Karnataka High Court
Sri Anil Amencherla vs The State Of Karnataka By Its Principal ... on 13 August, 2013
Author: Ashok B.Hinchigeri
Bench: Ashok B. Hinchigeri
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2013
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK B. HINCHIGERI
WRIT PETITION No.2290/2008 (LA-KIADB)
C/W WRIT PETITION Nos.2287/2008, 2288/2008,
2289/2008, 2604/2008, 2605/2008, 2606/2008,
2607/2008, 2608/2008, 8261/2008, 8920/2008,
6460/2008, 1167//2008 and 12141/2008
WP No.2290/2008:
BETWEEN:
Sri Anil Amencherla,
Aged about 44 years,
S/o A.V.B.Prasad,
R/at No.2, 1st Cross,
MICO Layout, Bangalore - 560 076.
Represented by his
General Power of Attorney
Mr.Palani Raju. ...Petitioner
(By Sri S.K.V.Chalapathy, Senior Counsel for
Sri R.Swaroop Anand, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Principal Secretary,
Commerce and Industries Department,
M.S.Buildings, Bangalore - 560 001.
2. The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
14/3, II Floor,
Rashrothana Parishat Building,
2
Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore - 560 001.
Rep. by its Executive Member.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
Zonal Office, Plot No.488/B,
14th Cross, KIADB Complex
III Block, IV Phase, Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore - 560 038. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri Basavaraj V.Sabarad, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the notification dated
13.10.2006 issued by R1 under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act,
1966 published in the official Gazette on 13.10.2006 vide
Annexure-A and etc.
WP No.2287/2008:
BETWEEN:
Sri R.Palani Raju,
S/o Sri S.Ramasudhkar,
Aged about 40 years,
R/at No.55, 47th Cross,
8th Block, Jayanagar,
Bangalore - 560 087. ...Petitioner
(By Sri S.K.V.Chalapathy, Senior Counsel for
Sri R.Swaroop Anand, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Principal Secretary,
Commerce and Industries Department,
M.S.Building, Bangalore - 560 001.
3
2. The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
14/3, II Floor,
Rashrothana Parishat Building,
Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore - 560 001.
Rep. by its Executive Member.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
Zonal Office, Plot No.488/B,
14th Cross, KIADB Complex
III Block, IV Phase,
Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore - 560 038. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri Basavaraj V.Sabarad, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the notification dated
13.10.2006 issued by R1 under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act,
1966 (published in the official Gazette on 13.10.2006) that is
Annexure -A in so far as petitioner is concerned and etc.
WP No.2288/2008:
BETWEEN:
Sri J.Shashidhar,
Aged about 39 years,
S/o Late Junja Reddy,
R/at Yaradahalli,
Jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk,
Bangalore District.
Represented by his
General Power of Attorney,
Mr.Palani Raju. ...Petitioner
(By Sri S.K.V.Chalapathy, Senior Counsel for
Sri R.Swaroop Anand, Advocate)
4
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Principal Secretary,
Commerce and Industries Department,
M.S.Building, Bangalore - 560 001.
2. The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
14/3, II Floor,
Rashrothana Parishat Building,
Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore - 560 001.
Rep. by its Executive Member.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
Zonal Office, Plot No.488/B,
14th Cross, KIADB Complex
III Block, IV Phase,
Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore - 560 038. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri Basavaraj V.Sabarad, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the notification dated
13.10.2006 issued by R1 under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act,
1966 published in the official Gazette on 13.10.2006) vide
Annexure-A and etc.
WP No.2289/2008:
BETWEEN:
Sri Raghu Chaitanya Nayak,
Aged about 27 years,
S/o Yashodhara G Nayak,
R/at No.252, 7th Cross,
5
4th Main, Gokulam 3rd stage,
Mysore.
Represented by his
General Power of Attorney,
Mr.Palani Raju. ...Petitioner
(By Sri S.K.V.Chalapathy, Senior Counsel for
Sri R.Swaroop Anand, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Principal Secretary,
Commerce and Industries Department,
M.S.Building, Bangalore - 560 001.
2. The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
14/3, II Floor,
Rashrothana Parishat Building,
Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore - 560 001.
Rep. by its Executive Member.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
Zonal Office, Plot No.488/B,
14th Cross, KIADB Complex
III Block, IV Phase,
Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore - 560 038. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri Basavaraj V.Sabarad, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the notification dated
13.10.2006 issued by R1 under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act,
1966 (published in the official Gazette on 13.10.2006) i.e
Annexure-A and etc.
6
WP No.2604/2008 :
BETWEEN:
Sri H.T.Srinivas,
S/o Late Thyagaraju,
Major,
R/at Hosa Anandur Village,
Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna Taluk,
Mandya District.
Represented by his GPA Holder,
Mr.Palani Raju,
Aged about 40 years. ...Petitioner
(By Sri S.K.V.Chalapathy, Senior Counsel for
Sri R.Swaroop Anand, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Principal Secretary,
Commerce and Industries Department,
M.S.Building, Bangalore - 560 001.
2. The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
14/3, II Floor,
Rashrothana Parishat Building,
Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore - 560 001.
Rep. by its Executive Member.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
Zonal Office, Plot No.488/B,
14th Cross, KIADB Complex
III Block, IV Phase,
Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore - 560 038. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri Basavaraj V.Sabarad, Advocate for R2 and R3)
7
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the notification dated
13.10.2006 issued by R1 under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act,
1966 published in the official Gazette on 13.10.2006 vide
Annexure-A and etc.
WP No.2605/2008 :
BETWEEN:
Sri Jayaramu,
S/o Late Papiah,
R/at Hosa Anandur Village,
Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna Taluk,
Mandya District.
Represented by his GPA Holder,
Mr.Palani Raju. ...Petitioner
(By Sri S.K.V.Chalapathy, Senior Counsel for
Sri R.Swaroop Anand, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Principal Secretary,
Commerce and Industries Department,
M.S.Building, Bangalore - 560 001.
2. The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
14/3, II Floor,
Rashrothana Parishat Building,
Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore - 560 001.
