Delhi District Court
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi vs Manoj Shukla @ Vijay on 27 September, 2025
IN THE COURT OF DISTRICT JUDGE -04,
(PRESIDED OVER BY: ANIL CHANDHEL)
WEST DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
CNR No. DLWT01-005704-2017
Civil DJ No. 761/2017
Mr. Paramjeet Singh Kalsi
S/o Late Jaswant Singh,
R/o E-39, Mansarowar Garden,
Delhi-110015 ...Plaintiff
Versus
1. Mr. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay
S/o Late H R Shukla
R/o52/41-A, Gali No. 17,
Nai Basti, Anand Parbat,
New Delhi-110005.
2. Mr. Krisan Kumar
S/o Mr. Ghansyam
52/41-A, Gali No.17,
Nai Basti Anand Parbat,
New Delhi-110005.
Also At:
18/30, FF, Gali No.17,
Railway Line Side,
Anand Parbat Industrial Area,
Delhi-110005 ....Defendants
SUIT FOR POSSESSION, MESNE
PROFITS/DAMAGES AND PERPETUAL
INJUNCTION.
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 1 of 48
Civil DJ No. 761/2017
DATE OF INSTITUTION : 01.07.2017
JUDGMENT RESERVED ON : 16.09.2025
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 27.09.2025
Appearances:
Mr. Keshav Kumar Srivastva, Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff.
Mr. G.K. Chauhan, Ld. Counsel for the Defendant No.1.
JUDGMENT
1. The Plaintiff has filed the present suit, against the Defendants, for recovery of possession, mesne profits/ damages and perpetual Injunction, with regard to suit property.
2. The facts stated in the Plaint:
The facts, as set out in the plaint, are summed up in brief in the paras hereinbelow:
i. The Plaintiff was the sole proprietor and owner M/s Gurunanak Refrigerator Corporation and had been carrying on the business at the property bearing No.18/30, Gali No.5, Railway Line Side, Anand Parbat Industrial Aria, Delhi -110005, which was bounded as under:-
North Property No.118/30-A. South Property No.18/29 Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 2 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 East Drain (Nala) West Street ii. The afore-mentioned property, constructed by the
Plaintiff on plot of land measuring 300 sq. yds, comprised of two floors i.e., ground floor and the first floor. The property tax of the entire said property was being paid by the Plaintiff under the name of his proprietorship concern, i.e., M/s Guru Nanak Refrigerator Corporation.
iii. The entire ground floor was in occupation of one Mr. Subhash Chand Nanda as tenant under the Plaintiff, on monthly a rent of Rs.30,000/- for the last about ten years. The part of first floor of the aforementioned property (Shown Yellow in the plan) was in occupation of M/s. Unique Stitch & Stick Pvt. Ltd as tenant under the Plaintiff on monthly rent of Rs.25,000/-.
iv. Both the Defendants, claiming themselves as close friends and associates of each other, jointly approached the Plaintiff for being inducted as licensee in the portion (marked red in site plan) on first floor and forming part of the aforesaid property. At the instance of both the Defendants jointly, an agreement dated 25.05.2015 to give the aforesaid portion on license for a period of eleven Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 3 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 months, commencing from 01.06.2015, was executed by Defendant No.2 alone in favour of the Plaintiff, on a license fee of Rs.21,000/- per month.
v. Two Plastic-Moulding Machines were installed in the said premises and their operation was being looked after by the Defendant No.1 with the help of two/three labourers/workers till date. The period of aforesaid license in respect of the portion in question, i.e., suit premises, expired on 30.04.2016.
vi. On expiry of the period, the Plaintiff called upon the Defendants to vacate the suit premises, however the Defendants did not vacate the aforesaid portion. The Defendant No.1 misbehaved with the Plaintiff and raised a dispute with regard to the payment of electricity charges and also claimed to be an occupant as a tenant in the suit premises. The Defendants also stopped making the payment of monthly license fee to the Plaintiff.
vii. On account of the misbehaviour, on the part of the Defendant No.1, the Plaintiff had to file the complaint against the Defendant No.1, who was known as Vijay. Upon enquiry by Police in the matter, the Defendant No.1 disclosed his actual name as Manoj Shukla. He also claimed himself to be in occupation as a tenant in the suit premises Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 4 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 taking benefit of the clauses/terms/conditions contained/mentioned in the Deed of License/agreement dated 25.05.2015. Thereafter it transpired that the residential address of Defendant No.2 as provided in in the lease deed was residential address of the Defendant No.1 himself. The payment of electricity charges for the consumption of running of his Plastic-Moulding Machines was also stopped.
viii. In order to avoid electricity dis-connection, the Plaintiff had to get a separate Electricity Connection bearing CA No. 60021166438, the consumption through the said connection was being used exclusively by the Defendant No.1 and the electricity charges were being paid by means of cheques by the Defendant No.1 directly to the authorities concerned as detailed hereinafter:-
Bill period Amount Demanded
03.10.2016 to 21.10.2016 Rs. 8030
22.10.2016 to 01.12.2016 30410
02.12.2016 to 01.01.2017 34840
02.01.2017 to 02.02.2017 42260
03.02.2017 to 08.03.2017 36870
09.03.2017 to 05.04.2017 27050
06.04.2017 to 03.05.2017 29473
03.05.2017 to 01.06.2017 30620
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 5 of 48
Civil DJ No. 761/2017
ix. The Defendants failed to pay the monthly license
fee since May, 2016 to the Plaintiff. The tenure of agreement dated 25.05.2015 stood already expired by efflux of time on 30.04.2016. Since the possession of the Defendants became unauthorized and unlawful after 30.04.2016, therefore, the Plaintiff issued a legal notice dated 14.12.2016 which was duly served upon the Defendant No.2, however he neither responded nor did comply with the terms of the same.
x. The Plaintiff, on coming to know of misrepresentation by the Defendant No.1 of his fictious name as Vijay and about his actual name as Manoj Shukla, issued another dated 29.05.2017, as an abundant caution, to the Defendants by speed post. The Defendants neither complied with the aforesaid notice nor replied to the same.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff has filed the present suit.
