Madras High Court
The Divisional Manager vs S.Syed Kadhar on 10 March, 2014
Author: S. Manikumar
Bench: S. Manikumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS DATED: 10.03.2014 CORAM: THE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE S. MANIKUMAR C.M.A.No.816 of 2014 and M.P.No.1 of 2014 The Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Thiruvannamalai. ... Appellant Vs. 1. S.Syed Kadhar 2. Noorjahan 3. S.Syed Monammed 4. S.Syed Meer 5. S.Shameem 6. S.Mubarak 7. Minor S.Shamshrutheen 8. Minor S.Syed Usain 9. Minor S.Zafer Ali 10. Minor S.Gouse Mohammed 11. Minor S.Hashma 12. Minor S. Salavutheen 13. A.Vengatesan Respondents [Minor respondents 7 to 12 are rep. by next friend and father Syed Kadhar, R1] The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the award & Decree dated 16.07.2009 made in M.C.O.P.No.1410 of 2013 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Sub Judge), Thirupattur, Vellore District. For Appellant : Mr.C.Velu. For Respondents : Mr.P.G.Padmanabhan JUDGMENT
Challenge in this appeal is to the liability of the insurance company to pay compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased, stated to be aged, 21 years, at the time of accident and a cleaner. Income has been fixed as Rs.4,500/- and '18' multiplier has been applied. Compensation awarded under the head 'love and affection' is assailed on the ground that they are not the dependents of the deceased. The claimants are parents, brothers and sisters.
2. Having noticed that the driver of the offending vehicle, bearing Regn.No.TN28R7286, insured with New India Assurance Company, Thiruvannamalai, the appellant herein, did not possess a valid and effective driving licence, at the time of accident, the claims tribunal has directed the insurance company to pay compensation of Rs.7,20,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of claim and then, to recover from the owner of the vehicle, 1st respondent in the claim petition.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, Insurance Company.
4. The issue as to whether the insurance company has to pay the compensation amount, if the vehicle insured with them is driven without a valid licence, is no longer res integra in the light of the decision in S.Iyyappan Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited & Another, reported in 2013 (7) SCC 62.
5. In view of the above decision, there is no manifest error in directing the insurance company to pay the compensation amount to the legal representatives of the deceased and then to recover from the insured.
6. The accident has occurred on 29.06.2010. In so far as the determination of monthly income is concerned, having regard to the avocation pleaded, the claims tribunal, has fixed the monthly income at Rs.4,500/-. The claimants were parents and brothers and sisters, including minors. The details of their relationship as per the claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, are as follows.
1. S.Syed Kadhar 46 Father
2. Noorjahan 43 Mother
3. S.Syed Mohammed 24 Brother
4. S.Syed Meer 23 Brother
5. S.Shameem 22 Daughter
6. S.Mubarak 19 Daughter
7. Minor S.Shamshrutheen 17 Brother
8. Minor S.Syed Usain 16 Brother
9. Minor S.Zafer Ali 12 Brother
10. Minor S.Gouse Mohammed 10 Brother
11. Minor S.Hashma 6 Daughter
12. Minor S. Salavutheen 4 Brother
7. Income determined at Rs.4,500/-, cannot be said to be on the higher side, in view of the decision in Sri Ramachandrappa Vs. The Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2011 (2) TNMAC 190 SC, wherein when a sum of Rs.4,500/- has been claimed as monthly wages for the deceased, stated to be a coolie, the claims tribunal has taken Rs.3,000/- for the purpose of computing the loss of contribution to the family. However, when the matter was taken on appeal, the Supreme Court having regard to the wages of a labourer, during the relevant period (1994 - between Rs.100 to Rs.150/- per day) found fault with the tribunal, for reducing the claim from Rs.4,500/- to Rs.3,000/- and determined the income at Rs.4,500/-.
