Central Information Commission
Shri Yoginder Kumar vs Central Bureau Of Investigation (Cbi) on 15 February, 2010
CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
Appeal No. CIC/WB/A/2009/000049 dated 12.2.2009
Right to Information Act 2005 - Section 19
Appellant - Shri Yoginder Kumar
Respondent - Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
Decision announced: 15.2.2010
Facts:
By an application of 3.4.08 to the S.P., CBI HQ, Shri Yoginder Kumar, himself an Inspector in the CBI, of Uttam Nagar, New Delhi sought the following information regarding five officials of the CBI:
'1. Whether any criminal or corruption cases were registered by the CBI against the above CBI officers?
2. Whether above named CBI officers were ever suspended from the duty if yes? The reason thereof and the copy of the suspension orders?
3. Whether the suspension of the above named CBI officers has been revoked or they reinstated, if yes the grounds on which their suspension has been revoked? The copy of such orders and the extract of the note sheet on which the matter is dealt.
4. The present status of the criminal/ corruption cases registered against the above named CBI officers.' To this, he received a reply from Asstt. Inspector General (Policy)-II to whom the matter had been transferred by SP HQ on 7.4.08 through a letter of 6.5.08 informing him as follows:
"2. In respect of point no. 1 of your application it is informed that as per information available in this office criminal cases have been registered in CBI against 4 officers mentioned in your letter except Shri Girish Bhardwaj, Inspector. Information in respect of Shri Bhardwaj may be available in administration Division/ CBI.
3. In respect of point no. 2 and 3 of your application regarding suspension and revocation of officers, your application is transferred to SP (HQ)/CPIO of Administration Division/ CBI, for appropriate reply.1
4. In respect of point no. 4, the status of cases as on 31.3.2008 against four officers is as follows:-
(1) Shri D. K. Srivastava, DLA -The case is pending under trial.
(2) Shri R. P. Dwivedi, DLA - The case is under investigation.
(3) Shri P. Balachandran, DSP - The case is under investigation.
(4) Shri D. S. Mann, DSP - The case is under investigation."
Shri Yoginder Kumar then moved a reminder before the Director (Admn) CBI HQ on 19.5.08, to which he received a response dated 6.6.08 in which he was told that the reply had been sent to him through a letter of 29.5.08. Not having received this reply, Shri Yoginder Kumar moved a further reminder of 11.6.08 through Email followed by others of 27.6.08 and 7.7.08, in the last of which he has submitted as below:
"The copy of letter dated 23.5.2008 of SP (Pers.) has still not been supplied along with the letter dated 2.7.2008 of SP (pers.) it is therefore, requested that letter no. DPPERS. I/2008/1393/1/2008 dated 23.5.2008 of SP (pers.), CBI, HQ, New Delhi along with its enclosures, containing the information in respect of para no. 2 and 3 requested by undersigned under RTI Act be sent to undersigned as soon as possible, as the matter has already been considerably delayed.' He has, after some further correspondence, received a copy of the letter of 23.5.08 from CPIO Shri Ashwani Kumar, SP, HQ CBI refusing the information sought, as follows:
"1. Yes it is personal information, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest and exempted under section 8 (1) (j) of the RTI Act.
2. It is personal information, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest and exempted under section 8 (1) (j) of the RTI Act, 2005. Information does not include 'file noting' as per section 2 (f) of the RTI Act, 2005."
Shri Yoginder Kumar then moved an appeal on 18.7.08 before Dy. Director (Admn), CBI, HQ pleading as follows:
2"It is further submitted that purpose of RTI information requested dated 3.4.2008 by undersigned, has great importance to the public interest. The CPIO has failed to appreciate the purpose of RTI information because of CBI is a premier investigating agency of the country and CBI itself restoring their tainted officers without proper process of law? So the supply of this information includes public interact at large! In view of the facts discussed above the refusal of information by SP (pers.), CBI, HQ, New Delhi vide Annexure B, is not covered under the provisions of section 8 (1) (j) of the RTI Act, 2005. It is, therefore, requested, that remaining RTI information in respect of paras 2 & 3 of my RTI request dated 3.4.2008 (Annexure- A) may kindly be given to undersigned at the earliest.' Upon this Shri Yoginder Kumar has received the following directions from Dy. Director (Admn) dated 14.8.08:
"Your original application dated 3.4.2008 has no relationship to any public activity or interest and CPIO/ CBI, HQ has rightly claimed exemption u/s 8 (1) (j) of RTI Act, 2005. Hence, your appeal is dismissed with no direction to the CPIO/ CBI, HQ New Delhi.' This has brought Shri Yoginder Kumar in 2nd appeal before us with the following prayer:
"It is prayed that in view of the fact discussed above and documents annexed in support, the CPIO, CBI be directed strictly to supply the remaining information asked vide 'Annexure-A-' immediately and penalty be imposed on CPIO, CBI for not providing the remaining information up to three months to the applicant, violating time provisions of RTI Act, 2005."
