Jharkhand High Court
Dr. Om Prakash Anand vs The State Of Jharkhand on 9 June, 2022
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
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Cr.M.P. No. 2110 of 2021
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Dr. Om Prakash Anand, aged about 47 years, son of Sri Yogendra Prasad, resident of Gayatri Shiksha Niketan Compound, Road No.4, PO Adityapur, PS RIT, District Seraikella Kharsawan ..... Petitioner
-- Versus --
1.The State of Jharkhand
2.Mr. Kunj Bihari, son of not known to the petitioner, Drug Inspector, West Singhbhum and Seraikella Kharsawan, Jamshedpur-1, PO and PS Chaibasa, District West Singhbhum ...... Opposite Parties
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
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For the Petitioner :- Ms. Pinky Anand, Sr.Advocate Mr. Rajesh Ranjan, Advocate Mr.Nilesh Kumar, Advocate Miss Sonal Sodhani, Advocate For the State :- Mr. Manoj Kumar, G.A.-III Mr. Ravi Prakash, Spl.P.P.
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6/09.06.2022 Heard Ms. Pinky Anand, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Rajesh Ranjan, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Manoj Kumar, the learned G.A.-III assisted by Mr. Ravi Prakash, the learned Spl.P.P appearing on behalf of the respondent State as well as on behalf of the O.P.No.2.
This petition has been filed for quashing the entire criminal proceeding in connection with N.D.P.S. Case No.20/2021 arising out of C.C. Case No.395 of 2021 including the order taking cognizance dated 08.06.2021 by which the learned Sessions Judge took cognizance against the petitioner for the offences under sections 22(a) of N.D.P.S. Act and section 28(a), 27(b)(ii) and 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, pending in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Seraikella-Kharsawan at Seraikella.
The Opposite Party No.2-Drug Inspector has lodged complaint case alleging therein as under:
That on the complaint of one Sweta Sah, Jyotsna Jha, Preeti Kumari an enquiry was conducted on 19.5.2021 and in the said enquiry few questions were asked 2 from the Hospital Management. It has been alleged that on 21.05.2021 again some quarries were made by the authority concerned with respect to use of supplied Remdesivir injection. On 23.5.21 by the Director, Medicines two other Drug Inspectors were deputed for the inspection and enquiry of 111 Save Life Hospital, Adityapur, on 24.05.21 a letter was sent to SDO Seraikella for deployment of sufficient security at the time of inspection. On 25.5.21 an enquiry /inspection was conducted i.e. in the alleged premises of the petitioner and from one Tata Sumo victa Ambulance. It has been alleged hue quantity of medicine kept illegally were recovered. It has been alleged that the same were total 123 in number. It has been further alleged that for storage of such medicines without drug license is an offence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, it has further been alleged that storage of few medicines which comes under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, i.e. for the small quantity.
Ms. Pinky Anand, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a practicing doctor at Seraikella and running hospital namely, 111 Save Life, at Adityapur. She submits that when the period of Covid-19 pandemic started, the Government had issued notification in terms of section 65 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and the hospitals was directed to reserve 50% of bed for Covid-19 patients by notification dated 13.04.2020. She submits that the hospital was working and providing treatment to the Covid-19 patients in terms of the notification of the Government of Jharkhand. By way of referring paragraph no.11 of the petition, she submits that the petitioner has raised some objection over the working culture of Health Department and misuse of the Government fund which has also been 3 reported in social media as well as in the newspaper and for that reason, series of cases have been filed against this petitioner as well as the hospital. She submits that even the wife of the petitioner has not been spared and in some of the cases she has been made accused. She submits that the allegations have been alleged against the petitioner as well as the hospital which is malicious in nature. She submits that on 17.05.2021 the petitioner made a complaint about this in the e.mail before the Secretary, Home Department regarding the wrongful demand of money. She submits that certain medicines have been recovered from the ambulance of the hospital which are the essential medicines for emergency treatment and in view of Rule 123 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, exemptions so far the drugs specified in Schedule-K are exempted from the provisions of Chapter-IV of the Act. She draws the attention of the Court to Schedule-K with regard to Rule 123 of the Rules, 1945, particularly, Clause-V, and submits by way of referring Clause-'V' she submits that medical practitioners have also been exempted and the drugs supplied by the hospitals have also been exempted under Clause-V(a) of the said Schedule. She refers to sub- section-c of section 8 of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985 and submits that restrictions have been made with regard to provisions of certain operations and except for medical and scientific purposes. She submits that the nature of drugs are not coming under the purview of N.D.P.S. Act which were the essential medicines for treatment. According to her, in view of all these circumstances and looking into the statutory provisions of the aforesaid Act and the rules, this Court is competent enough to quash the entire proceeding to avoid the abuse of process of law. She relied in the case of "Pepsi Food" reported in (1998) 5 SCC 749 and submits that it has been held in this case that summoning a person for criminal case is a serious matter and it should not be taken in a 4 routine manner. Paragraph no.28 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:
"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."