8. The deceased was a bachelor. Having regard to the number of claimants, including minor respondents 7 to 12, the claims tribunal instead of deducting 50%, towards, personal and living expenses, deducted 1/3 for the purpose of computing the loss of contribution to the family. As regards the contention that brothers and sisters are not entitled to claim any compensation, in a reported decision made in the Branch Manager, M/s. National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Tmt.Sumathi and others reported in 2012 AAC 2965, this Court has considered the said aspect and at paragraphs 25 to 28 and 34, held as follows:-
"25. 'Legal Representative' ordinarily includes heirs as well as persons, who represent the estate of the deceased person or a person, on whom, the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Right to claim for compensation by any or all legal representatives under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a legal right. It is an assertable right enforceable before Courts and administrative agencies, in its wider sense and therefore, a legal right has to be understood, as any advantage or benefit conferred upon a person by a rule of law; and having regard to the manner, in which, a provision has to be interpreted, as held by the Supreme Court in the decisions stated supra, this Court is of the view that the definition of legal representatives cannot be restricted to exclude married daughters/sisters, from making any claim under section 166 of the Act and consequently, restrict their claim, only under Section 140 of the Act, which has been engrafted in the statute, with a specific object of compensating all the legal representative, whether there is negligence, on the part of the deceased or not. It is a "No Fault Liability" clause.
26. Courts have consistently held that what has been specifically excluded by a legislation in a provision cannot be imported into the section by the decisions of Court. By engrafting Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, enabling all the legal representatives to make a claim, in contra distinction to, Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which enables only the persons enumerated in the said section to claim compensation under section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the intention of the legislature is clear and the definition, "legal representative" cannot be narrowed down to mean only "dependents", excluding married daughters/sisters.
27. There could still be a case where there is contribution of a portion of the income of the deceased to a legal representative, who had preferred a claim and he/she would not be wholly dependant on the income of the deceased. A likelihood of loss of contribution from the deceased would give rise to a claim for compensation by him under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, though he may not be a wholly dependent, as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
28. It is a well recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used in the statute, should ordinarily be understood, in which, they harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the objection of the legislature and the Court should adopt an object oriented approach, keeping in mind the language employed in the statute. When the legislature has used the words, Legal Representatives in Section 166 of the Act, and having regard to the duty of the Court to act upon the true intention of the legislature, Mens or Sententia Legis, this Court is not inclined to accept the submissions of the Insurance Company, interpret and circumscribe the meaning of the words, Legal Representatives to mean only dependents. Just because a brother or sister is married, the right to represent the estate of the deceased is not taken away and such an interpretation, would make the provisions of law of succession, ineffective.
.............
34. Limiting the payment of compensation to some of the legal representatives, as per section 140 of the Act, to the exclusion of others, would amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the light of the above, the contention that the married daughters are entitled to only compensation under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, under No Fault Liability claim of Rs.50,000/- alone cannot be countenanced. If the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company are to be accepted, then it would be introducing a bar or prohibition against a married daughter to prefer a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which apparently is not the intention of the legislature. Monetary dependency is not the only factor to award compensation to the legal representatives.
9. Hence, the objection of the appellant insurance company, as regards their entitlement to claim compensation, is rejected. Some of the decisions, on this aspect, relied on by this Court, in the above reported case, are as follows:
"29. The expression "legal representative" has been explained in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another reported in 1987 ACJ 561, as follows:
"10. Clauses ( b ) and ( c ) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expression legal representative has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines legal representative as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act authorises all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and clause ( c ) of that sub-section authorises any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110-A(1) of the Act thus expressly states that ( i ) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent, and ( ii ) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in Section 110-A of the Act."
30. Interpreting Section 110-A (now amended as Section 166(1)), vis-a-vis, a corresponding provision in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the Apex Court in Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai's case (stated supra) further held that, "These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies."
31. While confirming the decision of Gujarat High Court in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai reported in 1977 ACJ 253 (Guj.), the Supreme Court at Paragraph 12, held that, "We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers children and some times foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents."
