified in the order.
(4) The Rent Authority may, if it thinks fit, appoint one or more persons having special knowledge of the matter under consideration as an assessor or valuer to advise it in the proceeding before it.
(5) Any clerical or arithmetical mistake in any order passed by the Rent Authority or any other error arising out of any accidental omission may, at any time, be corrected by the Rent Authority on an application received by it in this behalf from any of the parties or otherwise.
(6) The Rent Authority may exercise the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class for the recovery of the fine under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) and the Rent Authority shall be deemed to be a Magistrate under the said Code for the purposes of such recovery.
(7) An order made by a Rent Authority or an order passed in appeal under this Chapter shall be executable by the Rent Authority as a decree of Civil Court and for this purpose, the Rent Authority shall have the powers of a Civil Court.
(8) The Rent Authority may set aside or recall any order passed ex parte if the aggrieved party files an application and satisfies it that the notice was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the case was taken up for hearing.
(9) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Rent Authority shall, subject to decision in appeal, be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings.
35. Appeal to Rent Tribunal.
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Authority may prefer an appeal along with a certified copy of such order to the Rent Tribunal within the local limits of which the premises is situated, within a period of thirty days from the date of the order:
Provided that no appeal shall lie unless the appellant pre-deposits fifty percent of the entire payable amount under the impugned order of the Rent Authority.
(2) Upon filing an appeal under sub-section (1), the Rent Tribunal shall serve notice, along with a copy of memorandum of appeal to the respondent and fix a hearing not later than thirty days from the date of service of notice of appeal on the respondent and the appeal shall be disposed of within a period of sixty days from such date of service.
(3) Where the Rent Tribunal considers it necessary in the interest of arriving at a just and proper decision, it may allow filing of documents at any stage of the proceedings in appeal:
Provided that no such document shall be allowed more than once during the hearing.
(4) The Rent Tribunal may, in its discretion, pass such interlocutory order during the pendency of the appeal, as it may deem fit.
(5) While deciding the appeal, the Rent Tribunal may, after recording reasons therefor, confirm, set aside or modify the order passed by a Rent Authority.
38. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred in respect of certain matters.
(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to the provisions of this Act.
(2) The jurisdiction of the Rent Authority shall be limited to tenant agreement submitted to it as specified in the First Schedule and shall not extend to the question of title or ownership of premises.
41. Application of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of Limitation Act, 1963 shall mutatis mutandis apply to all proceedings under this Act.
42. Overriding effect. The provisions of this Act shall have notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law of the State of Uttar Pradesh for the time being in force.
10. It would also be relevant to take note of certain provisions under the U P Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Rules, 20214. Rules 12 and 13 of the aforesaid Rules, are being reproduced below:
12. Appeal.-(1) Every appeal under this '[Act] shall be preferred in -the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant, and presented either in person or through counsel to the Rent Tribunal which shall be in Form. 9. The E-mail IDs or WhatsApp numbers or contact number of the appellant, his counsel and respondent shall also be mentioned in such memorandum of appeal for communication with them through electronic means.
(2) Appellant may upload scanned or PDF copies all of the papers including the memorandum of appeal on E-mail ID or WhatsApp number or contact number of the respondents, or send the same by registered post and a certificate of such sending is appended to the memorandum of appeal.
(3) Every such memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the order sought to be appealed and shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads, the grounds of objection and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively. Where it is not reasonably practicable or convenient to file certified copy or there is an urgency to obtain an interim order, the appellant may set out the reasons for not filing the certified copy in the memorandum of appeal, quoting therein the operative part of such impugned (4) The memorandum of of appeal shall also be accompanied by the sufficient on the respondents and also be accompanied by duly addressed and postage stamped envelopes with acknowledgment due for being sent by registered number of copies thereof along with copies of notices of the appeal for service post to the respondents and their counsel.
(5) The memorandum of appeal shall bear the requisite Court-fees as given in Section 39 of the [Act].
(6) On receipt of the appeal, the Rent Tribunal shall forthwith issue and, on receipt of such requisition, the Rent Authority shall immediately requisition for the records of the Rent Authority of the decided application send the records before the date fixed for hearing of the appeal before the Rent Tribunal.
(7) The Rent Tribunal shall endeavour to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible, not exceeding more than sixty days from the date of the receipt of the memorandum of appeal.
13. Execution of order of Rent Authority and Rent Tribunal (1) An application to execute an order of the Rent Authority or the Rent Tribunal shall be made in Form-10 to the concerned Rent Authority along with a supporting affidavit sworn on the date of presentation of application that no stay order operates or no proceeding is pending in respect of such order (2) On receipt of the application under sub-rule (1), the Rent Authority the date of receipt of such notice against the proposed execution of the order shall issue a notice to the opposite party to show cause within 7 days from and, in case, the opposite party files any objections to it, the same shall be disposed of in a summary manner within 30 days from the date of service of notice upon such opposite party:
Provided that no such objection by the opposite party shall be filed unless the scanned or PDF copy of such objections and documents given therewith are delivered to applicant or his counsel, or sent through E-mail, WhatsApp or contact number or registered post to the applicant and a certificate to that effect is appended to such objections.
(3) The Rent Authority shall not ordinarily adjourn the hearing of the objections and, after receipt of such objections, proceed to hear them immediately.
(4) The Rent Authority may, at the request of the applicant, execute the order in any of the manners enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of the Section 36 of the Act.