Rep. by its Executive Member.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
Zonal Office, Plot No.488/B,
14th Cross, KIADB Complex
8
III Block, IV Phase,
Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore - 560 038. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri Basavaraj V.Sabarad, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the notification dated
13.10.2006 issued by R1 under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act,
1966 published in the official Gazette on 13.10.2006 vide
Annexure-A and etc.
WP No.2606/2008:
BETWEEN:
Sri Veerabhadraiah,
S/o Late Papaiah,
Major,
R/at Hosa Anandur Village,
Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna Taluk,
Mandya District.
Represented by his GPA Holder,
Mr.Palani Raju,
Aged about 40 years. ...Petitioner
(By Sri S.K.V.Chalapathy, Senior Counsel for
Sri R.Swaroop Anand, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Principal Secretary,
Commerce and Industries Department,
M.S.Building, Bangalore - 560 001.
2. The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
14/3, II Floor,
Rashrothana Parishat Building,
Nrupathunga Road,
9
Bangalore - 560 001.
Rep. by its Executive Member.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
Zonal Office, Plot No.488/B,
14th Cross, KIADB Complex
III Block, IV Phase,
Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore - 560 038. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri Basavaraj V.Sabarad, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the notification dated
13.10.2006 issued by R1 under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act,
1966 published in the official Gazette on 13.10.2006 vide
Annexure-A and etc.
WP No.2607/2008:
BETWEEN:
Smt.C.Radha,
W/o Puttegowda,
Aged about 40 years,
R/at Belagola Village,
Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna Taluk,
Mandya District.
Represented by his GPA Holder,
Mr.Palani Raju. ...Petitioner
(By Sri S.K.V.Chalapathy, Senior Counsel for
Sri R.Swaroop Anand, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Principal Secretary,
Commerce and Industries Department,
M.S.Building, Bangalore - 560 001.
10
2. The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
14/3, II Floor,
Rashrothana Parishat Building,
Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore - 560 001.
Rep. by its Executive Member.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
Zonal Office, Plot No.488/B,
14th Cross, KIADB Complex
III Block, IV Phase,
Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore - 560 038. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri Basavaraj V.Sabarad, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the notification dated
13.10.2006 issued by R1 under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act,
1966 published in the official Gazette on 13.10.2006 vide
Annexure-A and etc.
WP No.2608/2008:
BETWEEN:
Sri H.V.Basavaraju,
S/o Sri Veerabadriah,
R/at Hosa Anandur Village,
Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna Taluk,
Mandya District.
Represented by his GPA Holder,
Mr.Palani Raju. ...Petitioner
(By Sri S.K.V.Chalapathy, Senior Counsel for
Sri R.Swaroop Anand, Advocate)
11
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Principal Secretary,
Commerce and Industries Department,
M.S.Building, Bangalore - 560 001.
2. The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
14/3, II Floor,
Rashrothana Parishat Building,
Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore - 560 001.
Rep. by its Executive Member.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Area
Development Board,
Zonal Office, Plot No.488/B,
14th Cross, KIADB Complex
III Block, IV Phase,
Peenya Industrial Area
Bangalore - 560 038. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri Basavaraj V.Sabarad, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the notification dated
13.10.2006 issued by R1 under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act,
1966 published in the official Gazette on 13.10.2006 vide
Annexure-A and etc.
WP No.8261/2008:
BETWEEN:
1. Boraiah
S/o Kalaiah,
Aged about 57 years.
12
2. Baragaiah,
S/o Kalaiah,
Aged about 55 years.
3. Nargaraju,
S/o Kalaiah,
Aged about 40 years.
4. Shivanna,
S/o Baragaiah
Aged about 73 years.
All are R/at Basthipura Village,
Belagola Post and Hobli,
S.R.Patna Taluk,
Mandya District. ...Petitioners
(By Sri V.Srinivas, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By it's Secretary,
Industries and Commerce,
M.S.Building, Bangalore.
2. The Karnataka Industrial Development Board,
Represented by it's Managing Director,
Race Course Road,
Bangalore.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Development Board,
Zonal Office, Bangalore. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri V.Y.Kumar, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the preliminary
notification dated 3rd October 2007 vide notification vide
Annexure-H to the writ petition and etc.
13
WP No.8920/2008:
BETWEEN:
1. B.C.Ravi
S/o B.Cheluvaiah,,
Aged about 37 years.
2. Kalaiah,
S/o Boraiah,
Aged about 40 years.
3. Halaiah,
S/o Boraiah,
Aged about 42 years.
All are R/at Basthipura Village,
Belagola Post and Hobli,
S.R.Patna Taluk,
Mandya District. ...Petitioners
(By Sri V.Srinivas, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Secretary,
Industries and Commerce,
M.S.Building, Bangalore.
2. The Karnataka Industrial Development Board,
Represented by its Managing Director,
14/3, 2nd Floor, Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore.
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board,
Zonal Office, Metgalli,
Mysore - 16. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri V.Y.Kumar, Advocate for R2 and R3)
14
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the preliminary
notification dated 3.10.2007 vide notification vide Annexure-J to
the writ petition with respect of the land bearing sy.No.1/1,1/2,
58/2, and 1/3 i.e., Sl.No.1,2,3 and 18 in the notification and etc.
WP No.6460/2008:
BETWEEN:
1. Sri Veerabhadraiah,
S/o Papaiah,
Aged about 44 years.
2. Sri Jayaramu,
S/o Papaiah,
Aged about 45 years.
3. Sri H.V.Basavaraju,
S/o Veerabhadraiah,
Aged about 28 years.
4. Sri H.T.Srinivasu,
S/o Thyagaraju,
Aged about 23 years.
5. Smt.N.S.Shyamala,
W/o Sri Thyagaraju,
Aged about 40 years.
All are R/o Sanandur Village,
Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna Taluk,
Mandya District. ...Petitioners
(By Sri K.V.Narasimhan, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Secretary,
Department of Commerce and Industries,
Vidhana Soudha, Bangalore- 560 001.