The appeal was heard on 12.2.08. Although appellant Sh. Yoginder Kumar had been informed by Notice dated 27.1.2010 regarding the hearing but he has opted not to be present. Shri Ashwani Kumar, SP HQs submitted that the officials concerned have not been suspended on the grounds of any departmental action, which would have brought it within the ambit of public activity, hence not exempted from disclosure u/s 8(1)(j). These are all cases of criminal investigation in which appellant Shri Yoginder Kumar is also one of the 3 accused. It is for this reason that the information has been treated as private information.
DECISION NOTICE On the application of exemption from disclosure u/s 8(1)(j) we now have a definitive decision of learned Justice Sanjiv Khanna in the Delhi High Court's ruling in Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 8396/2009, 16907/2006, 4788/2008, 9914/2009, 6085/2008, 7304/2007, 7930/2009 and 3607 of 2007.
28. Examination of the said Sub-section shows that it consists of three parts. The first two parts stipulate that personal information which has no relationship with any public activity or interest need not be disclosed. The second part states that any information which should cause unwarranted invasion of a privacy of an individual should not be disclosed unless the third part is satisfied. The third part stipulates that information which causes unwarranted invasion of privacy of an individual will not be disclosed unless public information officer or the appellate authority is satisfied that larger public interest justifies disclosure of such information. As observed by S. Ravindra Bhat, J. the third part of Section 8(1) (j) reconciles two legal interests protected by law i.e. right to access information in possession of the public authorities and the right to privacy. Both rights are not absolute or complete. In case of a clash, larger public interest is the determinative test. 1 Public interest element sweeps through Section 8(1) (j).Unwarranted invasion of privacy of any individual is protected in public interest, but gives way when larger public interest warrants disclosure. This necessarily has to be done on case to case basis taking into consideration many factors having regard to the circumstances of each case.
29. Referring to these factors relevant for determining larger public interest in R.K. Jain versus Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 120 it was observed :-
"54. The factors to decide the public interest immunity would include (a) where the contents of the documents are relied upon, the interests affected by their disclosure; (b) where the class of documents is invoked, whether the public interest immunity for the class is said to protect; (c) the extent to which the interests referred to have become attenuated by the passage of time or the occurrence of intervening events 1 Underlined by us for emphasis 4 since the matters contained in the documents themselves came into existence; (d) the seriousness of the issues in relation to which production is sought; (e) the likelihood that production of the documents will affect the outcome of the case; (f) the likelihood of injustice if the documents are not produced......
55. ...................When public interest immunity against disclosure of the State documents in the transaction of business by the Council of Ministers of the affairs of State is made, in the clash of those interests, it is the right and duty of the court to weigh the balance in the scales that harm shall not be done to the nation or the public service and equally to the administration of justice. 2 Each case must be considered on its backdrop. The President has no implied authority under the Constitution to withhold the documents. On the other hand it is his solemn constitutional duty to act in aid of the court to effectuate judicial review. The Cabinet as a narrow centre of the national affairs must be in possession of all relevant information which is secret or confidential. At the cost of repetition it is reiterated that information relating to national security, diplomatic relations, internal security of sensitive diplomatic correspondence per se are class documents and that public interest demands total immunity from disclosure. Even the slightest divulgence would endanger the lives of the personnel engaged in the services etc. The maxim salus populi est suprema lex which means that regard to public welfare is the highest law is the basic postulate for this immunity. Political decisions like declaration of emergency under Article 356 are not open to judicial review but it is for the electorate at the polls to decide the executive wisdom. In other areas every communication which preceded from one officer of the State to another or the officers inter se does not necessarily per se relate to the affairs of the State. Whether they so relate has got to be determined by reference to the nature of the consideration the level at which it was considered, the contents of the document of class to which it relates to and their indelible impact on public administration or public service and administration of justice itself. Article 74(2) is not a total bar for production of the records. Only the actual advice tendered by the Minister or Council of Ministers to the President and the question whether any, and if so, what advice was tendered by the Minister or Council of Ministers to the President, shall not be enquired into by the court. In other words the bar of judicial review is confined to the 2 Underlined by us for reference 5 factum of advice, its extent, ambit and scope but not the record i.e. the material on which the advice is founded. In S.P.Gupta case this Court held that only the actual advice tendered to the President is immune from enquiry and the immunity does not extend to other documents or records which form part of the advice tendered to the President."
