Kerala High Court
Deepti Sivan vs Jyothi Haridranath on 24 February, 2025
2025:KER:14789
CRP No. 402 of 2024
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.M.MANOJ
MONDAY, THE 24TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2025 / 5TH PHALGUNA, 1946
CRP NO. 402 OF 2024
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED 11.09.2024 IN I.A. No.
3/2024 IN OS NO.1074 OF 2024 OF RENT CONTROL COURT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
REVISION PETITIONER/PETITIONER IN I.A.No.3/24/DEFENDANT IN O.S.:
DEEPTI SIVAN
AGED 49 YEARS
D/O VASANTHA PILLAY, 2A, 2ND FLOOR, SILVER OAKS
APARTMENT, KOWDIAR P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN - 695 011
BY ADVS. NISHA GEORGE
GEORGE POONTHOTTAM (SR.)
N.ANAND
SIDHARTH.R.WARIYAR
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT IN I.A. No.3/24/PLAINTIFF IN O.S.:
JYOTHI HARIDRANATH
AGED 55 YEARS
D/O. VASANTHAPILLAY, 202, LANDMARK APARTMENTS,
NO.1, MOYENVILLE ROAD, LANGFORD TOWN, BANGALORE
NORTH, KARNATAKA STATE, PIN - 560 025
BY ADVS. R.T.PRADEEP
NAIR AJAY KRISHNAN(N-122)
NIRANJAN T. PRADEEP(K/001073/2024)
THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
04.02.2025, THE COURT ON 24.02.2025, DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:14789
CRP No. 402 of 2024
2
C.R.
P.M. MANOJ, J
------------------
CRP No. 402 of 2024
----------------------
Dated this the 24th day of February, 2025
JUDGMENT
The Revision Petition is preferred by the defendant in OS No.1074/2024 of the Rent Control Court, Thiruvananthapuram being aggrieved by order dated 11.09.2024, whereby the petitioner's objection to the Suit was declined. The parties in the Revision Petition will hereinafter be referred as to their status before the trial court.
2. Originally the suit is for a mandatory injunction. The plaintiff and the defendant are sisters. They are the children of late Vasantha Pillai, who died on 22.02.2022, intestate, as far as plaint A schedule property is concerned. Plaint A schedule is nothing but a de-mat account with the Sharekhan Limited in the name of late Vasantha Pillai. The defendant was a nominee of the mother in the de-mat account No.1208670001323727 with HDFC Securities.
2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 3
3. When the plaintiff verified the status of the de-mat account in the name of her mother with the HDFC Securities, it was informed that the said account was closed on 18.04.2022 by the defendant. She had transferred the entire holdings belonging to her mother by using her status as the nominee to the mother. She has been in possession of holdings of the account for more than the last two years. She has neither disclosed anything about the transactions in the mother's de-mat account nor she had accounted or transferred 1/4th right of the value and profits of those shares, which is transferred to de-mat account Number 12036000-05582065 with Sharekhan Limited, which is plaint B schedule.
4. The case of the plaintiff in the suit is that the defendant, being the nominee, was legally bound to account to the legal heirs of Vasantha Pillai, which includes two brothers of the plaintiff and the defendant. However, the said legal heirs had not raised a claim for their shares till this time and they are not party to the proceedings. The plaintiff has preferred the suit alleging that the defendant had failed to transfer the share of plaint A schedule property, i.e. 1/ 4 th share of the holdings of Late Vasantha Pillai, to the de-mat account 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 4 of the plaintiff. The Suit was preferred after giving sufficient opportunity by preferring legal demand notice. The reliefs sought in the suit is to grant decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendant/nominee of the deceased mother to transfer 1/4 th share of the holdings of Late Vasantha Pillai given in plaint A schedule property as specifically provided in plaint B schedule property along with the 1/4th of the dividend received in the de-mat account of the defendant with respect to the asset holdings of Late Vasantha Pillai till date into the de-mat account number of the plaintiff, within the time fixed by the court.
