Madras High Court
Ashok Leyland Limited vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 1 September, 2005
Equivalent citations: (2007)5VST175(MAD)
Author: K. Raviraja Pandian
Bench: K. Raviraja Pandian
ORDER K. Raviraja Pandian, J.
1. The writ petitions in W. P. Nos. 6802 to 6805 of 2004 are filed for the relief of issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for the records on the file of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the fourth respondent in T. A. Nos. 457 of 1997, 456 of 1997 and 353 of 1997 and 47 of 1998 all dated March 12, 1999 confirming the assessment orders of the third respondent in C. S. T. No. 1205/86-87 dated July 31,1992, C. S. T. No. 1205/86-87 dated September 16, 1992 (rectification order under Section 55), C. S. T. No. 1205/87-88 dated December 18, 1996 and C. S. T. No. 1205/88-89 dated December 12, 1997, respectively, and quash the same to the extent confirmatory of the orders of the third respondent in C. S. T. No. 1205/86-87 dated July 31, 1992, C. S. T. No. 1205/86-87 dated September 16, 1992 (rectification order under Section 55), C. S. T. No. 1205/87-88 dated December 18, 1996 and C. S. T. No. 1205/88-89 dated December 12, 1997.
2. In the alternative, it is prayed in W. P. Nos. 6802 to 6805 of 2004 for issuance of writ of mandamus to direct respondents Nos. 5 to 19 to transfer to the credit of the second and third respondents, the taxes paid by the petitioner herein on their sales to the respective State Transport Undertakings pursuant to the assessment for the years 1986-87, 1987-88 and 1988-89 in respect of respondents Nos. 6 to 13, 15 and 16, the assessment for the years 1987-88 and 1988-89 in respect of respondent No. 17, the assessment for the year 1986-87 in respect of respondent Nos. 14 and 18 and the assessment for the year 1987-88 in respect of respondent No. 19.
3. The writ petitions in W. P. Nos. 19223 to 19232 of 2004 are filed, for the relief of issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct respondents Nos. 18, 16, 14, 15, 10, 5, 11, 8, 13 and 6 to transfer to the credit of the second and third respondents herein against Central sales tax demands of the third respondent herein, the taxes paid by the petitioners herein on their sales of vehicles to the respective State Transport Undertakings during the period April 1, 1986 to March 31, 1989 being the vehicles manufactured in the factories of the petitioners in Tamil Nadu and moved into the respective regional sales office either from the factories in the State of Tamil Nadu or from other regional sales offices in respect of which the taxes have been assessed and realised by the authorities of the respondent Nos. 18, 16, 14, 15, 10, 5, 11, 8, 13 and 6, respectively, under the general sales tax law of the said State.
4. Inasmuch as the issue involved in these writ petitions, both on law and facts, is identical, the writ petition in W. P. Nos. 6802 of 2004 is taken up as typical case.
5. The petitioner twice went up to the Supreme Court in respect of the very same assessment years questioning the jurisdiction of the assessing officer to reopen assessment, which were originally concluded under Section 6-A after accepting form "F" and on facts also.
6. In the earlier round of litigation in the case of Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India reported in [1997] 105 STC 152, the two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court on law held that Section 6-A of the Central Act did not create a conclusive presumption and that an order accepting form "F", whether passed during the assessment or at any point earlier thereto, was ultimately part and parcel of the order of assessment. Its amenability to power of reopening and revision depends upon the provisions of the concerned State sales tax enactment by virtue of Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act. It was further held that it was not possible to agree that an order under Section 6-A(2) of the Central Act has an independent existence. So far as the power of reopening is concerned, it was held that if the order accepting form "F" was sought to be reopened, it could be done as part of reopening of assessment or, may be, independently depending upon the language of the relevant provision in the local sales tax enactment. From the language of Section 16 of the Tamil Nadu Act, it was held that it was possible to reopen an order accepting form "F" as true without, at the same time, reopening the assessment. It was further held that if the reopening was confined to the order accepting form "F" as true, the inquiry shall be confined to the matters relevant thereto. The Supreme Court further directed the Tamil Nadu assessing authorities to first decide the matter before them. Thereafter, if the orders were against the assessees, they were permitted to file an appeal directly before the Tribunal. If the Tribunal decided against the assessee by holding that the sale of vehicles to the State Road Transport Undertakings of various States were inter-State sale and it was found that those very transactions have also been taxed as intra-State sales under the State sales tax enactment of other States, that would be the stage for considering the advisability of giving appropriate direction if by that time no Central mechanism to meet such situation comes into existence.
