Delhi District Court
Mahesh Chand And Anr vs State And Ors on 16 February, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-008854-2019
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 406/2019
SHER SINGH,
S/o. Shri. Mahender Singh,
R/o. B-21, Police Colony,
Mandir Marg, New Delhi
Presently posted as;
Inspector PCR in Delhi Police. ... REVISIONIST/
PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI)
2. SHRI. VINAY TYAGI,
S/o. Late Shri. Dharam Dev Tyagi,
R/o. Flat No. 105, Kingsway Complex,
Nirankari Colony, Opposite Gurudwara,
Delhi-110009.
3. SHRI. RAJAT TYAGI,
S/o. Shri. Vinay Tyagi,
R/o. Flat No. 105, Kingsway Complex,
Nirankari Colony, Opposite Gurudwara,
Delhi-110009.
4. SHRI. MANOHAR TYAGI,
S/o. Late Shri. Malkhar Singh,
R/o. Khasra No. 40,
Village Jharoda Majra,
Burari, Delhi.
5. SHRI. KULDEEP,
S/o. Shri. Ram Kumar,
R/o. Khasra No. 65,
Village Jharoda Majra,
Burari, Delhi. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of filing : 06.07.2019
Date of institution : 08.07.2019
Date when judgment was reserved : 20.12.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 16.02.2026
CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 619/2019 Mahesh Chand & Ors. v. State & Ors. Page No. 1 of 40
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.02.16
16:32:50 +0530
AND;
CNR No.: DLCT01-013197-2019
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 619/2019
1. MAHESH CHAND,
S/o. Late Shri. Rishal Singh,
R/o. Village Dhaka,
Delhi-110009.
2. RAJPAL,
S/o. Late Shri. Rishal Singh,
R/o. Village Dhaka,
Delhi-110009.
3. BHOPAL,
S/o. Late Shri. Rishal Singh,
R/o. Village Dhaka,
Delhi-110009. ... REVISIONISTS/
PETITIONERS
VERSUS
1. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI)
2. SHRI. VINAY TYAGI,
S/o. Late Shri. Dharam Dev Tyagi,
R/o. Flat No. 105, Kingsway Complex,
Nirankari Colony, Opposite Gurudwara,
Delhi-110009.
3. SHRI. RAJAT TYAGI,
S/o. Shri. Vinay Tyagi,
R/o. Flat No. 105, Kingsway Complex,
Nirankari Colony, Opposite Gurudwara,
Delhi-110009.
4. SHRI. MANOHAR TYAGI,
S/o. Late Shri. Malkhar Singh,
R/o. Khasra No. 40,
Village Jharoda Majra,
Burari, Delhi.
5. SHRI. KULDEEP,
S/o. Shri. Ram Kumar,
R/o. Khasra No. 65,
Village Jharoda Majra,
CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.02.16
16:32:54 +0530
Burari, Delhi. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of filing : 25.09.2019
Date of institution : 26.09.2019
Date when judgment was reserved : 20.12.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 16.02.2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present common judgment shall determine the aforenoted criminal revision petitions, preferred in terms of the provisions under Sections 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code')/pari materia with Sections 438 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS'), bearing; Cr. Rev. No. 406/2019 and Cr. Rev. 619/2019, preferred by the revisionist, namely, Sher Singh as well as by revisionists, namely, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal (hereinafter all the said revisionists are collectively referred to as the 'revisionists'), respectively. Appositely, the said revision petitions challenge/impugn a common order dated 22.06.2019 (hereinafter referred to as the 'impugned order'), passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate-09/Ld. MM-09, Central, Tis Hazari Court (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. MM/Ld. Trial Court'), in case bearing, 'Vinay Tyagi v. Mahesh Chand, Case No. 522433/2016', PS. Burari. Pertinently, by virtue of the said/impugned order, Ld. Trial Court, allowed respondent nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5's ( hereinafter collectively referred to as the 'complainants') application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., thereby, directing registration of FIR against the revisionists.
2. Concisely, the case of the facts leading to the initiation of the present proceedings is that the complainants filed CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. along with an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. against the revisionists herein. Markedly, under the said complaint/application, the complainants inter alia proclaimed that complainant no. 1, namely, Vinay Tyagi (hereinafter referred to as 'complainant no. 1/respondent no. 2') was the owner of immovable property, admeasuring 375 sq. yards (hereinafter referred to as the 'property/premise/property in question') out of the total land, measuring 1 bighas 1 biswa, i.e., 1050 sq. yds. at rectangle no. 32 killa no. 1/1, situated in Krishan Nagar, Village Jharoda Majra, Burari, Delhi ( hereinafter referred to as the 'larger property'), which is enclosed with boundary wall as well as built up. As per the complaint/application, respondent no.3 is respondent no. 2's son, respondent no. 5 is respondent no. 2's nephew, whilst respondent no. 4 was employed as caretaker of the property in question by respondent no. 2. Correspondingly, as per the complainants, revisionists, namely, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal were the sons of late Sh. Rishal Singh, who was avowed to be the owner of the entire property/larger property , i.e., land, measuring 1 bighas 1 biswa, i.e., 1050 sq. yds. at rectangle no. 32 killa no. 1/1, situated in Krishan Nagar, Village Jharoda Majra, Burari, Delhi, of which, the property in question is a part of. It was further proclaimed by the complainants under their complaint/application that the larger property along with its adjoining properties, were purchased by Sh. Rishal Singh by virtue of sale deed bearing no. 6061 dated 14.06.1963 and sale deed bearing no. 840, dated 31.01.1970.