32. In United India Insurance Company v. Kasiammal reported in 1997 (III) CTC 346, one of the contentions raised therein, challenging the award, was that a married son, who was living separately and not a dependant, is not entitled to claim compensation. The short question framed by this Court, at Paragraph 6 of the judgment, was whether the claimants, who were married sons and married daughters, entitled for compensation? While addressing the abovesaid question, a learned Judge has considered two decisions relied on by the appellant-Insurance Company therein in Revanben v. Kantibhai Narottamehai Gohil reported in 1995 ACJ 548 and U.P.State Road Transport Corporation v. Tara Devi reported in 1995 ACJ 1220 and also the decisions of the Apex Court in Bhagwatidin v. Gheesalal reported in 1980 ACJ 116, Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai reported in AIR 1987 SC 1690 and Pushpam v. Nirmala reported in 1991 TLNJ 101, and at Paragraphs 15, 16 and 17, held as follows:
15. As pointed out earlier, the compensation amount is being paid to the legal representatives on account of untimely death of their ancestor. The dependency of the legal representatives is a question to be considered and does no mean only the dependents can claim compensation. The compensation being the amount for the loss to the estate of the deceased, it has to be considered as to whether the legal representatives had been put to loss because of the death of the deceased. Wherever the deceased is an earning member, naturally his savings is an accumulation for the estate which can be divided by the legal representatives after the death of the deceased. As the legal representatives had been put to loss of the earning of the deceased, the legal representatives are also entitled for the compensation.
16. Further in this case there is absolutely no evidence to show that the married sons are living separately. When they are residing with the mother, naturally the married sons had lost not only the assistance of the deceased mother but also lost her valuable advice in family matters. The deceased, being a widow, naturally she could have lived with any one of the sons. When the legal representatives, the married sons of the deceased are entitled for compensation even though they are residing separately, the claimants herein will be entitled for compensation; especially when they are residing with the deceased. More over, the aged parents in many a house are the watch dogs for the entire house, servants and the grand children except a few exceptional cases. When the claimants had lost such valuable services of their mother they are entitle for compensation. The loss cannot be substituted by any other confident or responsible person either in the family or by appointing a servant. If the contention of the counsel for the appellant is accepted, I do not surprise that in future the appellant may plead that generally the aged ones are only a liability in the family and since due to the accident the aged one died, the family is get rid of the same and the driver should be suitably rewarded by the legal representatives instead of claiming any compensation for the death of the deceased.
17. Further if the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the claimants are entitled only for the no fault amount is accepted, then a person who sustained some grievous injuries will be paid more than the amount that would be paid to the legal representatives i.e., married sons and daughters of the deceased and in that case it would be cheaper to kill than maim. If the claimants are to be paid the no fault amount, that may mean that the claimants are being paid some ex gratia payment out of sympathy and not for the loss of life of their ancestor. Hence the contention of the counsel for the appellant cannot be countenanced and there is absolutely no merit in the appeal and is dismissed."
33. It is worthwhile to reproduce the judgments in Pushpam's case (cited supra) and Bhagwatidin's case, which are as follows:
10. In fact in judgment reported in Pushpam v. Nirmala reported in 1991 TLNJ 101, the question considered is whether in a petition claiming compensation for injuries sustained by the claimant, after his death whether the sister can come on record as the legal representative. Venkataswami, J/has held, that the sister of the deceased claimant can be brought on record as the legal representative, in the following terms:-
"In more or less identical circumstances, V. Ramaswami, J, a he then was, in 1981 ACJ 185 (supra), after noticing a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in C.P.Kandaswamy v. Mariappa Stores, 1974 ACJ 3 held that by introducing Section 110-A in the Motor Vehicles Act, Parliament intended not to restrict the statutory right to claim damages to the injured alone. In the case of claims arising out of motor accidents, Clause (b) provides that the cause of action would survive to the legal representative where death has resulted from the accident. This was an exception to the general principle actio personalis moritor cum persona. It is true there is a distinction between case of death resulting from the accident and a case of other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, i.e., the party dying subsequently during the pendency of the proceedings not due to the accident. But the Motor Vehicles Act does not, in my opinion, make any distinction so far as the right to claim damages. The claims in all these cases are no statutory rights. Therefore, there appears to be no reason to restrict the right to the injured alone." Therefore, there appears to be no reason to restrict the right to the injured alone." The learned Judge further distinguished the Division Bench case (1974 ACJ 362) on facts. The learned Judge ultimately held as reasonable question of recovering the actual expenses incurred by the deceased, I have no doubt that the claim will survive since that amount if had not been spent might have been available as the estate of the deceased to be succeeded by his legal representatives." In 1987 II ACJ 561 (supra) the Supreme Court has elaborately considered the expression 'legal representative' in Section 110-A of the Act. After noticing the divergent views of the various High Courts, the Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"In the light of the principles laid down in the above two judgments, I am of the view that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent, namely reported in Videowala v. Union of India, 1986 (II) MLJ 345 and reported in Kandaswamyv. Mariappa Stores, 86 L.W. 667, cannot be pressed into service. I am further of the view that the question of bringing on record or coming on record as legal representatives and the further question whether they are entitled to compensation on the facts and circumstances of the case are two different issues. Merely because they are brought on record, that does not automatically entitled them to get compensation. In the light of the wider meaning given to the expression 'legal representative' by the Supreme Court, though in a case of death in a motor accident, the order of the Court below cannot be sustained. Therefore, I hold that the petitioner is entitled to continue the proceedings and it is for the court below to decide whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation at all, and if so, how much in the light of the principles laid down in 1981 ACJ 185 (supra) and other cases."