3. Service of the Defendants and Written Statements:
3.1. The summons of the suit were issued to the Defendants on 11.07.2017. The Defendant No.1 was served with the summons and entered appearance through Counsel on 02.08.2017. The Defendant No.1 filed the written statement and refuted the contentions of the plaint. The relevant averments, made by the Defendant No.1 in his written Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 6 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 statement and constituting his defence, are being summed up in brief in the paras hereinbelow:
i. The Defendant No.1 has taken the suit property from the Plaintiff on 20.03.2015 as rent free accommodation upon payment of Rs.13,00,000/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs only) as security without interest. It was agreed that the Plaintiff would use Rs.13,00,000/- without any interest and the suit property would be occupied by the Defendant No.1, without payment of rent, till refund of Rs.13,00,000/- to the Defendant No.1. It was agreed that no amount would be claimed from the Defendant No.1 in any manner except the electricity charges. The Defendant No.1 did not execute any rent agreement on 25.05.2015 or at any point of time.
ii. The Defendant No.1 had no concern with any act allegedly done between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.2 and same was done in collusion only with the intention to dispossess the Defendant No.1 from the suit property and to grab the security amount of the Defendant No.1.
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 7 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 iii. The suit property falls in slum area and the requisite permission for institution of the present suit has not been sought by the Plaintiff and therefore, the present suit is not maintainable.
iv. The suit is bad for non-joinder and misjoinder of the necessary parties as the Ramjas Foundation recorded owner of the land under the suit property, DDA, Union of India and Govt. of NCT of Delhi are the necessary parties to the present suit. The suit property has already been acquired by the Govt and the awards have been made by the Govt. and possession of the suit property "as is where is basis" have been taken by the Govt. on 19.06.1988. The ownership rights of the land vest with the Govt./DDA and the same has been supported by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Ramjas Foundation & Ors. V/s Union of India" in Civil Appeal No. 6662/2004 decided on 09.11.2010 cited in VIII(2010)SLT156.
v. The suit of the Plaintiff is not maintainable as the same is hit under Section 3 & 4 of the Delhi Land Restrictions of Transfer Act, 1972.
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 8 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 3.2 The Defendant No.2 could not be served with ordinary process and was served by way of affixation on 29.07.2017.
The Defendant No.2 did not enter appearance and did not file any written statement. The Defendant No.2 was proceeded against ex-parte on 11.05.2018.
4. The facts stated in the Replication:
4.1 The Plaintiff has filed the replication to the written statement of the Defendant No. 1, wherein the Plaintiff has traversed the contents of same and has made the necessary denials, reiterating the averments of the plaint.
5. Issues:
5.1 On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed on 11.05.2018: -
i. Whether the suit is liable to be dismissed as Plaintiff has no locus standi because there is no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant no. 1? OPD1 ii. Whether the Defendant no.1 has paid a sum of Rs. 13 Lacs to the Plaintiff as security without interest? OPD1 iii. Whether the possession of suit property was given Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 9 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 to Defendant no. 1 by plaintiff on 20.03.2015 as rent free accommodation in lieu of payment of Rs. 13 Lacs? OPD1.
iv. Whether there is an agreement between the parties that defendant no.1 shall continue with the possession of the suit property till the sum of Rs. 13 Lacs is returned to Defendant No.1 by the Plaintiff? OPD1.
v. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the absence of the requisite permission as suit property falls under slum area? OPD1 vi. Whether the suit is liable to be dismissed for non-
joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties? OPD1.
vii. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession of property bearing no. 18/30, Gali no. 5, Railway Line Side, Anand Parbat Industrial Area, Delhi-110005? OPP.
viii. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for recovery of sum of Rs.4,68,000/-as prayed for? OPP.
ix. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for pendente-lite and future interest, if so at what rate and for what Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 10 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 period? OPP.
x. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for future damages from the institution of the suit till the actual possession of suit property is handed over, if yes at what rate? OPP.
xi. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for perpetual injunction, thereby restraining the Defendant or any other person acting on his behalf from parting with the possession of suit property except to the Plaintiff? OPP xii. Relief.
The Defendant No.1 was directed to lead his evidence first and the matter was posted for the Defendant's evidence, after framing of Issues.
6. The Defendant's Evidence:
6.1 The Defendant No.1 has led his evidence and has examined three witnesses in support of his case. The Defendant No.1 has himself appeared himself as DW-1. The Defendant No.1 has reiterated the contentions of the written statement in his examination-in-chief. The DW-1 has relied upon the copy of judgment dated 22.09.2017, i.e., Exhibit DW-1/1 in his Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 11 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 examination in chief. The DW-1 was cross-examined by Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff and was discharged upon conclusion of his cross examination.
6.2. The Defendant No.1 has examined the official witness, i.e., Mr. Neeraj Meena, Patwari as DW-2. The DW-2 has produced copy of award dated 11.11.1994, copy of possession proceeding and copy of site plan, which are Ex.
DW-2/1 to Ex. DW-2/3. The DW-2 was cross-examined by Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff and was discharged upon conclusion of his cross examination.
6.3. The Defendant No.1 has examined the official witness, i.e., Mr. Sukhbir Singh, Survey Officer, DUSIB (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) as DW-3. The DW-3 has produced the Exhibit DW- 3/1, i.e., attested copy of Gazette Notification dated 20.04.1957 published in Gazette of India by competent authority, Ex.DW-3/2, i.e., application of RTI filed by Defendant No.1 and Exhibit DW-3/3, i.e., reply to the RTI application. The DW-3 was cross-examined by Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff and was discharged upon conclusion of his cross examination.
6.4. The Defendant No.2 has not filed any written statement nor has led any evidence in the matter and remained absent in the proceedings. The matter was posted for the Plaintiff's evidence after evidence of the Defendant No.1 was closed.