2.1. It was further chronicled under the complainants' complaint/application that Sh. Rishal Singh sold the larger property, of which the property in question is a part of, jointly to CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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Sh. Sham Lal, S/o. Sh. Mathra Prasad and Sh. Yash Pal, S/o. Sh. Lachhman Das vide sale deed dated 15.02.1973, coterminus with the handing over of the vacant possession of the larger property to Sh. Sham Lal and Sh. Yash Pal by Sh. Rishal Singh. As per the complainants, Sh. Sham Lal and Sh. Yash Pal, post such purchase of the larger property, carved out properties to be sold to the prospective buyers, either by themselves of through their duly constituted general attorney, namely, Sh. S. Kartar Singh vide General Power of Attorney dated 20.02.1973 and duly registered before the concerned Sub-Registrar, Delhi. Subsequently, the said GPA holder, i.e., Sh. S. Kartar Singh sold the property in question to complainant no. 1/respondent no. 2 for consideration on 23.11.1995, executed in form of GPA, Agreement to Sell, Will, Receipt and Affidavit, all dated 23.11.1995, duly witnessed by Sh. Rishal Singh, father of revisionists, namely, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal. Congruently, as per complainant no. 1/respondent no. 2, the actual, physical possession of the property in question was handed over to the said complainant. Ergo, under the said complaint, it was asserted by the complainants that revisionists, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal had no right, title and interest in the property in question, since the same was sold by Sh. Rishal Singh in favour of respondent no. 2. Nevertheless, as per the complainants, the revenue records persevered to show, Sh. Rishal Singh as the owner of the property in question as none of the subsequent purchasers, ever approached the revenue authorities for substitution of their names under the revenue records. It is further the case of the complainants that revisionists, namely, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal, taking advantage of such lapse, endeavored to have their names substituted under the CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 619/2019 Mahesh Chand & Ors. v. State & Ors. Page No. 5 of 40 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.02.16 16:33:08 +0530 revenue records, in place of Sh. Rishal Singh. However, as per the complainants, such endeavor was thwarted by complainant no. 1/respondent no. 2, who promptly submitted his objection before the revenue authorities on 02.08.2014. 2.2. Coterminously, it was proclaimed by the complainants under their complaint/application that revisionist, namely, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal, subsequently, started devising illegal methods/means to forcible dispossess complainant no. 1 from the possession of the property in question as well as to illegally trespass and occupy the same. However, in order to prevent such attempts, complainant no. 1/respondent no. 2, constructed a boundary wall and over a period of time, constructed three rooms as well as pakka shed with one room on the property in question, besides also appointed respondent nos. 4 and 5 as the caretakers of the property in question. It is further the case of the complainants that on 30.03.2014, when complainant no.
1/respondent no. 2 was instructing the caretakers of the property in question about the proposed building plan, revisionists, namely, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal, suddenly entered the said property and started threatening the complainants to vacate the same, inter alia by extorting money or by threatening the complainants of dispossession from the property in question. Ergo, as per the complainants, respondent no. 2, met with the concerned DCP on the following day, i.e., on 31.03.2014 and lodged a complaint in writing with revisionist, Sher Singh the (then) SHO, PS Burari, Delhi. However, as per the complainants, no action was taken on the said complaint of respondent no. 2 by revisionist, Sher Singh. Congruently, it is the case of the complainants that respondent no. 2 also filed a civil suit bearing no. 41/2015 before CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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the concerned Ld. Sr. Civil Judge Delhi an 07.04.2015 seeking a decree of perpetual injunction against revisionists, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal. Notably, summons were issued by the concerned Court in the said suit proceedings on 08.04.2015, whereupon, respondent no. 2 accompanied the process server on 13.04.2015 to serve the summons of the said suit proceedings, dasti, on revisionists, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal. However, on reaching the house, the said revisionists were not found present there, leading to the service of summons dasti to the female members of the family.
2.3. As per the complainants, subsequent to such service, respondent no. 2 returned to his home, however, he immediately received a call from respondent no. 3 that revisionists, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal along with their accomplices had reached the property in question and forcibly/illegally trespassed on the same. Correspondingly, as per respondent no. 2, he was also apprised at that point in time, revisionists, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal as well as their accomplices had also beaten up, respondent nos. 3-5 and other caretakers, namely, Sh. Laxman and Sh. Rajender, besides also damaged the Scorpio car/vehicle of respondent no. 2, parked in the property. It is further the case of the complainants that the said incident had occurred/transpired in the presence of revisionist, namely, Sher Singh. Consequently, upon receipt of the said property, as per complainant no. 1/respondent no. 2, he reached at the property, where it was determined that respondent nos. 3-5 were present outside the property in question, in an injured state as well as reiterated the incident to complainant no. 1/respondent no. 2. Ergo, as per respondent no. 2, he immediately rushed respondent nos. 3-5 to CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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Correspondingly, respondent no. 2 is asserted to have informed the concerned police officials at PS. Burari regarding the incident, however, no police officials are asserted to have reached at the spot, on the complaint of respondent no. 2. On the contrary, as per respondent no. 2, revisionist Sher Singh, got registered FIR bearing no. 446/2015, under Sections 448/511/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'), against respondent no. 3. Congruently, as per respondent no. 2, he went to the concerned police station to meet the SHO/revisionist Sher Singh, however, he was thrown out from the police station. It was further proclaimed by the complainants under their complaint that not only was respondent no. 2, illegally and forcibly dispossessed from the property in question on 13.04.2015, rather, the revisionists, while acting in furtherance of their common intention as well as in collusion with each other, damaged the said property and caused grievous hurt/injuries to respondent nos. 3-5. Ergo, under such facts and circumstances, the complainants are asserted to have issued a complaint to the concerned DCP as well as Commissioner of police dated 05.06.2015, seeking redressal of his concerns, averring commission of offences under Sections 383, 324, 450, 506 (part-II) IPC read with Section 34 IPC against the revisionists. However, as per the complainants no action was taken on the said complaint by the concerned police officials, leading to the complainants filing the aforenoted complaint and application under Section 200 and 156(3) Cr.P.C., respectively, before the Ld. Trial Court.
2.4. Notably, upon such complaint/application having been filed, Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 27.11.2015, directed CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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the concerned SHO, PS. Burari to file Action Taken Report/ATR. Consequently, Status Report/Action Taken Report dated 16.12.2016, came to be filed before the Ld. Trial Court on the same day inter alia noting as under;
"...Enquiry was conducted into the matter and during enquiry it has been revealed that on 13.04.2015 a PCR call vide DD No.17A was received at P.S. Burari Delhi which was marked to ASI Ramesh Kumar for further necessary action. After receipt of the PCR call ASI Ramesh Kumar along with staff reached the spot at Khasra No.32/1/1 Opposite Transport Authority Burari, near Hardev Nagar Xing, Main Road Burari Delhi where the complainant/caller Sh. Keshav Prasad S/o Sh. Om Nath R/o Khasra No.32/1/1 Opposite Transport Authority Burari, near Hardev Nagar Xing, Main Road Burari Delhi found present at the spot. ASI Ramesh Kumar recorded the statement of the complainant wherein he stated that "I am resided at the mentioned address since last 15-20 years and serving as Chowkidar in the property No.32/1/1 which is belongs to Sh. Rajpal Chauhan & Sh. Bhupal Singh Chauhan S/o Late Sing Risal Singh. To look after the said property he is also sleeping in the said property during night since last 15-20 years. He also running a Nursery in the said property. Today on 13.04.2015 at about 7.00-8.00 AM he was present in the Nursery one person along with Tractor Trolley approach him for the plant from the said Nursery and stopped his tractor-trolley out side of the gate by stating that his some other associates will also reached there to obtain the plant from the nursery. After some time 3-4 persons were also reached there. One of them Mr. Rajat Tyagi was identified by him who was previously also visited in the nursery many a times. All the said persons entered in the said premises/nursery and started breaking the goods lying in vacant place of the said plot/nursery by stating that they are owner of the said property. In between Mr. Jai Kishan (Son of the owner the property) reached there and he informed other members of the family about the said incident. After some time his owner along with other family members reached there and quarrel took place between both the parties but Mr. Rajat Tyagi and his associates were not succeeded to grab the property."
