Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Manjeet Sharma vs Union Of India Through on 19 March, 2014
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi.
1.OA-1554/2012 4. OA-2039/2012
MA-1289/2012
5. OA-2040/2012
With
2.OA-1848/2012 6. OA-2272/2012
MA-1533/2012
7. OA-2825/2012
3.OA-1909/2012 8. OA-579/2013
MA-1567/2012
Reserved on : 13.02.2014.
Pronounced on :19.03.2014.
Honble Mr. G. George Paracken, Member (J)
Honble Mr. Shekhar Agarwal, Member (A)
OA-1554/2012
1. Manjeet Sharma,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o late Sh. Rajendra Sharma.
2. Chain Pratap Singh,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Jwala Singh.
3. Neeraj Singh,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Sh. Anand Pal Singh.
4. Subhash Chand,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Surjeet Singh.
5. Azad Singh,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Hanraj.
6. Smt. Savitri Devi,
Asstt. Binder,
W/o Vinod Kumar.
7. Dayanand,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Roop Singh.
8. Rupesh Rajan Ravi,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Ram Murti Singh.
9. Som Dutt,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Sh. Bhoodev Singh.
10. Ms. Preeti Sinha,
Asstt. Binder,
D/o B.N. Sinha.
11. Chandrachur Shome,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o late Chinmoy Shome.
12. Surajit Mukherjee
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Satya Mukherjee.
13. Chinmoy Sarkar,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Dibakar Sarkar.
14. Animesh Malik,
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Sh. Baidya Nath Malik.
15. Asif Iqubal
Asstt. Binder
S/o Sh. S.K. Abul Hussain
16. Julfikar Nazir
Asstt. Binder,
S/o Sh. Atiar Nazir
17. Nabin Saha
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Naba Kumar Saha
18. Dilip Kumar Sharma
Asstt. Binder,
S/o late Ramesh Chand Sharma
19. Yogesh Kumar
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Jay Prakash
20. Proloy Pramanick,
Asstt. Binder,
s/o late Shri Ratikanta Pramanick
21. Kamal Kumar Kanojia
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh.R.B. Kanojia
22. Kedar Kumar Panda
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Surendra Nath Panda
23. Murari Lal,
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Kali Charan,
24. Arun Kumar,
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Ashok Kumar
25. Sunil Kumar
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Vidyia Shankar
26. Ram Prakash
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Raj Pal
27. Sunita Kumari
Asstt. Binder,
D/o Sh. Devi Ram
28. Hardeep Grohi
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Harish Chandra
29. Surajit Ghosh
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Sailen Ghosh
30. Rakhi Patra
Asstt. Binder,
D/o Sh.Sanat Patra
31. Vijay Kant Bhardwaj
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. M.C. Bhardwaj
32. Som Dutt
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Ram Het Singh
33. Sat Parkash
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Sajan Singh
34. Jogender Singh
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Jai Pal
35. Debasish Mohanty
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Laxmidhar Mohanty
36. Satish Banerjee
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Mohan Banerjee
37. Uday Singh
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Mahipal Singh
38. Mukesh Kumar
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Cheta Ram Verma
39. Krishan Gopal Saxena
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Roop Kishore Saxena
40. Milap Chand
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Bidhi Chande
41. Bhoop Singh Meena
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Sarwant Kumar
42. Sunil Kumar
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Panna Lal
43. Lokesh Kumar
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Inder Sen
44. Roop Singh
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Dhani Ram
45. Chandra Pal Singh
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. M.P. Singh
46. Bandana Dey
Asstt. Binder,
d/o Sh. Ravinder Day
47. Sunita Lakra
Asstt. Binder,
D/o Sh. Dhanu Lakra
48. Amit Malik
Asstt. Binder,
s/o Sh. Gokul Chand Malik
49. Gopal Singh
Offset M/C Attendant,
s/o Sh.Harpal Singh
50. Satish Kumar
Offset M/C Attendant,
s/o Sh. Khicchu Singh
51. Dharmendra Kumar Sharma
Offset M/C Attendant,
s/o Sh. K.M. Sharma
52. Yashpal Singh
Offset M/C Attendant,
s/o Sh. Bhajan Lal
53. Praveen Kumar Saxena
Offset M/C Attendant,
s/o Sh. Braj Bahadur Saxena
54. Arvindra Kumar
M/C Attendant Offset,
s/o Sh. Shiv Murat
55. Lokendra Kumar
Asst. Plate Maker
s/o Sh. Ramesh Chandra
56. Jaswant Singh
Asst. Plate Maker
s/o Sh. Sahab Singh
57. Rajveer
Carpenter
S/o Shri Nand Kishore
Applicants
All employees of Govt. of India Press, Aligarh C/o Press Colony, Qtr. No. 298, Type-II, Ringh Road, Mayapuri, Delhi.
(through Sh. K.C. Mittal, Advocate)
Versus
1. Union of India through
The Secretary,
Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation,
Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi-110011.
2. The Director,
Directorate of Printing,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-110011.
3. Shri Surendra Singh
Dy. Director, (Admn. II)
Directorate of Printing,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-110011.
4. The Manager,
Government of India Press, Aligarh,
U.P.
.Respondents
(through Ms. Ruby Sharma , Advocate)
OA-1848/2012
1. Govt. of India Press Employees
Union (Regd. No. 1476)
Govt. of India Press,
Ring Road, mayapuri,
New Delhi-64.
2. Sh. Hari Om,
S/o Sh. Bhagwan,
Govt. of India Press,
Ring Road, mayapuri,
New Delhi-64.
3. Sh. Ram kesh Meena,
S/o Sh. Babu Lal Meena,
Govt. of India Press,
Ring Road, Mayapuri,
New Delhi-64.
4. Sh. Vijay Kumar Dahiya,
S/o Sh. Mange Ram Dahiya,
Govt. of India Press,
Minto Road, New Delhi-2.
5. Sh. Mohan Singh Meena,
S/o Sh. Shri Narayan Meena,
Govt. of India Press,
Ring Road, Mayapuri,
New Delhi-64. . Applicants
(through Sh. K.C. Mittal, Advocate)
Versus Versus
Union of India & Ors. through
1. The Secretary,
Ministry of Urban Development
And Poverty Alleviation,
Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
2. The Director,
Directorate of Printing,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
3. Sh. Surendra Singh,
Dy. Director, (Admn.II)
Directorate of Printing,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
4. Manager,
Govt. of Indias Press,
Nilo Kheri, Distt. Karnal,
Aligarh, UP.