15
2. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board,
Zonal Office, K.R.S.Road, Metagalli,
Mysore. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri V.Y.Kumar, Advocate for R2)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the notifications at
Annexure-A, A1 and A2 dated 13.10.2006 and Annexure-D,
dated 3.10.2007 issued by the respondents under the provisions
of KIADB Act, and all further proceedings pursuant to the said
notifications and etc.
WP No.1167/2008:
BETWEEN:
Sri Venkatesh Gowda,
S/o Gaadi Dase Gowda,
Aged about 65 years,
R/o Belagola Village,
Srirangapattana Taluk,
Mandya District. ...Petitioner
(By Sri V.Sanjay Krishna, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
Represented by its Secretary,
(Industrial Development),
Department of Industries and Commerce,
Vikas Soudha, Dr.Ambedkar Road,
Bangalore - 01.
2. Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Development Board (KIADB),
KRS Road, Metagalli Industrial Area,
Near Vikranth Tyres,
Mysore - 570 016.
16
3. The Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board,
Represented by the Chief Executive Officer,
No.14/3, 1st Floor,
Rashtrothan Parishad Building,
Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri V.Y.Kumar, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash declaration under Section
3(1) and preliminary notification under Section 28(1) of KIAD
Act, dated 12.10.2006 vide Annexure-F in so far as it relates to
sy.No.29/4 and in Sy.Nos.39/1, 39/4, 41/2 and 43 of Pura and
Anagalli Villages, Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna taluk, Mandya
District and etc.
WP No.12141/2008:
BETWEEN:
B.M.Krishna
S/o Late Marieregowda,
Aged about 45 years,
KRS Main Road,
Belagola Village and Post,
S.R.Patna Taluk, Mandya District. ...Petitioner
(By Sri V.Srinivas, Advocate)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,
By its Secretary,
Industries and Commerce,
M.S.Building, Bangalore.
2. The Karnataka Industrial Development Board,
Represented by it's Managing Director,
14/3, 2nd Floor, Nrupathunga Road,
Bangalore.
17
3. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board,
Zonal Office, Metgalli Industrial Area,
Mysore - 16. ... Respondents
(By Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, AGA for R1;
Sri V.Y.Kumar, Advocate for R2 and R3)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India praying to quash the final notification under
Section 28(4) of the KIADB Act, dated 3rd October 2007 vide
notification No.CI 375, SPQ:2007:Bangalore vide Annexure-D to
the writ petition with respect to land bearing sy.No.1199/P2 in
the notification and etc.
These writ petitions coming on for hearing, this day, the
Court made the following:
ORDER
The petitioners have raised the challenge to the preliminary notification, dated 13.10.2006 and the final notification, dated 3.10.2007 issued under Section 28(1) and (4) respectively of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 ('KIAD Act' for short). The acquisition of the lands is for the purpose of industrial development.
2. Sri S.K.V.Chalapathy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri R.Swaroop Anand for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.2290/2008, 2287/2008, 2288/2008, 2289/2008, 2604/2008, 2605/2008, 2606/2008, 2607/2008 and 2608/2008 submits that there has been no formation of the opinion by the 18 State Government preceding the issuance of the preliminary notification. He submits that the Government has not examined the extent of the land required and the suitability of the land for the industrial development. The land requirements are not audited at all. In support of his submissions, he relied on this Court's decision in the case of PARAMASHIVAIAH AND OTHERS v. SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND OTHERS reported in ILR 2012 KAR 6119.
3. He brings to my notice the map (Annexure-G) issued by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board ('KIADB' for short), Special Land Acquisition Officer ('SLAO' for short), which shows that 178 acres 22 guntas of lands in Belagola Village are deleted from the acquisition proceedings.
4. The learned Senior Counsel complains of the hostile discrimination both in the matter of including the lands in the acquisition proceedings and deleting them from the acquisition proceedings. He submits that the casualness and arbitrariness are to be marked about the conduct of the authorities in the acquisition cases on hand. He brings to my notice that the land belonging to 19 Emerald Enclaves lying in between the industrial areas of KIADB is left untouched. He submits that nearly 42 acres belonging to Emerald Enclaves was notified for acquisition on 15.8.2000. However, in the final notification, dated 15.6.2005, the said lands are excluded. In support of his submission, he read out paragraph No.4 of the affidavit filed on behalf of the KIADB. The same is extracted hereinbelow:
"4. I submit that the Government vide notifications No.CI 154 SPQ 2000 dt.15.08.2000 had notified lands in Sy.Nos.17, 18, 19, 108, 105, 111, 12, 104 and 106 of Anagalli Village with total extent of these Sy.numbers coming to 42.07 acres u/Sections 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the KIAD Act. However in the final notification issued on 15.06.2005 these Sy.Nos. are not included. Copies of notifications are produced as Annexures R5A -preliminary and R5B - final respectively."
5. The learned Senior Counsel submits that as the 28(3) order is passed without considering the objections raised by the petitioners, it is not sustainable. Consequently, the final notification issued pursuant to and based on 28(3) order also becomes unsupportable. He submits that the petitioners have raised the objections that the lands are agricultural lands, the poultry farm is established on them, etc. Some of the petitioners propose to start their industries on the lands. The objection that 20 the acquisition of lands in question is going to affect their source of livelihood adversely is not considered at all. He submits that the objections are summarily rejected holding that the lands in question are required for the industrial purpose. He submits that the lands are adjacent to Varuna Canal Project, that is why they have the immediate potential to become irrigated and prime agricultural lands.
6. He relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of BHIKHUBHAI VITHLABHAI PATEL v. STATE OF GUJARAT reported in (2008) 4 SCC 144 for contending that the words 'considering the cause' employed in Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act and the words 'any land is required' used in Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act are of crucial importance. The term 'consider' means to think over; it connotes that there should be active application of the mind. In other words, the term 'consider' postulates consideration of all the relevant aspects of the matter. The word 'necessary means indispensable, requisite; indispensably requisite, useful; essential; unavoidable; impossible to be otherwise; inevitable. The words 'any land is required for the purpose of development by Board' do not confer unlimited discretion on the Government to resort to the 21 acquisition of the land casually or arbitrarily. There is nothing like absolute or unfettered discretion conferred on the Government in the matter of compulsorily acquisition of land.