7. As per the direction of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India [1997] 105 STC 152, the order passed by the Tribunal on facts has been carried on to the Supreme Court for the second time. The three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in [2004] 134 STC 473 reversed the finding of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India [1997] 105 STC 152, by holding that the order of the assessing authority under Section 6-A of the Central Act is conclusive for all practical purposes. It could only be reopened on a small set of grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, etc. The proof required to be furnished in form "¥" is as to whether the goods were factually transferred to the assessee himself or his branch office or his agent and not to any third party. Any other enquiry is beyond the realm of the assessing officer, however it directed the petitioner to move before this Court for suitable order, in the sense, to question the correctness of the order of the assessing officer/Tribunal in the light of the law declared in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473 (SC). Thus, these petitions are now before this Court.
8. The facts as culled out from the pleadings are as follows:
The petitioner is a company engaged in the manufacture of automobiles, chassis, oil engines and spares thereof at their factory situated at Ennore and Hosur (Tamil Nadu), Bhandara (Maharashtra) and Alwar (Rajasthan), and they, inter alia, registered under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter called for the sake of brevity as "the State Act") as also the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Central Act"). The petitioners have several regional sales offices (in short, "RSO") throughout the country, wherewith the regional sales offices are attached for the purpose of receiving, warehousing and selling the vehicles produced by the petitioner. In this case, the dispute relates to the sale of the chassis to other States' State Transport Undertakings (in short, "STUs") only.
9. It is the case of the petitioner that they transferred goods vehicle and chassis to their different RSOs for marketing the products which in turn are registered under the sales tax laws governing the State in question. The stock of vehicles were transferred to the RSOs under the cover of stock transfer invoices, excise gate pass, and entrusted to the transport contractors for movement and delivery thereof whereupon transfer of such vehicles' local sales tax were collected and paid by the different regional sales offices. The petitioner upon transfer of such stocks of vehicles filled up form "F" in terms of Section 6-A of the Central Act and filed the original before the assessing authority of the State of Tamil Nadu for the assessment year 1986-87. During November, 1990, the assessing authority completed the assessment under the Central Act by accepting the claim of the petitioner that the goods were transferred to the RSOs by way of stock transfer and not by way of sale to other States by accepting form "F" filed by the petitioner. Likewise, for the assessment year 1987-88, on August 28, 1991, by accepting form "F" passed an order treating the transfer of vehicles as branch transfer.
10. Despite such assessment orders having been passed as stated above, the assessing authorities have issued a show cause notice as to why the assessment orders for the assessment years 1986-87 and 1987-88 could not be revised and the stock of vehicles transferred to the regional sales offices so far as the sale relates to the State Transport Undertakings were concerned, should not be taxed as inter-State sales taxable in Tamil Nadu. The petitioner filed objection, inter alia, questioning the jurisdiction of the assessing authority to reopen the assessment on the ground that the issues stood determined in terms of Section 6-A of the Central Act relying or on the basis of the declarations made by the petitioners in terms of form F. However, the revisional proceedings was proceeded with and completed under Section 16 of the State Act read with Section 9(2) of the Central Act. Consequent to the said order the sales by the RSOs in relation to the deliveries made to the State Transport Undertakings of other States were treated as inter-State sale and tax levied. Penalty for non-disclosure of the turnover as taxable sales in terms of Section 16(2) of the State Act was also imposed. Similar show cause notices were issued for other assessment years also.