5. The Manager,
Government of India Press,
Ring Road, Mayapuri,
New Delhi. .. Respondents
(through Sh. Amit Anand, Advocate)
OA-1909/2012
1. Sh. Vijay Kumar Dahiya,
S/o Sh. Mange Ram Dahiya,
Govt. of India Press,
Minto Road,
New Delhi-2.
2. Sh. Mohan Singh Meena,
S/o Sh. Shri Narayan Meena,
Govt. of India Press,
Ring Road, Mayapuri,
New Delhi-64.
3. Sh. Dalip Kumar,
S/o Sh. Tilak Raj,
Govt. of India Press,
Faridabad, Haryana.
4. Govt. of India Press Workers
Association Regd., Govt. of India
Press, Nilokheri, Distt. Karnal,
Haryana.
5. Sh. Kailash Chander,
S/o Sh. Jag Phool Singh,
Govt. of India Press,
Nilokheri, Distt. Karnal,
Haryana.
6. Sh. Surender Kumar,
S/o Sh. Hari Ram,
Govt. of India Press,
Nilokheri, Distt. Karnal.
Haryana.
7. Sh. Ashok Kumar,
S/o Sh. Puran Chand,
Govt. of India Press,
Nilokheri, Distt. Karnal,
Haryana. . Applicants
(through Sh. K.C. Mittal, Advocate)
Versus
Union of India & Ors. through
1. The Secretary,
Ministry of Urban Development
And Poverty Alleviation,
Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
2. The Director,
Directorate of Printing,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
3. Sh. Surendra Singh,
Dy. Director, (Admn.II)
Directorate of Printing,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
4. Manager,
Govt. of Indias Press,
Nilo Kheri, Distt. Karnal,
Aligarh, UP. . Respondents
(through Sh. Amit Anand, Advocate)
OA-2039/2012
1. Sh. Harish Kumar,
S/o Sh. Yaspal Singh,
R/o Samoli Vistar,
H.No. 157, Gali No.9,
Block-C, Shahdara,
Delhi.
2. Sh. Dilip Kumar Agarwal,
S/o Sh. Ashok Kumar,
R/o Quarter No.II, Type-III,
Press Colony, Aligarh, UP.
3. Sh. Gaurauv Sharma,
S/o Sh. Gopal Sharma,
R/o 15/15, Barai Street,
Kachi Chaupal, Aligarh,
UP.
4. Sh. Vikas Kumar Bachi,
C/o Sh. Rajendra Sharma,
R/o H.No. 19/191 Krishnapuri,
Mathia, Aligarh.
5. Sh. Suarabh Gautam,
S/o Sh. Hari Om Gautam,
R/o Prem Nagar, Nagla Masani,
Aligarh, UP.
6. Sh. Manoj Kumar,
S/o Sh. Sohan Lal,
R/o Village Sidhagadi,
PO Sibala, Aligarh,
UP.
7. Sh. Saurab Johri,
S/o Sh. Shelendra Johri,
R/o H.No. 15/132, Aligarh
UP.
8. Sh. Pritam Singh,
S/o Sh. Narayan Singh,
R/o MIG 59/2, Swarn Jayanti Nagar,
Ram Garh Road, Aligarh,
UP.
9. Sh. Hemendra Kumar Singh,
S/o Sh Soran Singh,
R/o H.No. 4/300, Bhomala Near
Municipal Tube Well, Aligarh,
UP.
10. Sh. Dinesh Kumar,
S/o Sh. Tola Ram,
R/o Quarter No. 51/2, Colony,
Aligarh, UP.
11. Sh. Nutan Prakash Agarwal,
S/o Sh. M.P. Agarwal,
R/o Flat No. 107/B, Pocket-J/K,
Dilshad Garden, Delhi-95. . Applicants
(through Sh. Nasir Ahmed, Advocate)
Versus
1. Union of India through
Its Secretary,
Ministry of Urban Development,
Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi.
2. Director of Printing,
Ministry of Urban Development,
Govt. of India,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-1.
3. Manager,
Govt. of Indias Press,
Aligarh, UP. . Respondents
(through Sh. Rajinder Nischal, Advocate)
OA-2040/2012
1. Sh. A.K. Sharma,
S/o Sh. Man Mohan,
Qr. No. C-64, Minto Road
Complex, New Delhi.
2. Sh. Rahul Sharma,
Vill. & Post Machgar,
Faridabad,
Haryana.
3. Sh. Amit Kumar,
H.No. 1612, Anandpur
Ashram Gali, Hill Colony,
NIT Colony, Faridabad.
4. Sh. Gajraj,
Vill Bhawan, Post Amroli,
Faridabad, Haryana.
5. Sri Harish Phanga,
S/o Sh. Deep Chand,
Vill. Bhakri, Post Pali,
Faridabad.
6. Sri Bakai Bihari,
Dev Nagar, Bhagar Gate,
Kosikala, Mathura.
7. Sri Amit Kumar,
Vill. Meena Nagar,
Post Kosikala,
Mathura.
8. Sh. Kamal Kant,
S/o Sh. Trilok Chand,
H.No. S-4/81, Old Mahair Nagar,
New Delhi. . Applicants
(through Sh. Nasir Ahmed, Advocate)
Versus
1. Union of India through
Secretary,
Ministry of Urban Development,
Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi.
2. Director of Printing,
Directorate of Printing,
Ministry of Urban Development,
Govt. of India,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
3. Manager,
Govt. of Indias Press,
Aligarh, UP. . Respondents
(through Sh. Rajinder Nischal, Advocate)
OA-2272/2012
Sh. Dharam Vir Singh,
S/o Sh. Sardar Singh,
Asstt. Binder,
Govt. of India Press,
Aligarh, UP.,
R/o H.No. 298, Gali No.8,
West Kanti Nagar,
Delhi-51. . Applicant
(through Sh. K.C. Mittal, Advocate)
Versus
1. Union of India through
the Secretary,
Ministry of Urban Development,
And Poverty Alleviation,
Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
2. The Director,
Director of Printing,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
3. Sh. Surendra Singh,
Dy. Director (Admn.II)
Directorate of Printing,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
3. The Manager,
Govt. of Indias Press,
Aligarh, UP. . Respondents
(through Sh. R.V. Sinha, Advocate)
OA-2825/2012
1. Sh. Abhishek Bharadwaj,
S/o Sh. A.K. Bhardwaj,
Qtr. No. 3, Type-3,
Press Colony, Aligarh,
UP.
Present Address:
2/348-Nisanjanpuri, Near Shanti
Hur Home, Ramghat Road,
Aligarh, UP.
2. Sh. Brij Kishore,
S/o Sh. Girraj Kishore,
R/o Malipada Nehru Kunj,
Aligarh, UP.
