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Calcutta High Court - Port Blair

Shri Roshan Lakra vs The State And Another on 8 May, 2026

            IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR
                    Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction

                                (Appellate Side)

                                 CRA/4/2024

                             (IA NO: CRAN/3/2026)

                              Shri Roshan Lakra

                                      Vs.

                             The State and Another

                                     with

                                 CRA/5/2025

                             (IA NO: CRAN/3/2026)

                              Shri Roshan Lakra

                                      Vs.

                             The State and Another

Before: The Hon'ble Justice Arijit Banerjee

                         &

        The Hon'ble Justice Apurba Sinha Ray

For the Amicus Curiae           : Mr. D. C. Kabir, Sr. Adv.

For the Appellant               : Mr. Siddhartha Singha, Adv.

For the Respondent no.2         : Md. Sharukh, Adv.

For the State                   : Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar, Adv.

Judgment On                     : 08.05.2026

Arijit Banerjee, J.:

1. These two appeals and the connected applications were taken up for hearing together as they involve similar facts and the same parties as well as same points of law.

2

2. CRA 4 of 2024 is an appeal against a judgment and order dated January 2/3, 2020, whereby the appellant was convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short POCSO Act). The appellant was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years, and was fined in the sum of Rs. 5000/-, in default simple imprisonment for one month.

3. CRA 5 of 2025 is an appeal against a judgment and order dated April 25/30, 2025, whereby the appellant was again convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years and was fined in the sum of Rs. 5000/-, in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one month.

4. The facts of this case reveal a disturbing state of the law relating to protection of children from sexual offences. The appellant (hereinafter referred to as Roshan) is the younger brother of the survivor girl's (hereinafter referred to as Anjali) elder sister's husband. Roshan and Anjali fell in love with each other. That led to physical relationship between them. Admittedly, Anjali was a minor at that time. Roshan had attained majority.

5. As a consequence of the physical relationship between Roshan and Anjali, the latter became pregnant. She gave birth to a female child. When she had first approached the concerned hospital to confirm whether or not she had conceived, the hospital authorities, being duty bound in law, reported to the police that a minor girl had visited the hospital and it was found that she was pregnant. First Information Report was lodged by a Sub- Inspector. There was no complaint from Anjali or any of her family members. 3

6. A case was initiated against Roshan under Section 6 of the POCSO Act being Special Case No. 18 of 2017 leading to Special Trial No. 60 of 2017. He was arrested. Charge Sheet was filed under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Subsequently he was granted bail and was on bail during the trial.

7. While Roshan was on bail, evidently he and Anjali again cohabited. Consequently, Anjali became pregnant for a second time. Anjali had still not attained majority. Again, having received information from the concerned hospital, a First Information Report was lodged against Roshan. Special (POCSO) Case No. 12 of 2019 was initiated against him. Charge sheet was issued against him under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. This resulted in Special (POCSO) ST No. 20 of 2019. He had initially been arrested but was then granted bail.

8. The second case being Special (POCSO) Case No. 12 of 2019 was decided first. By his judgement and order dated January 2/3,2020, learned Special Judge (POCSO Act), North and Middle Andaman, Mayabunder, held Roshan to be guilty of commission of offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The punishment of 10 years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5000/-, was imposed on him. This resulted in CRA 4 of 2024.

9. The first case being Special Case No. 18 of 2017 was decided by the Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Judge Special Court (POCSO Act), South Andaman District, Port Blair, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, by his judgement and order dated April 25/30, 2025. Again, Roshan was held to be guilty for commission of offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO 4 Act. Punishment of 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5000/-, was imposed on him. This resulted in CRA 5 of 2025.

10. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties in these two appeals and the connected applications, at length.