11. The petitioner filed writ petition contending, inter alia, that having regard to the provisions contained in Section 6-A of the Central Act and the further fact that the petitioner has paid tax to other States in respect of the very same transaction, the reassessment orders were illegal. The other States where the local sales tax has been paid by the petitioner were impleaded as parties therein. This Court by its judgment dated June 13, 1996 in Venkatagiri Spinning Mills P. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in [1996] 103 STC 57 (Mad), upheld the jurisdiction of the Tamil Nadu assessing authorities to reopen the completed assessment despite acceptance of the declaration in form "F" and thus dismissed the writ petition. Thereupon the matter was carried to the Supreme Court as stated above in the petitioner's own case reported in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India [1997] 105 STC 152. The Supreme Court also upheld the jurisdiction of the Tamil Nadu authorities under Section 16 of the State Act to revise the completed assessment by accepting the form "F". As stated in the preamble, certain directions were also given to the petitioner to approach the Tribunal directly in order to cut-short the time-limit in passing the assessment order. As such, the appeals were filed before the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal upheld the order of revisional assessment on facts.
12. Again the petitioner as against the order of the Tribunal moved the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473. As stated earlier, the Supreme Court held that the order of an assessing authority under Section 6-A of the Central Act is conclusive for all practical purposes, however, carving out certain situations such as fraud, misrepresentation, etc., as exception to such conclusiveness. The Supreme Court further observed that the petitioner would be entitled to move this Court for ventilating their grievances. As such, the present writ petition is filed before this Court.
13. Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, strenuously contended that both the assessing authority as well as the Tribunal, which confirmed the reassessment orders, did not deal with form "F" declaration, which has been originally inquired into and accepted as true. The exercise of jurisdiction by the assessing authority, which has been confirmed by the Tribunal without a decision on the preliminary jurisdictional fact of the form "F" declaration, vitiates the entire proceedings. The correction pointed out in the form "F" declaration to deny the claim of the assessee is made only at the instance of the assessing authority for the reason that the original form "F" declaration related to number of vehicles transferred each month to different RSOs, whereas in assessments prior to and up to 1987-88 form "F" declarations were furnished by the RSOs on the basis of the number of vehicles received into the RSOs. So, the corrections were made as directed by the assessing authorities. To explain the same, a compilation, which has been marked as R-9 has been filed before the Tribunal. That aspect of the matter has been lost sight of and has not been dealt with by the Tribunal. He further submitted that in the matter of declaration in form "F" originally presented came to be inquired into and accepted as the corrections set out therein were made with the direction of the assessing authority. The reason of the assessing authority for revision of assessment was that incriminating documents were recovered from the place of business of the petitioner, which clinches the issue, particularly, the direction issued by the petitioner to destroy the documents connected with so called pre-determined sale, is totally incorrect. In the course of business, several instructions would have been issued to the RSOs and other subordinate offices by the Head Office for maintaining files and paper discipline and such instructions cannot be conclusive or cannot be put against the petitioner. Such directions are internal matters to increase the sale and part of sale strategy as there is competition in the field from other leading manufacturers. That cannot conclude the issue. Likewise, the tour programme of the petitioner's officer to Pondicherry would also cannot be regarded as a conclusive proof. The tour programme and other material with which reliance has been placed by the respondents for reopening the assessment and to treat those transactions as inter-State sale are totally extraneous to the issue as found by the Supreme Court, particularly as to the nature of inquiry which the assessing officer has to be made after filing the form "¥" declaration. Learned Senior Counsel also filed page-war submission, which has been placed before the assessing officer as well as the Tribunal by the petitioner and concluded that the non-consideration of those documents and consideration of which, not in consonance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473, vitiates the entire proceedings.
14. On the other hand, Mr. Muthukumaraswamy, learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the respondent-authorities, argued with equal vehemence and with much clarity by filing counter-affidavit sustaining the reassessment. He contended that the question raised in this writ petition is primarily a question of fact and the revising authority as well as the Tribunal, the final fact-finding authority, recorded its categorical finding against the assessee. The correctness of which cannot be gone into by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further contended that the documents recovered from the place of business of the petitioner clearly indicate that the RSOs are only acting as a conduit, that the other State STUs have directly placed orders on the petitioner. Hence, the movement of goods from Tamil Nadu to other RSO is only an inter-State sale coming within the sweep of Section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act.
