Madhya Pradesh High Court
Manaklal Barkade vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 30 April, 2026
Author: Dwarka Dhish Bansal
Bench: Dwarka Dhish Bansal
1
Cr. R-4146 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT J AB A L PU R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DWARKA DHISH BANSAL
ON THE 30th OF APRIL, 2026
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 4146 of 2022
MANAKLAL BARKADE
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Ms. Arti Sahu - Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Samta Jain - Govt. Adv. for the State.
ORDER
This criminal revision has been preferred by the petitioner/accused challenging the order dated 22.09.2022 framing charges against the petitioner/accused for the offences punishable under Section 304 Part-II, 379 of IPC and Section 194(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
2. As per prosecution story on 03.02.2022 at about 1.45 p.m. deceased Aman Marve s/o Anand Marve, aged 20 years, R/o Near Mahatma Tent House, Bilahari was going on his motorcycle to Kajarwara and when he reached Pink City, Kajarwara Road in front of Mangleshwari Complex, then co-accused Krishna negligently opened the door of his Bolero Jeep, due to which deceased Aman Marve fell down, immediately co-accused Manaklal Badkare by transporting the sand illegally and without royalty through his Hyva (Truck) No. MP 04 HE 7779 and by driving the same rashly and negligently caused death/injury likely to cause death.
3. In view of the aforesaid, in short the case of prosecution against the petitioner is that petitioner-Manaklal Badkare by transporting the sand illegally and without royalty through his Hyva (Truck) No. MP 04 HE 7779 and by driving 2 Cr. R-4146 of 2022 the same rashly and negligently caused death/injury likely to cause death of the deceased Aman Marve.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even on the basis of allegations made in the FIR and other documents, at the most, charge under Section 304-A of IPC can be said to have been made out and since necessary ingredients for the offence under Section 304 Part-II of IPC are not there, the Court below has committed an illegality in framing the charges against the petitioner including under Section 304 Part-II of IPC. With these submissions, she prays for setting aside the impugned order and for allowing the criminal revision.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned order and prays for dismissal of the criminal revision.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. For the sake of convenience extract of Sections 304 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is quoted as under :
"304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
304A. Causing death by negligence.
Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
8. So, in the present case it is to be considered as to whether the petitioner, who is a driver of Hyva, as a prudent man, was having any knowledge that his act of driving the Hyva on public road, loaded with illegal sand, rashly and negligently, is sufficient to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause 3 Cr. R-4146 of 2022 death. Undoubtedly, such an act may fall within the category of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
9. Aforesaid aspect had been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648, wherein it was held as under:-
"39. Like Section 304A, Sections 279, 336, 337 and 338 IPC are attracted for only the negligent or rash act. The scheme of Sections 279, 304A, 336, 337 and 338 leaves no manner of doubt that these offences are punished because of the inherent danger of the acts specified therein irrespective of knowledge or intention to produce the result and irrespective of the result. These sections make punishable the acts themselves which are likely to cause death or injury to human life.
40. The question is whether indictment of an accused under Section 304 Part II and Section 338 IPC can co-exist in a case of single rash or negligent act. We think it can. We do not think that two charges are mutually destructive. If the act is done with the knowledge of the dangerous consequences which are likely to follow and if death is caused then not only that the punishment is for the act but also for the resulting homicide and a case may fall within Section 299 or Section 300 depending upon the mental state of the accused viz., as to whether the act was done with one kind of knowledge or the other or the intention. Knowledge is awareness on the part of the person concerned of the consequences of his act of omission or commission indicating his state of mind. There may be knowledge of likely consequences without any intention. Criminal culpability is determined by referring to what a person with reasonable prudence would have known.
41. Rash or negligent driving on a public road with the knowledge of the dangerous character and the likely effect of the act and resulting in death may fall in the category of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A person, doing an act of rash or negligent driving, if aware of a risk that a particular consequence is likely to result and that result occurs, may be held guilty not only of the act but also of the result. As a matter of law - in view of the provisions of the IPC - the cases which fall within last clause of Section 299 but not within clause `fourthly' of Section 300 may cover the cases of rash or negligent act done with the knowledge of the likelihood of its dangerous consequences and may entail punishment under Section 304 Part II IPC. Section 304A IPC takes out of its ambit the cases of death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act amounting to culpable homicide of either description.
42. A person, responsible for a reckless or rash or negligent act that causes death which he had knowledge as a reasonable man that such act was dangerous enough to lead to some untoward thing and the death was likely to be caused, may be attributed with the knowledge of the consequence and may be fastened with culpability of homicide not amounting to murder and punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC. There is no incongruity, if simultaneously with the offence under Section 304 Part II, a person who has done an act so rashly or negligently endangering human life or the personal safety of the others and causes grievous hurt to any person is tried for the offence under Section 338 IPC.
43. In view of the above, in our opinion there is no impediment in law for an offender being charged for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC and also under Sections 337 and 338 IPC. The two charges under Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 338 IPC can legally co-exist in a case of single rash or negligent act where a rash or negligent act is done with the knowledge of likelihood of its dangerous consequences.
