Karnataka High Court
Sri M Mariyappa vs State Of Karnataka on 6 March, 2020
Author: B.Veerappa
Bench: B. Veerappa
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF MARCH, 2020
BEFORE
THE HON' BLE MR. JUSTICE B. VEERAPPA
WRIT PETITION No.20627/2016(KLR-RR/SUR)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI M. MARIYAPPA
S/O SRI. GOVINDAPPA
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
2. SRI. K.D CHANGAPPA
S/O SRI. K.P. DEVAIAH
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
3. SRI. GANGAPPA
S/O SRI. KUPPAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
PETITIONERS 1 TO 3 ARE
R/AT DODDATOGURU VILLAGE,
BEGUR HOBLI,
BANGALORE SOUTH TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT-560068.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI R. B. SADASIVAPPA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
M. S. BUILDING,
BANGALORE-560001.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT
KANDAYA BHAVAN,
2
2ND FLOOR, K.G. ROAD,
BANGALORE-560009
3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
BANGALROE URBAN DISTRICT
KANDAYA BHAVAN, K.G. ROAD,
BANGALORE-560001.
4. THE TAHSILDAR
BANGALORE SOUTH TALUK
KANDAYA BHAVAN,
K.G. ROAD,
BANGALORE-560001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI Y.D. HARSHA, AGA)
****
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 &
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 06.02.2016 PASSED BY THE
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU SOUTH SUB-
DIVISION, BENGALURU THAT IS RESPONDENT-3 HEREIN IN
CASE AT ANNEXURE-K ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING IN 'B' GROUP THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The petitioners have filed the present writ petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 6.2.2016 passed by the 3rd respondent-Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division, Bengaluru as per Annexure-K and direct the 4th 3 respondent to continue the name of the petitioners in the relevant columns of the computerized RTC extracts as before.
2. It is the case of petitioners that the land bearing Sy.No.105 of Doddatoguru village, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, petitioner No.1 is the owner of 4 acres of land; petitioner No.2 is the owner of 1 acre 2 guntas of land and petitioner No.3 is the owner of 2 acres and they are in physical possession and enjoyment of their respective lands as absolute owners.
3. The Tahsildar, Bengaluru South Taluk, who is the 4th respondent granted the above respective lands to the petitioners by the order dated 19.3.1978 about 38 years ago and saguvali chits dated 21.6.1978 were issued to the petitioners as per the grant orders and subsequently, the mutation was effected in the names of the petitioners in respect of their extent of lands that were granted to each one of them and the same was 4 reflected in the RTC of the new revenue records as per Annexures-A, B, C and D respectively and inspite of the same, in the year 2000, when the Revenue Department introduced computerization of RTC, their names were left out for no reason. However, the petitioners came to know that their names were not continued in the RTC upto the year 2000, though they were in possession and enjoyment of the lands. Therefore, they made representation dated 17.1.2010 to enter their names in the RTC as it stood before.
4. Since the representations were not considered, the petitioners filed Writ Petition No.59428/2014 seeking a writ of mandamus directing the authorities to consider their representations and the same came to be allowed by the order dated 18.2.2015 and a direction was issued to the 3rd respondent to consider their representations which were treated as appeals. The Assistant Commissioner by the order dated 5 11.8.2015 allowed the appeals and directed the Tahsildar to verify the genuineness or otherwise of the Grant Certificate and also physical possession of the parties. In pursuance of the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, the Tahsildar after holding an enquiry found that the grant orders are genuine and the petitioners are in physical possession and enjoyment of their respective lands and therefore, directed the Revenue Authorities to delete the name of BDA from column No.9 of the RTC in respect of Sy.No.105 and to make necessary correction by entering the names of the petitioners in pursuance of the order dated 20.10.2015 as per Annexure-H.
5. It is the further case of the petitioners that the order of the Tahsildar was also implemented in the RTC for the year 2015-16 as per Annexure-J. When the things stood thus, the Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division, Bengaluru on suo-moto 6 directed the Tahsildar to show the name of the Government in the relevant column by cancelling the mutation order made in favour of the petitioners as per Annexure-K dated 21.10.2015. Therefore, the petitioners are before this Court for the relief sought for.