8. The learned Senior Counsel read out paragraph Nos.137, 138 and 153.2 from the Apex Court's judgment in the case of BONDU RAMASWAMY AND OTHERS v. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS reported in 2010 (7) SCC 129. The said paragraphs are extracted hereinbelow:
"137. What do we say about a "development", where with reference to the total extent of a village, one-third is not notified at all, and more than half is deleted from proposed acquisition of the remaining two-thirds and only the remaining 20% to 30% area is acquired, that too not contiguously, but in different parcels and pockets. What can be done with such acquisition? Can it be used for orderly development? Can it avoid haphazard and irregular growth? The power of deletion and withdrawal unless exercised with responsibility and fairly and reasonably, will play havoc with orderly development, will add to haphazard and irregular growth and create discontent among sections of society who were not fortunate to have their lands deleted.
138. The learned single Judge as also the Division Bench have concurrently found that BDA had indulged in pick and choose deletions and acquisitions. The learned 22 Single Judge and the Division Bench have found discrimination and irregularities, both in initial omission of certain lands and in deleting of some lands which were notified. They have also recorded a finding that having regard to the nature of deletions, the acquisition lands do not form a continuous or contiguous area and acquisition of small extents of land surrounded by large chunks of unacquired lands and lands which have been omitted from acquisition would make the development of acquired pockets exceedingly difficult.
...............
153.2. Where the acquisition is for industrial or business houses (for setting up industries or special economic zones, etc.), the Government should play not only the role of a land acquirer but also the role of the protector of the landlosers. As most of the agriculturists/small holders who lose their land, do not have the expertise or the capacity for a negotiated settlement, the State should act as a benevolent trustee and safeguard their interests. The Land acquisition collectors should also become Grievance Settlement Authorities. The various alternatives including providing employment, providing equity participation, providing annuity benefiters ensuring a regular income for life, providing rehabilitation in the form of housing or new businesses, should be considered and whichever is found feasible or suitable, should be made an integral process of the scheme of such acquisitions. If the Government or Development Authorities act merely as facilitators for industrial or business houses, mining companies and 23 developers or colonisers, to acquire large extents of land ignoring the legitimate rights of the landowners, it leads to resistance, resentment and hostility towards the acquisition process."
9. He submits that the note is prepared by the SLAO even before the initiation of the acquisition proceedings. He submits that the question of the Government delegating some of its power to the SLAO would arise only after the initiation of the acquisition proceedings.
10. Sri V.Sanjay Krishna, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.No.1167/2008 and Sri V.Srinivas, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.No.8261/2008, W.P.No.8920/2008 and W.P.No.12141/2008 seek leave of the Court to adopt the submissions made by the Senior Counsel.
11. Sri Basavaraj V.Sabarad, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.2 and 3 has raised two threshold objections to the maintainability of these petitions. He submits that these petitions are filed by Sri Palani Raju, the general power of attorney holder. He submits that the petitioners are agriculturists, whereas their general power of attorney 24 holder is an industrialist. As Sri Palani Raju cannot set up an industrial land on agricultural land, he has no locus standi to file these petitions.
12. He submits that the objections of the notified khatedars are of routine nature and that they are considered objectively. He submits that the petitioners cannot be permitted to enlarge their objections. They cannot be permitted to raise the objections, which they have not raised in the statement of objections before the SLAO. He submits that W.P.No.2290/2008 and W.P.No.2289/2008 (in respect of 1 item of land) are liable to be rejected at the threshold, as the said petitioners have purchased the land subsequent to the issuance of the preliminary notification.
13. He submits that the inclusion of the lands in the acquisition notification and the exclusion of some lands from the final notification is for right reasons. He would assert that no land is deleted from the acquisition for any improper reasons.
14. He submits that the non-inclusion of some lands in the final notification does not mean that they are deleted from the acquisition proceedings. The respondents still have the power to 25 issue the final notification in respect of the lands, which are covered by the preliminary notification. He submits that the perusal of the writ petitions reveals that they are not claiming any parity with those, whose lands are deleted from the acquisition.
15. He submits that the land measuring 179 acres 6 guntas are not included in the final notification, as the Karnataka Housing Board ('KHB' for short) has entered into a joint development agreement with M/s. Subramanya Constructions and Developers Company. Similarly, 33 acres at Bastipura Village are also not included in the final notification, as the KHB has entered into a joint development agreement with M/s.Parshvanath Developers. He would contend that even assuming, without admitting that certain lands are illegally excluded from the final notification, then also the petitioners are not entitled to succeed. If there is any wrongful exclusion, a direction can be given only for the inclusion of those wrongfully excluded lands in the final notification. In support of his submissions, he relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of CHANDRA BANSI SINGH AND OTHERS v. JAWAHAR LAL MEHTA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1984 SC 1767.
26
16. He relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of SMT.SOMAVANTI AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1963 SC 151. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted hereinbelow:
"58. Apart from that it is always open to the State to fix priorities amongst public utilities of different kinds, bearing in mind the needs of the State, the existing facilities and other relevant factors. In the State like the Punjab where there is a large surplus of fruit and dairy products there is need for preserving it. There are already in existence a number of cold storages in that State. The Government would, therefore, be acting reasonably in giving priority to a factory for manufacturing refrigeration equipment which would be available for replacement in these storages and which would also be available for equipping new cold storages.
59. Apart from this it is for the State Government to say which particular industry may be regarded as beneficial to the public and to decide that its establishment would serve a public purpose. No question of discrimination would, therefore, arise merely by reason of the fact that Government has declared that the establishment of a particular industry is a public purpose. The challenge to the notification based on Art. 14 of the Constitution must, therefore, fail."
