Telangana High Court
Dr. Eunice L Chawngthu vs The Iv Metropolitan Sessions Judge on 6 November, 2020
Author: M.S.Ramachandra Rao
Bench: M.S.Ramachandra Rao
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO
AND
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T.AMARNATH GOUD
C.C.(SR) No.7056 of 2020
And
W.P.No.17904 of 2020
COMON ORDER: (per Hon'ble Sri Justice M.S. Ramachandra Rao)
The petitioner belongs to the Scheduled Tribe community and is a
Lawyer by profession.
D.V.C. No.35 of 2017
2. She had filed a D.V.C. No.35 of 2017 against her husband
Mr.Timothy T.Gonmel. The said D.V.C. was partly allowed on
27.12.2017 by the competent Criminal Court at Hyderabad.
Crl.Appeal No.91 of 2018 and Crl.Appeal No.223 of 2018
3. Against the said judgment, petitioner preferred Crl.Appeal
No.91 of 2018 in the Court of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge,
Hyderabad on 05.02.2018. The said appeal was made over to the
Court of IX Metropolitan Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad.
4. The husband of the petitioner also filed Criminal Appeal
No.223 of 2018 against the judgment dt.27.12.2017 in the
D.V.C.No.35 of 2017 and the said appeal was also made over to the
Court of IX Metropolitan Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad.
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The events which occurred in February 2020
5. In the month of February, 2020, the IX Metropolitan Additional
Sessions Judge, Hyderabad went on leave and the IV Metropolitan
Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad ( for short 'the respondent')
was put in charge of the Court of IX Metropolitan Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad.
6. Petitioner alleges that the respondent/ Presiding Officer of the IV Metropolitan Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad was biased, made unparliamentarily remarks, that he commented on her attire which amounts to sexual harassment, that he expressed a desire to dismiss the petitioner's appeal Crl.Appeal No.91 of 2018 and allow Criminal Appeal No.223 of 2018 filed by her husband.
7. The petitioner made a written complaint dt.20.01.2020 to the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad to transfer her case to some other Court. She further contended that the Presiding Officer did not allow her to make any submission in the case.
8. When the Criminal Appeal No.223 of 2018 was listed on 13.02.2020 before the said Court, since the appellant therein/husband of the petitioner was allegedly in civil prison since 03.02.2020, his counsel submitted written arguments and insisted the respondent to dispose of the matter as his client was in prison. The petitioner was absent and there was no representation on her behalf on that day.
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9. So on 13.02.2020, the Court adjourned the said appeal to 17.02.2020 taking note of the above facts and also the fact that there was a direction of this Court to dispose of Criminal Appeal No.91 of 2018 filed by the petitioner expeditiously and also the fact that in Criminal Appeal No.223 of 2018, the same judgment in the DVC No.35 of 2017 was questioned by the husband of the petitioner.
10. On 17.02.2020, when Criminal Appeal No.223 of 2018 was taken up, the appellant was absent. The petitioner was however present and she filed a Crl.M.P.. /2020 under Section 384 Cr.P.C.
along with a memo and sought dismissal of the appeal summarily.
11. The Court then adjourned the matter for pronouncement of orders to 18.02.2020.
12. The petitioner admitted that the Crl.A.No.223 of 2018 and Crl.A.No.91 of 2018 were disposed off on 18.2.2020, though there is no reference to that fact in her pleadings in the CC or in the Writ Petition.
The plea of the petitioner
13. It is the contention of the petitioner that on 18.02.2020, she was present from 10.30 a.m. to 17.00 hours in the Court of the IV Metropolitan Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, the respondent stated at 5.30 pm that he would return to the Bench "after 10 minutes", but did not return to the Bench till 7 pm. ::4::
14. Petitioner alleges that this amounts to her 'detention' by the respondent till 19.00 hours; that her consent was not taken by the respondent for the same; she felt harassed, humiliated and unsafe in the Criminal Court; the respondent cannot detain her beyond the stipulated Court working hours prescribed under the A.P. Criminal Rules of Practice; and that she then fled from the Court premises.
15. Petitioner made a representation on 25.02.2020 to the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad alleging that the respondent was egoistic, excessively corrupt and had a God complex, that he had bad intentions and made her wait until dark in his Court hall and that the C.C.T.V. footages of the Court of the IV Metropolitan Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad of 18.02.2020 from 10.30 a.m. to 10.00 p.m. should be preserved. She also requested him to treat the said representation as a complaint against the respondent as per the guidelines laid down by Supreme Court in Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan1.