(5) In case the Rent Authority decides to take the help from the local police for the execution of the final orders under sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Act, the Rent Authority shall send the request in Form-11 to the Superintendent of Police, who shall direct the concerned Station House Officer to execute the order within 15 days from the date of the receipt thereof either himself or through a Sub-Inspector appointed by him on that behalf.
(6) After execution of the orders under sub-rule (5), its report shall be sent by Superintendent of Police to the Rent Authority within seven days.
(7) If for any reason, the order could not be executed under sub-rule Rent Authority which shall pass appropriate orders thereupon including the issue of fresh request to the Superintendent of Police for the execution (5), the Report describing the circumstances thereof shall be sent to the of the order.
(8) Before making any request to the Superintendent of Police, the Rent Authority shall direct the tenant to vacate the premises and deliver vacant possession thereof to the person named in the order (i.e. landlord or his legal heir) within such period as may be specified in the order, which shall in no case be less than two week from the date of the service of the order upon him, and on his failure to comply with the order within the time allowed, the Rent Authority shall request for the police help under sub-rule (5) above.
(9) On the request of the applicant, the Rent Authority may issue order of attachment of one or more bank accounts of the opposite party for the purpose of recovering the amount specified in the order under execution:
Provided that the applicant furnishes the details of such bank accounts.
11. Section 34 of the Rent Act, 2021 which relates to powers of the Rent Authority and the Rent Tribunal provides that for discharging their functions under the Act, the Rent Authority and the Rent Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for certain specified purposes.
12. Section 35 of the Act, which relates to appeal to the Rent Tribunal, mandates that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Authority may prefer an appeal, along with a certified copy of such order, to the Rent Tribunal within the local limits of which the premises is situated. Sub-section (1) of Section 35 prescribes a period of thirty days for filing the appeal and the proviso thereto mandates pre-deposit of fifty percent of the entire payable amount under the impugned order. In terms of sub-sections (2) and (4), the Rent Tribunal is empowered to serve notice, fix an early hearing and pass such interlocutory orders during the pendency of the appeal as it may deem fit.
13. Section 34(9) provides for finality of orders, and in terms thereof, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, every order made by the Rent Authority shall, subject to decision in appeal, be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings.
14. Section 38 creates a bar on the jurisdiction of Civil Courts and provides that save as otherwise provided in the Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to the provisions of the Act.
15. In terms of Section 34(1) of the Act, the Rent Authority and the Rent Tribunal shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a suit in respect of matters specified therein.
16. Having regard to the scheme of the Act, it would be necessary to determine as to whether the District Judge himself or by Additional District Judge nominated by the District Judge in each district, presiding over the Rent Tribunal and exercising powers under Section 35, acts as a persona designata or as a Civil Court. In this regard, it would be relevant to bear in mind that where an authority is constituted under a statute and is identified by an official designation, the provisions of the statute must be examined to determine whether the legislative intent was to constitute such authority as a persona designata or as a Court exercising judicial powers.
17. The question as to whether the judicial authority constituted by the State Government under Section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, to hear appeals against orders of confiscation that may be passed by the licensing authority under Section 6-A, is not an inferior criminal court subordinate to the High Court and amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 435 read with Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, came up for consideration in the decision in Thakur Das Vs. State of M.P.5 While examining the question the court was required to consider whether the judicial authority appointed under Section 6-C of the said Act would be a persona designata, despite the fact that the said authority happens to be the Sessions Judge. It was noticed that while conferring power on the State government to appoint the appellate forum, the Parliament clearly manifested its intention as to who should be such Appellate Authority and by using expression "judicial authority" it was clearly indicated that the appellate authority must be one such pre-existing authority who was exercising judicial authority of the State and accordingly it was held that since the Sessions Judge is a Judge presiding over the Sessions Court and that is the appointed appellate authority, the conclusion is inescapable that he was not persona designata. It was observed as follows :-
"7. If the Sessions Judge presiding over the Sessions Court is the judicial authority, the question is: would it be an inferior criminal court subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of Sections 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code? At the one end of the spectrum the submission is that the judicial authority appointed under Section 6-C would be persona designata and that if by a fortuitous circumstance the appointed judicial authority happens to be the Sessions Judge, while entertaining and hearing an appeal under Section 6-C it would not be an inferior criminal court subordinate to the High Court and, therefore, no revision application can be entertained against his order by the High Court. While conferring power on the State Government to appoint appellate forum, the Parliament clearly manifested its intention as to who should be such Appellate Authority. The expression "judicial" qualifying the "authority" clearly indicates that that authority alone can be appointed to entertain and hear appeals under Section 6-C on which was conferred the judicial power of the State. The expression "judicial power of the State" has to be understood in contradistinction to executive power. The framers of the Constitution clearly envisaged courts to be the repository of the judicial power of the State. The Appellate Authority under Section 6-C must be a judicial authority. By using the expression "judicial authority" it was cleanly indicated that the Appellate Authority must be one such pre-existing authority which was exercising judicial power of the State. If any other authority as persona designata was to be constituted there was no purpose in qualifying the word "authority" by the specific adjective "judicial". A judicial authority exercising judicial power of the State is an authority having its own hierarchy of superior and inferior court, the law of procedure according to which it would dispose of matters coming before it depending upon the nature of jurisdiction exercised by it acting in judicial manner. In using the compact expression "judicial authority" the legislative intention is clearly manifested that from amongst several pre-existing authorities exercising judicial powers of the State and discharging judicial functions, one such may be appointed as would be competent to discharge the appellate functions as envisaged by Section 6-C. There is one in-built suggestion indicating who could be appointed. In the concept of appeal inheres hierarchy and the Appellate Authority broadly speaking would be higher than the authority against whose order the appeal can be entertained. Here the Appellate Authority would entertain appeal against