6. The respondents-State has filed objections justifying the impugned order passed by the Assistant Commissioner contending that during the pendency of the appeal, the Tahsildar had mutated the names of the petitioners in the RTC at Column No.9 and on knowing that the interim order was operating in Appeal No.954/2015, the Tahsildar proposed to the Assistant Commissioner to cancel the names of the petitioners by letter dated 3.2.2006, Annexure-R1. Accordingly, the Assistant Commissioner by the order dated 6.2.2006, initiated action as per Annexure-K in exercise of the power under the provisions of Section 136(2) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act (for short, hereinafter 7 referred to as 'the Act'). It is further contended that if the petitioners are so aggrieved, they can approach the Deputy Commissioner, who is the competent authority to revise the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act which is a revisable order, but the petitioner has approached this Court. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled for any relief and sought to dismiss the writ petition.
7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties to the lis.
8. Sri R.B. Sadasivappa, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the impugned order passed by the Assistant Commissioner vesting the land with the State Government is totally without jurisdiction. When once the Tahsildar has held a detailed enquiry and has come to the conclusion that the land was granted to the petitioners, by the order dated 20.10.2015 has directed 8 the revenue authorities to delete the name of BDA and enter the names of the petitioners at Column No.9 in the RTC in respect of their lands in question, which has attained finality. Therefore, he contended that the Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction under the Act to initiate suo-motu proceedings, and to cancel the mutation entries which are in the names of the petitioners and to enter the name of the Government. He would further contend that when the grant was made in the year 1978 and proceedings are initiated on 6.2.2016 by the Assistant Commissioner, even assuming that the Assistant Commissioner has got power to initiate suo-motu proceedings, is totally unreasonable and cannot be sustained. Therefore, he sought to allow the writ petition.
9. Per contra, Sri Y.D. Harsha, learned Counsel for the respondents-State while justifying the impugned order contended that based on the material on record, 9 the Assistant Commissioner has come to the conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief. Therefore, he sought to dismiss the writ petition.
10. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, it is not in dispute that the properties in question were granted in favour of the petitioners on 19.3.1978; on the basis of the grant, the names of the petitioners were entered in the revenue records from the year 1978 upto 2020 and after a lapse of 38 years, the proceedings are initiated. It is also not in dispute that on the basis of the direction dated 11.8.2020 issued by the Assistant Commissioner, the Special Tahsildar considering the entire material on record issued an Official Memorandum dated 20.10.2015 to the effect that after a lapse of 37 years, the grant made in favour of the petitioners cannot be canceled and cannot be considered as the Government land, in view of the dictum of this Court in the case of Shri Anna Rao and 10 Others -vs- Gundareddy and Others reported in ILR 1997 Kar. 1998 and therefore, issued a direction to enter the names of the original grantees in the Khatha by removing the name of the BDA in column No.9 in the RTC and revenue records in respect of land bearing Sy.No.105. The said order passed by the Special Tahsildar has reached finality in the year 2015. When the things stood thus, the Assistant Commissioner initiating suo-motu proceedings on 6.2.2016 and directing to cancel the mutation in the name of the petitioners and to enter the name of Government is totally without jurisdiction. If any such suo-moto proceedings has to be initiated, it is only the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act and not the Assistant Commissioner.
11. The respondents though have filed the statement of objections, have not produced any material authorizing the Assistant Commissioner to initiate suo- 11 moto proceedings and restore the lands granted in favour of the petitioners as long back as on 19.3.1978 after a lapse of 38 years. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Assistant Commissioner has power to initiate proceedings should be within a reasonable period, in the absence of any limitation period prescribed under the provisions of the Act, the respondents-State Government has not produced any material delegating the power to the Assistant Commissioner to initiate suo-motu proceedings. Even otherwise, the initiation of proceedings after a lapse of 38 years, cannot be sustained.