On the statement of Sh. Keshav Prasad a case FIR No. 446/15 dated 13/04/2015 u/s 448/506/511/34 IPC, CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.02.16
16:33:24 +0530
P.S. Burari was got registered by ASI Ramesh Kumar and investigation was taken up.
During the course of investigation, the Tractor- Trolley and other vehicles used by the accused persons (The complainants) were seized through seizure memo and deposited in malkhana. All the five accuser persons Rajat Tyagi S/o Sh Vinay Tyagi and his other associates were arrested in the case and released on bail.
During investigation Khasra Katouni of the property in question was obtained from the office of the SDM/Civil Lines in which Sh Risal Singh (Father of the person who is presently in possession of property in question) mentioned as owner of the Khasra No.32/1/1. During the course of investigation documents of the property in question were obtained from the alleged person in which Sh Risal Singh mentioned as witness No.2, and the said property shown sold to the complainant by Sh Kartar Singh who is not traceable as per investigation conducted so far (Copy of Khatoni is enclosed).
During further investigation it has also been revealed that on 02/04/2015 some unauthorized construction were carried out in the property in question by Sh. Jai Kishan S/o Sh. Mahesh Chand (son of the person presently in possession) and the then beat officer HC Kailash Chand No.56/N sent a Unauthorized Construction Form to the MCD Officials on which name of owner /Landlord was also mentioned as Jai Kishan S/o Mahesh Chand (Copy enclosed).
During further investigation the Sh. Mahesh Chand & Sh Rajpal were lodged a complaint against Sh. Vinay Tyagi (the complainant) for preparing the forged documents of the property in question by making the forged signatures of their father late Sh Risal Singh, hence section 468/471/120B IPC were added in the case against the accused persons (the complainants).
During investigation of the case documents of the property in question produced by Sh. Vinay Tyagi (the complainant) were sent to India Security Press Nasik, Maharashtra to find out the genuineness of the Stamp papers, for Comparison of the signatures of Sh Risal Singh and to find out the period of the Ink used to prepared the documents of property in question. Thereafter, the documents in question sent to FSL Rohini for comparison of the signatures and CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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some other examination and result of the same is awaited.
Keeping in view the above facts and circumstances the allegations levelled by the complainant could not substantiated. However, undersigned is ready to abide by any order passed by this Hon'ble court..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.5. Subsequently, upon the arguments being addressed by/on behalf of the complainants/respondent nos. 2-5 before the Ld. Trial Court, vide order dated 22.06.2019/impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court allowed the complainants' application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. inter alia under the following observations;
"...I have given my thoughtful consideration to the allegations made in the complaint and to the submission made by the complainant.
The perusal of the MLCs of the complainants, filed by SI Yogender on 04.06.2019 shows that the complainant Kuldeep suffered grievous injuries. From the careful scrutiny of the record, it appears that all the facts and circumstances taken up together hint at commission of a cognizable offence and the same needs to be investigated. Keeping in mind the totality of the fact and the circumstances, I am inclined to invoke the discretionary power vested in the court by virtue of section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Reference is made to the Judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case titled as Lalita Kumari vs. State of UP, WP (Crl.) No. 68 of 2008. An FIR be registered at PS Burari, under appropriate provisions of law.
In view of the above, the present application u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C is hereby allowed.
Copy of the order be sent to SHO concerned. Copy of the order be given dasti to complainant. File be consigned to record room after due compliance and be revived upon the application of the complainant after filing of the police report..."
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Ld. Counsel for the revisionists submitted that the CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled cannons of law, deserving the same to be set aside at the outset, as suffering with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent reasons have been delineated under the said order. Ld. Counsel further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that the entire story of the complainants is concocted, false and unreliable. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court passed the impugned order by totally misinterpreting the law and material brought on record. Ld. Counsel for the revisionists further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that compliance of provisions under Section 154 Cr.P.C. was a mandatory requirement, before initiation of the proceedings under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. However, in the instant case, as per the Ld. Counsel, the complainants filed the complaint/application without any compliance and/or affidavit as mandated under law, demonstrating compliance of the said provisions. As such, it was argued that the complainants made no efforts to comply with the requirement of Section 154 Cr.P.C., which fact was completely ignored by the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order. Correspondingly, it was argued that respondent no. 2 made several false averments even against the police officials, asserting that police officials did not come to the aid of respondent nos. 3-5, contrary to the fact that under respondent no. 4's MLC it was clearly noted that he was taken to the Hospital by HC Jaipal Singh, 737 PCR and the nature of his injury were, 'simple'.