17. He also sought to draw support from the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Bonduramaswamy (supra) while 27 advancing the contention that there can be no equality in securing the illegal benefits. He read out paragraph Nos.143, 144 and 159 of the said decision, which are as follows:
"143. We are conscious of the fact that when a person subjected to blatant discrimination, approaches a court seeking equal treatment, he expects relief similar to what others have been granted. All that he is interested is getting relief for himself, as others. He is not interested in getting the relief illegally granted to others, quashed. Nor is he interested in knowing whether others were granted relief legally or about the distinction between positive equality and negative equality. In fact he will be reluctant to approach courts for quashing the relief granted to others on the ground that it is illegal, as he does not want to incur the wrath of those who have benefited from the wrong action. As a result, in most cases those who benefit by the illegal grants/actions by authorities, get away with the benefit, while others who are not fortunate to have `connections' or `money power' suffer. But these are not the grounds for courts to enforce negative equality and perpetuate the illegality.
144. The fact that an Authority has extended favours illegally in the case of several persons cannot be a ground for courts to issue a mandamus directing repetition thereof, by applying the principle of equality. Article 14 guarantees equality before law and not equality in subverting law nor equality in securing illegal benefits. But courts cannot be silent bystanders if acquisition 28 process is used by officers of the Authority with ulterior or malafide motives. For example, let us take a case where 2000 acres are required for a project as per the Development Scheme, but the preliminary notification is issued in respect of 3000 acres; and when the land owners `apply' or `approach' the Authority, 1000 acres of lands are released. Or take a case where a project required 1000 acres of contiguous land for a development project, and preliminary notice is accordingly issued for acquisition of a compact contiguous extent of 1000 acres; but thereafter without any logical explanation or perceivable reason, several large areas in the midst of the proposed layout, are denotified or deleted making it virtually impossible to execute the development scheme, as proposed. In the absence of satisfactory explanations in such a case, it may be necessary to presume that there was misuse or abuse of the acquisition process. Be that as it may.
159. To salvage the acquisition and to avoid hardships to BDA and its allottees and to avoid prolonged further round litigations emanating from the directions of the High Court, a more equitable way would be to uphold the decision of the Division Bench, but subject BDA's actions to certain corrective measures by requiring it to re- examine certain aspects and provide an option to the landlosers to secure some additional benefit, as an incentive to accept the acquisition. A direction to provide an option to the land-losers to seek allotment of developed plots in lieu of compensation or to provide for preferential allotment of some plots at the prevailing 29 market price in addition to compensation will meet the ends of justice. Such directions will not be in conflict with the BDA (Allotment of sites) Rules, as they are intended to save the acquisitions. If the acquisitions are to be quashed in entirety by accepting the challenges to the acquisition on the ground of arbitrary deletions and exclusions, there may be no development scheme at all, thereby putting BDA to enormous loss. The directions of the High Court and this Court are warranted by the peculiar facts of the case and are not intended to be general directions applicable to regular acquisitions in accordance with law, without any irregularities."
18. Sri H.T.Narendra Prasad, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the Government submits that the SLAO has prepared elaborate notes. Based on that, the Board (KIADB) has passed the resolution recommending to the Government the acquisition of the lands in question. On being directed to produce the original records containing the Government's order for the issuance of the final notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act, he submits, on instructions, that the original file is misplaced.
19. Sri Narendra Prasad brings to my notice this Court's decision in the case of N.SOMASHEKAR AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in 1997 (7) 30 Kar.LJ 410 to buttress his submission that, if the Government on the basis of the material, survey and study conducted by its agencies, forms the opinion that a given area is suitable for acquisition and for purposes of furtherance of the objects of KIAD Act, it can extend the provisions of the said Act to the said area.
20. On hearing the learned advocates, the following questions fall for my consideration:
(i) Whether the consideration of the petitioners' objections by the Special Land Acquisition Officer is satisfactory?
(ii) Whether the Government has applied its mind to Section 28(3) order and the objections filed by the petitioners before issuing the final notification under Section 28(4) of KIAD Act?
(iii) Whether the acquisition of land in question suffers from the vice of discrimination?31
21. In Re.Question No.1: To answer this question, it is necessary to refer to the provisions contained in Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act. The provisions read as follows:
"28. Acquisition of land - (3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit."
22. The consideration of the petitioners' objections cannot be wished away saying that they are routine objections. Nor can the SLAO be content holding that the objections are over-ruled, because the land is required for the KIADB's purpose for industrial development.
23. The word 'consideration' is vividly explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of THE BARIUM CHEMICALS LTD. AND ANOTHER v. A.J.RANA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1972 SC 591. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow:
"15. The words 'considers it necessary' postulate that the authority concerned has thought over the matter deliberately and with care and it has been found necessary as a result of such thinking to pass the order. The dictionary meaning of the word 'consider' is 'to view 32 attentively, to survey, examine, inspect (arch), to look attentively, to contemplate mentally, to think over, meditate on, give heed to, take note of, to think deliberately, bethink oneself, to reflect' (vide Shorter Oxford Dictionary). According to Words and Phrases - Permanent Edn: Vol.8-A to 'consider' means to think with care. It is also mentioned that 'to consider' is to fix the mind upon with a view to careful examination; to ponder; study; meditate upon, think or reflect with care. It is, therefore, manifest that careful thinking or due application of the mind regarding the necessity to obtain and examine the documents in question in sine qua non for the making of the order. If the impugned order were to show that there has been no careful thinking or proper application of the mind as to the necessity of obtaining and examining the documents specified in the order. The essential requisite to the making of the order would be held to be non-existent."
24. As held by the Apex Court in the case of RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS reported in (2012) 1 SCC 792, the Collector is required to consider the land-owners' plea against the acquisition of land. It has this to say in paragraph No.40 of its judgment:
"40. Though it is neither possible nor desirable to make a list of the grounds on which the landowner can persuade the Collector to make recommendations against the proposed acquisition of land, but what is important is 33 that the Collector should give a fair opportunity of hearing to the objector and objectively consider his plea against the acquisition of land. Only thereafter, he should make recommendations supported by brief reasons as to why the particular piece of land should or should not be acquired and whether or not the plea put forward by the objector merits acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made by the Collector must reflect objective application of mind to the objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons."