16. On 25.02.2020, the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad replied to the petitioner informing her that there is no rule position to entertain her request to preserve the C.C. T.V. footage and advised her to approach the appropriate authority for necessary directions. 1
(1997) 6 SCC 241 ::5::
C.C. (SR) No.7056 of 2020
17. She then filed C.C. (SR) No.7056 of 2020 on 3.3.2020 alleging that the Presiding Officer of the IV Metropolitan Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad had lowered the dignity of the Bench, that he willfully disobeyed Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular orders, 1990 and a case should be registered against him under the relevant Sections of S.C.& S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and also the Nirbhaya Act i.e the Criminal law (Amendment) Act,2013.
18. After the C.C. (SR) No.7056 of 2020 had been filed on 03.03.2020, it was returned by the Registry with certain objections and it was resubmitted on 07.03.2020.
19. It was listed before this Bench for the first time on 09.10.2020 pursuant to an administrative order dt.12.03.2020 of the Chief Justice of the Telangana High Court.
20. One of the objections raised by the Registry in the C.C. (SR) No.7056 of 2020 was to clarify how such a C.C. can be filed under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the Presiding Officer of Court of IV Metropolitan Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, that too when there was no 'impugned order' and no default thereafter.
21. Petitioner responded stating that 'there cannot be an impugned order' and a Division Bench of the Supreme Court had held that the Registry cannot assign 'judicial responsibility' upon itself. According ::6::
to her, disobedience and lowering the dignity of the Bench are the two main criteria for maintainability of a Contempt Petition under the Act.W.P.No.17904 of 2020
22. She also filed W.P.No.17904 of 2020 on 13.3.2020 seeking a Writ of Mandamus to constitute a Sexual Harassment Committee as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Vishakha (1 supra) to enquire into her written complaint against the respondent and also to preserve the C.C. T.V. footages of 18.02.2020 of his Court.
23. The Writ Petition was filed on 13.03.2020 but it was returned with certain objections on the same day.
24. Even this Writ Petition was listed before the Bench on 08.10.2020 and was posted to 09.10.2020 to be heard along with C.C. (SR) No.7056 of 2020.
Consideration by the Court
25. On account of the Covid-19 pandemic, there was limited functioning through Video conferencing by this Court till September, 2020 and only very urgent matters were taken up till at least June, 2020.
26. With the result, these two matters were listed for the first time before this bench only on 08.10.2020. They were heard and reserved for orders on 09.10.2020.
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27. It is important to note that petitioner herself admitted that both Criminal Appeal No.91 of 2018 and 223 of 2018 had been disposed of on 18.02.2020 by the Presiding Officer of Court of IV Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, who was incharge of the Court of IX Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. Admittedly, petitioner deliberately suppressed this fact in the affidavit filed in support of the Contempt Case as well as the Writ Petition. No valid reason is assigned by the petitioner for her suppression of this fact.
28. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that it is not for the Registry to decide about issue of maintainability of the Contempt Case and that it is only the Court/Bench which can go into the said aspects. Thereafter the office objection regarding maintainability of the Contempt Case is overruled.
29. We shall next deal with the question whether there is any truth in petitioner's allegation that she was 'detained' till 7.00 pm on 18.2.2020 by the respondent.
30. We are of the opinion, that when the Crl.A.No.223 of 2018 and Crl.A.No.91 of 2018 were posted on 18.2.2020 by the respondent, and orders were admittedly passed therein even according to the petitioner on that day, it is highly unlikely that the respondent would make the petitioner wait till 7.00 pm after court hours. It is more ::8::
probable that the orders in the Crl.Appeals were passed during the course of the same day before end of normal working hours.
31. In nay event, it is not in dispute that as per instructions issued by the High Court, preservation and supply of C.C. T.V. footages has to be done as per the instructions of the High Court on its administrative side and that the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad has no power to take any decision in that regard. So no fault can be found with the refusal of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad to accede to the petitioner's request to preserve the said footage.
32. Normally, such C.C. T.V. footages would be preserved for 30 days only and would automatically stand erased thereafter.
33. So the C.C.T.V. footage of the events which transpired allegedly according to the petitioner on 18.02.2020 in the Court of the respondent would get automatically erased after 30 days i.e by 17.3.2020.