15. The Additional Advocate-General has pointed out that one of the documents dated December 31, 1990 and the averment contained in the affidavit filed by the Assistant Manager, Sales Tax, of the petitioner-company dated July 14, 1992 before the assessing authority and contended that this document clinches the issue and proved that the sales were only an inter-State, sale rather a pre-determined sale to the RSO at Maharashtra. Hence, all the sales by the petitioner to the other RSOs could very well be presumed to be inter-State sale. Both the revisional authority as well as the Tribunal in an elaborate and a very lengthy order have considered each and every transaction of the petitioner and came to the conclusion that the transactions were inter-State transactions and Central sales tax could be leviable by the State of Tamil Nadu only as the movement was occasioned by pre-determined sale and as such he further contended that the submission made by the petitioner has to be eschewed and the revisional order of the authorities in respect of assessment years and confirmed by the Tribunal has to be confirmed as there is no illegality in those orders.
16. In order to resolve the issue, I am of the considered view that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473, has to be looked into in the way the Supreme Court has interpreted the relevant provision of Section 6-A of the CST Act.
17. Having regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Central Sales Tax Act vis-a-vis the recommendations made by the Law Commission, the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473 has held in paragraph Nos. 34 and 35 as follows:
34. The liability to tax on inter-State sale as contained in Section 6 is expressly made subject to the other provisions contained in the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 9, on the other hand, which is a procedural provision starts with the words 'subject to the other provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder'. Section 6-A provides for exception as regard the burden of proof in the event a claim is made that transfer of goods had taken place otherwise than by way of sale. Indisputably, the burden would be on the dealer to show that the movement of goods had occasioned not by reason of any transaction involving sale of goods but by reason of transfer of such goods to any other place of his business or to his agent or principal, as the case may be. For the purpose of discharge of such burden of proof, the dealer is required to furnish to the assessing authority within the prescribed time a declaration duly filled and signed by the principal officer of the other place of business or his agent or principal. Such declaration would contain the prescribed particulars in the prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority. Along with such declaration, the dealer is required to furnish the evidence of such dispatch of goods by reason of Act 20 of 2002. In the event, if it fails to furnish such declaration, by reason of legal fiction, such movement of goods would be deemed for all purposes of the said Act to have occasioned as a result of sale. Such declaration indisputably is to be filed in form F. The said form is to be filled in triplicate. The prescribed authority of the transferee-State supplies the said form. The original of the said form is to be filed with the transferor-State and the duplicate thereof is to be filed before the authorities of the transferee-State whereas the counterfoil is to be preserved by the person where the agent or principal of the place of business of the company is situated.
35. When the dealer furnishes the original of form F to its assessing authority, an enquiry is required to be held. Such enquiry is held by the assessing authority himself. He may pass an order on such declaration before the assessment or along with the assessment. Once an order in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 6-A of the Central Act is passed, the transactions involved therein would go out of the purview of the Central Act. In other words, in relation to such transactions, a finding is arrived at that they are not subjected to the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act. It is not in dispute thereunder no appeal is provided thereagainst.
18. In paragraph No. 37 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has stated that on an analysis of Section 6-A(2) of the CST Act, the following propositions of law emerge:
(i) The initial burden of proof is on the dealer to show that the movement was occasioned by reason of transfer of such goods which is otherwise than by reason of sale. The assessee may file a declaration. On a declaration so filed an inquiry is to be made by the assessing authority for the purpose of passing an order on arriving at a satisfaction that movement of goods was occasioned otherwise than as a result of sale.
(ii) Whenever such an order is passed, a legal fiction is created. Legal fiction, as is well-known, must be given its full effect.
19. Thereafter, the Supreme Court after referring to the finding of the two-Judge judgment of the Ashok Leyland's case [1997] 105 STC 152 (SC) to the effect that "section 6-A does not create a conclusive presumption and that an order accepting form F, whether passed during the assessment or at any point earlier thereto, is ultimately a part and parcel of the order of assessment. Its amenability to power of reopening and revision depends upon the provisions of the State sales tax enactment concerned by virtue of Section 9(2)", ultimately held that the aforesaid view was not correct.