11. The facts of the case are not in dispute. Evidently there was an intense love affair between Roshan (who at the relevant point of time was about 24 years old) and Anjali (who was then about 14 years old). Roshan lived for about 4 years in Anjali's paternal house. They indulged in physical relationship resulting in Anjali's pregnancy. Anjali's father banished Roshan from his house. Roshan went away to his paternal home in Srinagar. Anjali became upset at this and left her paternal house. She went to reside with her elder sister whose husband is Roshan's elder brother. Soon thereafter, Roshan went to reside with his said elder brother. There is evidence on record that Roshan and Anjali are residing as husband and wife. They have been married upon Anjali attaining majority. They have two children aged 9 and 7 years old. They live as a happy family.

12. Before proceeding further, I would like to advert to certain portions of the depositions of some of the prosecution witnesses.

13. Anjali deposed as PW 1 in connection with the 2017 case and as PW 7 in connection with the 2019 case. In connection with the 2017 case, she deposed as follows:

"In the year, 2017, I was a student of class-VII of Karmatang. School. I know Roshan Lakra. I was in love with him. We had sexual intercourse and I conceived. I went to hospital for medical check-up. I did not go to any other place from hospital. Later I 5 delivered a female baby on 09.07.2017. Roshan is the father of my baby.
Roshan knew that I was a student of class-VII. We were not married at that time. Roshan is present in court today (identified). (Statement under section 164 of Cr.P.C. is shown to the witness). These are my three signatures appearing on the statement. (signatures are marked as Ext. 1).
Cross examination by the defence:
I did not complain against Roshan. I want to marry Roshan after attaining my majority. I do not want punishment of Roshan. I used to stay at the house of Roshan. I want to live with him. Our parents do not have any objection. Police officer never interrogated me. I do not know the contents of the document recorded by the Magistrate.
I wanted to be a mother of his baby."

14. In connection with the 2019 case, Anjali deposed as follows:

"1. I read up to class VII at Government Senior Secondary School, Karmatang. Roshan Lakra is my husband. Roshan Lakra married me in the year 2017.
2. At the time of birth of second child police started this case. Police recorded my statement and took my signature thereon. This is my signature. Let the signature of PW7 on her statement (fardbayan) be marked as Ext-4/1.
3. I was medically examined by doctor at PHC Kalighat. Doctor took my signature on my medical examination report. This is my 6 signature. Let the signature of PW7 on her medical examination report be marked as Ext-2/1.
4. I gave statement before Ld. Magistrate in connection with this case in presence of my mother. Ld. Magistrate after recording my statement took my signatures thereon. These are my signatures. Let the signatures of PW7 on her statement recorded u/s/164 Cr.P.C be marked as Ext-9/1 & Ext-9/2 respectively.
5. I had refused to give blood samples of myself and my new born baby at Mayabunder hospital in presence of witnesses including doctor because I had become pregnant on account of physical relationship with Roshan Lakra and case was started against him and he was in jail. I had signed on refusal letter. This is my signature. Let the signature of PW7 on my refusal letter be marked as Ext-7/1.
6. Roshan Lakra is present in court (identified). Cross Examination
7. Roshan Lakra is my husband. I want to live with Roshan Lakra."

15. Anjali's sister, Malika Toppo, deposed as P.W. 2 in connection with the 2017 case and as P.W. 9 in connection with the 2019 case. In connection with the earlier case, she recorded the following evidence:

"Roshan Lakra is my brother in-law. Anjili is my sister. Anjili delivered a baby less than a year ago. Anjili was a student. She quit her study as she was pregnant. She was carrying the baby of Roshan Lakra. Roshan knew that Anjili was a student. 7 Roshan is present in court today (identified). Roshan and Anjili were not married. I stated before the police officer that Anjili conceived due to physical relation with Roshan. Cross examination by the defence:
My sister used to stay in our house. Roshan also used to stay with us. We wanted them to marry. They were not married as she was minor. We fixed their marriage.
I never complained to the police officer.
It is not a fact that I deposed falsely."