the order of Collector, the highest revenue officer in a district. Sessions Judge is the highest judicial officer in the district and this situation would provide material for determining Appellate Authority. In this connection the legislative history may throw some light on what the legislature intended by using the expression "judicial authority". The Defence of India Rules, 1962, conferred power on certain authorities to seize essential commodities under certain circumstances. Against the seizure an appeal was provided to the State Government whose order was made final. By the Amending Act 25 of 1966 Sections 6-A to 6-D were introduced in the Act. This introduced a basic change in one respect, namely, that an order of confiscation being penal in character, the person on whom penalty is imposed is given an opportunity of approaching a judicial authority. Earlier appeal from executive officer would lie to another executive forum. The change is appeal to judicial authority. Therefore, the expression clearly envisages a pre-existing judicial authority has to be appointed Appellate Authority under Section 6-C. When the provision contained in Section 6-C is examined in the background of another provision made in the order itself it would become further distinctly clear that pre-existing judicial authority was to be designated as Appellate Authority under Section 6-C. A seizure of essential commodity on the allegation that the relevant licensing order is violated, would incur three penalties: (1) cancellation of licence; (2) forfeiture of security deposit; and (3) confiscation of seized essential commodity, apart from any prosecution that may be launched under Section 7. In respect of the first two penalties an appeal lies to the State Government but in respect of the third though prior to the introduction of Section 6-C an appeal would lie to the State Government, a distinct departure is made in providing an appellate forum which must qualify for the description and satisfy the test of judicial authority. Therefore, when the Sessions Judge was appointed a judicial authority it could not be said that he was persona designata and was not functioning as a court.
8. Sections 7 and 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, envisage division of the State into various Sessions Divisions and setting up of Sessions Court for each such division, and further provides for appointment of a Judge to preside over that court. The Sessions Judge gets his designation as Sessions Judge as he presides over the Sessions Court and thereby enjoys the powers and discharges the functions conferred by the Code. Therefore, even if the judicial authority appointed under Section 6-C is the Sessions Judge it would only mean the Judge presiding over the Sessions Court and discharging the functions of that court. If by the Sessions Judge is meant the Judge presiding over the Sessions Court and that is the appointed Appellate Authority, the conclusion is inescapable that he was not persona designata which expression is understood to mean a person pointed out or described as an individual as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class or as filling a particular character (vide Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad [AIR 1961 SC 606 : (1961) 3 SCR 495 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 740] and Ram Chandra v.
State of U.P. [AIR 1966 SC 1888 : 1966 Supp SCR 393 : 1966 Cri LJ 1514] )."
18. Taking a similar view in the context of District Judges functioning as appellate authorities under the Kerala Rent Control Act, in Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker6, a view was taken that where District Judges are appointed as appellate authorities under the provisions of a statute they constitute a class and cannot be regarded as persona designata. The decisions in the case of Central Talkies Ltd. Vs. Dwarka Prasad7 and Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao8 were referred, and it was observed as follows :-
"7. As noted earlier the appellate authority, namely the District Judge, Thallassery has taken the view that since he is a persona designata he cannot resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing appeal before him. So far as this reasoning of the appellate authority is concerned Mr Nariman, learned counsel for respondent fairly stated that he does not support this reasoning and it is not his say that the appellate authority exercising powers under Section 18 of the Rent Act is a persona designata. In our view the said fair stand taken by learned counsel for respondent is fully justified. It is now well settled that an authority can be styled to be persona designata if powers are conferred on a named person or authority and such powers cannot be exercised by anyone else. The scheme of the Act to which we have referred earlier contraindicates such appellate authority to be a persona designata. It is clear that the appellate authority constituted under Section 18(1) has to decide lis between parties in a judicial manner and subject to the revision of its order, the decision would remain final between the parties. Such an authority is constituted by designation as the District Judge of the district having jurisdiction over the area over which the said Act has been extended. It becomes obvious that even though the District Judge concerned might retire or get transferred or may otherwise cease to hold the office of the District Judge his successor-in-office can pick up the thread of the proceedings from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate authority under Section 18. If the District Judge was constituted as an appellate authority being a persona designata or as a named person being the appellate authority as assumed in the present case, such a consequence, on the scheme of the Act would not follow. In this connection, it is useful to refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad [AIR 1961 SC 606 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 740]. In that case Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court had to consider whether Additional District Magistrate empowered under Section 10(2) of Criminal Procedure Code to exercise powers of District Magistrate was a persona designata. Repelling the contention that he was a persona designata the learned Judge made the following pertinent observations:
"9. A persona designata is ''a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character'. (See Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 253). In the words of Schwabe, C.J. in Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao [ILR (1924) 47 Mad 369 : AIR 1924 Mad 561 (FB)] , personae designatae are ''persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges'. The same consideration applies also to a well-known officer like the District Magistrate named by virtue of his office, and whose powers the Additional District Magistrate can also exercise and who can create other officers equal to himself for the purposes of the Eviction Act. The decision of Sapru, J. in the Allahabad case, with respect, was erroneous."
Applying the said test to the facts of the present case it becomes obvious that appellate authorities as constituted under Section 18 of the Rent Act being the District Judges they constituted a class and cannot be considered to be persona designata."
19. The exposition of law, made as a consequence, in Mukri Gopalan case, was that once it is held that the appellate authority is not a persona designata, it becomes obvious that it functions as a court. Referring to an earlier decision in Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain9, it was observed that the tests for determining whether an authority is functioning as a court, in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness. Further, placing reliance upon the decision in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi Vs. State of Punjab10, it was stated that what distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. It was observed as follows : (Mukri Gopalan case, SCC pp. 14-15, para 8).