3. Sh. Ved Mohan Verma,
S/o Sh. Prakash Chand,
R/o H.No. 15/155, Saray Rai,
Khirnigate, Aligarh.
4. Sh. Sushil Kumar,
S/o Sh. Nannu Singh,
R/o Vill. & Post Kauchode,
Aligarh, UP.
5. Sh. Guddu Singh,
S/o Sh. Badam Singh,
R/o Holi Chouk, Gali No.3,
Kishanpur, Aligarh, UP.
6. Sh. Ajay Kumar,
S/o Sh. Murari Lal,
R/o H.No.6/154, Postman Gali,
Nayi Basti, Aligarh, UP.
7. Sh. Sabir Ahmed,
S/o Sh. Zeenat Khan,
R/o Vill. Kamalpur,
Aligarh, UP.
8. Sh. Pramod Kumar,
S/o Sh. Bhole Nath,
R/o Vill-Kayampur,
Post Devi Nagala,
Aligarh, UP. . Applicants
(through Sh. Nasir Ahemd, Advocate)
Versus
1. Union of India through
Its Secretary,
Ministry of Urban Development,
Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi.
2. Director of Printing,
Ministry of Urban Development,
Govt. of India,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-1.
3. Manager,
Govt. of Indias Press,
Aligarh, UP. . Respondents
(through Sh. J.P. Tewari for Sh. Krishna Kumar, Advocate)
OA-579/2013
Sh. Yogesh Kumar,
S/o sh. Jai Prakash,
C/o Press Colony, Qtr.No.139,
Type-II, Civil Line,
Aligarh. . Applicant
(through Sh. K.C. Mittal, Advocate)
Versus
1. The Secretary,
Ministry of Urban Development
and Poverty Alleviation,
Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-1.
2. The Director,
Directorate of Printing,
B-Wing, Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
3. Sh. Surendra Singh,
Dy. Director(Admn.II)
Directorate of Printing,
B-Wing, Niman Bhawan,
New Delhi-11.
4. The Manager,
Government of India Press,
Aligarh, UP. . Respondents
(through Sh. H.K. Gangwani, Advocate)
O R D E R
Mr. Shekhar Agarwal, Member (A) In the interest of justice and to avoid multiplicity of litigation, MA for joining together in one application is allowed.
The facts of this case are that selection process for appointment to various Group-C and D posts was carried by several Government of India Presses situated at different places such as Aligarh (UP), Minto Road (Delhi), Mayapuri (Delhi) and Nilo Kheri District Karnal (Haryana). In the year 20078-08 a written test was held and thereafter those who had qualified in the same were called for interview. Those selected were asked to complete formalities like medical test, verification of character and antecedents etc. Many of the selected persons were even allowed to join. While appointment letters to others were in the process of issue, a complaint was received by the respondents in which it was alleged that large scale irregularities had been committed in the recruitment process. Based on this a decision was taken in the Ministry not to let the remaining selected candidates join till the investigation was completed. However, those who had already joined were allowed to continue working. This decision was conveyed to various Government Presses by the Ministry on 04.04.2008. Meanwhile, the selected candidates who had not been allowed to join continued to wait for further developments in the case. However, when no action was being taken by the respondents they approached this Tribunal by filing OA-377/2010. This O.A. was disposed of on 03.02.2010 by directing the respondents to take decision in the matter in terms of earlier orders of the Tribunal dated 07.12.2009 in OA-1194/2009. By their orders dated 14.07.2010 the respondents conveyed their decision not to appoint the remaining candidates to the posts for which they were selected. Aggrieved by this decision some of the OA applicants filed Contempt Petitions in the Tribunal. However, their Contempt Petitions were closed after giving them liberty to assail orders of the respondents through appropriate judicial proceedings. Thereafter, many of the applicants filed OA-3264/2010 challenging the order dated 14.07.2010 of the respondents by which they had been denied appointment. This O.A. was allowed by the Tribunal on the grounds that the applicants of the OA had been discriminated against inasmuch as many others who had been selected through the same process had been allowed to join whereas the applicants had been denied appointment. The respondents then filed several Writ Petitions No. 4745/2011, 5962/2011 and 5825/2011 in the Honble High Court of Delhi. These were disposed of by the Honble High Court by a common order dated 07.03.2012. The Honble High Court set aside the directions of the Tribunal to appoint the OA applicants and gave further following directions:-
Final view in the matter shall be taken within one month from the date of this order. If the proposal, as mentioned above, namely, report of the CVO is accepted, the necessary action would be taken qua the persons already appointed as well. However, if for some reason it is decided not to accept the proposal and to continue with the existing appointments then the respondents herein shall also be appointed.
14. We may make it clear that we have not touched upon the question as to whether findings of the CVO that the selection process is vitiated because of irregularities stated therein is correct or not. It is not even necessary to do so as all those who are appointed are not before us and we cannot take any view in the matter in their absence. Therefore, needless to mention, in case the petitioners decide to scrap the selection process and the services of those appointed are terminated, they shall be within their right to challenge the action of the Government on its own merits and as per law.
15. The writ petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.
2. In compliance thereof the respondents have passed the impugned orders dated 03.05.2012, 04.05.2012 and 21.05.2012 scrapping the selection process and terminating the services of those who had already joined. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the respondents the applicants have filed the above mentioned OAs before us. While admitting OA-1554/2012 this Tribunal passed interims directions on 28.05.2012 staying the operation of OMs dated 03.05.2012 and 04.05.2012. Subsequently, the same relief was extended in other OAs also. Aggrieved by these orders the respondents approached Honble High Court of Delhi challenging the interim orders of this Tribunal. Honble High Court directed that Union of India shall implement the orders of the Tribunal but made it clear that the implementation of these orders will be subject to the final outcome of the decision of the Tribunal in the OAs.
3. Since the issue involved in all these OAs is the same we are disposing of all of them by means of this common order. Certain additional facts and issues involved in OA-579/2013 (Yogesh Kumar Vs. UOI &) are being separately discussed. For the sake of convenience facts of OA-1848/2012 are being discussed. Following relief has been sought in this O.A.:-
(a) Stay the operation of the impugned OM No. C-13019/1/2011-PTG dated 21.5.2012 and 1/1/2012-A.A dated 23.5.2012 and restrain the respondents from terminating the services of the applicants and/or giving effect to any such OM.
(b) Restrain the respondents from obstructing, preventing or disallowing the applicants from discharging their duties in any manner in their respective posts.
(c) Restrain the respondents from evicting the applicants from their residential quarters.
(d) Any other order that may be deemed fit and appropriate in the circumstances of the case may also be passed.