16. In connection with the 2019 case, Malika deposed that Roshan is her brother-in-law (Dewar). Anjali is her full blood sister. Anjali and Roshan are married. Anajli has two children. Anjali was residing presently in her paternal home. The elder child of Anjali is about two years old.

17. Anjali's father, Niranjan Toppo, deposed as P.W. 3 in connection with the 2017 case and as P.W. 4 in connection with the later case. In connection with the earlier case, Niranjan deposed that Roshan stayed at his house for 3 to 4 years. Roshan used to catch hold of Anjali. Being annoyed, Niranjan drove Roshan out of house. One or two months thereafter, Anjali left Niranjan's house to reside with her elder sister Malika. Thereafter, Niranjan came to know that Anjali had been impregnated by Roshan. In cross examination by the defence, Niranjan said that he never made any complaint to the police regarding the misdeeds of Roshan. He never lodged any complaint of any kind against Roshan. At the time when Anjali got pregnant, she had attained majority. Anjali and Roshan are married and 8 were residing in his house. In connection with the later case, Niranjan deposed that Roshan is his son-in-law.

18. Anjali's mother, Pushpa Lakra, deposed as P.W. 5 in connection with the 2019 case. She said that Roshan is her son-in-law. She did not know why the case had been started against Roshan. Anjali and Roshan have two children one of whom was born about 3 years ago (date of deposition September 23, 2019). At the time of birth of her second child, Anjali may have completed 18 years of age. Pushpa did not depose in connection with the 2017 case.

19. Roshan's elder brother, Edmon Lakra, deposed in connection with the 2019 case as follows-

"Examination in chief:-
1. Roshan Lakra is my brother. Anjali Toppo is the wife of my brother Roshan Lakra. My in laws house is also situated at Karmatang. My brother Roshan used to go to my in laws house at Karmatang and at that time he became acquainted with Anjali Toppo and after few days Roshan had physical relationship with Anjali and she became pregnant. Since Roshan Lakra made Anjali pregnant, a case was started against him which is pending in Port Blair court. After being released on bail in the case at Port Blair, Roshan came to house and had physical relationship with Anjali again and she became pregnant for the second time and Anjali gave birth to a male child.
2. It is true that Anjali is still a minor below the age of 18 years. 9
3. My wife had accompanied Anjali to Kishore Nagar, PHC at the time of her labour pain.
4. Hospital authority informed pregnancy of Anjali Toppo to police.
5. Roshan Lakra is present in court (identified).

Cross Examination

6. Anjali Toppo is my wife's sister."

20. In his examination under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Roshan admitted that Anjali was a minor when he had physical relationship with her. He said that he had not done 'any forceful act with Victim Girl'. Anjali had solemnised marriage with him out of her free will after she became major. In answer to Q. 25 he said: "I have been falsely implicated in this case. I and VG were in love affair and we have solemnised marriage out of our free will. I have two kids. At the time of my love affair with Victim Girl, she was major and I am the sole bread earner of my family'. In his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in connection with the 2019 case Roshan, in answer to Q. 44 said: 'I have two minor children. my wife Anjali is alone in house. I pray for mercy'.

21. We therefore see, from the evidence on record that Roshan, a young man in his early 20s, fell in love with Anjali, a young girl in her teens. Anjali's elder sister is married to Roshan's elder brother. The physical relationship that developed between Roshan and Anjali flowed from the love that they felt for each other. Roshan did not enter into sexual relationship with Anjali out of lust or to satisfy his carnal desire. No force was applied by 10 Roshan on Anjali. They were attracted to each other. Their physical union was as natural as a river flowing into the sea.

22. Anjali never made any complaint against Roshan, nor did any member of Anjali's family. Initially Anjali's father Niranjan may have been somewhat peeved with Roshan's display of affection for Anjali by touching her intimately. However, he never lodged any complaint. He subsequently accepted the marriage of his daughter Anjali with Roshan. Anjali's mother has evidently, accepted Roshan as her son-in-law. Anjali's elder sister Malika has also approved her sister's matrimony with Roshan. Roshan and Anjali have two kids who are about 9 and 7 years old.