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.02.16
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3.1. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that while passing the impugned order, it/Ld. Trial Court was obligated to indicate the offences, prima facie made out from the allegations levelled by the complainants. However, in the instant case, as per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court passed a blanket order, without examining the allegations and also the role of the revisionists, causing prejudice to the revisionists. Even otherwise, the Ld. Trial Court erred in not considering the Status Report filed by the concerned police officials, while passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, it was argued that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that respondent nos. 2-5 did not approach the Ld. Trial Court with clean hands, in as much, as the complaint filed by respondent no. 2 with the Commissioner of Police, after around two months of alleged incident, was inquired by the Vigilance Department of Delhi Police. However, during the said inquiry, respondent no. 2 tendered a written undertaking that he did not want to take any legal action against revisionists, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal. Correspondingly, it was argued that the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order, failed to consider that even at the time of release of respondent no. 2's vehicle on superdari, no complaint was made by respondent nos. 2-5 about the alleged incident or otherwise. Congruently, it was argued that the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that there was no explanation of delay in making the instant complaint.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for revisionist Sher Singh submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that in the entire complaint, there is no allegation against the said revisionist. Correspondingly, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel that while CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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passing the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court did not consider that in the absence of sanction from the competent authority, in terms of the provisions under Section 197 Cr.P.C. read with Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the 'DP Act'), no order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. could have been passed by the Ld. Trial Court against revisionist, Sher Singh. Even otherwise, it was argued that the complainants' complaint against revisionist, Sher Singh was not maintainable as filed beyond the period of three months of the alleged date of incident, without prior sanction, as mandated under Section 140 of DP Act. In this regard, it was further argued that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that revisionist, Sher Singh was deployed as Inspector in Delhi Police at the relevant point in time, and as such, not removable from his post/employment, without prior sanction of government in terms of the provisions under Section 197 Cr.P.C. Ergo, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists that the impugned order is liable to be set aside as passed in utter violation of settled law as well as contrary to the material brought on record. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, (2013) 10 SCC 705; Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287; Manjit Singh Bath & Anr. v. UT of Chandigarh & Anr., Crl. Appeal No. 4313/2023, dated 06.03.2025 (SC); Shadakshari v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC Online SC 1764; R.P. Singla v. C.K. Kapur, 2009 SCC Online Del 474; Deepak Kumar @ Deepak Kumar Saha v. Ombir Singh & Ors., 2018 SCC Online Del 10447; Rajni Palri Wala (Dr.) v. Dr. D. Mohan, 2009 SCC Online Del 1041; Ashish Kumar Aggarwal v. Vakil Ahmed, 2018 SCC Online Del 11339; Mahavir v. State, Crl. MC No. 4041/2015, dated CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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03.12.2018 (DHC); Deepak Kumar v. Ombir Singh & Ors., Crl. MC No. 664/2015, dated 08.08.2018 (DHC); and Brahm Singh Tanwar v. State & Ors., Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 819 of 2006 (DHC).
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State/respondent no. 1 (common in both petitions) submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, or incorrectness can be attributed to the impugned order, which was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizant of the principles of law, as well as wary of the facts and circumstances brought forth. Ergo, Ld. Addl. PP for the State entreated that the instant petitions be outrightly dismissed. 4.1. Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 2-5 (common in both petitions), while supplementing the arguments of Ld. Addl. PP for the State/respondent no. 1, submitted that the complaint lodged by the complainants discloses commission of cognizable offence, mandating registration of FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. In this regard, it was argued that the complaint dated 05.06.2015, discloses allegations of forcible dispossession/trespass/assault, etc., besides of the concerned police officials acting in complete dereliction of their duties, necessitating registration of the FIR in the instant case to elicit truth of the circumstances and to bring to justice, perpetrators of offence. As per the Ld. Counsel, the police officials, having failed to register FIR, prompted respondent nos. 2-5 to approach the Ld. Trial Court by means of the instant complaint/application, on which the impugned order came to be passed by the Ld. Trial Court, as per the mandate of law and decisions of superior courts. Further, it was argued that the police CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 619/2019 Mahesh Chand & Ors. v. State & Ors. Page No. 15 of 40 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.02.16 16:33:46 +0530 officials did not act fairly towards the complainant as the IO, who submitted the status report was more keen in detailing his investigations and the background related to the FIR register against respondent nos. 2-5 and to remain completely silent with respect to the issue as to why no police official reached at the Trauma Center on 13.04.2015 and why the statement of the injured persons were not recorded. Ergo, as per the Ld. Counsel, perusal of the impugned order would demonstrate that the Ld. Trial Court passed the said order after due application of mind as well as in a speaking/reasoned manner. Correspondingly, it was argued that the conduct of revisionist, Sher Singh would demonstrate that the same was not an act performed by him in discharge of his official duties, so as to necessitate sanction, as per law. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that no irregularity or impropriety can be attributed to the impugned order, making the instant petitions liable to be outrightly rejected. Consequently, it was prayed that the instant petitions be dismissed as amounting to abuse of process of law. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1; and Shadakshari v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 256/2024, dated 17.01.2024 (SC).
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionists, Ld. Addl. PP for the State/respondent no. 1 and that of Ld. Counsel for the complainants/respondent nos. 2-5, heard as well as the records, including the Ld. Trial Court records, other material/documents brought forth as well as the written submissions and case laws filed, thoroughly perused.
6. At the outset, this Court deems it pertinent to observe that though, Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 406/2019 was preferred CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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within the statutory period of limitation, however, Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 619/2019 against the impugned order dated 22.06.2019, the said appeal was preferred only on 25.09.2019, with a delay of 04 (four) days. Notably, under the application for condonation of delay, accompanying the instant petition, the reasons for such delay are specified as occasioned due to omission on part of Ld. Counsel for revisionists, namely, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal. In this regard, it is specifically averred under the said application that due to some mistake, the file of the present case got mixed with the records of other cases of the Ld. Counsel and that the same was recovered only on 25.09.2019, whereupon the said revision petition was immediately filed by/on behalf of the said revisionist. Correspondingly, as per Ld. Counsel for the revisionists, the delay in preferring the said petition was neither deliberate nor intentional, rather, attributed to reasons beyond the control of the revisionists. Further, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists that in case, the delay in preferring the instant revision is not condoned, grave and irreparable loss would accrue to the revisionists, while no loss/damage would be caused to the respondents, in case the prayer, as sought for is acceded to. Needless to mention here, Ld. Counsel for the respondents vehemently objected to the said prayer for condonation on the ground that considering the period of delay, no relaxation and/or indulgence may be granted in favour of the revisionists.