4. Learned counsel for the applicants Sh. K.C. Mittal stated that many of the applicants had joined the service in March 2008 and had been working for almost four years. Their work and conduct was satisfactory and there was no complaint against them. At the time of appointment they were informed through their appointment letters that their probation period was for two years. Since there is no provision for extension of probation period, they should be deemed to have been confirmed on completion of probation period of two years. The respondents have, therefore, erred by terminating their services without issue of a show cause notice and without giving them an opportunity to defend their case. He further argued that all these posts were filled after issue of an advertisement in the newspapers wherein the number of vacancies in respect of each posts have been mentioned. Since no advertisement can be issued without sanction and approval of Director (Printing) who also grants financial approval, the inference is that all the advertisements were issued after clearance for filling up all the posts had been obtained from the competent authority. Further, during the process of selection between November, 2007 and March, 2008 the Director (Printing) had at no time raised any objection regarding the contents of the advertisement or the number of vacancies mentioned therein. It was only later on 03.04.2008 that the Director (Printing) issued instructions to the Members not to allow persons who had not joined till then to join.
4.1 Learned counsel further argued that before the Honble High Court of Delhi the respondents had stated that an enquiry conducted by the CVO had revealed certain irregularities in the appointment process. The Honble High Court had then directed the respondents to take a final view on the report of the CVO to decide whether the selection process is vitiated. Thus, the Honble High Court had left the entire matter for the respondents to take a view in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case and law on the subject. However, Honble High Court had clarified in their order that they had not taken any view on the correctness of the report of the CVO. Yet the respondents without scrutinizing the aforesaid report to ascertain what illegality or irregularity had been committed, decided to scrap the entire selection process claiming it to be on the directions of the Honble High Court. The impugned orders are, therefore, bad in law as Honble High Court of Delhi had never given any direction to the UOI to scrap the entire selection process and terminate all the appointments. Thus, this is a case of non-application of mind by the respondents who have passed these orders without going into the facts and circumstances of the case and without scrutinizing the report of the CVO. These orders are, therefore, totally arbitrary, mala fide and an abuse of the process of the law.
4.2 Learned counsel for the applicants relied on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of UOI Vs. O. Chakradhar, 2002(3) SCC 146 in which the following has been held:-
8. In our view the nature and extent of illegalities and irregularities committed in conducting a selection will have to be scrutinized in each case so as to come to a conclusion about future course of action to be adopted in the matter. Learned counsel further stated that even Honble High Court in their judgment dated 07.03.2012 have referred to the above mentioned orders of the Apex Court but the respondents have not taken cognizance of the same.
4.3 Learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case Inderpreet Singh Kahlon & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 2571 in which the following has been held:-
41. If the services of the appointees who had put in few years of service were terminated; compliance of three principles at the hands of the State was imperative, viz., to establish (1) Satisfaction in regard to the sufficiency of the materials collected so as to enable the State to arrive at its satisfaction that the selection process was tainted; (2) determine the question that the illegalities committed go to the root of the matter which vitiate the entire selection process. Such satisfaction as also the sufficiency of materials were required to be gathered by reason of a thorough investigation in a fair and transparent manner; (3) Whether the sufficient material present enabled the State to arrive at satisfaction that the officers in majority have been found to be part of the fraudulent purpose or the system itself was corrupt. 4.4 Learned counsel further relied on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of UOI & Ors. Vs. Rajesh P.S., Puthuvalnikathu & Anr., 2003(7) SCC 285 in which the following has been held:-
6.In the light of the above and in the absence of any specific or categorical finding supported by any concrete and relevant material that widespread infirmities of all pervasive nature, which could be really said to have undermined the very process itself in its entirety or as a whole and it was impossible to weed out the beneficiaries of one or other of irregularities, or illegalities, if any, there was hardly any justification in law to deny appointment to the other selected candidates whose elections were not found to be, in any manner, vitiated for any one of other reasons.. 4.5 Learned counsel for the applicants also drew our attention to the judgment of Allahabad Bench of this Tribunal dated 04.02.2011 and to the judgment of Honble High Court of Allahabad dated 07.08.2011 to say that the selection process cannot be set aside merely on surmises.
4.5 Questioning the correctness of the CVOs report, learned counsel argued that the report regarding Aligarh Press was factually incorrect since it is mentioned in the report that 179 vacancies had been notified whereas as per the advertisement only 149 vacancies have been notified. He further stated that it is a settled proposition of law that in public service the recruitment has to be made through advertisement or Staff Selection Commission/Employment Exchange/UPSC. This Tribunal cannot go beyond the advertisement which was issued by the respondents with open eyes.
4.6 Learned counsel for the applicants Sh. K.C. Mittal also drew our attention to an office order dated 05.07.2007 which refers to the minutes of the meeting held in head office under the Chairmanship of present Director (Printing) Sh. A.K. Sinha. According to this it was very clear that the number of vacancies against which the recruitment was to be made should not be beyond the number of vacancies decided in the meeting. The advertisements issued were in accordance with this number. As such, there is no illegality or infirmity in these advertisements. The very basis of the orders of the respondents is frivolous. Sh. K.C. Mittal, learned counsel went on to say that while recruitments were carried out in several other Presses as well such as Korattay, Nasik, Rashtrapati Bhawan, Santragachi and Temple Street etc. action was taken only against three Presses, namely, Aligarh, Mayapuri and Nilokheri.
4.7 Learned counsel for the applicants Sh. K.C. Mittal argued that the respondents are relying on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Biswas Ranjan Sahoo Vs. Sushant Kumar Dinda, 1006 AIR 3175. However, this is totally distinguishable on facts ad in this case the illegalities pointed out were with regard to the change of marks of the answer sheet. Even reliance placed by the respondents on another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M.P. State Coop. Bank Ltd., Bhopal Vs. Nanuram Yadav & Ors., (Civil Appeal No. 4481/2007) decided on 25.09.2007 is misplaced because in that case the appointments had been made without notifying the vacancies to the employment exchange and without following the other mandatory provisions of the Act and the Rules whereas in the present case the due process was followed.
4.8 Learned counsel further stated that even for a moment if it is presumed that the vacancies notified in the advertisement were incorrect, the applicants cannot be penalized for the fault committed by the department as issuance of advertisement is the job of the respondents.