5. Along with the suit, the plaintiff preferred I.A. No.1 of 2024 for temporary injunction against which a counter affidavit has been preferred by the defendant. Thereafter a petition was filed by the defendant as I.A. No.3 of 2024 for rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC wherein the contentions raised by the revision petitioner is that the plaintiff's claim for 1/4 th share of her late mother results in testifying that the defendant is also a shareholder along with her two brothers who are not parties to the proceedings. On that argument, the suit necessarily is one for partition, which 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 5 could be filed after paying sufficient court fee for the value of shares claimed by the plaintiff. That too after arraying necessary parties on the party array. Without doing the same, by raising a tactical relief, she tried to evade the payment of the requisite court fee. This exercise is only to circumvent the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. These are the circumstances in which I.A.No.3 of 2024 is preferred under Order VII Rule 11 to reject the plaint.
6. It is further contended that the value of the shares is more than Rs.4 Crores which is not mentioned anywhere in the suit. Without mentioning the same, relief is sought for mandatory injunction and accounts with consequential relief. Instead of seeking the realisation of the amounts equivalent to the shares, she claimed partition of the shares. The relief claimed, therefore, ought to have been valued in accordance with the value of shares. This is the circumstance in which the petitioner prayed to reject the relief claimed in the plaint as it is undervalued and the court fee paid is insufficient.
7. The primary contention raised by the Revision petitioner is on the basis of Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 6 41 of the Specific Relief Act provides the circumstances in which an injunction can be refused. Sub Section (h) of Section 41 provides, when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceedings, except in case of breach of trust, an injunction cannot be granted.
8. On the strength of the said provision, the revision petitioner sought to reject the plaint by invoking Order VII Rule 11 CPC, especially sub-clause (a) and sub-clause (d). Sub-clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII provides;
"Where it does not disclose a cause of action, the plaint shall be rejected.
Whereas, sub-clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII provides where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected."
This argument is based on Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act. In the ground portion, it is also contended that the plaintiff's remedy was to file a suit for partition under the Hindu Succession Act by paying a court fee on the market value of shares under Section 37(1) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act. This contention is taken in the background that the respondent herein had 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 7 evaluated the market value of the shares as Rs.1,66,57,202/-. It is also stated that the State would be deprived of its legitimate entitlement under the Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act and Rules, if such tactical reliefs are granted. Thereby prayed that the suit is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d). It is further contended that the dismissal of the application to reject the plaint is by a non-speaking order. The court did not consider the petitioner's contention with respect to the bar on the suit under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act.
9. In support of the contentions the petitioner has produced a reported decision in Dahiben v. Aravindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead through Legal Representatives and Others [(2020) 7 SCC 366]. Wherein the apex court found the underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) that, if in a suit no cause of action is disclosed or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment read thus:
2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 8 " 23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.
23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823] this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : (SCC p. 324, para 12) "12. ... The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action."
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 9 23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the averments in the plaint [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] , read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. 23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] which reads as : (SCC p. 562, para 139) "139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed."
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557] . The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain case [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823.
2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 10 23.15. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint "shall" be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the court has no option, but to reject the plaint."
10. The Counsel also produced another Supreme Court judgment in Rajendra Bajoria & others v. Hemant Kumar Jalan and others [(2022) 12 SCC 641], in which it was stated in paragraph 20 as follows :
"20. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC are required to be strictly adhered to. However, under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the duty is cast upon the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, by scrutinising the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. This Court has held that the underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is that when a plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings. It has been held that in such a case, it will be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation so that further judicial time is not wasted."
11. In response to the contentions of the counsel for the petitioner the counsel for the respondent/plaintiff contended that the primary argument of the petitioner under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 11 is not sustainable. The said provision pertains to the bar in filing Civil Suit under Section 9 of the CPC, which says; the court shall have the jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Moreover, the petitioner is only a nominee to the mother in a de-mat account. Being a nominee to mother, the petitioner is only a trustee to recover the assets of the deceased.
12. It is further contended that it is for the plaintiff to decide what all reliefs could be sought. The plaintiff, being the master of the suit seeking only necessary reliefs from the court under Section 26 read with Order IV, VI & VII of the CPC in which Order VII stands for plaint. Order VII Rule 11 specifies the ground on which the plaint can be rejected. Rule 12 provides for the procedure for rejecting a plaint whereby it mandates that when a plaint is rejected, the judge shall record an order to that effect with reasons for such order. It is further contended that this provision is not applicable in this case as the suit itself is not rejected.
13. What is impugned in the Revision is the order of rejection of the plea for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. In fact, the procedure to be followed is under Order VIII by preferring a written 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 12 statement under Order VIII Rule 1. All these contentions can be raised in the written statement and can raise a question of the maintainability of the suit itself instead of filing a revision petition before this Court.