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 12 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017
7. The Plaintiff's Evidence:
7.1. The Plaintiff has filed his affidavit of evidence, however he had passed away before appearing as a witness.
Subsequently the legal representatives of the Plaintiff were brought on record. The Plaintiff's LRs have led their evidence and have examined three witnesses in support of their case. The Plaintiff's son has appeared as PW-1. The PW-1 has reiterated the contentions of the plaint in his examination-in-chief. The PW-1 has exhibited and relied upon the following documents in his examination-in-chief:
i. Exhibit PW-1/1: Evidence by way of affidavit. ii. Exhibit PW-1/2: House Tax Receipt dated 28.06.2016.
iii. Mark-A: Electricity Bill of CA No. 60021166438 dated 04.06.2017.
iv. Exhibit PW-1/4: Site Plan.
v. Exhibit PW-1/5: Lease Agreement dated
25.05.2015.
vi. Exhibit PW-1/6: Meter Installation Service order
form No.212896130 dated 26.10.2016.
vii. Exhibit PW-1/7: Copy of Electricity Bill CA No.
60021166438.
viii. Exhibit PW-1/8: Legal Notice dated 14.12.2016
along with original postal receipts.
ix. Exhibit PW-1/9: Legal Notice dated 29.05.2017
along with original postal receipts and tracking Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 13 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 report.
x. Exhibit PW-1/10: Photograph of the Defendants. xi. Exhibit PW-1/11: Cash memo dated 27.05.2017 for developing the photographs.
xii. Exhibit PW-1/12: Copy of order dated 07.01.2019 passed in FAO No. 85/2018 by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.
xiii. Exhibit PW-1/13: Copy of order passed in SLP No. 6391/2019, dated 12.03.2019 passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court.
xiv. Mark-B: True copy of judgment passed in Sessions Case No. 64/2014 dated 13.02.2015 passed by Hon'ble Court of Sh. Dinesh Bhatt, Ld. ASJ, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
The PW-1 was cross-examined by Ld. Counsel for the Defendant No.1 and was discharged upon conclusion of his cross-examination.
7.2. The Plaintiff's LRs have examined Mr. Ramesh Chand and Mr. Balpreet Singh as PW-2 and PW-3 respectively, as a witnesses of fact. The PW-2 and PW-3 have not relied upon any documents, however have reiterated the averments of the plaint in their examination in chief. The PW-2 and PW-3 were cross-examined by Ld. Counsel for the Defendant No.1 and were discharged upon conclusion of their cross- examination.
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 14 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017
8. Submissions of the Parties.
8.1. Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted that the Plaintiff has duly proved contentions of plaint in evidence and the Defendant No.1 failed to discharge onus of the principals Issues upon him. It is submitted that the plea of payment of Rs.13,00,000/- for rent free use of property has not been proved by the Defendant No.1 and therefore, he did not any right to occupy the suit property. It is submitted that the Defendant No.1 has come into possession through the Plaintiff and therefore, he is estopped from challenging the right, title or ownership of the Plaintiff. It is submitted that the area does not fall under the slum and no permission was required to obtained. It is also submitted that the Defendant No.1 was an unauthorized occupant of the suit property and therefore, the permission under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 was not required to be obtained for evicting him. Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff has relied upon the following judgments, in support of his contentions:
i. Kamaljit Singh Vs. Sarabjit Singh : 2014(16) SCC 472. ii. Tulsi Das Ahuja Vs. Chattar Singh: 2017/DHC/ 5950 8.2. Ld. Counsel for the Defendant No.1 has submitted that the Plaintiff was not owner of the suit property and the suit property was owned by Ramjas Foundation and therefore, Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 15 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 the Plaintiff cannot seek possession from the Defendant No.1. It is submitted that the suit property falls within area notified under the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 and therefore, the Plaintiff cannot institute suit for eviction without obtaining requisite permission under Section 19 of the Act of 1956. It is further submitted that the written license deed, as relied upon by the Plaintiff, is a sham document and the Defendant No.1 is not a party to the same and therefore, the same cannot be enforced against the Defendant No.1. Ld. Counsel for the Defendant No.1 has relied upon the following judgment:
i. Laxmi Ram Pawar Vs. Sitabai Balu Dhotre: AIT 2011 SC450.
9. Conclusions on Issues and reasons for such conclusions:
9.1 Issue No. 1: Whether the suit is liable to be dismissed as Plaintiff has no locus standi because there is no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1? OPD1 9.1.1. The onus to prove the issue No.1 is upon the Defendant No.1. It is case of the Plaintiff that the Defendants have entered into the suit property as licensees, in terms of the license deed dated 25.05.2015, which was signed only by the Defendant No.2 on behalf of the Defendants. The Defendant No.1 has stated that he was not a party to the license deed Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 16 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 dated 25.05.2015 and has not come into possession of the suit property by virtue of it. The Defendant No.1 has stated the Defendant No.1 has paid an amount of Rs.13,00,000/- to the Plaintiff and was permitted to occupy the suit property without payment of any rent, till the time the aforesaid amount of Rs.13,00,000/- is refunded/returned by the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Defendant No.1 does not plead the absence of privity of contract, however he has pleaded privity of contract in terms of the oral agreement, as relied upon by him and the same is evident from the para 4 of the preliminary objections of the written statement. Thus both the Plaintiff and the Defendant No.1 have pleaded different agreements, in terms of their pleadings, in order to assert their rights in the suit property and the absence of any contract/agreement altogether is not case set up by the Defendant No.1. Therefore, the Issue No.1 was wrongly framed in suit and is deleted in view of powers vested in the Court under Order XIV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
9.2. Issue No. 2: Whether the Defendant No.1 has paid a sum of Rs. 13 Lacs to the Plaintiff as security without interest? OPD1 Issue No.3: Whether the possession of suit property was given to Defendant No. 1 by Plaintiff on 20.03.2015 as rent free accommodation in lieu of payment of Rs. 13 Lacs? OPD1.
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 17 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 Issue No.4: Whether there is an agreement between the parties that Defendant No.1 shall continue with the possession of the suit property till the sum of Rs. 13 Lacs is returned to Defendant No.1 by the Plaintiff? OPD1.
9.2.1 The Issue Nos.2, 3 & 4 are inter-connected and therefore are being taken up for discussion together. It is the contention of the Defendant No.1 that the Defendant No.1 has paid an amount of Rs.13,00,000/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs only) to the Plaintiff and he was handed over the possession of the suit property and permitted the rent free use of the same, till the time, the Plaintiff does not return the aforesaid amount without interest or till the time the Defendant No.1 intends to occupy the suit property.