4.9 Lastly, learned counsel Sh. Mittal stated that it has never been alleged that any mischief was committed by any of the applicants in the selection process. On this basis he argued that the relief asked for may be granted
5. In their reply the respondents have stated that as per the report of inquiry conducted by Additional Secretary and CVO in the recruitment process in Government of India Presses Mayapuri, New Delhi, Minto Road, New Delhi, Aligarh UP and Nilokheri (Haryana) a large number of irregularities were found to have been committed. It was, therefore, decided by the competent authority to terminate the appointment in respect of all the candidates including those who had already joined service. Accordingly, all employees selected through this recruitment process were terminated and offer of appointment to those who had not joined was cancelled. Respondents stated that it is a settled law that entry to service has to be lawful entry. If any irregularity has been committed in the selection process, no vested right is created in favour of the employees illegally appointed.
5.1 Respondents have further stated that Honble High Court in their order dated 07.03.2012 had directed that if the CVO report is accepted then necessary action would be taken qua the persons already appointed as well. In view of these directions it was decided by the Ministry to cancel the recruitment process and terminate appointment of all candidates including those who had joined service. Respondents relying on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Biswan Ranjan Sahoo (supra) stated that in this case the Apex Court had observed that issue of show cause notice would not have been fruitful because fabrication would obviously either be not known or no one would come forward to bear the brunt.
5.2 Respondents also stated that it is incorrect to say that the applicants had been confirmed as their probation had not been terminated by the competent authority. The question of deemed confirmation would not arise as completion of probation is not automatic unless the same is approved by the competent authority. In the instant case, none of the candidates had cleared the probation period duly approved by the competent authority.
5.3 The respondents have stated that the inquiry report of the CVO had brought out following serious irregularities in the recruitment process:-
(i) Posts advertised were in excess of approved posts which could have been filled.
(ii) In certain cases candidates appointed by recruitment were not only in excess of the approved posts but also in excess of the advertised posts.
(iii) Relaxation of ban orders for direct recruitment had not been taken by the Press Authorities from the Ministry of Urban Development.
(iv) Large number of interviews for various posts such as peon, safaiwala, farash, chowkidar and labourers were held inextremely short time which is not amenable to fair assessment. In the case of Satpal Vs. State of Haryana, (1995 SPP ISC 206) it has been held that such selection/interview were mere farce and mockery as it was not possible to effectively interview and evaluate so many candidates in such a short time.
(v) Many of the appointments made were of relatives of existing employees of the Presses. This could not have been on merit and smacked of nepotism and favourtism.
5.4 Arguing for the respondents, learned counsel Sh. Rajinder Nischal stated that Honble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Cooperative Bank Limited Vs. Nanuram Yadav (CA No.4481/2007) decided on 25.09.2007 has held that when the entire selection process is stinking, conceived in fraud and delivered in deceit, individual innocence has no place and the entire selection process has to be set aside. In the case of Sankar Das Vs. UOI, AIR 1991 SC 1612 and in the case of Shri Chakradhan Vs. UOI, 2002(3) SCC 146 the Honble Supreme Court has opined that if large scale irregularities are found in the selection process and the selection process stood vitiated such process does not confer any vested right of appointment. Learned counsel Sh. Nischal further stated that in the State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Ors., 2009(9) SCC 94 Apex Court has held that a wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming equality or for enforcement of the same. In the case of B. Rama Rao Vs. Govt. of A.P. & Ors., 1995 SCC Suppl.(1) 153 the Honble Supreme Court has held that any wrong order or negative benefit given to any employee or non action by the employer to remedy the illegality committed would not be a ground to extend the illegal benefits to similarly situated persons.
6. Arguing for the respondents learned counsel Sh. R.V. Sinha and Sh. Amit Anand stated that the applicants were challenging the consequence of acceptance of CVOs report but have not challenged its correctness by improving the same. Thus, the O.A. is bad in law inasmuch as no relief can be granted unless the vigilance report itself is set aside by this Tribunal. A bare perusal of this report would show that there have been many irregularities and the beneficiaries have been persons who have been appointed. He stated that this was not a case in which chef could be separated from the grain. Thus, the entire recruitment process needed to be scrapped.
6.1 Learned counsel Sh. Amit Anand also disputed that the applicants had become permanent since no order confirming them on the post had been passed. He stated that it is trite law in service jurisprudence that unless an order of confirmation is passed the person remains on probation. He reiterated that the case of the respondents was covered by the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of A. Umarani Vs. Registrar, Cooperative Socieities & Ors., 2004(7) SCC 112, Krishan Yadav & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., 1994(4) SCC 165 and UOI & Ors. Vs. O. Chakradhar, 2002(3) SCC 146.
7. We have heard counsel for the parties and have also perused the material on record. We have also seen the original record made available by the Department consisting of File Nos. C-13019/1/2011-Pts and A-12031/1/2008-Ptg. For adjudication of this case we have framed the following issues for our determination:-
(i) Whether the irregularities found in the recruitment process were such as to warrant scrapping of the examination?
(ii) Whether the respondents have applied their mind to come to the conclusion that scrapping of the examination was necessary or whether they have done so mechanically on the grounds that Honble high Court has so ordered?
(iii) Whether those who had completed more than two years of service can be deemed to have been confirmed and whether their termination without even as much as issue of a show cause notice was in order.
7.1 Regarding the first issue we looked at the irregularities that had come to notice as a result of enquiry conducted by CVO. He had found that the posts advertised were much in excess of those that wee required to be filled up and appointments made in certain cases wee not only in excess of approved/sanctioned posts but also in excess of the posts advertised. He had also found that orders of the competent authority for relaxation of ban upon filling up of vacant posts were not obtained.
In this regard the applicants had disputed that the posts advertised and filled were in excess of the vacant posts. According to them a meeting was taken by Mr. Sinha in which the number of posts to be filled in each Press were discussed. The appointments made were in accordance with the decisions taken in this meeting. In any case, learned counsel argued, this was an administrative action to be taken by the respondents themselves. If there was any discrepancy in the number of posts advertised or filled, it was a mistake on the part of the respondents themselves for which the applicants cannot be held responsible and penalized. It was for the respondents themselves to ensure that the right number of vacancies were advertised and filled. This cannot be a ground for scrapping the selection. Further he stated that there were some factual errors in the report of the CVO and thus this report itself cannot be relied upon for determining whether the correct number of vacancies were advertised and filled.
We are inclined to agree with the applicants counsel in this regard. It is true that CVO had found certain discrepancies in the number of posts available for filling up, number of posts advertised and number of posts actually filled up. He had also found that orders of competent authority for relaxation of ban on filling up of the posts had not been obtained. However, these were all administrative lapses and the applicants cannot be penalized for the wrong doings of the respondents. If there were any discrepancies in the number of posts advertised and filled, it was for the respondents to correct those by taking post facto sanction of the competent authority. We, therefore, agree with the applicants that this alone cannot be aground for scrapping of the selection.