20. After referring the various other judgments, both English and Indian Law on that subject, to name a few, such as State of Madras v. Radio and Electricals Ltd. [1966] 18 STC 222 (SC); [1966] Supp SCR 198, Balabhagas Hulaschand v. State of Orissa , which has been referred to in the two-Judge judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India [1997] 105 STC 152 (SC) and after approving the judgment in C. P. K. Trading Company v. Additional Sales Tax Officer, III Circle, Mattencherry [1990] 76 STC 211 (Ker), the apex court has finally given a finding to the effect that the order of an authority under Section 6-A is conclusive for all practical purposes.
21. Again, in paragraph No. 61, while considering Section 6-A of the Central Act, and analysing the same, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
In the case at hand it has to be determined whether the sale in question is an inter-State one. If through the means of a legal fiction it is determined that this is not an inter-State sale, then it amounts to a transfer of stock. This finding is made by a statutory authority who has the jurisdiction to do so and there is no provision for appeal. Therefore, the order made by such authority is conclusive in that it cannot be reopened on the basis that there had been a mere error of judgment. It also cannot be reopened under another statute, for examples, the Sales Tax Act of the State concerned, when the order had been made under the Central Act. Section 9(2) of the Act is subject to the other provisions of the Act which would include subsection (2) of Section 6-A of the Act. 'Subject to' is an expression whereby limitation is expressed. The order is conclusive for all purposes. It can only be reopened on a small set of grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, etc.
22. The Supreme Court further held that there is no presumption when movement of goods has taken place in the course of inter-State sales in the case of standard goods but the same is not conclusive. It is only one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration along with others. In a case, however, where the purchaser places order on the manufacturer for manufacturing goods which would be as per this specifications, a presumption that agreement to sell has been entered into may be raised. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court further held that the situs of sale cannot conclude the issue by referring to 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra which placed reliance on Bengal Immunity Company Ltd.'s case .
23. The Supreme Court in paragraph No. 67 of the judgment has held thus:
It has not been disputed before us that all the requisite particulars are to be stated in form F. Once a determination is made that such statements are correct, the curtain is drawn keeping in view the expression 'thereupon'. The said word is of great significance and must be given its full effect.
24 In paragraph No. 80 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court further held thus:
... An order passed by the statutory authority who has jurisdiction therefor, the same would amount to a part of substantive and not procedural law. In addition to this, there is no provision for appeal. Thus, it is only in the limited cases of fraud, misrepresentation, etc., that reassessment can be directed and not if there had been a mere error of judgment.
25. Then, the crucial issue as to the nature of enquiry by the statutory authority has been stated in paragraph No. 83 to the following effect:
The particulars required to be furnished in form F clearly manifest that the proof required is as to whether the goods were factually transferred to the assessee himself or his branch office or his agent and not to any third party. Any other enquiry is beyond the realm of the assessing authority.
26. The purpose of verification of the declaration has been dealt with by the Supreme Court at paragraph No. 91 to the following effect.
The purpose of verification of the declaration made in form F, therefore, is as to whether the branch office acted merely as a conduit or the transaction took place independent to the agreement to sell entered into by and between the buyer and the registered office or the office of the company situated outside the State.
27. There again the Supreme Court held that the observation made by the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. Union of India [1997] 105 STC 152 to the effect that an order passed under Sub-section (2) of Section 6-A can be the subject-matter of reopening of a proceeding under Section 16 of the State Act was not correct. While concluding so, the Supreme Court has added that the conclusion would not mean that even wherein such an order has been obtained by commission of fraud, collusion, misrepresentation or suppression of material facts or giving or furnishing false particulars, the order being vitiated in law would not come within the purview of the aforementioned principle. Discovery of a new material although may be a ground but that itself may not be a ground for reopening the proceedings unless and until it is found that by reason of such discovery, a jurisdictional error has been committed. In other words, when an order passed in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 6-A is found to be illegal or void ab initio or otherwise voidable, the assessing authority derives jurisdiction to direct reopening of the proceedings and not otherwise. From paragraph No. 95 onwards of the judgment, the fraud, collusion, misrepresentation and concealment of facts has been dealt with.