30. In S.P. Gupta (supra), the Supreme Court held that democratic form of Government necessarily requires accountability which is possible only when there is openness, transparency and knowledge. Greater exposure about functioning of the Government ensures better and more efficient administration, promotes and encourages honesty and discourages corruption, misuse or abuse of authority, Transparency is a powerful safeguard against political and administrative aberrations and antithesis of inefficiency resulting from a totalitarian government which maintains secrecy and denies information 3 . Reference was again made to Sodhi Sukhdev Singh (supra) and it was observed that there was no conflict between public interest and non- disclosure' and private interest and disclosure' rather Sections 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act, 1872 balances public interest in fair administration of justice, when it comes into conflict with public interest sought to be protected by non-disclosure and in such situations the court balances these two aspects of public interest and decides which aspect predominates. It was held that the State or the Government can object to disclosure of a document on the ground of greater public interest as it relates to affairs of the State but the courts are competent and indeed bound to hold a preliminary enquiry and determine the validity of the objection to its production and this necessarily involves an enquiry into the question whether the evidence relates to affairs of the State. Where a document does not relate to affairs of the State or its disclosure is in public interest, for the administration of justice, the objection to disclosure of such document can be rejected. It was observed:
"The court would allow the objection if it finds that the document relates to affairs of State and its disclosure would be injurious to public interest, but on the other hand, if it reaches the conclusion that the document does not relate to affairs of State or that the public interest does not compel its non-disclosure or that the public interest in the administration of justice in the particular case before it overrides all other aspects of public interest, it will overrule the objection and order disclosure of the document."3
Emphsised by us to highlight a basic principle of the RTI Act 2005 6
31. A statement or defence to non-disclosure is not binding on the courts and the courts retain the power to have a prima facie enquiry and balance the two public interest and affairs of the State. The same is equally true and applies to CIC 4 , who can examine the documents/information to decide the question of larger public interest. Section 18(4) of the RTI Act empowers CIC to examine any record under the control of a public authority, while inquiring into a complaint. The said power and right cannot be denied to CIC when they decide an appeal. Section 18 is wider and broader, yet jurisdiction under section 18 and 19 of the RTI Act is not water-tight and in some areas overlap. 32. The Supreme Court in S.P Gupta's case considered the question whether there may be classes of documents which the public interest requires not to be disclosed or which should in absolute terms be regarded as immune from disclosure. In other words, we may examine the contention whether there can be class of documents which can be granted immunity from disclosure not because of their contents but because of their class to which they belong. Learned Additional Solicitor General in this regard made pointed reference to the following observations in S.P.Gupta (supra):
"69. .... The claim put forward by the learned Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India is that these documents are entitled to immunity from disclosure because they belong to a class of documents which it would be against national interest or the interest of the judiciary to disclose........ This class includes cabinet minutes, minutes of discussions between heads of departments, high level inter-departmental communications and dispatches from ambassadors abroad (vide : Conway v. Rimmer, 1968 AC 910 at pp. 952, 973, 979, 987 and 993 and Reg v. Lewes J.K. Ex parte Home Secy., 1973 AC 388 at p.412). Papers brought into existence for the purpose of preparing a submission to cabinet (vide Commonwealth Lanyon property Ltd v. Commonwealth, 129 LR 650) and indeed any documents which relate to the framing of government policy at a high level (vide: Re Grosvenor Hotel, London). It would seem that according to the decision in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (AIR 1961 SC 493) (supra) this class may also extend to notes and minutes made by the respective officers on the relevant files, information expressed or reports made and gist of official decisions reached in the course of determination of questions of policy. Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer (supra) at page 952 proceeded also to include in this class all documents concerned with policy-making within departments including, it may be minutes and the like by 4 Emphasised by us as defining the responsibilities of the CIC 7 quite junior officials and correspondence with outside bodies. It is this case to consider what documents legitimately belong to this class so as to be entitled to immunity from disclosure, irrespective of what they contain. But it does appear that cabinet papers, minutes of discussions of heads of departments and high level documents relating to the inner working of the government machine or concerned with the framing of government policies belong to this class which in the public interest must be regarded as protected against disclosure."