14. In support of his contention, the counsel for the respondent brought to the notice of this Court a reported decision in Shakti Yezdani & another v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar & others [(2024) 4 SCC 642] in which paragraphs 53 to 59 are relevant which read:
"53. It is settled law that general words and phrases used in a statute, regardless of their wide ambit, must be interpreted taking into account the objects of the statute. The clauses and sections within a statute are not to be read in isolation, but their textual interpretation is determined by the scheme of the entire statute. [RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424] Notably, a non obstante clause is to be considered on the basis of the context within which it is used, as has also been observed in R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286]. Applying the aforestated rule of interpretation, the non obstante clause in Section 109-A of the Companies Act, 1956 should also be interpreted keeping in mind the scheme of the Companies Act, 1956 and the intent of introduction of nomination facility under Sections 109-A and 109-B of the Companies Act, 1956 vide the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1999 wherein emphasis was laid on building investor confidence and bringing the company law in tune with policies of liberalisation and deregulation. With this backdrop, it can be concluded that the use of the non obstante clause, serves a singular purpose of allowing the company to vest the shares upon the nominee to the 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 13 exclusion of any other person, for the purpose of discharge of its liability against diverse claims by the legal heirs of the deceased shareholder. This arrangement is until the legal heirs have settled the affairs of the testator and are ready to register the transmission of shares, by due process of succession law.
54. As per Bye-law 9.11.7 of the Depositories Act, 1996, the non obstante clause confers overriding effect to the nomination over any other disposition/nomination "for the purposes of dealing with the securities lying to the credit of deceased nominating person(s) in any manner". Therefore, the purpose of invoking such a non obstante clause is clearly delineated and limited to the extent of enabling the depository to deal with the securities, in the immediate aftermath of the securities holder's death. The upshot of the above discussion is that the non obstante clause in both Section 109-A(3) of the Companies Act, 1956 & Bye-law 9.11.7 of the Depositories Act, 1996 cannot be held to exclude the legal heirs from their rightful claim over the securities, against the nominee.
55. The appellants also contend that a nomination validly made under Section 109-A of the Companies Act, 1956 and Bye-law 9.11 of the Depositories Act, 1996 constitutes a "statutory testament" that overrides testamentary/intestate succession. It is worth noting that the argument of nomination as a "statutory testament" in respect of instruments such as life insurance policies, government savings certificates, provident fund, etc. were considered and emphatically rejected by this Court in multiple rulings.
56. In Sarbati Devi [Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424] this Court held that nomination under Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (quaere Insurance Act, 1938) does not contemplate a third line of succession styled as a "statutory testament" and any amount paid to a 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 14 nominee on the policy holder's death forms a part of the estate of the deceased policy holder and devolves upon his/her heirs, as per testamentary or intestate succession. Further, in Ram Chander Talwar [Ram Chander Talwar v. Devender Kumar Talwar, (2010) 10 SCC 671 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 313] , while discussing the rights of a nominee of a deceased depositor [Section 45-ZA(2)Banking Regulation Act, 1949], this Court concluded that the right to receive the money lying in the depositor's account was to be conferred on the nominee but the nominee would not become the owner of such deposits. The said deposit is a part of the deceased depositor's estate and is subject to the laws of succession, that govern the depositor.
57. The appellants' have contended that nominations under Section 109- A of the Companies Act, 1956 & Bye-law 9.11 of the Depositories Act, 1996 suggest the intention of the shareholder, to bequeath the shares/securities absolutely to the nominee, to the exclusion of any other persons (including legal representatives) and constitutes a "statutory testament". However, aforesaid argument is not acceptable for the following reasons:
(a) The Companies Act, 1956 does not contemplate a "statutory testament" that stands over and above the laws of succession,
(b) The Companies Act, 1956 as iterated above is concerned with regulating the affairs of corporates and is not concerned with laws of succession.
(c) The "statutory testament" by way of nomination is not subject to the same rigours as is applicable to the formation and validity of a will under the succession laws, for instance, Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, wherein the rules for execution of a will are laid out.
58. Therefore, the argument by the appellants of nomination as a "statutory testament" cannot be countenanced simply because the Companies Act, 1956 does not deal with succession nor does it override 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 15 the laws of succession. It is beyond the scope of the company's affairs to facilitate succession planning of the shareholder. In case of a will, it is upon the administrator or executor under the Succession Act, 1925, or in case of intestate succession, the laws of succession to determine the line of succession.