9.2.2. The above-mentioned factual averments give rise to a relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee and further the agreement, as pleaded, spells out factual ingredient of a usufructuary mortgage. Section 58(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is being reproduced hereinbelow:
"58.'Mortgage', 'mortgagor', 'mortgagee', 'mortgage- money' and 'mortgage-deed' defined.
(a) A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 18 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. The transferor is called a mortgagor, the transferee a mortgagee; the principal money and interest of which payment is secured for the time being arc called the mortgage-money, and the instrument (if any) by which the transfer is effected is called a mortgage-deed."
Clause (d) of Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1881 defines Usufructuary Mortgage in the following manner:
"(d) Usufructuary mortgage:
Where the mortgagor delivers possession or expressly or by implication binds himself to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and authorises him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage-money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property or any part of such rents and profits and to appropriate the same in lieu of interest, or in payment of the mortgage-money, or partly in lieu of interest or partly in payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is called an usufructuary mortgage and the mortgagee an usufructuary mortgagee."
Therefore, if the averments of the written statement of the Defendant No.1 are read, in view of the above-referred provision, it is amply clear that the defence of the Defendant No.1 is of a usufructuary mortgage between the Plaintiff and the Defendant No.1.
9.2.3. In order to plead a sustainable defence of usufructuary mortgage, such mortgage, securing a debt of Rs.1,00/- and Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 19 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 above, should be written, signed, attested by two witnesses and registered, in view of Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which is being reproduced hereinbelow:
"59. Mortgage when to be by assurance:
Where the principal money secured is one hundred rupees or upwards, a mortgage 5[other than a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds] can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses.
Where the principal money secured is less than one hundred rupees, a mortgage may be effected either by [a registered instrument] signed and attested as aforesaid, or (except in the case of a simple mortgage) by delivery of the property."
The Defendant No.1 has not produced any written or registered instrument and his contention of debt of Rs.13,00,000/- and retention of the suit property as rent free till repayment, are completely oral. Therefore, the defence of the Defendant No.1 is not legally sustainable, in view of mandate of Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as referred to hereinabove.
9.2.4. More pertinently, the Defendant No.1, besides making oral averments of the amount being paid to the Plaintiff, has not divulged the details and manner of the payment. There is nothing on record about the payment of Rs.13,00,00/- except the self-serving statement of the Defendant No.1 that he has made payment of Rs.13,00,000/- to the Plaintiff on 20.03.2015. The Plaintiff has cross-examined the Defendant Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 20 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 No.1 and the Defendant No.1 stated that he had paid the aforesaid amount in cash. The Defendant No.1 has further stated that he did not remember the denomination for the aforesaid cash amount as it was paid long time ago. The Defendant has stated that a part of Rs.13,00,000/- was paid by him and the remaining was obtained from his mother and brother. He had further stated that his mother had inherited Rs.10,00,000/- to 15,00,000/- in cash from his father and received Rs.5,00,000/- from LIC of father. He had further stated that his mother was present, when the amount was paid to the Plaintiff. The Defendant had further stated that he did not have a bank account. He has stated that his mother had a bank account, but she was not using the same. He has further stated that his brother also had a bank account, however he was not aware as to as to whether brother was using the same or not. He had further stated that the mother and brother were still alive.
9.2.5. The Defendant No.1 has not corroborated the contentions of payment of Rs.13,00,0000/- by any documentary evidence. No receipt for the aforesaid amount is stated to have been obtained and reasons for not obtaining the receipt have also not been stated. No record has been produced to establish that the Defendant No.1 had the ready cash or financial soundness to give an amount of Rs.13,00,000/- in cash to the Plaintiff at the relevant time. Though the amount is stated to obtained by the Defendant from his mother and brother and the amount was further stated to given to the Plaintiff in Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 21 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 presence of the Defendant's mother, however neither the mother nor brother have been examined as witnesses. No document has been produced on record from which it could be inferred that the Defendant's mother and brother has ready cash of such a huge amount, to be given as loan to him. In fact, the reasons for pleaded arrangement of use of the property by paying such a amount has also not been explained. No reason has been stated as to what was such a pressing need to give an amount of Rs.13,00,000/- to the Plaintiff, after obtaining loans and further why the suit property or similarly situated property could not have been taken on rent for use.
9.2.6. Therefore, besides self-serving oral averment, denied by the Plaintiff, there is nothing on record to establish the fact that the Defendant No.1 has paid an amount of Rs.13,00,000/- to the Plaintiff on 20.03.2015. Thus, the on the facts as well as on the law, as discussed hereinabove, the Defendant No.1 has failed to prove that he has paid an amount of Rs.13,00,000/- in cash to the Plaintiff on 20.03.2015 and the Plaintiff had permitted the Defendant No.1 to occupy the suit property without payment of any rent till the same was not returned. The Issue No.2, 3 and 4 are accordingly decided against the Defendant No.1 and in favour of the Plaintiff.
9.3. Issue No.5: Whether the suit is not maintainable in the absence of the requisite permission as suit property falls under slum area?
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 22 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 OPD1.
9.3.1. The onus to prove the Issue No.5 is upon the Defendant No.1. The Defendant No.1 has stated in his written statement that the suit property falls under the area notified under the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 and therefore, the Plaintiff cannot institute suit for eviction without obtaining requisite permission under Section 19 of the Act of 1956. Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted that the area does not fall under the slum and no permission was required to obtained. It is also submitted that the Defendants were unauthorized occupants of the suit property and therefore, the permission under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 was not required to be obtained for evicting them.
9.3.2. In order to prove that the suit falls within the area notified under Section 3 of the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956, the Defendant has examined DW-3 as an Official witness, who is the Survey Officer, DUSIB (Govt. of NCT of Delhi). The DW-3 has produced the following three documents in his examination in chief:
i. Exhibit DW-3/1: attested copy of Gazette Notification dated 20.04.1957 published in Gazette of India by competent authority;
ii. Ex.DW-3/2, i.e., application of RTI filed by Defendant No.1;
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 23 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 iii. Exhibit DW-3/3, i.e., reply to the RTI application.