7. Apropos, the present discussion, it would be relevant to make a reference to Article 131 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Limitation Act'), which prescribes a period of ninety (90) days from the date of order, sought to be revised, as a period of limitation for filing CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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criminal revision. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for condonation of delay in certain cases on demonstration of 'sufficient cause'. Needless to mention here that the words, 'sufficient cause' have been repeated asserted by superior courts to be quite elastic and necessitating liberal construction, in the interest of justice. In fact, in this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while meticulously collating the guiding principles, governing the exercise of court's power to condone delay as well as the meaning of the said words, 'sufficient cause', enunciated as under;
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters..."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Unmistakably, the rules of limitation, which are premised on the principles enshrined in Latin maxim, 'interest reipublicae up sit finis litium1', are designed, not to destroy the legal rights of parties, rather, to ensure that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics. Ergo, considering the objective of the law and further being wary of the fact that there is no presumption under law that the delay in approaching courts was deliberate, courts 2 have repetitively professed for adopting a pragmatic, justice- oriented approach, in variance to, technical interpretation, while determining 'sufficient cause' in a case. Needless to mention that it is equally a settled law3, "decisive factor for condonation of delay is not length of delay but sufficiency and satisfactory explanation." Apposite in regard the foregoing to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Satish Chand Shivhare & Brothers, 2022 SCC Online SC 2151 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while professing for the adoption of a balanced as well as liberal approach in the determination of a prayer for limitation/condonation of delay, asserted as under;
1It is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation.
2J.M. Ramachandra & Sons v. Customs Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, 2001 SCC Online Del 1082.
3Dineshbhai Rameshbhai Minama v. State of Gujarat, 2018 SCC Online Guj 2610. CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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"22. When consideration of an appeal on merits is pitted against the rejection of a meritorious claim on the technical ground of the bar of limitation, the Courts lean towards consideration on merits by adopting a liberal approach towards 'sufficient cause' to condone the delay. The Court considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act may also look into the prima facie merits of an appeal. However, in this case, the Petitioners failed to make out a strong prima facie case for appeal.
Furthermore, a liberal approach, may adopted when some plausible cause for delay is shown. Liberal approach does not mean that an appeal should be allowed even if the cause for delay shown is flimsy. The Court should not waive limitation for all practical purposes by condoning inordinate delay caused by a tardy lackadaisical negligent manner of functioning."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Remarkably, reference in respect of the foregoing is further made to the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh v. State of M.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 600 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, noted in an akin context, as under;
"14. There can be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major aspect which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a particular case, the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Consequently, in light of the aforenoted judicial dictates/principles governing limitation; arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists, namely, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal and that of Ld. Counsel for the respondents; as well as upon appreciation of the facts and circumstances brought forth, this Court is of the considered opinion that the said revisionists' prayer for condonation of delay in filing the said petition/Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 619/2019, deserves to be allowed. As aforenoted, the reasons for delay in preferring the instant petition CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.02.16
16:34:11 +0530
are stated to be occasioned due to inadvertence/mistake on the part of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionists, besides the reasons for delay in preferring the present petition have been clearly, enunciated under the application preferred by/on behalf of the revisionists, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as annexed/appended along with the said petition. Clearly, in light of the foregoing, the reasons for delay in preferring the present revision petition/Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 619/2019 on behalf of the revisionists, namely, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal have not only been properly explained/forthcoming in the instant application as well as the arguments addressed by the Ld. Chief for the revisionists, rather, the same, in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be treated to be malicious and/or dilatory in any manner. Consequently, in light of the foregoing, this Court unswervingly observes that the prayer for condonation of delay in filing the instant petition deserves to be allowed and the period of 04 (four) days delay in preferring the said revision petition merits, to be condoned. Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, this Court allows revisionists' (namely, Mahesh Chand, Rajpal and Bhopal's) prayer for condonation of delay in preferring the said criminal revision petition bearing; Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 619/2019 and the period of delay in filing/preferring the said revision is, hereby, condoned.
11. Proceeding further, however, before progressing with the determination of the merits of the present case, this Court deems it apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions under law, in particular, to the provisions under Section 397 Cr.P.C.4, as under;
4Pari materia provision under Section 438 BNSS, which provides, "438. Calling for records to exercise of powers CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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"397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
*** *** *** (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding...."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is quite evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be agitated either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Hon'ble Court while explicating the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. (pari materia with Section 438 BNSS), observed as under:
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.***Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding..." (Emphasis supplied) CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Similarly, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in V.K. Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC Online Del 1192, in a similar context noted as under;
"67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The Revisional Court has to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the impugned order on the face of record."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 619/2019 Mahesh Chand & Ors. v. State & Ors. Page No. 24 of 40 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.02.16 16:34:23 +0530 settled law5 that trite law that in a case where the order of subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality, "merely because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner." Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC Online Del 312 , wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi expounded as under;
"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Germane for the purposes of present discourse as well as to comprehensively deal with the issue at hand to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi 6 in Nishu Wadhwa v. Siddharth Wadhwa, 2017 SCC Online Del 6444 , wherein the Hon'ble Court unambiguously observed that an order dismissing or allowing an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order and that a revision petition against such orders is maintainable. Relevant extract(s) of the said decision are reproduced as under;
5Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine MP
958. 6 Shri. Shiv Kumar v. State (GNCT of Delhi), W.P.(Crl.) 2112/2025, dated 22.09.2025 (DHC); and Ravinder Lal Airi v. S. Shalu Construction (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 HCC (Del) 597. CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 619/2019 Mahesh Chand & Ors. v. State & Ors. Page No. 25 of 40 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.02.16 16:34:28 +0530 "13. The issue that since the accused has not been summoned as an accused and has no right to file a revision petition is alien, while deciding an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The said issue crops up when the Magistrate entertains the complaint and on taking cognizance proceeds as a complaint case. In case directions are issued for registration of FIR immediately, on registration of FIR, the person against whom allegations are made in the FIR attains the status of an accused. His rights in so far as the Police can summon him for investigation, arrest him without warrants for allegations of cognizable offences are duly affected. In a situation where the fundamental right of freedom and liberty of a person is affected, it cannot be held that he has no right to be heard at that stage. Thus to hold that since directions only have been issued under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and no cognizance has been taken thus no revision would lie would be an erroneous reading of the decisions of the Supreme Court. Therefore, an order dismissing or allowing an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order and a revision petition against the same is maintainable."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Notably in the context of the foregoing, it is further apposite to observe that it is a settled law 7 that in the case where the criminal complaint, filed before the Magistrate, discloses commission of a cognizable offence upon scrutiny, two courses are open to the Magistrate, i.e., such magistrate may opt to take cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. and proceed to inquire into it/the complaint, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Sections 200/202 Cr.P.C. In the alternate, such magistrate may refer the complaint to police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for investigation, wherein magistrate would stay his hand till report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is submitted by the police, on which further process of law would follow. Reference in this regard, is made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Qamar 7 Satyamuni Verma v. State (Govt. NCT of Delhi) & Ors., MANU/DE/0704/2014. CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 619/2019 Mahesh Chand & Ors. v. State & Ors. Page No. 26 of 40 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2026.02.16 16:34:32 +0530 Jahan v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2014 SCC Online Del 3745, wherein the Hon'ble Court remarked in the context of the foregoing as under;
"8. It is a well settled law that when criminal complaint is filed before the Magistrate and upon perusal it is found that it discloses a cognizable offence having been committed, two courses are open to the Magistrate. He may chose to inquire into the complaint by taking cognizance in exercise of his powers under Section 190 Cr.P.C. and proceed to inquire into it in accordance with the procedure laid down in sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. In the alternative, he may refer the complaint to police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for investigation. In the latter case, the Magistrate, having given such direction would stay his hand till report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is submitted by the police, on which further process of law would follow.
