Jharkhand High Court
Sahdev Prasad Yadav & Ors vs The State Of Jharkhand & Ors on 9 November, 2022
Author: Kailash Prasad Deo
Bench: Kailash Prasad Deo
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
(Civil Writ Jurisdiction)
WP(C) No. 1145 of 2020
Sahdev Prasad Yadav & Ors. ..... ...... Petitioners
Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. .... .... Respondents
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH PRASAD DEO
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Lalit Yadav, Advocate For the Respondent No.1 to 3 : Mr. Pradeep Kumar, AC to AAG-IV For the Respondent no.4 : Mr. R.C. P. Sah, Advocate
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The matter is being taken up through Video Conferencing. Learned counsel for the parties have no objection with it and submitted that audio and video qualities are good.
Order No.07 /Dated: 09th November, 2022 Learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Lalit Yadav has submitted, that these petitioners Sahdev Prasad Yadav, son of Baijnath Mahto, Basudev Yadav, son of Late Amin Yadav, Karu Prasad Yadav, son of Govind Prasad Yadav, Rina Devi, wife of Vikash Das, Sukhdev Mahra, son of Jago Mahra, Jharkhandi Mahto, son of Yugalkishor Yadav, Vishwanath Yadav, son of Roshan Mahto, Bhuwneshwar Mahto son of Thanu Mahto, Tarni Mahto, son of Late Nilkanth Mahto, Nabi Mahra, son of Late Mangru Mahra, Mithilesh Yadav, son of Late Baijnath Yadav, Sunil Kumar Yadav, son of Late Kishun Mahato, Gopal Yadav, son of Late Baijnath Yadav, Anaul Miyan, son of Late Idrish Mian, Alauddin Miyan, son of Late Mahjid Miyan, Shyamsundar Napit, son of Gobinda Napit have preferred this writ petition to quash the entire land acquisition proceeding pertaining to L.A. Case No.7/2009-10 (Annexures-1 &2) whereby the land of the petitioners have been acquired for industrial area at the cost of the Government and is being handed over to different businessmen and as such, the acquisition has been frustrated and thus the land may be returned.
Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 Mr. Pradeep Kumar, AC to AAG-IV has submitted, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, it is not the concern of the landowner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose as held in the case of V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer, (2012) 12 SCC 133 at paras 25, 26, 28, 29, 30 and 31 which reads as under:-
-2-25. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period. [Vide Awadh Bihari Yadav v.State of Bihar [(1995) 6 SCC 31] ,U.P. Jal Nigamv.Kalra Properties (P) Ltd.[(1996) 3 SCC 124 :
AIR 1996 SC 1170] ,Allahabad Development Authority v.Nasiruzzaman [(1996) 6 SCC 424] , M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of T.N. [(2000) 4 SCC 322] and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar[(2005) 1 SCC 558 : AIR 2005 SC 492] .]
26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure-
holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances. (Vide State of M.P. v.Vishnu Prasad Sharma [AIR 1966 SC 1593] , Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma [(1970) 2 SCC 149 : AIR 1970 SC 1576] , Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. [(1993) 4 SCC 369 :
AIR 1993 SC 2517] , Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan [(1993) 2 SCC 84] and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corpn. of India v. Subodh Singh [(2011) 11 SCC 100 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 604] .)
28. In Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 1 SCC 800 : AIR 1977 SC 448] in a similar situation, this Court held as under: (SCC p. 802, para 5) "5. ... once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in ... declaration."
29. Similarly, in State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai [(1997) 5 SCC 432 : AIR 1997 SC 2703] this Court held as under: (SCC p. 433, para 4) "4. ... It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution."
(emphasis supplied) See also C. Padma v. Govt. of T.N. [(1997) 2 SCC 627] , Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. [(1999) 2 SCC 384 : AIR 1999 SC 436] , Niladri -3- Narayan Chandradhurja v. State of W.B. [(2002) 9 SCC 682 : AIR 2002 SC 2532] , Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh [(2003) 1 SCC 335] and Leelawanti v. State of Haryana [(2012) 1 SCC 66 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 10] .
30. In Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar [(2005) 1 SCC 558 : AIR 2005 SC 492] , this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons interested/tenure-holders, and that therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure-holder, does not arise. [See also Pratap v. State of Rajasthan [(1996) 3 SCC 1 : AIR 1996 SC 1296] , Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC 405] , State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai [(1997) 5 SCC 432 : AIR 1997 SC 2703] , Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed [(2004) 4 SCC 460] , Bangalore Development Authority v. R. Hanumaiah [(2005) 12 SCC 508] and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673] ]
31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallised to mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the landowner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes persona non grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land to the person interested nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect.
Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 Mr. Pradeep Kumar, AC to AAG-IV has placed reliance upon the case of Northern Indian Glass Industries, v. Jaswant Singh reported in (2003) SCC 335 at para- 9 which reads as under:-
9. Looking to the facts of the present case and conduct of Respondents 1-5, the High Court was not at all justified in ignoring the delay and laches and granting relief to them. As already noticed, Respondents 1-5 approached the High Court by filing writ petition almost after a period of 17 years after finalization of the acquisition proceedings.
They accepted the compensation amount as per the award and sought for enhancement of the compensation amount without challenging the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6. Having sought for enhancement of compensation only, they filed writ petition even three years after the appeals were disposed of by the High Court in the matter of enhancement -4- of compensation. There is no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions. Merely because full enhanced compensation amount was not paid to the respondents, that itself was not a ground to condone the delay and laches in filing the writ petition. In our view, the High Court was also not right in ordering restoration of land to the respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used for which it had been acquired. It is a well-settled position in law that after passing the award and taking possession under Section 16 of the Act, the acquired land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the landowner does not get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask for restitution of the possession. This Court as early as in 1976 in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 1 SCC 800] in para 5 has stated thus: (SCC p. 802, para 5) "5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony. Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long after the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration." Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 Mr. Pradeep Kumar, AC to AAG-IV has further placed reliance upon the case of Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar (2005) 1 SCC 558 at para-10 to 14 which reads as under:-
10. It is neither debated nor disputed as regards the valid acquisition of the land in question under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the possession of the land had been taken. By virtue of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land has vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, Government could withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. In the instant case, even under Section 48, the Government could not withdraw from acquisition or to reconvey the said land to the respondent as the possession of the land had already been taken. The position of law is well settled. In State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai [(1997) 5 SCC 432] para 4 of the said judgment reads: (SCC p. 433) "4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all -5- encumbrances. The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the directive principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid.
Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value."
11. In that case, an extent of 1.94 acres of land was acquired in 1952 for construction of national highway and the construction was completed in 1955 in 80 cents of land and the balance of land remained unused. The remaining land was sought to be sold to the landowner at the same rate at which the compensation was awarded under Section 11. This again was challenged in the writ petitions. The Government tried to sustain the action on the basis of the executive order issued by the Government for permission for alienation of the land. On these facts, the position of law was made clear in para 4 extracted above. Thus, it is clear that under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land should vest in the State free from all encumbrances and that any executive order inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act was invalid. Further that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In our view, this decision supports the case of the appellants fully.
12. In the case Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC 405] claim of the petitioner for restitution of the possession of the land acquired pursuant to the resolution of the State Government was rejected. In para 2, this Court observed thus: (SCC p.
406) "2. ... We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that -6- any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions."
13. Yet in another recent decision, this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh [(2003) 1 SCC 335] referring to the case of Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil [(1996) 6 SCC 405] and other cases held that: (SCC p. 340, para 12) "12. If the land was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to the State Government to take action but that did not confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land." Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment read thus: (SCC p. 340) "10. In Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC 405] it is stated that the acquired land remaining unutilised was not intended to be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of notification.
11. Yet again in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. [(1997) 2 SCC 627] it is held that acquired land having vested in the State and the compensation having been paid to the claimant, he was not entitled to restitution of possession on the ground that either original public purpose had ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for other purpose."
14. From the position of law made clear in the aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances; (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilised for any other public purpose; and (3) the acquired land which is vested in the Government free from all encumbrances cannot be reassigned or reconveyed to the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 Mr. Pradeep Kumar, AC to AAG-IV has submitted, that once a land has been acquired by the State, it is upon the State to utilize it for any other purposes.
Learned counsel for the respondent no.4, Mr. R.C. P. Sah has submitted, that the land has been acquired for the purpose of industrial area and the same is being granted to the entrepreneur for development of industries, as such the land which has been acquired by Land Acquisition Case No.07/2009-10 cannot be returned to the petitioners at any cost.
Considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, -7- the writ petition is hereby dismissed as the land has been rightly acquired by the State and is being used, in view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment, for development of industrial growth in the State of Jharkhand.
Accordingly, the writ petition is hereby dismissed.
(Kailash Prasad Deo, J.) Rohit/-