The Exhibit DW-3/2 and Exhibit DW3/3 are copies of the RTI application and reply furnished by the witness to the same. The Defendant No.1 has sought information under RTI Act in terms of query in the RTI Application Exhibit DW-3/2, whereby a query was raised as to whether the suit property falls under the notified area. The DW-3 has responded to the aforesaid query stating that the suit property falls within notified area. The basis of the information supplied is the Exhibit DW-1/1. The DW-3 has been cross-examined. The address of the suit property is not readily traceable in the aforesaid notification and the witness has also not specifically referred to the area or ward in the notification, under which the suit property falls. The DW-3 has stated in the cross- examination that he could not say as to which properties, the clause (i) at page 787 of DW-3/1 pertains to. He has further stated that he did not have the list of area covered under Ward 17 referred to by him. The DW-3/1 is not complete or conclusive enough in itself to infer that the suit property falls within the notified area, unless and until the suit property is identified clearly from the wards or area mentioned in the notification and further list of the aforesaid area being part of the notification was also required to be filed. Though this Court does not have any reason to disbelieve that the information provided in the RTI Applications was not correctly supplied in the due course of official duties, however some further information is warranted to be sought and Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 24 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 examined for rendering a conclusive finding as to whether the suit property falls under the notified area or not.
9.3.3. Even assuming that the suit property falls in the notified slum area, the permission under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 is required to initiate an action only against a tenant and it is not required for initiating action for recovery of possession of immovable property against the persons, who are occupying the same in the capacities other than that of a tenant. Section 19 of the Act of 1956 is being reproduced hereinbelow:
"19. Proceedings for eviction of tenants not to be taken without permission of the competent authority:
(1.) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority:
a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance), Amendment Act, 1964 (43 of 1964) any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area; or
b) where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or proceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in such area, execute such decree or order.
(2.) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub-section (1) shall make an Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 25 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 application in writing to the competent authority in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed.
(3.) On receipt of such application, the competent authority, after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit, shall by order in writing, either grant or refuse to grant such permission.
(4.) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under sub-section (3), the competent authority shall take into account the following factors, namely:
a) whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted;
b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas;
c) such other factors, if any, as may be prescribed.
(5.) Where the competent authority refuses to grant the permission, it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to the applicant."
9.3.4. Therefore, in terms of Section 19 of the Act, a tenant cannot be evicted without seeking prior permission of the competent authority under the Act. Ld. Counsel for the Defendant No.1 has submitted that the Defendant No.1, being a tenant, cannot be evicted from the suit property, without prior permission of the competent authority and therefore, the suit is not maintainable in absence of the requisite permission. Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted that the Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 26 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 Defendants were unauthorized occupants in the suit property at the time of institution of the suit and therefore, no such permission was required to be obtained, prior to filing the suit in question.
9.3.5. It has been held by the Hon'ble Full Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of "Punnu Ram and Others v. Chiranji Lal Gupta and Others: AIR 1982 Delhi 431", that bar of Section 19 of the Act is applicable only against the tenant and not against an occupant of the premises in other capacities such as licensees or unauthorized occupants. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Full Bench are being reproduced hereinbelow:
"27. This brings us to the consideration of a few other aspects agitated at the Bar. Sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act postulates grant or refusal of the permission to institute any suit or proceedings for obtaining a decree or order for eviction of a tenant or where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or proceedings instituted before the commencement of the Act for eviction of a tenant from any building or land in an area declared as a slum area. The question that arises for consideration is what is the meaning of the term "tenant". As noticed earlier, this term is not defined by the Act. Mr. Narula submits that tenant contemplated by Section 19 is a person in occupation or a person likely to be evicted, if permission is granted to institute eviction proceedings or execute an order of eviction. We do not agree. The protection contemplated is for a tenant as recognized by law. A mere occupier cannot be equated to a tenant. An occupier may be a trespasser or a licensee or a tenant. The concept of welfare State cannot extend to giving protection to the trespassers or persons who have no right of occupation.
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 27 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 Therefore, when the Legislature used the term 'tenant' in Section 19 as well as in the Preamble of the Act it meant tenant-in-law"
The aforesaid position has further been followed by the Hon'ble Court of Delhi in, "Tulsi Dass Ahuja and Ors. Vs. Chattar Singh and Ors.: 2017:DHC:5950", wherein it has been held that a tenant, not being a statutory tenant, becomes an unauthorized occupant upon termination of his tenancy and he cannot plead the bar of Section 19 of the Act. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Court are being reproduced hereinbelow:
"15. I have heard counsels for the parties and has gone through the record including the trial court. I have also gone through the written arguments filed on behalf of the appellants as well as respondents. While I take up first this issue of Section 19 of Slum Area (Improvement & Clearance) Act, question for consideration is whether plea under the above said provision for taking prior permission before institution of the suit, could be taken even at the appellate stage or not. In this regard, I may again refer to judgment in Chiraguddin v. Urmila Rani & Ors. MANU/DE/2335/2014:213 (2014) DLT 699, Single judge bench of Hon'ble Delhi High Court, wherein in more or less similar situation, considering the scope of section 19 of Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, it was observed in Para 10 & 11 of Judgment as "I may note that if the argument which is urged on behalf of the petitioner with respect to non- maintainability of the petition under section 14(1)
(a) of the act is accepted on the ground that there was no jurisdiction of the Additional Rent Controller to pass the judgment decreeing the petition under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, the Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 28 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 same would create a very peculiar position because it is perfectly possible that an eviction petition may be decreed right till the Supreme Court and thereafter in execution proceedings an objection would be taken with respect to the fact that the eviction petition itself was not maintainable in view of the fact that the premises are situated in a slum area and permission of the slum authority was not taken under Section 19 of the Slum Act. To accept such an argument would mean grave harassment of the landlady in allowing a tenant to plead the rights which were waived by him i.e the tenant will be allowed to plead non- existence of jurisdiction although such an issue is an issue of a right which can be waived, and was in fact waived by not raising the same. After many years of litigation in which the landlady is successful in obtaining an eviction order, to argue that the entire proceedings for eviction must fail cannot be accepted. I cannot subscribe to such a view in view of the categorical ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra). In Para 14 of the judgment in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) Supreme Court has applied the principle of estoppels in a case having facts such as the present because if objection under Section 19 of the Slum Act was taken in the written statement, the landlords would have simply withdrawn the petition at that stage and sought permission under Section 19 of the Slum Act. Thus landlords having changed their position to their detriment by pursuing the eviction petition for a longer period of time (at least eight years), petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of maintainability only before the first appellate court. It is an extremely important aspect to note that 'slum area' is now only a mere nomenclature because really there are no slums and there is no slum area except that an area in the old Delhi, popularly known as walled city of Delhi, has been Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 29 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 categorized as a 'slum area' under the Slum Act although in fact and reality the entire walled city of Delhi/old Delhi is totally built-up area and therein exist some of the most valuable immovable properties; both commercial and residential; in Delhi. Actually Slum Act was passed in the year 1956 as per the situation then prevailing but today in the year 2014 really there are no slums but only huge costly buildings, both commercial and residential though technically they continue to be labeled as a 'slum area'."