9. The Magistrate is not supposed to act mechanically and direct registration of FIR in each and every case in routine and casual manner. Criminal law is not expected to be set in motion on mere asking of a party. There has to be some substance in the complaint filed and it is only if it appears that the allegations are serious enough and establish the commission of cognizable offence required thorough investigation by the police, an FIR should be ordered to be registered.
10. In case Gulab Chand Upadhyay v. State of U.P., (2002) Crl.L.J. 2907, it was held that the use of the word "may" in Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in contra distinction to the word "shall" in Section 154 Cr.P.C. clearly indicates that the Magistrate has the discretion to refuse registration of FIR..."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Correspondingly, earlier the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Skipper Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. State, 2001 SCC Online Del 448, explicated the law in respect of exercise of magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in the following terms;
"7. It is true that Section 156(3) of the Code empowers a Magistrate to direct the police to register a case and initiate investigations but this power has to be exercised judiciously on proper grounds and not CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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in a mechanical manner. In those cases where the allegations are not very serious and the complainant himself is in possession of evidence to prove his allegations there should be no need to pass orders under Section 156(3) of the Code. The discretion ought to be exercised after proper application of mind and only in those cases where the Magistrate is of the view that the nature of the allegations is such that the complainant himself may not be in a position to collect and produce evidence before the Court and interests of justice demand that the police should step in to held the complainant. The police assistance can be taken by a Magistrate even Under Section 202(1) of the Code after taking cognizance and proceeding with the complaint under Chapter XV of the Code as held by Apex Court in 20001 (1) Supreme Page 129 titled "Suresh Chand Jain Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors."..."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Germane for the purposes of present discourse to further make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Anjuri Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC Online Del 7570, wherein the Hon'ble Court reiterated that the directions for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be given by the Magistrate mechanically, rather, only on application of mind. Correspondingly, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Subhkaran Luharuka v. State, 2010 SCC Online Del 2324, catalogued the guiding principles and procedure to be followed while dealing with an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., remarking as under;
"52. ...For the guidance of subordinate courts, the procedure to be followed while dealing with an application under Section 156(3) of the Code is summarized as under:-
(i) Whenever a Magistrate is called upon to pass orders under Section 156(3) of the Code, at the outset, the Magistrate should ensure that before coming to the Court, the Complainant did approach the police officer in charge of the Police Station having jurisdiction over the area for recording the CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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(ii) The Magistrate should then form his own opinion whether the facts mentioned in the complaint disclose commission of cognizable offences by the accused persons arrayed in the Complaint which can be tried in his jurisdiction. He should also satisfy himself about the need for investigation by the Police in the matter. A preliminary enquiry as this is permissible even by an SHO and if no such enquiry has been done by the SHO, then it is all the more necessary for the Magistrate to consider all these factors. For that purpose, the Magistrate must apply his mind and such application of mind should be reflected in the Order passed by him.
Upon a preliminary satisfaction, unless there are exceptional circumstances to be recorded in writing, a status report by the police is to be called for before passing final orders.
(iii) The Magistrate, when approached with a Complaint under Section 200 of the Code, should invariably proceed under Chapter XV by taking cognizance of the Complaint, recording evidence and then deciding the question of issuance of process to the accused. In that case also, the Magistrate is fully entitled to postpone the process if it is felt that there is a necessity to call for a police report under Section 202 of the Code.
(iv) Of course, it is open to the Magistrate to proceed under Chapter XII of the Code when an application under Section 156(3) of the Code is also filed along with a Complaint under Section 200 of the Code if the Magistrate decides not to take cognizance of the Complaint. However, in that case, the Magistrate, before passing any order to proceed under Chapter XII, should not only satisfy himself about the pre-requisites as aforesaid, but, additionally, he should also be satisfied that it is necessary to direct Police investigation in the matter for collection of evidence which is neither in the possession of the complainant nor can be produced by the witnesses on being summoned by the Court at the instance of complainant, and the matter is such which calls for CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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investigation by a State agency. The Magistrate must pass an order giving cogent reasons as to why he intends to proceed under Chapter XII instead of Chapter XV of the Code..."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Remarkably, quite recently, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Alok Kumar v. Harsh Mander, 2023 SCC Online Del 4213, again summarized and reiterated the principles governing invocation/exercise of power/discretion under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as under;
"40. To summarise, a conspectus of the above- mentioned judicial precedents reveal the following:
(i) Power under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. necessitates application of judicial mind.
(ii) Such power is to be exercised in a judicious manner, and cannot be exercised mechanically or arbitrarily.
(iii) Magistrates cannot direct registration of FIR on mere asking of complainant.
(iii) Necessity to pass Speaking Order.
41. Given that the exercise of power under Section 156 Cr.P.C. falls within the realm of judicial function rather than administrative, it necessitates the application of judicial mind. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate to pass a reasoned order directing registration of an FIR..."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Clearly, it is observed from above the exercise of discretion under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. entails adoption of a cautionary approach, with the magistrate being duty bound to pass a reasoned order, while directing registration of FIR. As aforenoted, registration of FIR cannot be directed on mere asking of complainant. On the contrary, it is only where there is substance in the complaint filed and when it appears that the allegation made therein, establish the commission of cognizable offence, requiring thorough investigation by the police, only then FIR can be ordered to be registered. Ergo, under such circumstance(s), Magistrate is CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.02.16
16:34:48 +0530
required to consider the entire facts and circumstances of the case and exercise the discretion judiciously, not being unmindful of attempts to obtain such drastic orders on bald allegations and concocted stories for ulterior motives.