The CVO also found that a number of appointments made were of relatives of existing employees of the Press. He opined that this could not be on merit alone and therefore the selection process smacked nepotism and favourtism. However, in our opinion such cases can easily be identified and separated from those who were innocent. This cannot be a reason for scrapping the selection process as that should be done only as a last resort.
However, it is the next irregularity noticed that has engaged our attention. The CVO found that a very large number of candidates had been interviewed in a very short span of time making mockery of the whole process of interview. This finding of the CVO has not been disputed by the applicants either. Since it is not disputed that the process of selection for all posts involved interview it follows that every candidate selected must have passed through this process which by itself was farcical. If this be so, it will not be possible to separate the meritorious candidates from those who were tainted as all have come through the same interview process. In our opinion this irregularity by itself is sufficient to warrant scrapping of the examination. Learned counsel for the applicants had relied on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon (supra) to say that no attempt was made by the respondents to separate the tainted officers from the innocent ones. Nor any material has been adduced to show that separation was impossible. In our opinion the conditions laid down in that case for scrapping the selection have been met since it has already been brought out above that each and every candidate had been selected on the basis of farcical interviews and therefore it was not possible to separate the meritorious from the tainted ones. For the same reason the citation UOI & Ors. Vs. Rajesh P.S., Puthuvalnikathu (supra) will not be of any help to the applicants. Thus, we come to the conclusion that scrapping of the examination was necessary on account of the irregularities noticed.
7.2 The second issue for our determination is whether the respondents have mechanically scrapped the selection process on the ground that the Honble High Court had so ordered or whether they have actually examined the report of the CVO and come to the conclusion that scrapping of the selection was necessary. In this regard we have seen the original files of the respondents. We find that the report of the CVO has been examined in great details by the respondents as is evident from their notes starting from page-18 onwards in File No. C-13019/1/2011-Ptg. Before taking this decision they have also consulted the Ministry of Law who advised them that in the case of UOI Vs. Chakradhar (supra) the Honble Supreme Court had in a similar situation held that the nature and extent of irregularities and illegalities committed in conducting a selection will have to be scrutinized in each case so as to come to a conclusion about future course of action to be adopted in the matter. The Honble Supreme Court had further held that if the mischief noticed is so widespread and all-pervasive, affecting the result, so as to make it difficult to pick out the persons who have been unlawfully benefited or wrongly deprived of their selection then the only way out was to cancel the whole selection. The Ministry of Law further advised on the basis of the aforesaid citation that in such cases it will neither be possible nor necessary to issue individual show cause notices to each selectee. After consulting the Ministry of law the matter was further examined in the department and the file was seen by concerned officers of the department as well as by the Honble Ministers. Based on the report of the CVO as well as the advice of the Ministry of Law obtained the respondents decided to scrap the selection. In our opinion, this decision has been taken after application of mind by the respondents and not mechanically on the ground that Honble High Court of Delhi had so ordered. Thus, the respondents cannot be faulted on this account.
7.3 The third issue to be decided is whether those applicants who had completed more than two years of service were to be treated as confirmed and whether their termination without issuance of show cause notice was in order. The applicants counsel had contended that when the applicants were appointed it was stated in their appointment letters that they will be on probation for two years. Thereafter since they had completed this two year period with unblemished record they should be deemed to have been confirmed. The respondents, on the other hand, had disputed this contention and had stated that no confirmation orders had been passed in the case of any of the applicants. As such, question of their confirmation does not arise. They also disputed that in absence of confirmation orders the applicants can be treated as deemed to have been confirmed.
In this regard, we turn to various pronouncements of the Apex Court for guidance. The Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210, has held as follows:-
8. The initial period of probation of the respondents ended on October 1, 1958. By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation, the competent authority must be taken to have Extended the period of probation up to October 1, 1960 by implication. But under the proviso to r. 6(3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. In view of the proviso to R. 6(3), it is not possible to presume that the competent authority extended the probationary period after October 1, 1960, or that thereafter the respondents continued to hold their posts as probationers.
9. Immediately upon completion of the extended period of probation on October 1, 1960, the appointing authority could dispense with the services of the respondents if their work or conduct during-the period of probation was in the opinion of the authority unsatisfactory. Instead of dispensing with their services on completion of the extended period of probation, the authority continued them in their posts until sometime in 1963, and allowed them to draw annual increments of salary including the increment which fell due on October 1, 1962. The rules did not require them to pass any test or to fulfill any other condition before confirmation. There was no compelling reason for dispensing with their services and re-employing them as temporary employees on October 1, 1960, and the High Court rightly refused to draw the inference that they were so discharged from service and re-employed. In these circumstances, the High Court rightly held that the respondents must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts. Though the appointing authority did not pass formal orders of confirmation in writing, it should be presumed to have passed orders of confirmation by so allowing them to continue in their posts after October 1, 1960. After such confirmation, the, authority had no power to dispense with their services under r. 6(3) on the ground that their work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory. It follows that on the dates of the impugned orders, the respondents had the right to hold their posts. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. Theremoval from service could not be made without following the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and without conforming to the constitutional requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitution. As the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 was not followed and as the constitutional protection of Art. 311 was violated, the impugned orders were rightly set aside by the High Court. In the case of Kazia Mohammed Muzzamil vs. State of Karnataka and another, (2010) 8 SCC 155, the Apex Court has held as follows:-
46. On a clear analysis of the above enunciated law, particularly, the Seven Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Samsher Singh (supra) and three-Judge Bench judgments, which are certainly the larger Benches and are binding on us, the courts have taken the view with reference to the facts and relevant rules involved in those cases that the principle of automatic or deemed confirmation would not be attracted. The pith and substance of the stated principles of law is that it will be the facts and the rules, which will have to be examined by the courts as a condition precedent to the application of the dictum stated in any of the line of the cases afore noticed.
47. There can be cases where the rules require a definite act on the part of the employer before an officer on probation can be confirmed. In other words, there may a rule or regulation requiring the competent authority to examine the suitability of the probationer and then upon recording its satisfaction issue an order of confirmation. Where the rules are of this nature the question of automatic confirmation would not even arise. Of course, every authority is expected to act properly and expeditiously. It cannot and ought not to keep issuance of such order in abeyance without any reason or justification. While there could be some other cases where the Rules do not contemplate issuance of such a specific order in writing but merely require that there will not be any automatic confirmation or some acts, other than issuance of specific orders, are required to be performed by the parties, even in those cases it is difficult to attract the application of this doctrine.