"8. Once it is held that the appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is not a persona designata, it becomes obvious that it functions as a court. In the present case all the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Rent Act have been extended are constituted as appellate authorities under Section 18 by the Government notification noted earlier. These District Judges have been conferred the powers of the appellate authorities. It becomes therefore, obvious that while adjudicating upon the dispute between the landlord and tenant and while deciding the question whether the Rent Control Court's order is justified or not such appellate authorities would be functioning as courts. The test for determining whether the authority is functioning as a court or not has been laid down by a series of decisions of this Court. We may refer to one of them, in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd. [(1967) 3 SCR 163 : AIR 1967 SC 1494] In that case this Court was concerned with the question whether the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies functioning under Section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 was a court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. While answering the question in the affirmative, a Division Bench of this Court speaking through Mitter, J. placed reliance amongst others on the observations found in the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain [(1955) 2 SCR 955 : AIR 1956 SC 66] wherein it was observed as under:
"It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement."
Reliance was also placed on another decision of this court in the case of Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab [(1955) 2 SCR 1013 : AIR 1956 SC 153]. Following observations found (at SCR p. 1018) therein were pressed in service:
"It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a court."
When the aforesaid well settled tests for deciding whether an authority is a court or not are applied to the powers and functions of the appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Rent Act, it becomes obvious that all the aforesaid essential trappings to constitute such an authority as a court are found to be present..."
20. A similar question with regard to the position of District Judge exercising powers under Section 32 of the State Financial Corporation, 1951 and as to whether the Act confers jurisdiction on the District Judge as persona designata was subject matter of consideration in Asnew Drums Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Maharashtra State Finance Corporation,11 and it was opined that the legislative intent was clear that the District Judge was not a persona designata. It was stated thus :-
"9. The question which really arises is whether by using the words "in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure" in Section 32(8) the legislature intended to include the provisions in the Code dealing with appeals. There is no doubt that under the Code of Civil Procedure an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale in execution of a decree is appealable under Order LXIII, Rule 1(j). It is difficult to understand why the scope of the language should be cut down by not including appeals provided under the Code of Civil Procedure within the ambit of the words "in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure". "Manner" means method of procedure and to provide for an appeal is to provide for a mode of procedure. The State Financial Corporation lends huge amounts and we cannot for a moment imagine that it was the intention of the legislature to make the order of sale of property, passed by the District Judge, final and only subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
10. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that, wherever the legislature wanted to provide for an appeal to the High Court, it did so specifically. In this connection he pointed out that sub-section (9) of Section 32 provided that "any party aggrieved by an order under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) may, within thirty days from the date of the order, appeal to the High Court, and upon such appeal the High Court may, after hearing the parties, pass such orders thereon as it thinks proper". It is true that an appeal has been expressly provided in this case but the reason for this is that if there had been no specific provision in sub-section (9), no appeal would lie otherwise because it is not provided in sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) that the District Judge should proceed in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
11. We are not impressed by the argument that the Act confers jurisdiction on the District Judge as persona designata because sub-section (11) of Section 32 provides that "the functions of a district judge under this section shall be exercisable (a) in a presidency town, where there is a city civil court having jurisdiction, by a judge of that Court and in the absence of such Court, by the High Court; and (b) elsewhere, also by an additional district judge". These provisions clearly show that the District Judge is not a persona designata."
(emphasis supplied)
21. The question as to whether the District Judge would be a persona designata in the context of the powers conferred under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, again came up for consideration in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation Vs. Jaycee Drugs & Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd.,12 and it was reiterated that where special statute confers jurisdiction on District Judge, the District Judge was not a persona designata but was a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction to which rules of procedure under the Code would apply. Referring to earlier decisions in Central Talkies Ltd. Kanpur Vs. Dwarka Prasad13, National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Vs. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd.14 and the observations made by Viscount Haldane L.C. in National Telephone Co. Ltd. Vs. Postmaster-General15 and also the decisions in Adaikappa Chettiar Vs. R. Chandrasekhara Thevar16 and Secretary of State for India Vs. Chellikani Rama Rao,17 it was observed as follows :-
"26. We may now state our reasons for holding that even if Section 46-B of the Act was not there the provisions of the Code for the execution of a decree against a surety who had given only personal guarantee would, in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the Act, be applicable. In view of the decision of this Court in Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad [(1961) 3 SCR 495 : AIR 1961 SC 606] , where it was held that a persona designata is a person selected as an individual in his private capacity, and not in his capacity as filling a particular character or office, since the term used in Section 31(1) of the Act is "District Judge" it cannot be doubted that the District Judge is not a persona designata but a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction while exercising jurisdiction under Sections 31 and 32 of the Act. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. [1953 SCR 1028 : AIR 1953 SC 357] while repelling the objection that an appeal under the Letters Patent against the judgment of a Single Judge passed in an appeal against the decision of the Registrar under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 was not maintainable it was held at pages 1033-34 of the Report: (SCR pp. 1033-34) "Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which that court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court. This rule was very succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L.C. in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster-General [1913 AC 546 : 82 LJKB 1197] , in these terms:--
''When a question is stated to be referred to an established court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches.' The same view was expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Adaikappa Chettiar v. R. Chandrasekhara Thevar [(1947) 74 IA 264 : AIR 1948 PC 12] , wherein it was said:
''Were a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary courts of the country are seized of such dispute the courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of appeal.' Again in Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao [AIR 1916 PC 21 : ILR (1916) 39 Mad 617] , when dealing with the case under the Madras Forest Act their Lordships observed as follows:
''It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further proceedings in courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the statute just quoted. In their Lordships' opinion this objection is not well founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that court is appealed to as one of the ordinary courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders, and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply..." (emphasis supplied)
22. The distinction between a persona designata and a legal tribunal was considered in earlier decision in Ram Chandra Aggarwal and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another18, and referring to the observations made by Lord Atkinson and also the decision in Central Talkies Ltd. Vs. Dwarika Prasad19 and Chatur Mohan Vs. Ram Behari Dixit,20 it was observed that where a special or local statute refers to a constituted court as a court and does not refer to the presiding officer of that court the reference cannot be said to be to a persona designata. The meaning given to the expression "persona designata" in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary21 as "a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character" was also referred to. The relevant observations made in the judgment in this regard are as follows :-
"3. In Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar [44 IA 261] Lord Atkinson has, pointed out the difference between a persona designata and a legal tribunal. The difference is this that the "determination of a persona designata are not to be treated as judgments of a legal tribunal". In the Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad [(1961) 3 SCR 495, at pp 500-501] this Court has accepted the meaning given to the expression persona designata in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. p. 263 as "a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character". Section 146(1) CrPC empowers a Magistrate to refer the question as to whether any, and if so, which of the parties was in possession of the subject-matter of dispute as the relevant point of time to a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The power is not to refer the matter to the presiding Judge of a particular civil court but to a court. When a special or local law provides for an adjudication to be made by a constituted court -- that is, by a court not created by a special or local law but to an existing court -- it in fact enlarges the ordinary jurisdiction of such a court. Thus where a special or local statute refers to a constituted court as a court and does not refer to the presiding officer of that court the reference cannot be said to be to a persona designata. This question is well settled. It is, therefore, unnecessary to say anything more on this part of the case except that cases dealing with the point have been well summarised in the recent decision in Chatur Mohan v. Ram Behari Dixit [1964 All LJ 256]."
23. A question as to whether the order passed by the City Civil Court exercising powers under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, as an Appellate Officer, is in the capacity of a civil court or persona designata was subject matter of consideration in Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Nandini J.Shah and others22, and upon an extensive consideration of a legal position, it was concluded that the Appellate Officer referred to in Section 9 of that Act, is not a persona designata but acts as a civil court, and against an order passed by the Appellate Officer the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed. It was stated thus :-
"58. In other words, the Appellate Officer while exercising power under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, does not act as a persona designata but in his capacity as a pre-existing judicial authority in the district (being a District Judge or judicial officer possessing essential qualification designated by the District Judge). Being part of the district judiciary, the judge acts as a court and the order passed by him will be an order of the subordinate court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction."
24. Reverting to the facts of the present case, under the scheme of the Rent Act, 2021, the powers to be exercised by the Rent Tribunal, for the purpose of discharging its functions or holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal under the Act, as provided under Section 34, are stated to be the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the purposes specified under sub-section (1) thereof.
25. Section 35 of the Rent Act, 2021 provides that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Authority may prefer an appeal to the Rent Tribunal within the local limits of which the premises is situated, and as per Section 32 the Rent Tribunal shall be presided over by the District Judge himself or by an Additional District Judge nominated by the District Judge. Thus, as the Act predicates that the Rent Tribunal is to be presided over by the District Judge or an Additional District Judge nominated by him, it is clearly indicative of the fact that only a pre-existing authority exercising judicial power of the State can discharge the appellate functions under the Act.
26. The constitution of Civil Courts, in the State of Uttar Pradesh, is provided for under Chapter II of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and Section 3 thereof, as applicable in the State of U.P., which provides for the classes of civil courts, reads as follows :-
"3. Classes of Courts.- There shall be the following classes of Civil Courts under this Act, namely:
(1) The Court of the District Judge;
(2) The Court of the Additional Judge;
(3) The Court of the Civil Judge; and (4) The Court of the Munsif"
27. For the purposes of the Civil Procedure Code, the subordination of Courts is provided under Section 3 of the Code and the same is as follows :-
"3. Subordination of Courts.--For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court."
28. It would be worthwhile to take note that the judicial power of the State is exercised by establishment of hierarchy of courts, to decide disputes between its subjects and the subjects and state. The powers, which these courts exercise, are judicial powers; the functions, which they discharge, are the judicial functions; and the decisions, which they reach and pronounce, are judicial decisions.
29. The District Judge having been constituted as a civil court, exercises judicial powers of the State and is an authority having its own hierarchy of superior and inferior courts, and the law of procedure according to which it is empowered to dispose of matters coming before it depending upon the nature of jurisdiction exercised by it, acting in judicial manner. The District Judge is the officer presiding over the court of the District Judge and derives his designation from the nomenclature of the Court. The District Judge himself, or the Additional District Judge nominated by the District Judge constitutes a class of judicial authorities and cannot be considered as a persona designata.
30. The Rent Tribunal is required to function as a court, and every order passed by the Rent Authority has been accorded finality subject to decision in appeal in terms of Section 34(9) of the Rent Act, 2021. The legislative scheme of the Act and the intent behind providing a forum of appeal under Section 35 before the Rent Tribunal, which is to be presided over by the District Judge himself or by an Additional District Judge nominated by the District Judge, is clearly indicative of the legislative intent that the power to be exercised by the Rent Tribunal is not as a persona designata but as a judicial authority of a pre-existing court. This leads to the inference that the Rent Tribunal, while deciding an appeal under Section 35, exercises powers of a Civil Court.