21. Ergo, with the foregoing understanding, this Court would now proceed with the determination of the correctness of the impugned order. In this regard, this Court outrightly records that from a conscientious perusal of the impugned order, it is noted that the only reason of the Ld. Trial Court, forthcoming for issuing/giving directions for registration of FIR in the instant case is, "...it appears that all the facts and circumstances taken up together hint at commission of a cognizable offence and the same needs to be investigated. Keeping in mind the totality of the fact and the circumstances, I am inclined to invoke the discretionary power vested in the court by virtue of section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Reference is made to the Judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case titled as Lalita Kumari vs. State of UP, WP (Crl.) No. 68 of 2008...". However, except such observation of the Ld. Trial Court that the facts and circumstances brought forth hint at the commission of cognizable offence, no reasons are emerging under the impugned order so as to convince the Ld. Trial Court to determine/reach a conclusion for making up a mind for directing registration of FIR in the instant case. Needless to mention that same is notwithstanding the fact that the superior courts, as aforenoted, have persistently professed for the adoption of a cautionary approach while directing registration of FIR in a given case. Reference in this regard is further made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court in Alok Kumar v. Harsh Mander, (Supra.), wherein the Hon'ble Court accentuated the importance of passing CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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a speaking order, whilst ordering direction for registration of FIR in a given case, under the following terms;
"...75. The importance of passing a reasoned order cannot be undermined when the order in question is challengeable in the higher Court and can be called into question by a petition seeking judicial review by way of a revision or appeal. When faced with an order which is passed without reasons, the higher Courts cannot decipher whether or not the concerned Judge has reached the decision after application of judicial mind or not. The application of judicial mind can be adjudged only by appreciating the reasons given to support the order in question. Whether the order in question lacks application of judicial mind, non-appreciation of relevant provisions of law or incorrect application of law and judicial precedents, can also be judged only through the reasons given in the order. The higher Courts also will not know as to whether relevant or irrelevant considerations became the basis of passing the order in absence of sufficient reasons. Similarly, whether the discretion of the Court was exercised judicially or not, or was based on relevant or irrelevant considerations, will be revealed by the reasons discussed in the impugned order. Since the decision and discretion exercised by a criminal Court affects significantly an individual against whom such direction is being issued, procedural and judicial fairness will require reasons to be given for the same.
76. From the perspective of appellate review, factually supported and reasoned order facilitates a review of the order. It also facilitates the correcting role of the appellate Courts by reaching a correct decision in case the reasons are found to be baseless or based on incorrect facts and law. In the judicial hierarchy of our country, the task of the Appellate or a Higher Court of reviewing erroneous orders with the aim of ensuring that justice is done to a litigant can be performed better in case a reasoned order is passed by the Courts below. Judicial accountability and the requirement of giving reasons so that the same can be scrutinised by the appellate Courts make it essential that the orders passed, which involves serious repercussions for a person especially since he is not before the Court, will also let the person so affected know as to what was the basis of issuance of a particular direction or order.
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2026.02.16 16:34:55 +0530
77. The duty to give reasoned decisions is also an obligation which is in consonance with idea of institutional responsibility of judiciary to the public at large, since they are entrusted with judicial power of making decisions which affect the lives of the citizen of this country who have a right to know, through the reasoning given by the Judge, as to how and why an order has been passed against them. Reasons are expressions of a Court's judicial mind which is essential for judicial function. Administrative decision making functions cannot be equated with judicial decision making function. It is the judicial decisions which distinguishes between a decision based on application of judicious mind as distinguishable from arbitrary decisions. Whether the reasons for decisions are adequate or inadequate, judicious or arbitrary, thus can be decided by an appellate Court on the basis of reasons which become the basis of reaching a conclusion. The reasons, thus, disclose the journey of a case from filing of an application under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. to passing of a direction, a judgment or order.
78. The reasons given in an order or judgment articulate the factual and legal basis for the decisions. The growing case load, pressures or other constraints before the Courts should not be the grounds to pass orders without recording satisfaction for the same. The principles of fairness and procedural and natural justice require reasons to be given for passing a judicial order of the nature as in the present case. When justifying an order, the concerned Judge conveys to the litigant and the appellate Court that the view taken by him is consistent with law and precedents.
79. The cases where exercise of judicial discretion is involved, the requirement of giving reasons therefore assumes more significant importance. No rules or guidelines can be laid down as to which issue involved in a petition, complaint or application would require reasons to which extent. Whether the reasons be given in detail, in a given set of facts and circumstances, can be decided by the learned Trial Judge by application of judicial mind. However, the one rule to be scrupulously followed while directing registration of FIR is that such an order cannot be a cryptic and non-reasoned order, which at times may run into two pages, but still neither discusses facts in brief nor the details qua cognizable offence disclosed CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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2026.02.16 16:34:59 +0530 from the facts alleged which had persuaded the Court to order registration of FIR.
80. However, it is not the number of pages in which the order runs that decides application of mind, but the contents of the same. If the order directing registration of the FIR does not deal with the most essential pre-conditions for doing so, it cannot be a valid or legal order.
*** *** ***
83. To have simply written one line order "that the complaint discloses commission of cognizable offence" without giving reasons as to which facts led the learned Magistrate to make up his mind for reaching the said decision was entirely insufficient.
A well-reasoned order will assure the person, adversely affected by the said decision, that it was not arbitrarily made and the relevant provisions of law had not been ignored. A higher Court will also be able to exercise its judicial review powers effectively in case the reasons for decision are provided. In the peculiar context of present case, it is clear that the learned Magistrate overlooked an important principle that reasons needed to be given to set out as to why an order for registration of the FIR was passed.
84. The reasons in an order give reassurance in an open public justice system that the discretion vested in the Court has been judiciously exercised and is supported by judicial precedents and guidelines laid down apropos the issue in question. Reasons cannot be cryptic or based on extraneous considerations or on irrelevant grounds or against the doctrine of natural justice. Neither can they be in the form of performa orders passed casually in similar kinds of cases or applications without having regard to the individualism and peculiarity of a case.
85. Setting of criminal law into motion by directing registration of FIR against a person should not be mechanically ordered. One line orders stating that in a complaint cognizable offence has been disclosed against one named and another unnamed person, without application of mind to the complaint in hand which disclosed no offence committed by the present applicant, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Thus, nonexistence of reasons in the order in question was against the judicial precedents and guidelines laid down for deciding applications under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C..."