59. Consistent interpretation is given by courts on the question of nomination i.e. upon the holder's death, the nominee would not get an absolute title to the subject-matter of nomination, and those would apply to the Companies Act, 1956 (pari materia provisions in the Companies Act, 2013) and the Depositories Act, 1996 as well."
In the light of the above, the learned counsel contends that upon the holder's death, the nominee would not get an absolute title to the subject matter of the nomination. The right conferred on the nominee is only to receive the money lying in the depositor's account. The nominee would not become the owner of such deposits. The said deposit is part of the deceased depositor's estate and is subject to the law of succession that governs the depositor.
15. In Ramesh Chand Daga v. Rameshwari Bai reported in [(2005) 4 SCC 772] wherein it was held that a decree in the nature of mandatory injunction directing a party to the suit to deliver certain movable property in favour of the applicant cannot be equated with decree of payment of a specified sum. This decision is cited in order to 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 16 substantiate that the plaintiff is seeking a direction only to appropriate the share that the defendant clandestinely transferred to her own account using the status of 'nominee'. In fact, being the nominee of the mother, who died intestate with respect to A schedule property, the petitioner herein is liable to apportion the 1/4th share and its accrued benefits to all other legal heirs. Instead, she was holding the same for the last two years without disclosing the assets involved in it.
16. Learned counsel also brought the attention of this Court to the Apex Court judgment in Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat and Others [(2021) 9 SCC 91], paragraph 10 of which reads :
"10. The application under Order 7 Rule 11 was dismissed by the Trial Judge on 1 July 2019 for the following reasons:
(i) With respect to non-payment of the court fee, according to Order 7 Rule 11(c), a plaint would only be rejected if the plaint is written on a paper that is insufficiently stamped, and the court requires the plaintiff to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time fixed and despite such an order, the plaintiff fails to do so. In this case, no such order was passed by the court;
(ii) The cause of action had been specifically pleaded by the first respondent in paragraph 5 of the plaint; and
(iii) In order to reject a plaint for the suit being barred by any law under Order 7 Rule 11(d), the court needs to be guided by the averments 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 17 in the plaint and not the defence taken. The grounds taken by the Appellant-that the issues raised had been decided by the decree of the Trial Court in OS No.103/2007 and affirmed on appeal by the High Court-were the defence of the Appellant. Thus, these cannot be taken into account while rejecting a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the issue was to whether the suit is barred by res judicata cannot be decided in an Order 7 Rule 11 application but has to be decided in the suit."
The above decision is brought to substantiate the contention with respect to the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d). Whereby trying to substantiate that the relief sought in the suit was only for apportionment of the amount which was illegally held by the petitioner herein in the capacity of a nominee to their mother for which the respondent herein is entitled to have 1/4th share. The cause of action is also specifically avoided in the plaint. Especially in the light of the cause of action specified in the plaint in paragraphs 4 to 11, the trial court is bound to maintain the plaint and not by the defence taken by the defendants.
17. In Sathyan v. Manager Indian Overseas Bank [1988 (1) KLT 553] produced by the counsel for the respondent, paragraphs 7 to 9 are relevant, which read thus :
2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 18 "7. It is settled law that the court fee payable is to be decided on the basis of the averments in the plaint and the relief sought by the plaintiff. The Court, however, will have to look at the substance of the relief sought, at the question of court fee is linked to the substantial relief claimed.
8. In the plaint now filed, the actual relief prayed for is only for an injunction. It is clear from the plaint averments that the petitioner asserts that he alone is entitled to the amount covered by the fixed deposit receipt in the bank, and does not seek any declaration of his right. He, therefore, proceeds on the footing that the bank has no power to pay the amount to any other person. It may be that while deciding to grant injunction or not, the court might have to consider the question as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to the amount. The suit in which the plaintiff does not pray for the money cannot be treated on exactly the same footing as a suit in which he does pray for such relief for purposes of court fee.
9. It is therefore clear that the suit has to be valued only under S.27(C) as a suit for injunction and not under S.25, as a suit for declaration or under S.22, as a suit for recovery of money."