23. We therefore find a big happy family all members of which who could live happily ever after. But that was not to be the case. The POCSO Act in effect criminalises sex with a person below the age of 18 years. Therefore, in the backdrop of the admitted fact that when both the 2017 and 2019 cases were initiated, Anjali was below the age of 18 years, the learned Trial Judges in both the cases had no choice but to convict Roshan under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Afterall, the actus reus of the crime was not disputed even in the faintest manner by Roshan. The hands of the learned Trial Judges in the two cases were firmly tied. Such is the impact and effect of the POCSO Act.

24. The intensity of Anjali's feelings for Roshan would be evident, inter alia, from the statement made by Anjali from the witness box in open Court to the effect that she wanted to be the mother of Roshan's child. It was more than mere physical relationship between the two. It was a meeting of minds. 11 It was a longing to be together and walk the path of life holding each other's hands.

25. This is not a case where the survivor girl fell prey to the accused person's lust, libido or carnal desire. This is a case of loving consensual physical relationship in which force or violence had no role to play.

26. Roshan is the sole earning member of the family. If these appeals fail, Roshan, who is presently on bail, will have to go back to custody. The probable and very likely result would be disintegration of a happy family leading to destitution and ultimate destruction and ruination of Anjali and the two children.

27. At this point we may note that Anjali has filed two applications in the two appeals being CRA No. 4 of 2024 and CRA No. 05 of 2025 both of which are marked as CRAN 3 of 2026, the prayer portions whereof read as follows:

"It is therefore most humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be graciously pleased to consider the subsequent marriage between me and the Appellant and the birth of our two children and accept my submissions to quash the entire proceedings of this case including the conviction and sentence passed on my husband Roshan Lakra and to pass such other order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice."

28. It is important to note what Anjali has stated in those two petitions which are identical:-

"2. That I am filing the instant application voluntarily, out of my own free will, without any pressure, threat, coercion, or undue 12 influence from the appellant or any other person being an adult and of sound mind and clear conscience.
3. That at the time of the incident, I and the appellant were known to each other and were in a relationship out of mutual affection and consent, wherein I was fully aware of the consequences and nature of our relationship, and I wanted to be married to and live with the appellant and have children and a family with him. I have repeatedly made these statements before the police and Magistrate and court at different times over the years during the trial proceedings faced by my husband Roshan Lakra.
4. That after the registration of the case and during the pendency of the proceedings, our relationship has always continued and with the consent and blessing of both our families, we have solemnized our marriage according to Christian rites and customs.
5. That since the date of marriage, I and the appellant have been living together as husband and wife peacefully and happily.
6. That out of the said wedlock, we have been blessed with two children being a Baby Girl aged about 9 years and a Baby Boy aged about 7 years.
The copies of their birth certificate of Baby Girl and Mother & Child Protection Card of Baby Boy are enclosed with this application and marked as "Annexure A/1".

7. That I am residing with the Appellant along with our children and we are leading a normal matrimonial and family life. The Appellant is taking proper care of me and our children and is 13 maintaining the family by earning livelihood being our sole breadwinner and earner. That I have never had and still do not have any grievance, complaint, or ill-will whatsoever against the Appellant and I do not wish to pursue anything adverse against him. I have made this clear over the years before both police and judicial authorities, yet the case has been going on where my husband has been punished for no fault of his.

8. That the incident which led to the present case arose out of our relationship at that time and the same never existed as an offence nor does anything of that case survive in view of our subsequent marriage and family life. My conscious decision was to have a family with the appellant and I was aware of the consequences of my relationship with him, and I accepted the same, and he is guilty of no offence.