25. It is also profitable to refer to the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in the case of KAMAL TRADING PRIVATE LIMITED v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS reported in (2012) 2 SCC 25, wherein it is held that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are required to be strictly construed, as it is an ex-proprietary legislation. Emphasizing the cardinal importance of the right/protection given under Section 5-A of the said Act, it has this to say in paragraph Nos.15 and 28 of its judgment:
"15. Hearing contemplated under Section 5-A(2) is necessary to enable the Collector to deal effectively with the objections raised against the proposed acquisition and make a report. The report of the Collector referred to in this provision is not an empty formality because it is required to be placed before the appropriate Government 34 together with the Collector's recommendations and the record of the case. It is only upon receipt of the said report that the Government can take a final decision on the objections. It is pertinent to note that declaration under Section 6 has to be made only after the appropriate Government is satisfied on the consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5- A(2). As said by this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., the appropriate Government while issuing declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act is required to apply its mind not only to the objections filed by the owner of the land in question, but also to the report which is submitted by the Collector upon making such further inquiry thereon as he thinks necessary and also the recommendations made by him in that behalf.
28. By no stretch of imagination, can it be said that the Second Land Acquisition Officer had applied his mind to the objections raised by the appellant. The abovequoted paragraphs are bereft of any recommendations. The Second Land Acquisition Officer has only reproduced the contentions of the officers of the acquiring body. The objections taken by the appellants are rejected on a very vague ground. Mere use of the words "for the greater interest of public" does not lend the report the character of a report made after application of mind. Though in our opinion, the declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act must be set aside because the appellant was not given hearing as contemplated under Section 5-A(2) of the LA Act, which is the appellant's substantive right, we must record that in the facts of this 35 case, we are totally dissatisfied with the report submitted by the Second Land Acquisition Officer. His report is utterly laconic and bereft of any recommendations. He was not expected to write a detailed report but, his report, however brief, should have reflected application of mind. Needless to say that as to which report made under Section 5-A(2) could be said to be a report disclosing application of mind will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case."
26. Section 28(3) order is not reflective of the consideration of the petitioners' objections. Mere mechanical or stereotyped rejection of objections cannot be regarded as adequate. The recording of reasons ensures that the SLAO has applied his mind to the case and the reasons which impelled him to take the decision in question is germane to the content and scope of the power vested in him. I therefore answer question No.1 by holding that the SLAO's consideration of the petitioners' objections is not satisfactory. It may not be necessary for the SLAO to write out a judgment as a court of law does. However, he must at least state what arguments are canvassed and for what reasons he is rejecting them.
27. In Re. Question No.2: The well reasoned order under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act would constitute the raw-material 36 for the Government to take a final call on the issuance of the final notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act. When Section 28(3) order itself is deficient, Section 28(4) notification also becomes unsustainable. This is all the more so when nothing is placed on record to show that the Government has applied its mind afresh to the objections of the petitioners and the report of the SLAO.
28. As held in the case of Kamal Trading (supra), the final notification has to be issued only after the Government is satisfied on considering of Section 5-A report (Section 28(3) order in these cases). It is reiterated in the said decision that the Government, while issuing the final notification, is required to apply its mind not only to the objections filed by the owner of the land in question, but also to the report which is submitted by the Collector (SLAO in the instant case) and also the recommendations made by him in that behalf. Mere rote acceptance or endorsement of the SLAO's order by the Government does not meet the requirements of law.
29. In taking this view, I am fortified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment in the case of SURINDER SINGH 37 BRAR AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in 2013 (1) SCC 403. The relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow:
"84. What needs to be emphasised is that hearing required to be given under Section 5-A(2) to a person who is sought to be deprived of his land and who has filed objections under Section 5-A(1) must be effective and not an empty formality. The Collector who is enjoined with the task of hearing the objectors has the freedom of making further enquiry as he may think necessary. In either eventuality, he has to make report in respect of the land notified under Section 4(1) or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objections and submit the same to the appropriate Government along with the record of proceedings held by him for the latter's decision. The appropriate Government is obliged to consider the report, if any, made under Section 5-A(2) and then record its satisfaction that the particular land is needed for a public purpose. This exercise culminates into making a declaration that the land is needed for a public purpose and the declaration is to be signed by a Secretary to the Government or some other officer duly authorised to certify its orders. The formation of opinion on the issue of need of land for a public purpose and suitability thereof is sine qua non for issue of a declaration under Section 6(1). Any violation of the substantive right of the landowners and/or other interested persons to file objections or denial of 38 opportunity of personal hearing to the objector(s) vitiates the recommendations made by the Collector and the decision taken by the appropriate Government on such recommendations. The recommendations made by the Collector without duly considering the objections filed under Section 5-A(1) and submissions made at the hearing given under Section 5-A(2) or failure of the appropriate Government to take objective decision on such objections in the light of the recommendations made by the Collector will denude the decision of the appropriate Government of statutory finality. To put it differently, the satisfaction recorded by the appropriate Government that the particular land is needed for a public purpose and the declaration made under Section 6(1) will be devoid of legal sanctity if statutorily engrafted procedural safeguards are not adhered to by the authorities concerned or there is violation of the principles of natural justice. The cases before us are illustrative of flagrant violation of the mandate of Sections 5-A(2) and 6(1). Therefore, the second question is answered in the affirmative."
87.The proposition laid down in the aforementioned two judgments does not support the stance of the Chandigarh Administration that even though there is breach of the mandate of Section 5-A read with Section 6(1), the Court cannot, after the issue of declaration under Section 6(1), nullify the acquisition proceedings. As a matter of fact, the ratio of both the judgments is that satisfaction of the appropriate Government envisaged in Section 6(1) must be preceded by 39 consideration of the report prepared by the Collector after considering the objections filed under Section 5-A and hearing the objectors. This necessarily implies that the Government must objectively apply its mind to the report of the Collector and the objections filed by the landowners and then take a decision whether or not the land is needed for the specified public purpose. A mechanical endorsement of the report of the Collector cannot be a substitute for the requirement of application of mind by the Government which must be clearly reflected in the record."