The afore decision is brought to the notice of this Court to show that the court fee payable is to be decided on the basis of the averments of the plaint and the relief sought by the plaintiff. The court fee is linked to the substantial relief claimed. Here, in the case on hand, the relief sought is only to apportion the value of 1/4th share illegally held by the petitioner in the capacity of the nominee to her mother's de-mat account for which 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 19 mandatory injunction is sufficient to give a direction to the petitioner to transfer the said shares in the name of the respondent. On this background, it is submitted by the counsel for the respondent that the revision petition is nothing but a protracting tactic by the petitioner herein to deny the right of the respondent.
18. I have heard Sri.George Poonthottam, learned Senior Counsel instructed by Smt.Nisha George for the petitioner, Sri.R.T. Pradeep for the respondent.
19. Having heard the submissions on both sides and going through the records produced, it appears that the petitioner and the respondent are sisters. Petitioner, being the nominee to the de-mat account of her mother, transferred the entire assets in the de-mat account of her mother into her own de-mat account. Their mother died on 22.02.2022. Thereafter as per the contentions in the suit, the de-mat account in the name of the mother was closed on 18.04.2022 by using the nominee status by the petitioner herein and she transferred the entire holdings in the mother's de-mat account, which is plaint A schedule, into her own de- mat account and keeps hold of the entire asset till this time from 18.04.2022. The petitioner is also not disclosing the status of the said 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 20 account to any of the legal heirs of Late Vasantha Pillai, the mother of the petitioner as well as the respondent.
20. Going by the reported decision in Shakti Yezdani supra, it appears that the non-obstante clause of Section 109A (3) of the Companies Act, 1956 confers an overriding effect to the nominations over any other disposition/nomination 'for the purpose of dealing with the securities lying to the credit of the deceased nominating person(s) in any manner'. Therefore, the purpose of invoking such a non-obstante clause is clearly delineated and limited to the extent of enabling the nominee to deal with the securities in the immediate aftermath of the security holder's death. Thereby the non-obstante clause in Section 109A (3) of the Companies Act, 1956 cannot be held to exclude the legal heirs from their rightful claim over the securities against the nominee. No third line of succession is contemplated under the Companies Act. Thereby, any amount paid to the nominee on the account holder's death forms part of the estate of the deceased and devolves upon her heirs in intestate succession.
21. Similarly, the contentions raised by the petitioner under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act cannot be accepted since the said provision 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 21 pertains to the bar under Section 9 of the CPC where specific forums are provided, and a suit is barred in such cases. Here the contention of the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum for a partition suit cannot be equated with Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act. The contentions against the impugned order under Order VII Rule 11 (d) will not sustain, since the suit is not barred by any law as explained earlier under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act. This position has been clarified in Ramesh Chand Daga and Srihari Hanumandas Totala supra.
22. Yet another contention was raised with respect to Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d), I am not satisfied with the contention of the petitioner that the suit is not disclosed with any cause of action, since paragraphs, 3 to 7 and 11 specifically provide for cause of action.
23. The contention with respect to Order VII Rule 12 is also not sustainable for the reason that the plaint is not yet rejected. Only an application to reject the plaint is declined by the trial court as per the impugned order. Since the suit is pending, the petitioner herein has every right to file a written statement under Order VIII and challenge the very maintainability of the suit itself.
2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 22 Under such circumstances, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
P.M.MANOJ JUDGE ttb 2025:KER:14789 CRP No. 402 of 2024 23 APPENDIX OF CRP 402/2024 PETITIONER'S ANNEXURES :
Annexure 1 TRUE COPY OF THE PLAINT FILED IN O.S.NO.1074/2024 ON THE FILES OF THE HON'BLE ADDITIONAL MUNSIFF'S COURT (RCC), THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DATED 12.07.2024 ALONG WITH DOCUMENTS Annexure 2 TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM APPLICATION FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF SEEKING FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION FILED AS I.A.NO.1/2024 IN O.S.NO.1074/2024 ON THE FILES OF THE HON'BLE ADDITIONAL MUNSIFF'S COURT (RCC), THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DATED 12.07.2024 Annexure 3 TRUE COPY OF THE COUNTER AFFIDAVIT DATED 13.08.2024 FILED BY THE DEFENDANT TO ANNEXURE 2 Annexure 4 TRUE COPY OF I.A.NO.3/2024 IN O.S.NO.1074/2024 ON THE FILES OF THE HON'BLE ADDITIONAL MUNSIFF'S COURT (RCC), THIRUVANANTHAPURAM FILED BY THE DENFENDANT SEEKING FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT DATED 13.08.2024 Annexure 5 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF TO ANNEXURE 4 DATED 16.08.2024