(Emphasis supplied) CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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22. Ominously, in light of the foregoing that not only are the reasons for direction of registration of FIR under the impugned order not forthcoming, except to the extent that the allegations prima facie demonstrate/hint towards commission of cognizable offence, rather, directing such FIR registration, the Ld. Trial Court even failed to note/appreciate, though, briefly the role of each of the revisionists/proposed accused persons under the impugned order. Needless to mention that the impugned order is completely silent as to the determination on the requirement for sanction, in so far as the directions for FIR registration related to revisionist, Sher Singh, who was admitted posted as the SHO at PS. Burari, at the relevant point in time. Disconsolately, another glaring factor in the instant case is that neither from the contents of the complaint nor the documents available on record of the Ld. Trial Court, or even from the accompanying affidavits filed along with the complainants' complaint/application before the Ld. Trial Court, the complainants are seen to have demonstrated the compliance of the provisions under Section 154 Cr.P.C. in the instant case, before approaching the Ld. Trial Court with an entreaty for police investigation/registration of FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., as mandated under law. In fact, in this regard, this Court, records that along with its complaint/application, the complainants merely annexed a complaint dated 05.06.2015, addressed to Commissioner of Police as well as to the concerned DCP. However, it is not forthcoming from the material placed on record that the complainants, in fact, filed a complaint first before/at the concerned police station/police officials, before filing such complaint to the senior police officials. Needless to mention that no receiving of any such complaint by/at the concerned police CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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station is also observable from the material placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court or even demonstrable by the complainants before this Court, despite specific query in this regard.
23. Apposite to note in respect of the foregoing that this Court is conscious of the settled law that prior to agitating a claim before magistrate/Ld. Trial Court under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., an aggrieved/victim/complainant is required to demonstrate compliance of mandatory provisions8 under Section 154 Cr.P.C. In fact, the law mandates that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C., before filing a petition under Section 156(3) of the Code. However, from a conscientious perusal of the material brought forth, it is noted by this Court that the said aspects were also not considered by the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order. Apposite in this regard, to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (Supra.), wherein the Hon'ble Court, while explicating the necessity and mandatory nature of the compliance under Section 154 Cr.P.C. inter alia, remarked, as under;
"...30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged 8 Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, Crl. Appeal No. 252/2022, dated 18.02.2022. CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.02.16
16:35:10 +0530
under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.
*** *** ***
32. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an the application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR..."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Congruently, reference is made to the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh Bath v. State (UT of Chandigarh), 2025 SCC Online SC 1479, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in an akin context, while inter alia dismissing the direction for registration of FIR against the appellant (as before the Hon'ble Court), reiterated as under;
"7. The requirement of sub-Section (1) of Section 154 is that information regarding commission of a cognizable offence has to be furnished to an officer Incharge of a Police Station. In this case, obviously, the said compliance was not made. It is stated that the Inspector General of Police forwarded a complaint to the Economic Offences Wing. Sub-Section (3) of Section 154 comes into picture only when after a CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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complaint is submitted to the Officer Incharge of Police Station or information is provided to the Officer Incharge of Police Station regarding commission of a cognizable offence, the Officer Incharge refuses or neglects to register First Information Report.
8. Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC are the two remedies available for setting the criminal law in motion. Therefore, this Court held that before a complainant chooses to adopt a remedy under Section 156(3) of the CRPC, he must exhaust his remedies under sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CRPC and he must make those averments in the complaint and produce the documents in support. However, in this case, the second respondent did not exhaust the remedies. In this view of the matter, we find that both the learned Magistrate and the High Court have completely ignored the binding decision of this Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava [(2015) 6 SCC 287].
9. We, therefore, quash and set aside both the impugned orders and quash and set aside all the further steps taken on the basis of order dated 14th June, 2017 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate..."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Correspondingly, being circumspect of the facts and circumstances as well as the judicial dictates and arguments hereunder noted, in the considered opinion of this Court, the directions for registration of FIR, passed by the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order, are against all canons of law/justice, both on merits, as well as for the reasons of non-compliance of the provisions under Section 154 Cr.P.C. As aforenoted, the impugned order has not only been passed by the Ld. Trial Court in an extremely casual/cryptic manner, rather, the same is bereft of any reasons. Needless to further mention that impugned order demonstrates lack of application of judicial mind as it fails to disclose any reasons for directing registration of FIR, except to merely recording the cognizable offence are disclosed from CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
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Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.02.16
16:35:17 +0530
complaint. However, as aforenoted, the impugned order does not record as to commission of which cognizable offences were disclosed from the perusal of complainants' complaint/application against the proposed accused persons/revisionists. Correspondingly, as aforenoted, the impugned order is even bereft of finding on aspect of sanction, if any, necessary against revisionist, Sher Singh or even as to the compliance of the provisions under Section 154 Cr.P.C. in the instant case.
26. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court unswervingly records and reiterates that the Ld. Trial Court committed impropriety under the impugned order, for the reasons noted herein, while allowing complainants' entreaty for police investigation and directing registration of FIR, in light of the facts and circumstances, arguments addressed, documents and the material placed on record, as well as judicial dictates. Consequently, in the considered opinion of this Court the present revision petitions, i.e., Cr. Rev. No. 406/2019 and Cr. Rev. 619/2019 deserve to be permitted/allowed and are hereby allowed. Correspondingly, the order dated 22.06.2019, passed by Ld. MM-09, Central, Tis Hazari Court in case bearing, 'Vinay Tyagi v. Mahesh Chand, Case No. 522433/2016', PS. Burari, allowing complainants' application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and directing registration of FIR, against the revisionists is hereby set aside. Apposite at this stage for this Court to further note that, though, it/this Court holds highest regard for the decisions relied upon by Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 2-5, however, the same would not, in the considered opinion of this Court, come to the aid/rescue of the case put forth by the said respondents, in the manner as prayed for, as the facts and circumstances of the present CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 619/2019 Mahesh Chand & Ors. v. State & Ors. Page No. 39 of 40 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.02.16 16:35:21 +0530 case are clearly, distinguishable.
27. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court concerned, with the directions to proceed as per law.
28. Revision file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.02.16
16:35:26
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 16.02.2026. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CR No. 406/2019 Sher Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 619/2019 Mahesh Chand & Ors. v. State & Ors. Page No. 40 of 40