11. In my opinion in any case the argument urged on behalf of the appellants/defendants of the suit being barred under Section 19 of the Slum Act, even if appellants/defendants are permitted to raise this defence and that this plea was not waived by the appellants/defendants, yet, the issue is covered against the appellants/defendants in terms of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Punnu Ram and Others v. Chiranji Lal Gupta and Others MANU/DE/0388/1982 : AIR 1982 Delhi 431 which holds that protection contemplated under the Slum Act is for a tenant as recognized by law and a mere occupier i.e illegal occupant/trespasser cannot be equated to a tenant. An occupier can be a trespasser or a licencee or a tenant, and if an occupier is a trespasser then the concept of welfare state cannot extend to giving protection to the trespasser or persons who have no right of occupation under Section 19 of the Slum Act. I have had an occasion to consider this aspect in the judgment in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma v. Manoj Kumar Garg in RSA No. 179/2016 decided on 20.7.2016 wherein I have accordingly applied the ratio of the Full Bench judgment in the case of Punnu Ram (supra) and held that the benefit of Section 19 of the Slum Act is only available to a tenant and not to a trespasser or a licencee. The relevant paras of the judgment in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma (supra) is para 5 and this para reads as under:
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 30 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 "5. Before adverting to the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant, I may note that possibly the understanding of the respondent/plaintiff/landlord that permission was required of the slum authority for eviction of the appellant/tenant is based upon a wrong understanding of law inasmuch as permission under Section 19 of the Slum Act is required with respect to a tenant and not a trespasser. Once the appellant/defendant was a tenant at a rent of Rs.
8,000/- per month and was not having protection under the Delhi Rent Control Act as per the case of the respondent/landlord as his tenancy was terminated by efflux of time, as against such a person being the appellant/defendant who continued in possession in spite of expiry of lease by efflux of time, such continuation in possession is as a trespasser and as against an illegal occupant/trespasser no prior permission was required of the slum authority under the Slum Act as held by a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Punnu Ram and Others v. Chiranji Lal Gupta and Others MANU/DE/0388/1982 : AIR 1982 Delhi 431. Para 27 of the judgment is relevant and the same reads as under:
"27. This brings us to the consideration of a few other aspects agitated at the Bar. Sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act postulates grant or refusal of the permission to institute any suit or proceedings for obtaining a decree or order for eviction of a tenant or where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or proceedings instituted before the commencement of the Act for eviction of a tenant from any building or land in an area declared as a slum area. The question that arises for consideration is what is the meaning of the term "tenant". As noticed earlier, this term is not defined by the Act. Mr. Narula submits that tenant contemplated by Section 19 is a person in occupation or a Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 31 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 person likely to be evicted, if permission is granted to institute eviction proceedings or execute an order of eviction. We do not agree.
The protection contemplated is for a tenant as recognized by law. A mere occupier cannot be equated to a tenant. An occupier may be a trespasser or a licensee or a tenant. The concept of welfare State cannot extend to giving protection to the trespassers or persons who have no right of occupation. Therefore, when the Legislature used the term 'tenant' in Section 19 as well as in the Preamble of the Act it meant tenant-in-law"
(underlining added)
12. I would also like to note that an SLP was filed against the aforesaid judgment dated 20.7.2016 in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma (supra) and that SLP being SLP (C) No. 27944/2016 has been dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 30.9.2016. 13. In the present case once the tenancy of the appellants/defendants of the suit property being land stood terminated, the status of the appellants/defendants was not of a tenant or licencee. The status of the appellants/defendants after termination of tenancy became that of an illegal occupier of the suit property and therefore in view of the ratio of the judgment in the case of Punnu Ram (supra) the appellants/defendants even if they would have taken the plea under Section 19 of the Slum Act yet such a defence would not have been successful.
Therefore the last argument urged on behalf of the appellants/defendants is also rejected."
Therefore, it has been held by the Hon'ble Court that the historic bar of Section 19 of the Act is not applicable for filing a suit against a licensor or against a previous tenant, whose tenancy was duly terminated and who was not a statutory tenant under the Delhi Rent Control, 1958. It has further been amplified that 'slum area' is now only a mere Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 32 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 nomenclature because really there are no slums and there is no slum area except that an area in the old Delhi, popularly known as walled city of Delhi, has been categorized as a 'slum area' under the Slum Act although in fact and reality the entire walled city of Delhi/old Delhi is totally built-up area and therein exist some of the most valuable immovable properties; both commercial and residential; in Delhi. It is held that Slum Act was passed in the year 1956 as per the situation then prevailing but today in the year 2014 really there are no slums but only huge costly buildings, both commercial and residential though technically they continue to be labeled as a 'slum area'. It has further been held that the aforesaid objection is waivable by the Defendant. The Defendant No.2 has not filed any written statement and has thus waived the objection. The bar of Section 19 of the Act has only been pleaded by the Defendant No.1 and therefore, the question to be determined is as to what was the status of the Defendant No.1 in the suit property, at the time of institution of the suit.