9. That the continuation of this proceeding and the pronouncing of a conviction and sentence against the Appellant is causing mental agony and hardship to me and our children who are all dependent on him and our happy family life is being further disrupted by the forcible continuation of a case which I have never wanted or supported.

10. That I respectfully state that Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees me and my husband the right to life and personal liberty, which includes the right to live with dignity, the right to matrimonial life, and the right to family life. As the legally wedded wife of the Appellant, I have a fundamental right to cohabit 14 and lead a dignified matrimonial life with my husband and my rights may be considered in this situation instead of merely going by the letter of the law rather than the spirit of justice.

11. That my two minor children also have independent fundamental rights under Article 21 to receive love, care, protection, guidance, and upbringing from their father, which they have done for so many years and still require at this stage of their lives, where this legal proceeding is causing disruption and havoc in their lives and our family.

12. That if the Appellant is required to undergo the sentence without considering these situations and developments, the same would directly affect my marital life and the welfare, education, and future of our minor children. We would be reduced to a state of destitution and more than anything, I would be deprived of my husband and the children deprived of their father, merely to fulfil the satisfaction of a law which I never wanted invoked in the first place, and which I have repeated over the years before the authorities in connection with this proceeding, being myself responsible for the situation which I chose of my own free will and volition being fully aware of the matters at the time.

13. That the welfare of children and preservation of the family unit are humanitarian considerations flowing from Article 21 which deserve kind consideration by this Hon'ble Court. These subsequent developments are of such nature which were not in existence at the time of trial and therefore deserve consideration at 15 the appellate stage, which is fully permissible, and I pray for this Hon'ble Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to act ex debitio justitae and to do complete justice to protect my rights under the Constitution which overrules and overrides any statutory provisions or laws.

14. That I respectfully submit that these facts constitute exceptional mitigating circumstances for consideration by this Hon'ble Court while deciding the present Criminal Appeal, in which it is my specific prayer that the offences were never existent, constituted purely personal and private matters between me and the appellant, and which have been subsequently compromised, settled and closed. In such light, the entire conviction and sentence of my husband may be quashed by this Hon'ble Court being without merit or substance, in the interests of justice being more important than merely blind adherence to the words of the law which do not apply to this case at all.

15. That I am ready and willing to appear before this Hon'ble Court and satisfy this Hon'ble Court as to my intentions in filing this application."

29. The question that arises in the above factual matrix is whether or not we affirm the learned Trial Court's judgments and orders in these two appeals and dismiss the appeals holding that there is technically no error in the impugned judgments and orders? Will that serve the ends of justice? Should our conscience permit that when we see that Roshan and Anjali 16 crave to be with each other and share their lives as a happy family with their two kids? The answer to each of these questions must be in the negative.

30. While the object of the POCSO Act is definitely laudable, its demerit is its rigidity. In the present case, in our opinion, there is nothing criminal in Roshan's conduct but for the fact that the relevant provisions of the POCSO Act make his physical relationship with Anjali, a crime. In this context we may note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Anurudh & Anr. (Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 10656 of 2025), reported at 2026 INSC 47 approved the High Court's view in Satish alias Chand vs State of U.P. (Crl. Misc. Bail Appl. No. 18596 of 2024) to the effect that 4 factors are crucial for the Courts to consider in deciding a prosecution under the POCSO Act:-

"A. Assess the Context: Each case should be evaluated on its individual facts and circumstances. The nature of the relationship and the intentions of both parties should be carefully examined. B. Consider Victim's Statement: The statement of the alleged victim should be given due consideration. If the relationship is consensual and based on mutual affection, this should be factored into decisions regarding bail and prosecution. C. Avoid Perversity of Justice: Ignoring the consensual nature of a relationship can lead to unjust outcomes, such as wrongful imprisonment. The judicial system should aim to balance the protection of minors with the recognition of their autonomy in certain contexts. Here the age comes out to be an important factor. 17 D. Judicial Discretion: Courts should use their discretion wisely, ensuring that the application of POCSO does not inadvertently harm the very individuals it is meant to protect."