10. Though in Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation, reported in 2009 ACJ 1298, the Apex Court held that in respect of bachelor, 50% of the deduction should be made for the purpose of computation of loss of contribution to the family, considering the number of persons in the family, including six minors, it can be presumed that income from the head of the family alone, would not be sufficient to meet out the day to day expenditure. Therefore, deduction of 1/3 towards personal and living expenses made by the claims tribunal can be justified.
11. Death has occurred when the deceased was in the cabin of the offending vehicle TN 28 R 7286, insured with the appellant. For the purpose of computation of loss of contribution to the family, the claims tribunal has taken Rs.3,000/- only. Following the decision in Amrit Bhanu Shali Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2012 (2) TNMAC 321 (SC) : 2012 ACJ 2002, the claims tribunal applied '18' multiplier.
12. Though, the learned counsel for the appellant insurance company submitted that no document for proof of age of the deceased has been produced by the respondents/claimants, having regard to the entry in Ex.P2, Postmortem report, the claims tribunal, has determined the age of the deceased as 24, for the purpose of adopting '18' multiplier, for computing compensation towards loss of contribution to the family. In Fakeerappa Vs. Karnataka Cement Pipe Factory, reported in 2004 (1) TNMAC SC 190, the Supreme Court and in the Managing Director, Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation, Madurai v. Mary [2005 (5) CTC 515], this Court held that in the absence of proof relating to the age, such as birth extract or any supporting document, entry in the Postmortem Report, can always be taken into account for the purpose of computation of compensation.
13. The deceased is survived by parents, two major sons, two major daughters and other Minor brothers and sisters. Details have already been furnished in the foregoing paragraphs. The contention that the abovesaid blood brothers and sisters are not entitled to compensation under the head 'loss of love and affection' as they are not dependents of the deceased, is untenable, as well as unreasonable. Compensation under the head 'love and affection', is non pecuniary. Brothers / sisters, parents, who have lost a member in the family is certainly entitled to a reasonable compensation under the head loss of love and affection. Blood is thicker than water. The loss is immeasurable and cannot be circumscribed by any arithmetic precision.
14. The tortfeasor or the insurer cannot deny compensation, for the loss of love and affection. I am of the view that the argument put forth by the appellant is against the conscience of any human being. It is said, Rule the world with love.
15. Each of us need affection, more than anything in this world, but only few find it. Blood brothers and sisters, who have lost their dear, would perceive the loss more than others. A third party, Insurance Company, a entity, existence of which is recognised in law, may not perceive the loss, but it is unfortunate, that the deponent of the affidavit filed in support of the affidavit and who has questioned the award, has failed to understand, what love and affection means. All human beings need love and affection or else, living is meaningless.
16. In the realm of love, there is no caste, creed, colour. Love is eternal. Money or dependency is insignificant. It is unconscionable that the Insurance Company has measured love and affection of the blood brothers and sisters, in terms of dependency. Love is divine, purity in heart, not measured in terms of dependency. The Insurance Company has failed to consider, love and affection has no barriers. The stone cold and rigid approach of the company is deprecated, and it is inhuman.