9.3.6. The Plaintiff has stated that the Defendants approached the Plaintiff to be inducted as licensees in the suit property and a license deed dated 25.05.2015 was executed by the Defendant No.2, on behalf of both the Defendants. The Defendant No.1 has stated that he was not a party to the aforesaid License deed dated 25.05.2015 and he has obtained the possession of the suit property on 20.03.2015 after paying an amount of Rs.13,00,000/- to the Plaintiff. The Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 33 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 Defendant No.1 has failed to establish his contentions of payment of Rs.13,00,000/-, as held hereinabove in discussion under Issue No.2, 3 and 5. Though the Defendant No.1 is referred to a licensee in the plaint, however in the evidence, i.e., examination in chief and cross-examination of the PW-1, the relationship is sometimes referred as tenancy and sometimes as a license.
9.3.7. The only document between the parties is license deed dated 25.05.2015, i.e., Exhibit PW-1/5. Though the document is referred to as license deed, however the difference between a lease and a license is not of the form and is only of the substance of document. Some of the clauses of the License deed could very well be recitals of a lease deed, however there are some clauses in the license deed, which makes it doubtful to interpret the same as a lease. For example, the clauses such as the possession would at all times be only of the Licensor or the parties had only intended to create a license and DRC and tenancy laws were not applicable, speaks against the intention of the parties to create a lease. The Defendant No.1 has not raised any contention that the document was a lease and not a license. The defence of the Defendant No.1 is that he did not execute the document and the same was not binding upon him. The aforesaid document indeed was executed only by the Defendant No.2 and not by the Defendant No.1. The document itself does not reflect that the same was executed or even meant to be executed on behalf of the Defendant No.1. The term and tenor of the Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 34 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 document makes it difficult to read the same as a concluded contract on behalf of the Defendant No.1, who has neither signed nor his name was even remotely mentioned in the document. There is further no corroboration of the factum of acceptance of execution of license deed dated 25.05.2015, on behalf of the Defendant No.1. The Plaintiff has stated that the Defendants have paid the license fee under the agreement, however no documents or receipt for showing such payment by the Defendant No.1 has been shown. The Plaintiff has not produced any evidence, which leads to any inference that the Defendant No.1 has accepted the license deed dated 25.05.2015. The Plaintiff has not proved the material terms of the tenancy such as payment of rent etc. by the Defendant No.1 at any point of time. Therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Defendant No.1 is his tenant or is occupying the suit property in pursuance of license deed dated 25.05.2015. The Defendant No.1 himself did not claim to be a tenant in the written statement.
9.3.8. Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant No.1 have both termed the possession of the Defendant No.1 in the suit property as being permissive and through the Plaintiff, however the Defendant No.1 has not been proven to be a tenant in the suit property and his capacity remains only that of a licensee. In so far as the Defendant No.2 is concerned, he is referred to as licensee in the license deed dated 25.05.2015, whereas in the evidence, sometimes he is referred to as licensee and at some places is referred to as Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 35 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 lessee.
9.3.9. Eventually whatever be capacity of the Defendant No.1 and No.2, however the relationship came to an end, once the Plaintiff issued a notice for termination. The Notice for termination is Exhibit PW-1/8 (Colly) and postal receipts and tracking report of the same are on record. The notice for termination issued to the Defendant No.1 is Exhibit PW-1/9 and the Plaintiff has filed tracking report of service, however no certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has been filed in support of the same. However the Defendant No.1 in his cross-examination has himself admitted that the eviction notice was served upon him. The cross-examination of the Defendant No.1 dated 03.11.2018 (para 4 of page 3) is being reproduced hereinbelow:
"............I have received a notice for eviction from the Plaintiff prior to the institution of the present suit. Legal Notice dated 29.05.2017 bears my correct address. Same is now Ex.-DW-1/X-3.(Court Observation: After seeing the notice, witness has identified only his address and name to be correct but not the notice. Witness submits that he does not remember if this the same notice or not which he received..................)"
Therefore, the Defendant has admitted that he has received the notice for eviction prior to filing of the suit. The witness does not identify the notice, filed by the Plaintiff stating that he did not remember as to whether it was the same notice. However, the Defendant has not produced any notice for termination other than the notice filed by the Plaintiff. In any Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 36 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 case, the Defendant does not dispute the fact that the notice for eviction was served upon him. Once the notice for eviction/termination of tenancy/license is served, the relationship, whether of a licensee or of a tenant, came to end and the permission to occupy the suit property was forfeited and status of the Defendants in the suit property became that of unauthorized occupants.
9.3.10. Thus, the Defendant No.2 has not raised any bar of Section 19 of the Act and the same was waived. The Defendant No.1 was not a tenant in the suit premises and, the license of the Defendant No.1 stood terminated by termination notice dated 29.05.2017. Therefore, no permission was required to be sought under Section 19 of the Act, prior to institution of the present suit against the Defendants. Therefore, the Issue No. 5 is decided against the Defendant No.1 and in favour of the Plaintiff.
9.4. Issue No.6: Whether the suit is liable to be
dismissed for non-joinder and
misjoinder of necessary parties? OPD1.
9.4.1. The onus to prove the Issue No.6 is upon the Defendant No.1. The Defendant No.1 has stated in the written statement that the Plaintiff is not owner of the suit property. It is stated that the suit property is owned by Ramjas Foundation and further has legally been acquired by the DDA/ Government of India. Therefore, the Plaintiff, not being the owner of the Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 37 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 suit property, cannot maintain suit for possession against the Defendant No.1.
9.4.2. The Defendant No. 1 has examined the DW-2 to prove the factum of acquisition of the suit property. The DW-2 is area Patwari, who has produced copy of award dated 11.11.1994, copy of possession proceeding conducting by the DDA and copy of site plan, which are Ex. DW-2/1 to Ex. DW-2/3. However, the aforesaid documents brought by the DW-2 are only photocopies. Ld. Counsel for the Plaintiff has raised objection to exhibition of the documents on the ground of same being only copies and original/certified copies of the same still have not been sought and produced. Further though it has been stated that the suit property falls in the Khasra No.270, any further details of the properties so acquired has not been given, with regard to the properties or their acquisition, in terms of specific details of the properties, their owners, the amount of compensation booked or granted. Further the Witness was not sure as to whether the possession of the suit property was acquired. Therefore, on the basis of the copies of the aforementioned three documents, it cannot be concluded that the suit property was acquired for public purpose by the DDA or by the Government.