She submits that Hon'ble Supreme Court had laid down with regard to medical negligence in the case of "Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab" reported in (2005) 6 SCC 1. Paragraph nos. 14 and 17 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:
14. In order to hold the existence of criminal rashness or criminal negligence it shall have to be found out that the rashness was of such a degree as to amount to taking a hazard knowing that the hazard was of such a degree that injury was most likely imminent. The element of criminality is introduced by the accused having run the risk of doing such an act with recklessness and indifference to the consequences. Lord Atkin in his speech in Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions stated:
(All ER p. 556 C) "Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough. For purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence, and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established." Thus, a clear distinction exists between "simple lack of care" incurring civil liability and "very high degree of negligence" which is required in criminal cases. In Riddell v. Reid (AC at p. 31) Lord Porter said in his speech --
"A higher degree of negligence has always been demanded in order to establish a criminal offence than is sufficient to create civil liability." (Charlesworth & Percy, ibid., para 1.13) 5
17. In our opinion, the factor of grossness or degree does assume significance while drawing distinction in negligence actionable in tort and negligence punishable as a crime. To be latter, the negligence has to be gross or of a very high degree.
She further submits that if a complaint or the F.I.R is malicious from the initial stage, the Court can interfere in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as held in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. Paragraph no. 102 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a 6 criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
She took the additional point on the point of sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. and submits that since the hospital in question was taken over under section 65 of the Disaster Management Act, as the hospital was after the said notification was discharging the Government duty, it was incumbent upon the authorities concerned to obtain sanction under section 197 of the Cr.P.C., which is lacking in the case in hand. On the point of sanction, she relied in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Budhikota Subbarao (Dr), (1993) 3 SCC 339. Paragraph no.9 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:
9. Reverting to the main issue the two courts below have found it as a fact that the acts or omissions for which the accused has been charged were committed by him in discharge of his official duty. To steer clear of the effect of such finding the learned Additional Solicitor General urged that in view of the charges framed under O.S. Act the accused could not claim any protection under Section 197 of the Code as espionage can by no stretch be taken to be official duty. The learned counsel submitted that the documents which were recovered from possession of the accused were such as could not have been in his possession when he had already retired and the proper custodian of those documents being the Central Government, no sanction was required for prosecuting the accused for possessing such documents. As a matter of law no exception can be taken to the submission that no public servant can indulge in espionage. But mere allegation of spying cannot deprive a public servant of the legal protection provided for in Section 197 of the Code. Section 3 of the O.S. Act, no doubt, provides penalty if any person acts in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State. This appeal is not concerned if the accused acted in such manner which can give rise to an inference in law that he was guilty of spying or acted in any manner to affect sovereignty and integrity of the country. The limited question is if the documents which were seized from the accused either at the airport or from his residence are such that they could have been obtained or procured by him while acting as Naval officer 7 in discharge of his duty. As is clear from the charge itself the accused was selected in course of his employment in the Navy to study the feasibility of nuclear power propelled submarine vessel along with a team of officers and was attached with B.A.R.C. as second officer in command. He joined the project in 1976 and was associated with the Centre for nearly 10 years.