31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the concluding part of the judgment has called upon the Secretary, Law, Government of India to consider introduction of a Romeo-Juliet clause exempting genuine adolescent relationships from the stronghold of the POCSO Act. However, no such amendment has been made to the POCSO Act as yet.

32. The question then is, what should we do? Should we dismiss these appeals knowing that same would almost certainly result in rapid disintegration of Roshan's family leading to the family's annihilation? Or, should we take a view within the four corners of law that would terminate the prosecution once and for all enabling Roshan to be with his family and nurture the family as its paterfamilias.

33. I have no doubt in my mind that we should adopt the second course of action. Indeed, upholding the conviction in the facts of the present case, would bring the justice delivery system into shame, odium and contempt.

34. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Article 21 has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a vast number of cases, as encompassing a wide variety of rights. It has been held that one such right is the right to marry or choose a life partner. It was held in Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. and Ors. reported at (2018) 16 SCC 368: AIR 2018 SC 1933 that right to marry a person of one's choice is an integral aspect of Article 21 i.e., protection of life and 18 personal liberty. In Lata Singh v. State of U. P. & Anr., reported at (2006) 5 SCC 475: AIR 2006 SC 2522, Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised the right to marry as a part of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The right to live a happy and healthy married life is therefore a citizen's fundamental right. Anjali has highlighted this right of her in the petitions that she has filed in connection with these appeals. Rohan also has the same right. It cannot be gainsaid that Article 21 would override any other provision of law if there is a conflict between the two. For example, it is now well established that notwithstanding the restriction in Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), bail can be granted to an under-trial charged with an offence under the NDPS Act, on the touch stone of Article 21, if he is detained in custody for an inordinately long period of time without the trial coming to an end. Similarly, Article 21 overrides the restriction on grant of bail in Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

35. In the present case, nobody seems to be having any grievance against Roshan, excepting the prosecution. However, to be fair to the prosecution, it has merely discharged its duties under the law of the land. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, prosecuting Roshan has not advanced the cause of justice. It perhaps also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court. The process of Court is meant to be used to secure justice and a fair result. However, if setting in motion the process of Court in a given set of facts leads to injustice, unfairness, inequity or unconscionable results that would exemplify abuse of the process of court. Section 482 of 19 the Code of Criminal Procedure reserves to the High Court inherent powers to deal with such situations. Section 482 reads as follows:

"482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

36. A question may arise as to whether the High Court can exercise its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code while hearing a criminal appeal. This question has been answered in the affirmative by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Popular Muthiah v. State Represented by Inspector of Police reported in (2006) 7 SCC 296.

37. Nobody can possibly dispute that the final cause of law is the welfare of society as was observed by Benjamin N. Cardozo Former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of United States. Law without justice is as vain as a Ferrari without its engine and as useless as a refrigerator without its compressor. Law is not an end in itself. It is a means to achieve a just end. Law cannot be divorced from reality or humanity.

38. In Mahesh Mukund Patel v. State of U.P. & Ors., reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 614, the charge was under the POCSO Act. In that case, upon the survivor girl attaining majority, the accused person married her. The girl filed an affidavit before Court stating that she was happily married to the accused and they were residing together. The Hon'ble Supreme Court treated the matter to be a fit case, where the High Court 20 should have exercised its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by quashing the proceedings and recording a conclusion that no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution since the same would cause undue harassment to the accused person, the survivor girl being his wife and their children. The Hon'ble Supreme Court accordingly set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the entire proceedings.