34. So by 08.10.2020, when these two cases came to be listed for the first time before us, the C.C.T.V. footage of the events which transpired allegedly on 18.02.2020 in the Court of the respondent would not be available, having got erased automatically by 17.03.2020.
35. Thus there is no means to verify whether the respondent had in fact risen from the Bench at 5.30 p.m. and returned to the Bench at ::9::
7.00 p.m and that he did not call the Crl.A.No.223 of 2018 before that time.
36. The entire case of the petitioner rests on the above event having occurred.
37. In the absence of the C.C.T.V. footage of that day, it is not possible to believe the allegation of the petitioner that the respondent had made her wait till 7.00 p.m. on 18.02.2020.
38. Even otherwise, the petitioner is an adult and a Post Graduate having a Degree in Law. She is also a practicing Advocate. She was appearing as a party-in-person in the Criminal Appeal Nos.223 of 2018 and 91 of 2018.
39. Having decided to appear personally in her own case in a Criminal Court, petitioner cannot contend that she had to be present in the said Court with criminals causing her agony, mental pain and humiliation and blame the respondent for the same. If she had any difficulty or embarrassment, nothing prevented her from engaging a counsel to represent her or seek legal aid.
40. Merely because she happened to be present in the Court allegedly from 10.30 a.m. to 17.30 hours on 18.02.2020, she cannot claim that somehow the respondent is at fault for not calling her case.
41. The petitioner does not dispute that he had not only cases of his Court to take up but also the cases of the IX Additional Metropolitan ::10::
Sessions Judge, Hyderabad ( of which he was Incharge) to be taken up on 18.02.2020.
42. It is possible (though not probable as already stated by us in para 30 supra) that because of such heavy work, the petitioner and her husband's appeals probably could not be taken up by the respondent before 17.30 hours. On that basis, petitioner cannot accuse the respondent of 'detaining' her. There is no order of 'detention' passed by the respondent admittedly, which can be touted as amounting to 'arrest' of the petitioner.
43. We therefore reject the contention of the petitioner that she was 'detained' after 5 p.m. on 18.02.2020 by the respondent.
44. Though she had made allegations of corruption and bias, no such evidence is placed on record by her. There is no evidence to believe that the respondent had made any comment on her dress either.
45. The fact that the petitioner had made representations seeking transfer of her husband's Crl.A.No.223 of 2018 on 20.01.2020 from the Court of the respondent to another Court is admitted by her.
46. This above conduct of petitioner indicates that she attempted to avoid hearing of her matter before the respondent by making first a complaint against him and when that was not acted upon, and she lost the Crl.A.No.223 of 2018, she decided to file this Contempt Case and ::11::
this Writ Petition to harass and humiliate him and to take revenge on the Officer.
47. In several cases, the Supreme Court had observed that there is a dangerous trend in vogue of making false allegations against Judicial Officers and humiliating them and that such trend has to be curbed with heavy hand or otherwise the Judicial system itself would collapse. It has emphasized that Superior courts have a duty to protect the reputation of Judicial officers of subordinate courts, taking note of the growing tendency of maligning the reputation of Judicial Officers by unscrupulous practicing Advocates who either failed to secure desired orders or did not succeed in brow beating the Judge for achieving ulterior purposes. It stated that such an issue touches upon independence of not only the Judicial Officers but brings the question of protecting the reputation of the Institution as a whole. It has held that foundation of our system which is based on the independence and impartiality of those who man it, will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against Presiding Judicial Officers with impunity (M.B.Sanghi Vs. High Court of Punjab & Haryana2 and Vishram Singh Raghubanshi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh3).
48. In O.P. Sharma v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana4, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer/party-in-person is given liberty of expression; but they equally owe countervailing duty to maintain 2 (1991) 3 SCC 600 3 (2011) 7 SCC 776 4 (2011) 6 SCC 86 ::12::
dignity, decorum and order in the court proceedings or judicial processes. Any adverse opinion about the judiciary should only be expressed in a detached manner and respectful language. The liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary. It observed:
"22. In Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, In re5 the advocate was charged of criminal contempt of court for the use of intemperate language and casting unwarranted aspersions on various judicial officers and attributing motives to them while discharging their judicial functions. This Court held as under: (SCC p. 259, para 17) "17. The subordinate judiciary forms the very backbone of the administration of justice. This Court would come down with a heavy hand for preventing the judges of the subordinate judiciary or the High Court from being subjected to scurrilous and indecent attacks, which scandalise or have the tendency to scandalise, or lower or have the tendency to lower the authority of any court as also all such actions which interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. The protection is necessary for the courts to enable them to discharge their judicial functions without fear."