31. The Rent Tribunal, while exercising powers under Section 35 of the Rent Act, 2021, does not act as a persona designata but in its capacity as a pre-existing judicial authority in the district, namely the District Judge or the Additional District Judge nominated by the District Judge. Being part of the district judiciary, the Judge presiding over the Rent Tribunal acts as a court and the order which is passed would partake the character of an order of a Civil Court.
32. The interplay of Section 35 of the Rent Act, 2021 in juxtaposition with the other provisions of the Act also makes it clear that the jurisdiction exercised by the Rent Tribunal, presided over by the District Judge or the Additional District Judge, as the case may be, is in the capacity of a Civil Court and not as a persona designata. The Rent Tribunal is a creation of the statute and it is to be presided over by the District Judge or by Additional District Judge, as the case may be, identified by an official designation as one of a class, being a pre-existing authority exercising judicial power of the State. It is an authority forming part of an established judicial hierarchy, governed by procedural law, and discharging its functions in a judicial manner.
33. The Rent Tribunal having been specified to be presided over by the District Judge or an Additional District Judge nominated by the District Judge, the conclusion is inescapable that it is not a persona designata, which expression is understood to mean a person pointed out or described as an individual as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class or as filling a particular character. An authority can be styled as a persona designata if powers are conferred on a named individual and such powers cannot be exercised by any successor. A persona designata acts in a private capacity and not as a Judge.
34. In a situation where, notwithstanding retirement, transfer or cessation of office of the presiding officer, the successor-in-office can continue the proceedings from the stage at which they were left by the predecessor, the designated authority cannot be regarded as a persona designata. A persona designata would therefore be a person described individually and not as a member of a judicial class or as holding a particular judicial office.
35. The test for determining whether an authority functions as a court, as per settled legal principles, is that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense, it must possess, apart from the trappings of a judicial tribunal, the power to render a definitive and authoritative judgment having finality. What distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial authority is that it is charged with the duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and to declare the rights of parties conclusively.
36. Applying the aforesaid tests in the context of the provisions of the Rent Act, 2021, it follows that the Rent Tribunals constituted under Section 32, being presided over by District Judges or Additional District Judges, constitute a judicial class and cannot be considered to be personae designatae.
37. Section 35 of the Rent Act, 2021 provides for a forum of appeal against every order passed by the Rent Authority before the Rent Tribunal, presided by District Judge or by Additional District Judge nominated by District Judge, which is a pre-existing judicial authority within the hierarchy of courts, discharging judicial power of the State, and has been expressly conferred the power to pass interlocutory orders and decide appeals within a prescribed time. Though designated as a Rent Tribunal, the District Judge or the Additional District Judge, while deciding an appeal under Section 35, would therefore be held to exercise powers of a Civil Court.
38. The question as to whether judicial orders of a civil court would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 came up for consideration in the case of Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath (supra), upon a reference made by a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in terms of an order dated April 15, 2009 in Radhey Shyam and Another vs. Chhabi Nath and Others23.
39. The two-Judge Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) took notice of an earlier Constitution Bench decision in the case of Sohan Lal vs. Union of India24, wherein it was held that a writ of mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus is not to be made against a private individual and also a subsequent three-Judge Bench decision in Mohd. Hanif vs. State of Assam,25 expressing the general principle that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is extraordinary in nature and is not to be exercised for the purpose of declaring private rights of the parties. Reference was also made to the decision in Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. Kalyani Banerjee,26 wherein it was held that proceedings by way of writ were not appropriate in a case where the decision of the court would amount to a decree declaring a party's title and ordering restoration of possession.
40. The law laid down in the nine-Judge Constitution Bench in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar vs. State of Maharashtra27, was also referred, wherein after considering the history of writ of certiorari and various English and Indian decisions, a conclusion was drawn that "certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction". The decision in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra) was also seen to have drawn a distinction between judicial orders of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction and orders of inferior tribunals or courts which are not civil courts and which cannot pass judicial orders.
41. Expressing inability to agree with the legal proposition laid down by a two-Judge Bench in the earlier decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai,28 to the effect that judicial orders passed by civil courts can be examined and then corrected/reversed by the writ court under Article 226 in exercise of its power under a writ of certiorari, the two-Judge Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) made a reference by observing as follows:
"26. The two-Judge Bench in Surya Dev Rai did not, as obviously it could not overrule the ratio in Mirajkar, a Constitution Bench decision of a nine-Judge Bench. But the learned Judges justified their different view in Surya Dev Rai, inter alia on the ground that the law relating to certiorari changed both in England and in India. In support of that opinion, the learned Judges held that the statement of law in Halsbury, on which the ratio in Mirajkar is based, has been changed and in support of that quoted paras 103 and 109 from Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. (Reissue), Vol. 1(1). Those paras are set out below:
"103. The prerogative remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus: historical development.--Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal courts of common law prohibited other courts from entertaining matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the common law courts; certiorari was issued to bring the record of an inferior court into the King's Bench for review or to remove indictments for trial in that court; mandamus was directed to inferior courts and tribunals, and to public officers and bodies, to order the performance of a public duty. All three were called prerogative writs;
xxx
109. The nature of certiorari and prohibition.--Certiorari lies to bring decisions of an inferior court, tribunal, public authority or any other body of persons before the High Court for review so that the court may determine whether they should be quashed, or to quash such decisions. The order of prohibition is an order issuing out of the High Court and directed to an inferior court or tribunal or public authority which forbids that court or tribunal or authority to act in excess of its jurisdiction or contrary to law. Both certiorari and prohibition are employed for the control of inferior courts, tribunals and public authorities."