In K. Kirubakaran vs State of Tamil Nadu reported at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2307, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while quashing the conviction and sentence imposed under the provisions of the POCSO Act in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, noted that a balance needs to be struck between the competing interests of justice, deterrence and rehabilitation. It was observed that in order to do complete justice in proper cases, in the peculiar facts and circumstances, a balanced approach combining practicality and empathy is necessary. The Hon'ble Court specifically observed as follows:

"9. ......The appellant and the victim are not only legally married, they are also in their family way. While considering the offence committed by the appellant punishable under the POCSO Act, we have discerned that the crime was not the result of lust but love. The victim of crime herself has expressed her desire to live a peaceful and stable family life with the appellant, upon whom she is dependent, without the appellant carrying the indelible mark on his forehead of being an offender. Continuation of the criminal proceedings and the appellant's incarceration would only disrupt 21 this familial unit and cause irreparable harm to the victim, the infant child, and the fabric of society itself."

39. Section 482 Cr.P.C. is an overriding section which saves the inherent powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be exercised firstly, to give effect to an order under CrPC.; secondly, to prevent the abuse of the process of court; and thirdly, to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of the court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are wide and the court is vested with a significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to exercise such powers. Every High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of court. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in the absence of specific provisions in the statute books. [Please see Inder Mohan Goswami and Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors. reported at 2007 (12) SCC 1 and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. reported at 2019 (9) SCC 608]

40. Another question pertains to the power of a High Court to quash proceedings emanating from non-compoundable offences which have no impact or depraving effect on the society at large, on the basis of a comprise between the accused and the victim/complainant. As noted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramgopal and Anr v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported at (2022) 14 SCC 531, such question has been 22 answered in the affirmative by a larger bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh vs State of Punjab & Anr. reported at 2012 10 SCC 303.

41. The power of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is of the widest amplitude. The power is to be exercised to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of Court. In this connection the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 11 to 13 of the judgment in Ramgopal and Anr Vs State of Madhya Pradesh, (supra), should be noted:-

"11. True it is that offences which are "non-compoundable" cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under Section 320 CrPC. Any such attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 CrPC, which is the exclusive domain of legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320 CrPC, which may justify its wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of "compoundable" offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of Section 320 CrPC is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 CrPC in 23 aid to prevent abuse of the process of any court and/or to secure the ends of justice.
12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyse the very object of the administration of criminal justice system.
13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non- heinous offences or where the offences are pre-dominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to 24 the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Section 482 CrPC would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard-and-fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab. [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, para 29 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] and Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, para 15 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706]"

42. The facts of the present case will reveal that although the offence that Roshan is charged with, is non-compoundable in nature, there never was any grievance against him on the part of Anjali or her family members. In our opinion, quashing the instant proceedings will not have any adverse or deprave effect on the society at large or any section of it.

43. As discussed above, the present case is not a run of the mill POCSO case where a minor has been forcibly violated. The physical relationship between Roshan and Anjali was admittedly consensual. It may be true that consent of a minor is of no effect. However, the same has to be taken into 25 account along with other factors indicated above, to decide whether or not prosecuting Roshan is warranted in the present factual matrix. At the cost of repetition we say that Anjali has pleaded before us to put an end to the prosecution so that the family survives. Blindly prosecuting Roshan under the provisions of the POCSO Act will be counterproductive. Such prosecution will almost certainly destroy Roshan's wife Anjali for the protection of whom and the like, the POCSO Act was promulgated, not to talk of the two children born to Roshan and Anjali.

44. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, to prevent abuse of process of Court and to secure the ends of justice we quash the entire proceedings in both the criminal cases being Special Case No. 18 of 2017 leading to Special Trial No. 60 of 2017 and Special (POCSO) Case No. 12 of 2019 leading to Special (POCSO) ST No. 20 of 2019 as also the conviction of Roshan. The bail bonds shall stand discharged.

45. CRA No. 4 of 2024 and CRA No. 05 of 2025 along with the two interlocutory applications filed in the two appeals, both numbered as IA NO:

CRAN/3/2026, are disposed of accordingly.

46. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.

I agree.

(Apurba Sinha Ray, J.)                                   (Arijit Banerjee, J.)
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