23. In Chetak Construction Ltd. v. Om Prakash6 this Court deprecated the practice of making allegations against the Judges and observed as under: (SCC pp. 585-86, para 16) 5 (1998) 7 SCC 248 6 (1998) 4 SCC 577 ::13::
"16. Indeed, no lawyer or litigant can be permitted to browbeat the court or malign the presiding officer with a view to get a favourable order. Judges shall not be able to perform their duties freely and fairly if such activities were permitted and in the result administration of justice would become a casualty and the rule of law would receive a setback. The Judges are obliged to decide cases impartially and without any fear or favour. Lawyers and litigants cannot be allowed to 'terrorise' or 'intimidate' Judges with a view to 'secure' orders which they want. This is basic and fundamental and no civilised system of administration of justice can permit it."
A similar view has been reiterated in Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan High Court7.
24. Advocacy touches and asserts the primary value of freedom of expression. It is a practical manifestation of the principle of freedom of speech. Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity, equality and justice. It plays its part in helping to secure the protection of other fundamental human rights, freedom of expression, therefore, is one of the basic conditions for the progress of advocacy and for the development of every man including legal fraternity practising the profession of law. Freedom of expression, therefore, is vital to the maintenance of free society. It is essential to the rule of law and liberty of the citizens. The advocate or the party appearing in person, therefore, is given liberty of expression. But they equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order in the court proceedings or judicial processes. Any adverse opinion about the judiciary should only be expressed in a detached manner and respectful language. The liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary."( emphasis supplied) 7 (2003) 3 SCC 427 ::14::
49. It also referred to its earlier decisions in L.D.Jaikwal Vs. State of U.P.8 wherein it had observed that it is yet to come across a Judge who can take a decision which does not displease one side or the other; by the very nature of his work he has to decide matters against one or the other of the parties; and if the fact that he renders a decision which is resented to by a litigant or his lawyer were to expose him in such risks, it will sound the death knell of the institution. It also observed that no sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter as per the dictates of his conscience on account of the fear of being scandalized and persecuted by an Advocate who does not mind making reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his wishes; and if the situation were to be countenanced, Advocates who can cow-
down the judges, and make them fall in line with their wishes, by threats of character assassination and persecution, will be preferred by the litigants to the Advocates who are mindful of professional ethics and believe in maintaining the decorum of Courts.
50. The fact that the petitioner has chosen to even make exaggerated claim of sexual harassment, victimization on account of her Scheduled Tribe status and is seeking to invoke the guidelines of the Supreme Court about alleged sexual harassment in Vishaka (1 supra), and filing of cases against the respondent under the SC& St (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and also the Nirbahya Act,2013 shows her vindictive nature and the lengths to which the petitioner 8 (1984) 3 SCC 405 ::15::
herein would go to in order to take revenge on the respondent for allowing the Crl.A.No.223 of 2018 filed by her husband on 18.02.2020.
51. We condemn this conduct of the petitioner in the strongest terms and hold that the Writ Petition was filed by the petitioner by making false and motivated allegations with a mala fide intention to harass the respondent with the sole intention of maligning his reputation and causing him humiliation for deciding the Criminal Appeal No.223 of 2018 filed by her husband adversely to the petitioner.
52. In the Contempt case, the petitioner has repeatedly alleged that the respondent had by his alleged actions 'lowered the dignity of the Bench'. According to petitioner, she is invoking the 'criminal contempt jurisdiction' of this Court.
53. The term 'criminal contempt' is defined in Sec.2 (c) of the Contempt of Court Act,9171 as under:
"2(c) 'Criminal contempt' means the publication (whether by works, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-
(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or ::16::
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;
.."
54. Lowering the dignity of the Bench does not fall within the ambit of 'criminal contempt' as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act and only 'lowering the authority of the Court' falls within its ambit.
55. We do not agree with the petitioner that the respondent has either lowered the 'authority' of his Court or that anything he did 'scandalized' the Court either.
56. In our opinion, it is the petitioner, who has by her conduct, tried to lower the authority of the Court and scandalize the Court.
57. Therefore both the Writ Petition and the Contempt Case are dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.10,000/- to be paid by her to the High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad within 4 weeks.
58. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
___________________________ M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO, J _______________________ T.AMARNATH GOUD, J Date : 6 .11.2020 Vsv