The aforesaid paragraphs are based on general principles which are older than the time when Mirajkar was decided are still good. Those principles nowhere indicate that judgments of an inferior civil court of plenary jurisdiction are amenable to correction by a writ of certiorari. In any event, change of law in England cannot dilute the binding nature of the ratio in Mirajkar and which has not been overruled and is holding the field for decades.
27. It is clear from the law laid down in Mirajkar in para 63 that a distinction has been made between judicial orders of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction and orders of inferior tribunals or court which are not civil courts and which cannot pass judicial orders. Therefore, judicial orders passed by civil courts of plenary jurisdiction stand on a different footing in view of the law pronounced in para 63 in Mirajkar. The passage in the subsequent edition of Halsbury (4th Edn.) which has been quoted in Surya Dev Rai does not show at all that there has been any change in law on the points in issue pointed out above.
30. ... this Court unfortunately is in disagreement with the view which has been expressed in Surya Dev Rai insofar as correction of or any interference with judicial orders of civil court by a writ of certiorari is concerned.
31. Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari. Article 227 of the Constitution vests the High Courts with a power of superintendence which is to be very sparingly exercised to keep tribunals and courts within the bounds of their authority. Under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Such power, however, is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law.
32. The essential distinctions in the exercise of power between Articles 226 and 227 are well known and pointed out in Surya Dev Rai and with that we have no disagreement. But we are unable to agree with the legal proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai that judicial orders passed by a civil court can be examined and then corrected/reversed by the writ court under Article 226 in exercise of its power under a writ of certiorari. We are of the view that the aforesaid proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai, is contrary to the ratio in Mirajkar and the ratio in Mirajkar has not been overruled in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra.
33. In view of our difference of opinion with the views expressed in Surya Dev Rai, matter may be placed before His Lordship the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench, to consider the correctness or otherwise of the law laid down in Surya Dev Rai on the question discussed above."
42. Upon the reference having been made the question which was considered by the three-Judge Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath (supra), was stated as follows :-
"5. Thus, the question to be decided is: whether the view taken in Surya Dev Rai, that a writ lies under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the civil court, which has been doubted in the reference order, is the correct view?"
43. The decision of the three-Judge Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) took notice of the nine-Judge Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar, wherein a judicial order of the High Court was challenged as being violative of fundamental rights and the court by majority held that a judicial order of a competent court could not violate a fundamental right, and even if, there was incidental violation it could not be held to be violative of the fundamental right. The following observations were made (Mirajkar case, AIR p. 11, para 38):
"38. The argument that the impugned order affects the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1), is based on a complete misconception about the true nature and character of judicial process and of judicial decisions. When a Judge deals with matters brought before him for his adjudication, he first decides questions of fact on which the parties are at issue, and then applies the relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate court. But it is singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of the citizens under Article 19(1). What the judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy between the parties brought before the court and nothing more. If this basic and essential aspect of the judicial process is borne in mind, it would be plain that the judicial verdict pronounced by court in or in relation to a matter brought before it for its decision cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of citizens under Article 19(1)."
44. Referring to Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 112729 and also the observations made in Kemp vs. Balne and by Wrottesley, L.J. in Rex vs. Chancellor of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocese, Ex Parte White30, it was observed as follows (Mirajkar case, AIR p.18-19, paras 63-64):
"63. Whilst we are dealing with this aspect of the matter, we may incidentally refer to the relevant observations made by Halsbury on this point. "In the case of judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction", says Halsbury in the footnote, "it has been suggested that certiorari might be granted to quash them for want of jurisdiction (Kemp v. Balne, Dow & L at p. 887), inasmuch as an error did not lie upon that ground. But there appears to be no reported case in which the judgment of an inferior Court of civil jurisdiction has been quashed on certiorari, either for want of jurisdiction or on any other ground".
The ultimate proposition is set out in the terms: "Certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction". These observations would indicate that in England the judicial orders passed by civil courts of plenary jurisdiction in or in relation to matters brought before them are not held to be amenable to the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari.
64. In Rex v. Chancellor of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocese, Ex parte White, the question which arose was whether certiorari would lie from the Court of King's Bench to an ecclesiastical court; and the answer rendered by the court was that certiorari would not lie against the decision of an ecclesiastical court. In dealing with this question, Wrottesley, L.J. has elaborately considered the history of the writ jurisdiction and has dealt with the question about the meaning of the word ''inferior' as applied to courts of law in England in discussing the problem as to the issue of the writ in regard to decisions of certain courts. "The more this matter was investigated", says Wrottesley, L.J., "the clearer it became that the word "inferior" as applied to courts of law in England had been used with at least two very different meanings. If, as some assert, the question of inferiority is determined by ascertaining whether the court in question can be stopped from exceeding its jurisdiction by a writ of prohibition issuing from the King's Bench, then not only the ecclesiastical courts, but also palatine courts and admiralty courts are inferior courts. But there is another test, well recognised by lawyers, by which to distinguish a superior from an inferior court, namely, whether in its proceedings, and in particular in its judgments, it must appear that the court was acting within its jurisdiction. This is the characteristic of an inferior court, whereas in the proceedings of a superior court it will be presumed that it acted within its jurisdiction unless the contrary should appear either on the face of the proceedings or aliunde".
Mr Sen relied upon this decision to show that even the High Court of Bombay can be said to be an inferior court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction by this Court under Article 32(2) to issue a writ of certiorari in respect of the impugned order passed by it. We are unable to see how this decision can support Mr Sen's contentions."