The accused while working with B.A.R.C. not only obtained Ph.D. but was even awarded gold medal for his achievements in computer technology and control engineering and a special Herbert Lott Memorial Award for his inventions in improving the existing, fighting devices of the Navy. It is not the case of prosecution that the documents which were seized either from the airport or the residence of the accused could not have been dealt by him when he was in service. Amongst various documents which were seized were the Identity Card of the Indian Armed Forces bearing his photograph and name, the eight files containing different types of maps of India, diagrams and computer information, a book by name 'Nuclear Power Plan' Modelling and Design, one brown envelope containing lamination papers with diagrams, one book 'MWT Nuclear Submarine Propulsion Plant Design' and one book 'Multi Point Satellite Links in Navnet System' were also recovered from him. The documents which were found at his residence on May 31 were 'Computer Communication on HF Links in Navnet' and 'Advanced Technology Adaptation Centre, C-3 I System Development for Armed Forces Advanced Technology Adaptation for Defence, Multi Point Satellite Links in Navnet System', Government of India publications project report of Nuclear Propulsion for Marine Application, and one book about 'Sea on Control Radar and Display System for Land Design'. Certain plan designs of B.A.R.C. were also recovered from his possession. Most of the documents which can be said to be sensitive which were recovered from the accused were admittedly either the book written by him or the paper read by him as is clear from the Panchnama and the Statement of Witnesses who were produced on behalf of the prosecution to prove the same. Even the thesis written by the accused on which he was awarded Ph.D. by the Bhabha Institute of Technology was seized by the prosecution. The purpose of stating all this is to demonstrate that these papers were written and the books published when the accused was attached with B.A.R.C. as a Second Officer-in-Command and, therefore, the material or documents which were found by him cannot be said to have been collected or procured by him by going out of way and beyond the discharge of his duties as an officer in the Naval Department. Maybe some of them were secret, confidential or unclassified items. But the accused came across them and obtained their copies in course of his duty as an officer attached to B.A.R.C. Charge 2 is in respect of classified information obtained by him when he was in Naval service.Taking out of 8 information obtained in course of employment was thus squarely covered by Section 197. Whether it was for communication or not is not material. Retention of Identity Card issued during service may be dereliction of duty but it was committed when the accused was in service and it was issued to him while discharging his duties as a Naval officer. The trial court found that even though the Panchnama shows that two Identity Cards were recovered from the possession of the accused, but from their perusal it appeared that the Identity Card was issued to the accused as a retired officer and consequently the claim of the prosecution that the accused acted in violation of the provisions of the Act was not justified. But assuming there was violation since it was done when the accused was in service he was entitled to protection under Section 197 of the Code. The High Court and the trial court appear to have, rightly, inferred that whatever material came in possession of the accused was as a result of discharge of his duty as a Naval officer. If this be so then even the second and the most important requirement of acting in discharge of official duty was satisfied. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on merits we are of the opinion that it was necessary for the prosecution to have obtained sanction for prosecuting the accused. Similarly so far charge 4 is concerned we do not propose to examine if it was properly framed against the accused and if there was any material in support of it. But the alleged information which the accused was taking with him to United States having been obtained by him in course of employment and in discharge of his duty the High Court did not commit any error of law in recording the finding that no prosecution could be initiated unless sanction under Section 197 was obtained. Same applies to charge 5. Therefore, we are of opinion that the courts below did not commit any error of law in coming to conclusion that the entire proceedings were vitiated as no cognizance of the offences could have been taken against the accused without complying with provisions of Section 197 of the Code.
Per contra, Mr. Manoj Kumar, the learned G.A. III appearing on behalf of the respondent as well as O.P.No.2 submits that so far other F.I.R or complaint are concerned, he is not having any instruction and the O.P.no.2 has not disclosed in the counter affidavit and that is why he is unable to say anything with regard to other F.I.R or the complaint, except the facts of the present case. He further submits that so far as the stay in one or another case has been granted by this Court that is with regard to medical negligence which is not the case in hand. He draws the attention 9 of the Court to paragraph no.17 of the counter affidavit and submits that exemption under Rule 123 is not applicable in favour of the petitioner. He further submits that Schedule-K is reproduced in that paragraph and according to him, in light of the Clause-5(A) of the said Schedule, the hospital and the dispensary maintained or supported by the Government or Local Body are only exempted. By way of referring section 80 of the N.D.P.S. Act, he submits that this is in addition to and not in derogation of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act or the rules made thereunder. He further refers to sub section (a) of section 22 of the said Act, and submits that even for the small quantity of recovery, the N.D.P.S. Act is applicable. Lastly, he submits that it is well settled that so far the factual aspect is concerned, this is the matter of trial and this Court may not interfere under section 482 Cr.P.C and for that he relied in the case of "Priti Saraf v. State of N.C.T. of Delhi" reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 206. Paragraph nos. 23 and 24 of the said judgment is quoted as under:
"23. It being a settled principle of law that to exercise powers under Section 482 CrPC, the complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and the High Court at that stage was not under an obligation to go into the matter or examine its correctness. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same. The offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and other documentary evidence, if any, on record.