33. The aforesaid observations have to be read along with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in subsequent paras of the said judgment. In para 71, it was observed that the object of granting immunity to documents of this kind is to ensure proper working of the Government and not to protect Ministers or other government servants from criticism, however intemperate and unfairly biased they may be. It was further observed that this reasoning can have little validity in democratic society which believes in open government. It was accordingly observed as under:-
"The reasons given for protection the secrecy of government at the level of policy making are two. The first is the need for candour in the advice offered to Minister; the second is that disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism. Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer thought the second the most important reason. Indeed, he was inclined to discount the candour argument. I think both reasons are factors legitimately to be put into the balance which has to be struck between the public interest in the proper functioning of the public service (i.e. the executive arm of the government) and the public interest in the administration of justice. Sometimes the public service reasons will be decisive of the issue; but they should never prevent the court from weighing them against the injury which would be suffered in the administration of justice if the document was not to be disclosed. The same view was expressed by Gibbs A.C.J. in Sankey v. Whitlam (supra) where the learned acting Chief Justice said: "I consider that although there is a class of documents whose members are entitled to protection from disclosure irrespective of their contents, the protection is not absolute, and it does not endure for ever. The fundamental and governing principle is that documents in the class may be withheld from production only when this is necessary in the public interest. In a particular case the court must balance the general desirability that documents of that kind should not be 8 disclosed against the need to produce them in the interests of justice. The court will of course examine the question with special care, giving full weight to the reasons for preserving the secrecy of documents of this class, but it will not treat all such documents as entitled to the same measure of protection the extent of protection required will depend to some extent on the general subject matter with which the documents are concerned." There is nothing sacrosanct about the immunity which is granted to documents because they belong to a certain class. Class immunity is not absolute or inviolable in all circumstances. It is not a rule of law to be applied mechanically in all cases. 5 The principle upon which class immunity is founded is that it would be contrary to public interest to disclose documents belonging to that class, because such disclosure would impair the proper functioning of the public service and this aspect of public interest which requires that justice shall not be denied to any one by withholding relevant evidence. This is a balancing task which has to be performed by the Court in all cases."
34. Possibly the only class of documents which are granted immunity from disclosure is those mentioned under Article 74(2) of the Constitution. These are documents or information which are granted immunity from disclosure not because of their contents but because of the class to which they belong. Other documents and information which do not fall under Article 74(2) of the Constitution cannot be held back on the ground that they belong to a particular class which is granted absolute protection against disclosure. All other documents/information is not granted absolute or total immunity. Protection from disclosure is decided by balancing the two competing aspects of public interest i.e. when disclosure would cause injury or unwarranted invasion of privacy and on the other hand if non-disclosure would throttle the administration of justice or in this case, the public interest in disclosure of information. In such cases, the Court/CIC has to decide, which of the two public interests pre-dominates.
35. Same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in its subsequent judgment in the case of R.K. Jain (supra). It was observed as under:-
5Underlined by us for ease of reference 9 "43. It would, therefore, be concluded that it would be going too far to lay down that no document in any particular class or one of the categories of cabinet papers or decisions or contents thereof should never, in any circumstances, be ordered to be produced. Lord Keith in Burmah Oil case considered that it would be going too far to lay down a total protection to Cabinet minutes. The learned Law Lord at p.1134 stated that something must turn upon the subject-
matter, the persons who dealt with it, and the manner in which they did so. Insofar as a matter of government policy is concerned, it may be relevant to know the extent to which the policy remains unfulfilled, so that its success might be prejudiced by disclosure of the considerations which led to it. In that context the time element enters into the equation. Details of an affair which is stale and no longer of topical significance might be capable of disclosure without risk of damage to the public interest..... The nature of the litigation and the apparent importance to it of the documents in question may in extreme cases demand production even of the most sensitive communications to the highest level . Lord Scarman also objected to total immunity to Cabinet documents on the plea of candour. In Air Canada case Lord Fraser lifted Cabinet minutes from the total immunity to disclose, although same were entitled to a high degree of protection....