30. As Section 28(3) order is not a reasoned order and in the absence of the application of mind on the part of the Government to the objections filed by the petitioners, the consequential Section 28(4) final notification becomes unsupportable.
31. As the Government is in no position to produce the file containing the approval for the issuance of Section 28(4) notification, it is well-nigh impossible to know whether the Government has applied its mind to the SLAO's order, to the petitioners' objections, etc. There is no way of knowing whether the approval is accorded for the issuance of Section 28(4) notification. The Court has to only draw the necessary inference from the stated misplacement and consequently its non- 40 production. I therefore answer the second question in negative. In the result, I hold that the notification issued under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act is liable to be quashed.
32. In Re.Quesion No.3: To answer this question, the Apex Court's judgment in the case of HARI RAM AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS reported in (2010) 3 SCC 621 is of immense value. In the said case, the Apex Court has come down very heavily on the authorities for not following the uniform policy regarding the withdrawal of lands from acquisition. Passing different orders in respect of the persons similarly situated relating to the same acquisition proceedings and for the same public purpose was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is held therein that though the landowner, whose land has been acquired cannot claim, as a matter of right, the release of his land from acquisition, but where State exercises its power under Section 48 for withdrawal from acquisition in respect of a particular land, the similarly situated landowners have a right to the similar treatment. Equality of citizens' rights is one of the fundamental pillars on which the edifice of rule of law rests. All 41 actions of the State Government have to be fair and for legitimate reasons. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted hereinbelow:
"40. It is true that any action or order contrary to law does not confer any right upon any person for similar treatment. It is equally true that a landowner whose land has been acquired for public purpose by following the prescribed procedure cannot claim as a matter of right for release of his/her land from acquisition but where the State Government exercises its power under Section 48 of the Act for withdrawal from acquisition in respect of a particular land, the landowners who are similarly situated have a right of similar treatment by the State Government. Equality of citizens' rights is one of the fundamental pillars on which the edifice of rule of law rests. All actions of the State have to be fair and for legitimate reasons.
41. The Government has obligation of acting with substantial fairness and consistency in considering the representations of the landowners for withdrawal from acquisition whose lands have been acquired under the same acquisition proceedings. The State Government cannot pick and choose some landowners and release their land from acquisition and deny the same benefit to other landowners by creating artificial distinction. Passing different orders in exercise of its power under Section 48 of the Act in respect of persons similarly situated relating to same acquisition proceedings and for the same public 42 purpose is definitely violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and must be held to be discriminatory.
42. More so, it is not even the case of the respondents that release of land from acquisition in favour of various landowners, as noticed above, was in violation of any statutory provision or actuated with ulterior motive or done due to some mistake or contrary to any public interest. As a matter of fact, vide order dated 19.8.2008, this Court gave an opportunity to the State Government to consider the representations of the appellants for release of their land and pass appropriate order by the State Government considered their representations in light of the policy dated 26.10.2007 ignoring and overlooking the fact that for none of the landowners whose lands have been released from acquisition the policy dated 26.10.2007 was applied. The State Government has sought to set up make-believe grounds to justify its action that development planning has been kept into consideration and that the appellants have been offered developed plots of double the area of construction while the fact of the matter is that in some cases where the plots were vacant and had no construction, the entire plot has been released from acquisition and also the cases where one room or two rooms construction was existing, the whole of plot has been released. While releasing land of more than 40 landowners having plots of size from 15 sq.yd to 1500 sq.yd, if development plan did not get materially disturbed in the opinion of the State Government, the same opinion must hold good for the appellants' lands as well.43
43. It is unfair on the part of the State Government in not considering representations of the appellants by applying the same standards which were applied to other landowners while withdrawing from acquisition of their land under the same acquisition proceedings. If this Court does not correct the wrong action of the State Government, it may leave citizens with the belief that what counts for the citizens is right contacts with right persons in the State Government and that judicial proceedings are not efficacious. The action of the State Government in treating the present appellants differently although they are situated similar to the landowners whose lands have been released can not be countenanced and has to be declared bad in law.
44. Consequently, these appeals are allowed and the order of the State Government dated 29.9.2008 is set aside. Respondent 1 (the State of Haryana) is directed to issue appropriate order(s) concerning the appellants' lands on the same terms and in the same manner as has been done in the matters of Sumitra Devi, Ram Kala, Mani Ram and others. Obviously, the portion of the lands which in the layout plan forms part of roads or common sites or public utility area shall not be considered for release."
33. In the instant case, the map of the lands in question and the surrounding areas is produced as Annexure-R1 with the affidavit of the KIADB's SLAO. A glance at the said map reveals that the land belonging to Emerald Enclaves is flanked by the KIADB's industrial areas. It is not known why the KIADB chose 44 to go to far flung area leaving the area lying in between its two industrial areas. While the choice of location of land for a particular purpose is always the prerogative of the executive, what cannot go unnoticed in these cases is that the land acquisition is only for extending the existing industrial area. It is not known why the Emerald Enclave land is not acquired, though it is adjacent to KIADB's existing industrial areas on two sides. . Further, it is also to be noted that before the issuance of the preliminary notification proposed to acquire the land in question in 2006, the lands belonging to Emerald Enclave were also sought to be acquired way back in 2000 itself. Section 28(3) order also came to be passed but the Government issued the final notification, dated 15.06.2005 without including the lands belonging to the Emerald Enclave in the final notification. Emerald Enclave lands are not included in the final notification, though the Section 28(3) order for the issuance of the final notification in respect of the Emerald Enclave lands is passed long ago.
34. The map duly certified by the SLAO shows that 178 acres 22 guntas of lands in Belagala Village are deleted from the acquisition proceedings (Annexure-G). The reasons shown for deletion of those lands are the existence of the house, use of the 45 land for industrial purposes, the land being irrigated, the land being not strategically situated, the existence of poultry farm. If these are good reasons for deleting certain lands from acquisition, the respondents are not justified in clinging on to acquisition of the lands in question, as the existence of similar reasons in respect of the petitioners' lands is not in dispute. In the fitness of things, the respondents ought to have evolved the yardstick or common factors for deleting the lands. That does not appear to have been done.