24. The question which is raised for consideration is that in what circumstances and categories of cases, a criminal proceeding may be quashed either in exercise of the extraordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, or in the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. This has often been hotly debated before this Court and various High Courts. Though in a series of decisions, this question has been answered on several occasions by this Court, yet the same still comes up for consideration and is seriously debated."
To buttress his argument, he relied in the case of "Qualified Private Medical Practitioners' and Ors v. The State of Kerala and Ors"
[W.P.(C) No.38494 of 2003(Y)].
In view of the above facts and submissions of the learned 10 counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record. It is an admitted fact which has not been denied in the counter affidavit that this petitioner has raised certain objections with regard to the work culture of the Health Department which has also been addressed to the Secretary of the Home Department. In the complaint, the following medicines have been disclosed to be recovered from the ambulance of the hospital, as below:
S.No. As Name of Drugs & Batch No. Exp.Dt. Quantity As per NDPS Act 1985 Per Form Active Ingredients Seized (Quantity mentioned 16 Small Commercial Quantity Quantity 10 Valium VLB0003 Apr.23 90 Tablets 450 mg. -
5(Diazepam) 26 Contramal VBLE0006 4/2013 25 Vial 2.5 mg -
(Tramadol Hydrochloride Inj.
100 mg.
74 Medzol (10 ml) MDZ013 11/2022 06 Vial 60 mg -
(Midazolam) 107 Tazowin TAZ002 12/2021 40 Amp 1200 mg. -
(Pentazocine) 108 Ketamine KEM908 04/22 06 Vial 60 mg. -
Hydrochloride Inj.
119 Trika 0.5 mg. 2FZSF026 Sep/2022 30 Tablets 15 mg. -
(Alprazlom Tablets I.P 120 Trika 0.25 mg 2FZ6G015 Jun/2023 60 Tablets 15 mg. -
(Alprazlam Tablets IP) On perusal of the Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010, published on the web-site with regard to the hospital, in Level-1(a) and 1(b) wherein Annex.-4, the list of emergency drugs have been disclosed. The said list has been produced in the Court and has been taken on the record and looking to the said Annexure-4, it transpires that what is disclosed in the complaint with regard to medicines kept in the ambulance were for emergency. Apart from that nothing has been recovered and no other opium or the medicines in terms of N.D.P.S. Act was recovered. Rule 123 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 provides for exemption which stipulates as under:
"123. The drugs specified in Schedule K shall be exempted from the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act and the rules and thereunder to the extent and subject to the condition specified in that Schedule"
Schedule-K in the light of Rule 123 of the said Rules, particularly-5 class of Drugs speaks as under: 11
5.Drugs supplied by the registered medical All the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act practitioner to his own patient or any drug and the rules made thereunder subject to specified in Schedule C supplied by a the following conditions:
registered medical practitioner at the (1)The drugs shall be purchased only from request of another such practitioner if it is dealer or a manufacturer licensed under specially prepared with reference to the these rules, and records of such purchases condition and of the use of an individual showing the names and quantities of such patient provided the registered medical drugs, together with their batch numbers practitioner is not (a) keeping an open and names and address of the show or (b) selling accrues the counter or manufacturers shall be maintained. Such
(c) engaged in the importation, records shall be open to inspection by an manufacture, distribution or sale of drugs Inspector appointed under the Act, who in India to a degree which render him may, if necessary, make enquiries about liable to the provisions of Chapter IV of purchase of the drugs and may also take the Act and the rules thereunder samples for test .