44. x x x x x
45. In a clash of public interest that harm shall be done to the nation or the public service by disclosure of certain documents and the administration of justice shall not be frustrated by withholding the document which must be produced if justice is to be done, it is the courts duty to balance the competing interests by weighing in scales, the effect of disclosure on the public interest or injury to administration of justice, which would do greater harm. Some of the important considerations in the balancing act are thus: in the interest of national security some information which is so secret that it cannot be disclosed except to a very few for instance the State or its own spies or agents just as other countries have. Their very lives may be endangered if there is the slightest hint of what they are doing. In R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex p Hosenball in the interest of national security Lord Denning, M.R. did not permit disclosure of the information furnished by the security service to the Home Secretary holding it highly confidential. The public interest in the security of the realm was held so great that the sources of the information must not be 10 disclosed nor should the nature of information itself be disclosed."
36. Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dinesh Trivedi M.P. and others versus U.O.I (1997) 4 SCC 306 and Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties versus Union of India (2004) 2 SCC 476.
37. Considerable emphasis and arguments were made on the question of 'candour argument' and the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Gupta (supra). It will be incorrect to state that candour argument has been wholly rejected or wholly accepted in the said case. The ratio has been expressed in the following words:
"70. ...... We agree with these learned Judges that the need for candour and frankness cannot justify granting of complete immunity against disclosure of documents of this class, but as pointed out by Gibbs A.C.J. in Sankey v. Whitlam (supra), it would not be altogether unreal to suppose that in some matters at least communications between ministers and servants of the Crown may be more frank and candid if these concerned believe that they are protected from disclosure because not all Crown servants can be expected to be made of sterner stuff. The need for candour and frankness must therefore certainly be regarded as a factor to be taken into account in determining whether, on balance, the public interest lies in favour of disclosure or against it (vide : the observations of Lord Denning in Neilson v. Lougharre, (1981) 1 All ER at p. 835.
71. There was also one other reason suggested by Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer for according protection against disclosure to documents belonging to this case: "To my mind," said the learned Law Lord: "the most important reason is that such disclosure would create or fan ill- informed or captious public or political criticism. The business of Government is difficult enough as it is, and no Government could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the Government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to grind." But this reason does not commend itself to us. The object of granting immunity to documents of this kind is to ensure the proper working of the Government and not to protect the ministers and other Government servants from criticism however intemperate and unfairly based. Moreover, this reason can have little validity in a democratic society which 11 believes in an open Government. It is only through exposure of its functioning that a democratic Government can hope to win the trust of the people. If full information is made available to the people and every action of the Government is bona fide and actuated only by public interest, there need be no fear of ―ill-informed or captious public or political criticism. But at the same time it must be conceded that even in a democracy, Government at a high level cannot function without some degree of secrecy. No minister or senior public servant can effectively discharge the responsibility of his office if every document prepared to enable policies to be formulated was liable to be made public. It is therefore in the interest of the State and necessary for the proper functioning of the public service that some protection be afforded by law to documents belonging to this class. What is the measure of this protection is a matter which we shall immediately proceed to discuss."
38. This becomes clear when we examine the test prescribed by the Supreme Court on how to determine which aspect of public interest predominates. In other words, whether public interest requires disclosure and outweighs the public interest which denies access. Reference was made with approval to a passage from the judgment of Lord Reid in Conway vs. Rimmer 1968 AC 910. The Court thereafter elucidated:-
"72. ......The court has to decide which aspect of the public interest predominates or in other words, whether the public interest which requires that the document should not be produced outweighs the public interest that a court of justice in performing its function should not be denied access to relevant evidence. The court has thus to perform a balancing exercise and after weighing the one competing aspect of public interest against the other, decide where the balance lies. If the court comes to the conclusion that, on the balance, the disclosure of the document would cause greater injury to public interest than its non-disclosure, the could would uphold the objection and not allow the document to be disclosed but if, on the other hand, the court finds that the balance between competing public interests lies the other way, the court would order the disclosure of the document. This balancing between two competing aspects of public interest has to be performed by the court even where an objection to the disclosure of the document is taken on the ground that it belongs to a class of documents which are protected irrespective of their contents, because there is no absolute immunity for documents belonging to such class".12
39. Again reference was made to the following observations of Lord Scarman in Burmah Oil versus Bank of England 1979-3 All ER 700:
"But, is the secrecy of the inner workings of the government at the level of policy making are two. The first is the need for candour in the advice offered to Ministers; the second is that disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism. Lord Reid in Conway v. Rimmer thought the second the most important reason. Indeed, he was inclined to discount the candour argument."