17. If blood brothers and sisters are not even entitled to be provided with a reasonable compensation, under the head 'loss of love and affection', just because they are alleged to be not dependents, this Court fails to understand, as to who are the persons entitled to be awarded a reasonable compensation, under this head? According to the appellants, it is only the parents, who are entitled, as if they alone have lost the love and affection of a member in a family, and not the blood brothers and sisters. In the case on hand, there are minor brothers and sisters, who have lost the love and affection of their elder brother, and that they are awarded only a meagre compensation of Rs.5,000/- each. How can dependency be correlated with love and affection? Can anybody say that, if only he is dependent on the other, in terms of money, love and affection, can be showered? The objection of the insurance company to the compensation awarded under the head "love and affection" is unconscionable.
18. The total compensation awarded under the head, love and affection for 12 respondents, including six minor brothers and sisters, is just Rs.60,000/-, i.e., each one of them has been awarded a sum of Rs.5,000/-. Just compensation is explained in the following decisions.
(i) In Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and another reported in (2003) 7 SCC 197, in Paragraph 12, the Supreme Court held that, "Broadly speaking, in the case of death the basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary benefits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss, expenses etc. and loss to the estate. The object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives due to the sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor deficient. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damage cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation; but amount recoverable depends on broad facts and circumstances of each case. It should neither be punitive against whom claim is decreed nor should it be a source of profit for the person in whose favour it is awarded."
In Paragraph 15 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has held that, "Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be just", a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness, and non-arbitrariness. If it is not so, it cannot be just."
(ii) In Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prasanth S.Dhananka reported in (2009) 6 SCC 1 = 2010 ACJ 38 (SC), the three-Judge Bench was dealing with a case arising out of the complaint filed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. While enhancing the compensation awarded by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission from Rs.15 lakhs to Rs.1 crore, the Bench made the following observations which can appropriately be applied for deciding the petitions filed under Section 166 of the Act:
We must emphasise that the court has to strike a balance between the inflated and unreasonable demands of a victim and the equally untenable claim of the opposite party saying that nothing is payable. Sympathy for the victim does not, and should not, come in the way of making a correct assessment, but if a case is made out, the court must not be chary of awarding adequate compensation. The adequate compensation that we speak of, must to some extent, be a rule of thumb measure, and as a balance has to be struck, it would be difficult to satisfy all the parties concerned. ...At the same time we often find that a person injured in an accident leaves his family in greater distress vis-`-vis a family in a case of death. In the latter case, the initial shock gives way to a feeling of resignation and acceptance, and in time, compels the family to move on. The case of an injured and disabled person is, however, more pitiable and the feeling of hurt, helplessness, despair and often destitution enures every day. The support that is needed by a severely handicapped person comes at an enormous price, physical, financial and emotional, not only on the victim but even more so on his family and attendants and the stress saps their energy and destroys their equanimity. (emphasis supplied)
19. In the light of the legal principles of law, and the entitlement of just compensation to the victims, this Court finds no infirmity in the quantum of compensation awarded by the claims tribunal and hence not inclined to interfere with the award, in respect of the directions of the claims tribunal, to pay compensation to the accident victims and then, to recover from the insured as well as on the quantum. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
20. In A.V.Padma & Others Vs. R.Venugopal & others, reported in 2012 (3) SCC 378, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that not in all cases, the amount apportioned to the major sharers should be directed to be deposited in nationalised banks. In the case on hand, the claims tribunal, has apportioned, a compensation of Rs.40,000/- to each of the major respondents 1 to 6 / claimants and in respect of the minors, the claims tribunal, has apportioned a sum of Rs.80,000/- each. Clause '6' of the decree in MCOP 1410 of 2013 dated 15.07.2013, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Sub Judge), Thirupattur, Vellore District, reads as follows:
"That as far as the other petitioners award amount is concerned the same is ordered to be deposited for 3 years as fixed deposit in Nationalized bank and they are permitted to draw the interest quarterly."
21. In the light of the decision of the Apex Court stated supra, the abovesaid portion of the decree is modified. The major claimants are permitted to seek for withdrawal of the sum apportioned to them, by making necessary applications before the tribunal. The share apportioned to the minors shall be in bank deposit, till they attain majority. Interest accrued is permitted to be withdrawn once in three months. No costs.
10.03.2014 Index: Yes Internet: Yes ars S.MANIKUMAR, J., ars To
1. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sub Judge, Thirupattur, Vellore District.
2.The Section Officer, VR Section, High Court, Madras.
C.M.A.No.816 of 201410.03.2014