48. However, there will be cases where not only such specific Rules, as noticed above, are absent but the Rules specifically prohibit extension of the period of probation or even specifically provide that upon expiry of that period he shall attain the status of a temporary or a confirmed employee. In such cases, again, two situations would rise: one, that he would attain the status of an employee being eligible for confirmation and second, that actually he will attain the status of a confirmed employee. The Courts have repeatedly held that it may not be possible to prescribe a straightjacket formula of universal implementation for all cases involving such questions. It will always depend upon the facts of a case and the relevant rules applicable to that service. Further the Apex Court in the case of Headmaster Lawrence School Lovedabel vs. Jayanthi Raghu and Anr., 2012 (4) SCC 793, has held as follows:-
27. After referring to the decisions in Dharam Singh (supra), Sukhbans Singh (supra) and Shamsher Singh (supra) and other authorities, the three-Judge Bench expressed thus:-
11. The question of deemed confirmation in service Jurisprudence, which is dependent upon language of the relevant service rules, has been subject matter of consideration before this Court times without number in various decisions and there are three lines of cases on this point. One line of cases is where in the service rules or the letter of appointment a period of probation is specified and power to extend the same is also conferred upon the authority without prescribing any maximum period of probation and if the officer is continued beyond the prescribed or extended period, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed. In such cases there is no bar against termination at any point of time after expiry of the period of probation. Other line of cases is that where while there is a provision in the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. The inference in such cases is that officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed upon expiry of the maximum period of probation in case before its expiry order of termination has not been passed. The last line of cases is where though under the rules maximum period of probation is prescribed, but the same require a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing an order of confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of confirmation. In such cases, even if the maximum period of probation has expired and neither any order of confirmation has been passed nor the person concerned has passed the requisite test, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed merely because the said period has expired. In the case of Sukhbans Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1711, the Constitutional Bench had opined that a probationer cannot after the expiry of a probationary period, automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of the service, unless of course, the Rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result. In the case of U.P. vs. Akbar Ali Khan, AIR 1966 SC 1842, the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court held that :
6If the order of appointment itself states that at the end of the period of probation.in the absence of any order to the contrary, the appointee will acquire a substantive right to the post even without an order of confirmation. In all other case, in the absence of such an order or in the absence of such a service rule, an express order of confirmation is necessary to give him such a right. Where after the period of probation an appointee is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation, the only possible view to take is that by implication the period of probation has been extended, and it is not a correct proposition to state that an appointee should be deemed to be confirmed from the mere fact that he is allowed to continue after the end of the period of probation. Further, in the case of Lawrence School Vs. Jayanthi Raghu, (2012) 4 SCC 793 the following has been held:-
38. Had the rule-making authority intended that there would be automatic confirmation, Rule 4.9 would have been couched in a different language. That being not so, the wider interpretation cannot be placed on the Rule to infer that the probationer gets the status of a deemed confirmed employee after expiry of three years of probationary period as that would defeat the basic purpose and intent of the Rule which clearly postulates :if confirmed. A confirmation, as is demonstrable from the language employed in the Rule, does not occur with efflux of time. As it is hedged by a condition, an affirmative or positive act is the requisite by the employer. In our considered opinion, an order of confirmation is required to be passed. Further the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Salman vs. Committee of Management, (2011) 12 SCC 308, has held as follows:-
16. The correspondences which are on record also indicate That the service of the appellant was also found to be not satisfactory by the respondent and the said fact was also brought to the notice of the appellant continuously and repeatedly so as to give him an opportunity to improve his performance. However, despite the said opportunity granted and also extension, his performance and service were not improved and, therefore, the service was terminated under the aforesaid letter dated 3-4-1993.
17. In the case of Kedar Nath Bahl Vs. The State of Punjab and Others reported in 1974 (3) SCC 21, this Court clearly laid down the proposition of law that where a person is appointed as a probationer in any post and a period of probation is specified, it does not follow that at the end of the said specified period of probation he obtains confirmation automatically even if no order is passed on that behalf. It was also held in that decision that unless the terms of appointment clearly indicate that confirmation would automatically follow at the end of the specified period or that there is a specific service rule to that effect, the expiration of the probationary period does not necessarily lead to confirmation. This Court went on to hold that at the end of the period of probation an order confirming the officer is required to be passed and if no such order is passed and if he is not reverted to his substantive post, the result merely is that he continues in his post as a probationer. We have analyzed the various citations given above. The first citation is of State of Punjab Vs. Dharam Singh (supra). Going through the facts of this case we find that in that case it was provided under the proviso to Rule-6(3) that the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960. In view of this position of the Rules the Apex Court had ruled that even though appointing authority did not pass any formal orders of confirmation, it should be presumed to have passed orders of confirmation by so allowing the petitioners to continue in their posts after October 1,1960.
From the case of Headmaster Lawrence School Lovedabel (super), we find that the Apex Court has quoted the ruling of three Judge Bench expressed in Dharam Singh (supra), Sukhbans Singh (supra) and Shamsher Singh (supra) to state that depending upon the position of the Rule there could be different types of cases and deemed confirmation in service-jurisprudence would be dependent on the language of the Service Rules. They have stated that deemed confirmation would take place only in cases where a maximum period of probation has been prescribed and beyond which no extension is permissible. In the case of Kazia Mohammed Muzzamil (supra), the view taken by the Apex Court is that it may not be possible to prescribe a straightjacket formula of universal implementation for all cases as far as deemed confirmation is concerned. The Apex Court has stated that it will always depend upon the facts of a case and the relevant rules applicable to that service.
Thus, the position that emerges is that no straightjacket formula for deemed confirmation can be prescribed and the facts and service rules of each case have to be seen for deciding this issue. However, if the rules provide for maximum period of confirmation beyond which probation cannot be extended and if the officer concerned is continued beyond such period, then he will be deemed to have been confirmed.
In the instant case, we find that while the appointment letter stated that the probation period of the employee would be two years, it did not prescribe that the probation period under no circumstances can be extended beyond two years. Moreover, the applicant also could not show any applicable service rule which prescribed the maximum period of probation beyond which further extension was not possible. Under these circumstances, based on the above citations, we conclude that till an order of confirmation is issued by the respondents it will be presumed that the period of probation of the applicants was extended and that they continued to remain as probationers. The argument of the applicants counsel that they be considered as deemed confirmed is not sustainable.
7.3 Next we proceed to decide whether there was requirement of issue of show cause notice to the applicants in consonance with the principles of natural justice before terminating their appointment. The respondents in this regard had relied on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Chakradhar (supra) to say that under the circumstances issue of show cause notice was neither possible nor necessary.