40. However, the said observations have to be read and understood in the context and the year in which they were made. In the S.P Gupta's case, the Supreme Court observed that interpretation of every statutory provision must keep pace with the changing concepts and values and to the extent the language permits or rather does not prohibit sufficient adjustments to judicial interpretations in accord with the requirements of fast changing society which is indicating rapid social and economic transformation. The language of the provision is not a static vehicle of ideas and as institutional development and democratic structures gain strength, a more liberal approach may only be in larger public interest. In this regard, reference can be made to the factors that have to be taken into consideration to decide public interest immunity as quoted above from R.K. Jain case (supra).
41. The proviso below Section 8(1) (j) of the RTI Act was subject of arguments. The said proviso was considered by the Bombay High Court in Surup Singh Hryanaik versus State of Maharashtra AIR 2007 Bom. 121 and it was held that it is proviso to the said sub- section and not to the entire Section 8(1). The punctuation marks support the said interpretation of Bombay High Court. On a careful reading of Section 8(1), it becomes clear that the exemptions contained in the clauses (a) to (i) end with a semi colon (;) after each such clause which indicate that they are independent clauses. Substantive sub section Clause (j) however, ends with a colon (:) followed by the proviso. Immediately following the colon mark is the proviso in question which ends with a full stop. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 11th Ed. 2008 (at page No. 169) G.P Singh, has noted that "If a statute in question is found to be carefully punctuated, punctuation, though a minor element, may be resorted to for purposes of construction." Punctuation marks can in some cases serve as a useful guide and can be resorted to for interpreting a statute 13
42. Referring to the purport of the proviso in Surup Singh (supra), the Bombay High Court has held that information normally which cannot be denied to Parliament or State Legislature should not be withheld or denied.
43. A proviso can be enacted by the legislature to serve several purposes. In Sundaram Pillai versus Patte Birman (1985) 1 SCC 591 the scope and purpose of a proviso and an explanation has been examined in detail. Normally, a proviso is meant to be an exception to something in the main enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. A proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to qualify and set at naught, the object of the main enactment. Sarthi on Interpretation of Statutes, referred to in the said judgment, states that a proviso is subordinate to the main section and one of the principles which can be applied in a given case is that a proviso would not enlarge an enactment except for compelling reasons. It is unusual to import legislation from a proviso into the body of the statute. But in exceptional cases a proviso in itself may amount to a substantive provision. The proviso in the present cases is a guiding factor and not a substantive provision which overrides Section 8(1) (j) of the RTI Act. It does not undo or rewrite Section 8(1) (j) of the RTI Act and does not itself create any new right. The purpose is only to clarify that while deciding the question of larger public interest i.e., the question of balance between public interest in form of right to privacy'and public interest in access to information' is to be balanced."
From this we can derive the4 following conclusions:
1. Immunity is not absolute or inviolable in all circumstances. It is not a rule of law to be applied mechanically in all cases
2. Disclosure shall not bring harm the nation or the public service and equally to the administration of justice.
In the present case therefore while holding that the information sought cannot be excluded from disclosure only on grounds of it being personal information, given the fact that appellant himself is one of the accused in the criminal investigation which has led to this RTI request, and information sought if provided can be used to harm the administration of justice, the decision of the 14 appellate authority Dy. Director (Admn), CBI, HQ of 14.8.'08, and this appeal dismissed.
Reserved in the hearing this Decision is announced this fifteenth day of February 2010. Notice of this decision be given free of cost to the parties.
(Wajahat Habibullah) Chief Information Commissioner 15.2.2010 Authenticated true copy. Additional copies of orders shall be supplied against application and payment of the charges, prescribed under the Act, to the CPIO of this Commission.
(DC Singh) Dy. Registrar 15.2.2010 15