28. From a reading of the abovesaid paragraphs of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473, the following could be deducible:
The assessing officer should ensure while making the assessment that the form F declaration obtained from other States is valid and genuine; whether the particulars contained in form 'F' declaration are true and correct or not; whether the branch office/agent or principal has the facility to carry on business activity in other States; whether the goods sent to the branch office/agent or principal has reached the branch or agent or principal and not to the customer directly; and whether the assessee has sales tax registration in other States and taxes which are due have been paid for the sales effected from the branch offices/agent. In order to satisfy that, the assessing authority can verify whether the proper accounts and records are maintained showing details of receipt and disposals of the goods; whether the particulars furnished in form 'F' prove as to whether the goods were factually transferred to the assessee himself or his branch office or his agent and not to any third party. Any other enquiry is beyond the realm of the assessing authority. Once the assessing authority found that the form 'F' is true and correct and passed an assessment order, then the curtain is drawn and conclusive presumption operates. The exceptions for reopening the assessment are that there must be a jurisdictional error committed by the assessing officer, that the assessment has been obtained with fraud, collusion or misrepresentation. Any discovery of new materials after the due acceptance and completion of assessment is not a ground for reopening the proceedings, unless a jurisdictional error is committed. The supression, misrepresentation or fraud should relate to the particulars furnished and incorporated in the form '¥' declaration. A non-disclosure of fact, which is not required by law to be disclosed does not amount to misrepresentation. The non-disclosure of fact not required by statute to be disclosed may not amount to fraud.
29. By keeping in mind the abovesaid principles, the orders impugned are tested, I am of the view that the authorities deviated from the guiding principles. On an entire reading of the assessment order and the order of the Tribunal confirming the assessment, it is clear that the authorities have not exercised the jurisdiction and conducted enquiry as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the. abovesaid judgment, the essence of which has been extracted above. But certain facts, which are otherwise clinching the issue, have been unearthed by the assessing authorities (referred to at para No. 127 of the Tribunal order), which cannot be lost sight of by this Court. Hence, I am of the considered view that the claim of the Revenue cannot be brushed aside in total by following the judgment of the Supreme Court as contended by the counsel for the assessee. The assessing officer has to be given another opportunity to re-do the exercise as per the exposition of law on this subject by the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473. Furthermore, the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473 was not available when the exercise has been done, i.e., the reassessment and the issuance of notices in respect of the assessment for the assessment years 1986-87 and 1987-88 and the further proceedings of taking up the matter up to the Tribunal. In order to safeguard the interest of the Revenue and balance the hardship stated to be caused to the assessees, I am of the view that the matter has to be remitted back to the assessing authorities to re-do the exercise after giving due opportunity to the petitioner.
30. Hence, the impugned orders of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the fourth respondent herein in the preamble, i.e., in T.A. Nos. 457, 456 and 353 of 1997 and 47 of 1998 all dated March 12, 1.999 confirming the assessment orders of the third respondent in C.S.T. No. 1205 of 1986-87 dated July 31, 1992, C.S.T. No. 1205 of 1986-87 dated September 16, 1992 (rectification order under Section 55), C.S.T. No. 1205 of 1987-88 dated December 18, 1996 and C.S.T. No. 1205 of 1988-89 dated December 12, 1997 are hereby set aside and the matters are remitted back to the assessing authorities to consider the issue afresh as per the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [2004] 134 STC 473. As already stated, nearly two decades have passed and the petitioner has approached the Supreme Court more than once, the assessing officer is hereby directed to re-do the assessment as expeditiously as possible by giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, so as to avoid any unnecessary further litigation. The petitioner is also directed to co-operate with the assessing officer to conclude the issue as expeditiously as possible.
31. As the issue is still alive on remittal before the assessing officer and the relief of certiorari has been granted, there is no need to consider the alternative relief sought for by way of mandamus in the above writ petitions. All the writ petitions filed seeking the relief of mandamus have thus been dismissed as not arising for consideration in the above-stated factual situation of the case.
32. Accordingly, the writ petitions are disposed of. No costs. Consequently, the connected W.P.M.Ps. and W.V.M. Ps are closed.