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in identical circumstances in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another -vs- D. Narsing Rao and Others reported in (2015)3 SCC 695 relying upon the dictum in the case of State of Gujarat -vs- Patil Raghav Natha reported in (1969) 2 SCC 187 while considering 12 the provisions of Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, has held that:-
"Though there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 to revise an order made under Section 65 of the Act, the said power must be exercised in reasonable time and on the facts of the case in which the decision arose, the power came to be exercised more than one year after the order and that was held to be too late."
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court considering the provisions of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, in the case of Santoshkumar Shivgond Patil -vs- Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale reported in (2009)9 SCC 352 at para-11 has held that:-
"It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should 13 be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a lapse of long time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. In the said case, the reasonable period within which the power of revision would be exercised was three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar 14 passed on 30.3.1976 is flawed and legally not correct."
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav, reported in (2018) 12 SCC 527 has held that actions must be taken within reasonable time, where no period of limitation specified - even while dealing with beneficial legislations, rights accrued by third persons cannot be ignored lightly where no period of limitation prescribed and actions initiated after delay and at paragraphs-9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, it has been held as under:
"9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants vehemently submitted that the delay must be overlooked because the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to bring relief to farmers who had been dispossessed during the proscribed period. The reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma [New India Assurance 15 Co. Ltd. v.C. Padma, (2003) 7 SCC 713 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 1709] , where this Court held that in a motor accident which took place on 18-12-1989, a claim petition barred by time but filed on 2-11-1995, after limitation itself was removed from the statute was maintainable. This Court held that there could be no resort to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 even though no period of limitation was prescribed. Accordingly, the Court held that the claim petition could not be rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation, after the deletion of sub- section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which had provided a period of six months. This view was taken having regard to the purpose of the statute. We, however, find that the judgment relied on has no application to the present case. It is a settled law where the statute does not provide for a period of limitation, the provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time.16
10. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., "reasonable time" is explained as follows:
"That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer."
Thus, time must be reckoned reasonably, not only in order to
preserve rights and advantages a party possesses, but equally to protect each party from the losses he ought not to suffer. Thus, whether an action has been taken within a reasonable time, must also be viewed from the point of view of the party who might suffer losses.
11. In the instant case, we find that the High Court had observed as follows:
"The auction-sale took place in 1942, the application for 17 restoration of the lands was first made in 1975 and the appeal from it was dismissed for default in 1983. In the meanwhile, the disputed lands changed hands twice and were in the possession of the appellant-writ petitioners from 1962 and 1986. Such a long-
settled position could only be upset for some very compelling reasons and on making out an extremely strong case for restoration of the appeal. There is nothing on record to suggest anything remotely like that.
Secondly, the action of the Additional Collector in restoring the appeal even without any notice to the appellant-writ petitioners was clearly illegal and in contravention of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act."
The High Court was clearly right in the view it had taken.
18
12. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that power of the Additional Collector for restoration of lands could have been exercised suo motu and since no limitation was prescribed for exercise of such power, the delay in this case may be overlooked. This submission presupposes that where the power can be exercised suo motu, such exercise may be undertaken at any time. The submission is directly contrary to a decision of this Court in Collector v. D. Narsing Rao[Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] where this Court affirmed the view [Collector v. D. Narasing Rao, 2010 SCC Online AP 406 : (2010) 6 ALD 748] of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Para '17' of the judgment reads as follows:
(D. Narsing Rao case [Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] , SCC p. 706, para 17) "17. ... that the suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of 19 limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law."
Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention.
13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights.
14. We are of the view that merely because the legislation is beneficial and no limitation is prescribed, the rights acquired by persons cannot be ignored 20 lightly and proceedings cannot be initiated after unreasonable delay as observed by this Court in Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand[Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 8 SCC 340] .
15. In view of the aforesaid reasons, writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 6.2.2016 passed by the 3rd respondent-Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division Bengaluru is without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed and accordingly, it is quashed.
Rule is made absolute.
Sd/-
Judge Nsu/-