(2)IN the case of medicine containing a substance specified in Schedule G. H or X the following additional conditions shall be complied with:
(a)the medicine shall be labelled with the name and address of the registered medical practitioner by whom it is supplied;
(b)If the medicine is for external application it shall be labelled with the words 'for external use only' or, if it is for internal use with the does;
(c)the name of the medicine or ingredients of the preparation and the quantities thereof, the dose prescribed, the name of the patient and the date of supply and the name of the person who gave the prescription shall be entered at the time of supply in register to be maintained for the purpose;
(d)the entry in the register shall be given a number and that number shall be entered on the label of the container;
(e)the register and the prescription if any on which the medicines are issued shall be preserved for not less than two years from the date of the last entry in the register or the date of the prescription as the case may be (3)The drug will be stored under proper storage conditions as directed on the label (4)NO drug shall be supplied or dispensed after the date of expiration of potency recorded on its container, label or wrapper or in violation of any statement or direction recorded on such container, label or wrapper Looking into clause-5 of Schedule-K, it is crystal clear that registered medical practitioners are also exempted under Schedule-K and clause-5 (a) of the said Schedule speaks as under:
5A.Drugs supplied by a hospital or The provisions of Chapter IV of the Act dispensary maintained or supported and the rules thereunder which require Government or local body them to be covered by a sale license, subject to the following conditions:
(1)the dispensing and supply of drugs shall be carried out by or under the supervision of a qualified person;
(2)the premises where drugs are supplied or stocked shall be open to inspection by an Inspector appointed under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act who can if necessary take samples for test;
(3)the drugs shall be stored under proper storage conditions (4)The drugs shall be purchased from a manufacturer or a dealer licensed under these rules or received as transferred 12 stocks from hospital stores for distribution.
Records of such purchases or receipt shall be maintained
5)No drug shall be supplied or dispensed after the date of expiration of potency recorded on its container, label or wrapper or in violation or any statement or direction recorded on such container, label or wrapper.
Looking into this Schedule, it transpires that medical practitioners have been exempted from the provisions of Chapter-IV of the said Act. Sub-section (c) of section 8 of the N.D.P.S. Act provides prohibition of certain operations except for medical and scientific purposes. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner is a practicing doctor and he was running a hospital namely, 111 Save Life hospital. Thus, the petitioner was also exempted in the light of this provision of Sub-section
(c) of section 8 of the N.D.P.S. as nothing has been recovered which is restricted in terms of N.D.P.S. Act.
All the statutory provisions suggest how to manage the hospital and as to what are the parameters to be followed in running the hospital by a practicing doctor. Looking to the complaint petition as well as the materials on record, nothing has come to disclose that the statutory provisions have been violated by the hospital in question. The petitioner has been implicated in several cases for raising voice against the working culture of the Health Department of the State of Jharkhand and if for raising a genuine voice and that too, at the time when the entire world was facing the pandemic, the petitioner has been prosecuted and there is no hesitation to the Court in coming to the conclusion that this prosecution is malicious as it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Bhajanlal" (supra). Summoning a person in a criminal case is a serious thing as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Pepsi Food"(supra). The judgment relied by Mr. Manoj Kumar, the learned G.A.III appearing on behalf of the respondent State as well as on behalf of the O.P.No.2 in the matter of "Priti Saraf" (supra), it is not in dispute that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the guideline as 13 to how under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the Court is required to pass the interim orders. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the High Court comes to the conclusion that the case is malicious in nature, section 482 Cr.P.C is applicable. Thus, the judgment in the case of "Priti Saraf" (supra) is not helping the respondent State. The judgment relied by Mr. Manoj Kumar, the learned G.A.III for the respondent State in the case of "Qualified Private Medical Practitioners' and Ors v. The State of Kerala and Ors" (supra), in that case the Disaster Management Act was not the subject matter and as such, this case is also not helping the respondent State. In the Covid-19 pandemic how the hospitals and the doctors, nurses and para-medical volunteers have worked are well-known to everybody.
In view of the above analysis and the reasons, there is no hesitation in the mind of the Court that this prosecution is malicious in nature against the petitioner.
Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding in connection with N.D.P.S. Case No.20/2021 arising out of C.C. Case No.395 of 2021 including the order taking cognizance dated 08.06.2021, pending in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Seraikella-Kharsawan at Seraikella is hereby quashed.
Cr.M.P.No.2110 of 2021 stands allowed and disposed of.
( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) SI/,;