4
Cr. R-4146 of 2022
***** ***** ***** *****
49. It is a fact that no charge under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 66(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 was framed against the appellant. It is also a fact that in the charge framed against the appellant under Section 304 Part II IPC, the words `drunken condition' are not stated and the charge reads; `on November 12, 2006 between 3.45 to 4.00 a.m. he was driving the car bearing Registration No. MH-01-R-580 rashly and negligently with knowledge that people are sleeping on footpath and likely to cause death of those persons rammed over the footpath and thereby caused death of 8 persons who were sleeping on footpath on Carter Road, Bandra (West), Mumbai and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC'. The question is whether the omission of the words, `in drunken condition' after the words `negligently' and before the words `with knowledge' has caused any prejudice to the appellant.
50. Section 464 of the Code reads as follows:
"S.464. - Effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or error in, charge.-
(1) No finding sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion of the court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
(2) If the court of appeal, confirmation or revision is of opinion that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned, it may-
(a) In the case of an omission to frame a charge, order that a charge be framed and that the trial be recommenced from the point immediately after the framing of the charge.
(b) In the case of an error, omission or irregularity in the charge, direct a new trial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner it thinks fit:
Provided that if the court is of opinion that the facts of the case are such that no valid charge could be preferred against the accused in respect of the facts proved, it shall quash the conviction."
10. Similarly in the case of Padman Singh Diwaan v. State of Chhattisgarh and Anr., 2024 Supreme (Chh) 442=CRR No. 1069 of 2023, a coordinate Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court at Bilaspur, has held as under:-
"15. In the case at hand, the applicant, driver of offending vehicle, is holding the post of Sub- Divisional Officer, Public Works Department, and as such, had the knowledge that if the vehicle is driven at an excessive high speed and in dangerous manner, that too in inebriated condition, it may cause fatal accident. It is seen from the statements of the witnesses, who were present on the spot, the offending Bolero vehicle was being driven at such high speed that it had first dashed backside of Activa two-wheeler of deceased and then collided with a tractor parked in front of tractor showroom, due to impact of accident, stationary tractor moved 8-10 feet ahead and dashed another vehicle. Thus, it is clear that applicant was driving the vehicle in drunken condition at utmost high speed, he could not able to come out of the vehicle for long time. The 5 Cr. R-4146 of 2022 condition, conduct and act of applicant shows that in spite of having knowledge being a prudent person that such reckless driving may cause death of any by-stander, himself or his fellow passengers as well as damage or loss to the amount of Rs.50/- or upwards. A prudent person will not drive a vehicle at a very high speed and in dangerous manner which he cannot control because a man of prudence has the knowledge that there is obvious chance of fatal accident if a vehicle is driven at very high speed and in dangerous manner, that too under the influence of liquor or drug.
16. In the cases of like nature, there cannot be any direct evidence of knowledge or intention of the offender. It can be only ascertained through circumstantial evidence. The test adopted by the Courts under such circumstances is the test of prudent person under the same facts and circumstances. A prudent person is someone who acts sensibly and takes proper precautions to protect themselves and others.
17. In case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles to be borne in mind for proper exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or 482 CrPC, as the case may be, particularly in the context of quashing of charge. The principles in Amit Kapoor's case (supra) were recently quoted with approval in case of Manendra Prasad Tiwari v. Amit Kumar Tiwari & another, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1057. One of the principles on which revisional jurisdiction can be exercised is that if the allegations are patently so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. Relevant principles culled out by Hon'ble Supreme Court in aforementioned decision read thus:-
"27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist."6
Cr. R-4146 of 2022
11. Even otherwise, this Court at the stage of charge, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is not required to go for mini trial as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr., (2019) 15 SCC 584, para 7 of which, reads thus:-
"7. We are of the view that the High Court could not have conducted a mini trial at the stage of framing of charge, and that too in revision filed against the order framing charges. We are of the view that it is impossible to state at this stage that no case could possibly be made out for ultimate conviction of Respondent No.2. This being the case, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial Court."
12. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal scenario, this Court does not deem fit to make any interference in the impugned order framing the charges against the petitioner.
13. Resultantly, the criminal revision fails and is hereby dismissed.
14. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(DWARKA DHISH BANSAL) JUDGE pb Digitally signed by PRASHANT BAGJILEWALE PRASHANT BAGJILEWALE DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH JABALPUR, 2.5.4.20=062bc13272373e2768c883468695ccafcb8f7bf9db7cbd37ad359bc82069bcdf, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH JABALPUR,CID - 7057681, postalCode=482001, st=Madhya Pradesh, serialNumber=a08ae25aceff18c7a0f94698e1bc6a3ccf1dc9654549200eb1bc8e5ddf6349b0, cn=PRASHANT BAGJILEWALE Date: 2026.05.02 15:52:14 +05'30'