8. We have also looked at pronouncements of Apex Court in this regard. In the case of Rajesh Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 4 SCC 447 the Apex Court has held as under:-
9. A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the appellant are generally under scrutiny and on the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service. In the present case, in the course of adjudging such suitability it was found by the respondents that the performance of the appellant was not satisfactory and therefore he was no suitable for the job.
10. The aforesaid decision to release him from service was taken by the respondents considering his overall performance, conduct and suitability for the job. While taking a decision in this regard neither any notice is required to be given to the appellant nor he is required to be given any opportunity of hearing. Strictly speaking, it is not a case of removal as sought to be made out by the appellant, but was a case of simple discharge from service. It is, therefore, only a termination simpliciter and not removal from service on the grounds of indiscipline or misconduct. While adjudging his performance, conduct and overall suitability, his performance record as also the report from the higher authorities were called for and they were looked into before any decision was taken as to whether the officer concerned should be continued in service or not. Further, Apex Court in the case of H.F. Sangati Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, (2001) 3 SCC 117 has laid down as follows:-
There was, thus, no requirement to comply with the principles of natural justice, much less to be preceded by any formal proceedings of inquiry before making the order. Apex Court also in the case of High Court of Judicature at Patna Vs. Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha, (1997) 10 SCC 409 has laid down as follows:-
As regards a probationer, the law is well settled that he does not have a right to hold the post during the period of probation. The position of a probationer cannot be equated with that of an employee who has been substantively appointed on a post and has a right to hold that post. An order terminating the services of a probationer can be questioned only if it is shown that it has been passed arbitrarily or has been passed by way of punishment without complying with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Since a probationer has no right to hold the post on which he has been appointed on probation, he cannot claim a right to be heard before an order terminating his services is passed. The obligation to communicate the adverse material to a person before taking action against him on the basis of the said material is a facet of the principles of natural justice. But principles of natural justice have no application in the case of termination of the services of a probationer during the period of probation since he has no right to hold the post. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that there is an obligation to communicate the adverse material to a probationer before a decision is taken on the basis of the said material that he is not fit for being retained in service. Such material can be relied upon to show that such a decision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and is not capricious.
9. On the basis of above rulings the conclusion that can be drawn is that a probationer has no right to hold the post during the period of probation and therefore there is no requirement of following principles of natural justice while terminating his appointment provided termination has not been done on the grounds of misconduct. In the instant case, the termination orders have not been passed on account of alleged misconduct of any of the applicants. They have been passed on the grounds that the selection process through which they were appointed was itself vitiated and therefore their entry into service was not lawful. Therefore, in our opinion, there is no infirmity in the terminations orders as there was no requirement of issuing a show cause notice and giving an opportunity to the applicants to defend themselves. In fact in the instant case no defence by them would have been possible as they would not have been aware of the irregularities that had been brought in the CVOs report.
9.1 The applicants counsel had also contended that while appointments were made in several other Presses action to terminate the appointments was taken only in three Presses, namely, Aligarh, Mayapuri and Nilokheri. We have perused original record of the department and we find that action has been taken in all the Presses in which inquiry was conducted by CVO and irregularities detected. There is nothing on record to show that complaints were received and inquiry conducted into appointments made in other places. As such, this cannot be a ground for allowing the relief asked for by the applicants.
10. On the basis of the above analysis, we are of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the action of the respondents. The entire selection process was vitiated on account of interviews conducted in a farcical manner. Therefore, the respondents were left with no option but to withhold the appointment letters of those who were awaiting their appointment after their selection. They were also right in terminating those who had been appointed and had been serving for different periods after such appointment. This action of the respondents was also as per the directions of Honble High Court given in Writ Petition Nos. 4745/2011, 5962/2011 and 5825/2011 wherein they had ordered that those appointed and those who were yet to be appointed were to be treated in a similar manner after the respondents take a view on the report of the CVO.
11. We, therefore, dismiss all the OAs mentioned above. No costs.
OA-579/2013
12. The applicant of this O.A. has also come through the same selection process which has been discussed above. However, in this case his services were terminated by impugned order dated 31.10.2012 on the ground that the educational qualification certificate furnished by him was found to be fake on verification. While the candidature of this applicant will also be cancelled in terms of our order passed in OAs mentioned above, the additional issue to be decided in this O.A. is whether the respondents were right in terminating his appointment on the ground that he had produced a fake educational qualification certificate.
13. To challenge his termination the applicant has stated that the action of the respondents is illegal, mala fide and against the principles of natural justice. He has stated that he had completed the period of probation and was deemed to have been confirmed. Therefore, the termination order is in violation of principles of natural justice. He has also stated that the respondents have wrongly invoked Clause-19(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 which has no application in the present case.
14. On the other hand the respondents have contended that DoP&T O.M. No. 11012/7/91-Estt.(A) dated 19.05.1983 clearly stipulates that a government servant who has furnished false information or has produced a false certificate to secure appointment should not be retained in service. They have stated that before terminating his appointment proper verification was conducted to verify his certificates. Thus, a letter was written on 10.02.2012 to Gurukul Vishwavidyala Vrindavan to ascertain the genuineness of the certificate. The Vishwavidyala Vrindavan replied on 07.03.23012 to say that the certificate appears to be fake. Thereafter, another letter was written on 12.09.2012 to this Institute in order to carry out physical verification and two officials namely Sh. Ram Dayal, Deputy Manager along with Sh. Raj Kumar, Accountant were deputed. They found that no record was available in the Institute as regards issuance of this certificate. The Institute again vide their letter dated 28.09.2012 gave in writing that this certificate was fake one.
15. We have considered the submissions of both sides. We find that the applicant has not been able to adduce even iota of evidence to establish that his educational qualification certificate was genuine. On the other hand, we notice that the respondents have made every effort to verify the genuineness of this certificate. It was only after due diligence that they came to the conclusion that this certificate was false. They have, therefore, terminated the services of the applicants in accordance with the directions of DoP&T mentioned above. We do find that they have invoked the wrong rule, namely, 19(1) of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 for his termination. This rule reads as follows:-
Whether any penalty is imposed on a government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge or Clearly this rule has no application in the instant case as there is nothing on record to show that the applicant has been convicted in a criminal case. However, in our opinion, mere invoking wrong section or rule does not vitiate the termination, which is otherwise in order. As regards his contention that he was confirmed in service, we have already discussed this issue in earlier part of the judgment and rejected it.
16. We, therefore, find no merit in this O.A. and dismiss the same. No costs.
17. A copy of this order be placed in each case file.
(Shekhar Agarwal) (G. George Paracken)
Member (A) Member (J)
/Vinita/