35. In para 10A of their counter, the KIADB and the SLAO have this to say:
" .................... As regards the extent of 179 - 06 acres the KHB has entered into a joint development with M/s. Subramanya Constructions and Developers and as such, the final notification under Section 28(4) is not issued. In respect of another extent of the 33 acres at Bastipura Village, the KHB has entered intro joint development agreement with M/s.Parshvanath Developers and hence the final notification under Section 28(4) is not issued."
36. Excluding certain lands from final notification at the instance of KHB or M/s.Subramanya Constructions and Developers or M/s.Parshawanath Developers is most untenable, to say the least. It is not known whether the KHB has entered 46 into an agreement with the property developers before the issuance of the preliminary notification. If they had entered into an agreement before the preliminary notification, then they ought to have filed objections in response to the preliminary notification Admittedly, they have not filed the objections. If it is their case that the agreements are entered into after the issuance of the preliminary notification, then the very entering into such agreements is illegal. To know at what stage and to whom the said property developers have written the letters and how at their instance a vast extent of lands covered by the preliminary notification were left out of the final notification, I directed the State Government to produce the original records. But the Government is not producing the original file, as it is stated to have been misplaced. It is difficult to give any decisive finding on whether the power is exercised colourably as certain lands are withdrawn from acquisition at the instance of the colonizers (M/s.Subramaya Constructions and Developers and M/s.Parshanath Developers). Be it as it may, if the lands are required for KHB or M/s.Subramanya Constructions or Developers or M/s.Parshawanath Developers, then the concerned authorities can always resort to the initiation of the acquisition 47 proceedings under the applicable land acquisition law. The dropping of the acquisition proceedings at the request of KHB or M/s.Subramanya Constructions and Developers or M/s.Parshawanath Developers cannot be justified, more so because of the non-production of the original records.
37. The respondents' defence that some lands are not included in the final notification because their exclusion is sought by the KHB or M/s.Subramanya Constructions and Developers or M/s.Parshawanath Developers or because there is some construction on them is absolutely untenable. The Apex Court in the case of HARERAM (supra) has held that the classification on the basis of the nature of construction cannot be validly made and such policy is not based on an intelligible differentia and a rational basis. What appears from the available material is that for the release of the lands from acquisition, no policy, no principles, no common factor are evolved. The release of some similar land from acquisition is actuated by ad hocism, if not by favoritism. I do not see any justificatory reason for the inclusion of the lands in question in the impugned acquisition notification and further for their non-withdrawal from acquisition. The third question is answered accordingly.
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38. The reckless and casual acquisition of the lands is deprecated by the Apex Court in the case of Raghbir Singh Sherawat (supra). The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereinbelow:
"42. It is difficult, if not impossible, to appreciate as to why the State and its instrumentalities resort to massive acquisition of land and that too without complying with the mandate of the statute. As noted by the National Commission of Farmers, the acquisition of agricultural land in the name of planned development or industrial growth would seriously affect the availability of food in future. After independence, the administrative apparatus of the State has not spent enough investment in the rural areas and those who have been doing agriculture have not been educated and empowered to adopt alternative sources of livelihood. If land of such persons is acquired, not only the current but the future generations are ruined and this is one of the reasons why the farmers who are deprived of their holdings commit suicide.
43. It also appears that the authorities concerned are totally unmindful of the plight of those sections of the society, who are deprived of their only asset like small house, small industrial unit, etc. They do not realise that having one's own house is a lifetime dream of a majority of the population of this country. Economically affluent class of society can easily afford to have one or more houses at any place or locality in the country but other 49 sections of the society find it extremely difficult to purchase land and construct house. Majority of the people spend their lifetime savings for building a small house so that their families may be able to live with a semblance of dignity. Therefore, it is wholly unjust, arbitrary and unreasonable to deprive such persons of their houses by way of the acquisition of land in the name of development of infrastructure or industrialisation. Therefore, before acquiring private land the State and/or its agencies/ instrumentalities should, as far as possible, use land belonging to the State for the specified public purposes. If the acquisition of private land becomes absolutely necessary, then too, the authorities concerned must strictly comply with the relevant statutory provisions and the rules of natural justice."
39. There is no doubt that under the KIAD Act, no limitation is prescribed for issuing the final notification or for passing the award. But this does not mean that the preliminary notification can be kept as some kind of reservoir and the subsequent final notification can be issued therefrom spread over 10 years or 20 years by paying the market value which was prevalent as on the date of the issuance of the preliminary notification. In the instant case, admittedly no award is passed and no compensation amount is disbursed to the petitioners. The Apex Court has this to say in the case of K.KRISHNA 50 REDDY AND OTHERS v. THE DEPUTY COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, UNIT II, LMD KARIMNAGAR, ANDHRA PRADESH reported in AIR 1988 Sc 2123. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereinbelow:
"12. ............. After all money is what the money buys. What the claimants could have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not been one half of it. It is a common experience that the purchasing power of rupee is dwindling. With rising inflation, the delayed payment may lose all charm and utility of the compensation. In some cases, the delay may be detrimental to the interests of claimants. The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They may even face starvation unless rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost importance that the award should be made without delay."
40. Thus, viewed from any angle, the impugned acquisition proceedings are liable to be invalidated. Therefore, the impugned notifications, in so far as they pertain to the petitioners herein, are quashed.
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41. There cannot be any dispute with Sri Sabarad's submission that the parties, who purchased the lands subsequent to the preliminary notification are not entitled to question the acquisition proceedings. But when the acquisition proceedings are quashed in respect of all the surrounding lands, no purpose would be served in keeping the acquisition notification intact in respect of one or two items of lands. I therefore over-rule the preliminary objection raised by Sri Sabarad.
42. Needless to observe that the respondents may resort to the initiation of the acquisition proceedings afresh, if the need for the land for industrial purpose persists but strictly complying with the requirements of law. No order as to costs.
43. Now that the main matter itself is disposed of, Misc. W.Nos.5919/2011, 5918/2011 and 5917/2011 for amendment are dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE MD/cm