45. The three-Judge Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra), extensively referring to the legal position on the scope of writ of certiorari concluded that orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. It held that the expression "inferior court" is not referable to judicial courts and accordingly judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. It was also held that the scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. It was observed as follows:
"25. ... Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All the courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all the High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for the High Courts to issue writs to the subordinate courts. Control of working of the subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence under Article 227. Orders of the civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by the statutes, power of superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression "inferior court" is not referable to the judicial courts, ...
27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226.
29. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows:
29.1. Judicial orders of the civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
29.2. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226.
29.3. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai, is overruled."
46. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the legal position that emerges is that orders passed by a civil court in exercise of its judicial functions are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and any challenge thereto can be entertained only in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
47. The said legal position has been considered and reiterated in the context of statutory provisions conferring judicial powers upon civil courts, including the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly with respect to enforcement of arbitral awards, by this Court in M/s Magma Leasing Ltd. v. Badri Vishal and others.31
48. Taking a similar view, this Court in Radha Kishan vs. State of U.P. and Others32 held that the Appellate Officer exercising powers under Section 9 of Uttar Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972 does not act as a persona designata, but in his capacity as a pre-existing judicial authority functioning as a court; consequently, the order passed by him would be a judicial order passed by a civil court and hence would not be amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
49. As regards the decision in the case of Chanda Devi (supra) relied upon by counsel for the petitioner in Writ-A No.19650 of 2025, it may be noted that the said decision was rendered in the context of the provisions of the U P Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 In that case, the District Judge was exercising revisional powers under a statutory framework which required him to follow a procedure prescribed by the State Government, and the proceedings were not governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. It was in that backdrop that the Court concluded that the authority concerned could not be said to be functioning as a Civil Court. The statutory scheme under the Act, 2021 stands on a distinct footing. The Rent Tribunal is presided over by a regular judicial officer and is expressly vested with powers akin to those of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision in Chanda Devi (supra), therefore, is clearly distinguishable and does not advance the case of the petitioners.
50. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ-A No.19129 of 2025 has emphasised the conceptual distinction between courts and tribunals. The decision in State of Gujarat (supra), relied upon in this regard, lays down that the High Courts power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 would extend to a tribunal, body or authority provided two conditions are satisfied: firstly, that such tribunal performs judicial functions of rendering definitive judgments having finality and binding effect upon the parties in respect of their rights, in exercise of the sovereign judicial power transferred to it by the State; and secondly, that such tribunal is subject to the High Courts appellate or revisional jurisdiction.
51. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles and having regard to the statutory framework of the Act, 2021, it is evident that the Rent Tribunal performs judicial functions of rendering definitive and binding adjudications between landlord and tenant in respect of their civil rights. The orders passed by the Tribunal determine substantive rights of the parties and attain finality subject to the remedies provided under the Act. The Tribunal is presided over by a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge or Additional District Judge and exercises powers akin to those of a Civil Court. There can thus be no manner of doubt that the Rent Tribunal answers the description of a judicial tribunal subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
52. A question of similar nature in the context of orders passed by Appellant Rent Tribunal came to be considered by a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Mahendra Kumar Jain Versus Appellate Rent Tribunal, Ajmer and Others33 and it was held that the Rent Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Rajasthan Rent Control Act of 2001, while adjudicating the disputes between landlord and tenant, exercises the judicial power of the State and discharges judicial functions, which are akin to judicial functions discharged by Civil Courts, and thus, keeping in view the law laid down in the case of Radhey Shyam and Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra), such judicial orders are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and their legality can only be examined by invoking power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.
53. The issue with regard to the maintainability of a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Rent Tribunal in Rent Appeal under the Act of 2021, arose in the Matters under Article 227 No. - 10541 of 2023, Shri Thakur Ji Baldau Ji And Shree Krishnaji Swami Sri Satuwa Baba Nyas vs Vinit Keshari, wherein the objection taken in this regard was repelled after noticing the Full Bench judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Mahendra Kumar Jain (supra).
54. Applying the settled principles to the statutory scheme of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021, it is manifest that the Rent Tribunal constituted under Section 32 is presided over by the District Judge or by an Additional District Judge nominated by him. Section 34 of the Act endows the Tribunal with powers analogous to those of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the statute expressly characterises the proceedings before it as judicial proceedings, treating the Tribunal to be a Civil Court for specified purposes.
55. The conferment of appellate jurisdiction under Section 35 upon such a judicial authority, forming an integral part of the regular district judiciary, leaves no room for doubt that the Rent Tribunal functions as a court and not as a persona designata. The source of its authority, the nature of the powers exercised, and the binding and definitive character of its determinations unmistakably establish that it discharges the judicial power of the State.
56. Accordingly, it is hereby held that an order passed by the Rent Tribunal under the Act of 2021 is a judicial order rendered by a civil court exercising statutory jurisdiction. Such orders are not amenable to challenge by way of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Any interference, if warranted, lies only within the well-defined contours of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, to be exercised in accordance with the established parameters governing the exercise of such jurisdiction.
57. The matters shall stand over for a week in order to enable the counsel appearing for the petitioners in the respective petitions to move appropriate applications, seeking necessary amendments in light of the legal position stated hereinabove.
58. List on 26.2.2026, as fresh.
59. Interim protection, already granted in Writ-A Nos.19129 of 2025, 371 of 2026 and 874 of 2026, to continue till the next date of listing.
(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J) February 19, 2026 RKK/-