9.4.3. The contentions of the acquisition are only intended to raise a ground that the Plaintiff was not the owner of the suit property. Therefore, primary contention of the Defendant Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 38 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 No.1 is that the Plaintiff is not the owner of the suit property and the actual owners have not been joined in the proceedings. The Plaintiff has not filed any documents, whereby the ownership of the Plaintiff could be inferred. The testimony of the PW-1 further spells out the absence of the documents and rights appears to be based upon long settled possession. Though the ownership of the Plaintiff may not have been proved, however the ownership of the Ramjas Foundation or DDA has also not been proved, in terms of the evidence led by the Defendant No.1.
9.4.4. The Plaintiff may not have proved the ownership of the suit property, however the same does not create a bar to maintain the present suit against the Defendants. A suit for possession of immovable property can be filed in multiple capacities such as:
i. On the basis of absolute ownership.
ii. On the basis of landlord-tenant relationship;
iii. On the basis of licensor-licensee relationship;
iv. On the basis of prior possession alone under Section 6
of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, within a period of 6 months from the date of dispossession;
v. On the basis of prior possession alone under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963, within a period of 12 years from the date of dispossession.
In the suit for possession on the basis of landlord-tenant Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 39 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 relationship or licensor-licensee relationship, the ownership is not needed to be proved, in case the relationship of landlord-tenant or licensor-licensee is established. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 creates a bar against a tenant or licensee to challenge the ownership or title of the landlord or licensor. In a suit for possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the ownership is not required to be proved. Even in a suit under Article 64 of Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for possession of immovable property, on the basis of prior possession alone, can be filed within a period of 12 years from the date of dispossession. It has been held by the Hon'ble full bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in "Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. Rev. Fr. K.C. Alexander (12.02.1968 - SC):
MANU/SC/0144/1968: 1968 INSC 39", that in a suit on the basis of possession, filed by the Plaintiff, within a period of 12 years from the date of his dispossession, as per Article 64 of the Limitation Act, the Plaintiff is not required to prove his title, unless and until the Defendant challenges the same and prove the title in the suit property and in that eventuality, the Plaintiff has to show a better title than the Defendant.
9.4.5. It has been established on record that the Defendants came into possession of the suit property only licensees of the Plaintiff. It is the case of the Defendant No.1 that he acquired the possession of the suit from the Plaintiff for a limited period till the repayment of amount of Rs.13,00,000/-
by the Plaintiff. Though the Defendant No.1 failed to prove Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 40 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 the factum of payment of Rs.13,00,000/- in first itself, however the nature of his possession is only permissive through the Plaintiff. Once the factum of the Defendant No.1 being a licensee of the Plaintiff is established, the Defendant No.1 is estopped from challenging the ownership or title of the Plaintiff, in terms of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which is being reproduced hereinbelow:
"116. Estoppel of tenant and of licensee of person in possession.
No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given."
9.4.6. The bar under Section 116 of Act of 1872 against the tenant or licensee has been explained and affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in "Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra Vs. Stanley Parker Jones: AIR2006SC3569", and the relevant observations of the Hon'ble Court are being reproduced hereinbelow:
"11. The "possession" in the instant case relates to second limb of the Section. It is couched in negative terms and mandates that a person who cones upon any Immovable property by the license of the person in possession thereof, shall not be permitted to deny that such person had title to such possession at the Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 41 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 tine when such license was given.
12. The underlying policy of Section 116 is that where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord at the tine of the settlement then that will give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship of the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the said section.
13. The principle of estoppel arising from the Contract of tenancy is based upon a healthy and salutary principle of law and justice that a tenant who could not have got possession but for his contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord should not be allowed to launch his landlord in some inequitable situation taking undue advantage of the possession that he got and any probable defect in the title of his landlord. It is on account of such a contract of tenancy and as a result of the tenant's entry into possession on the admission of the landlord's title that the principle of estoppel is attracted.
14. Section 116 enumerates the principle of estoppel which is merely an extension of the principle that no person is allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time. 15. As laid down by the Privy Council in Krishna Prasad Lal v. Barabani Coal Concern Ltd. MANU/PR/0072/1937, "It (Section 116) deals with one cardinal and simple estoppel and states it first as applicable between landlord and tenant and then as between licensor and licensee, a distinction which corresponds to that between the parties to an action for rent and the parties to an action for use and occupation".
Thus, a licensee cannot challenge the right or title of the Licensor in an action by the Licensor for his eviction. A Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 42 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 licensee cannot be heard to say that the Licensor's right was good and valid to place him in the possession, and was not good enough to receive the possession back from him, when there was no change in the status and circumstances of the parties. Therefore, the Defendant cannot challenge the right of the Plaintiff to recover possession on the basis of challenge to his title. Between a licensor and licensee, the licensor has a better right for possession of the immovable property. Therefore, the Plaintiff has a better right to retain possession of the suit property amongst him and the Defendants, even though the aforesaid right may not be perfect enough against the third parties at large. It is not even case of the Defendant No.1 that in case the Plaintiff was not owner and third parties were owners, he was authorized by such third parties to remain in the possession. Therefore, the aforesaid parties are not required to be impleaded to the present suit and the suit does not suffer from any misjoinder or non-joinder. The Issue No.6 is accordingly decided in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant No.1.
9.5. Issue No.7: Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession of property bearing No. 18/30, Gali no. 5, Railway Line Side, Anand Parbat Industrial Area, Delhi-110005? OPP.
9.5.1. The Onus to prove the Issue No.7 is upon the Plaintiff. It has been established on record that the Defendants have acquired Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 43 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 the permissive possession of the suit property through the Plaintiff. It has been established on record, in terms of discussion under Issue No. 2 to 6, that the Defendant No.2 has come into possession through License deed dated 25.05.2015, whereas the Defendant No.1 was permitted as a Licensee. It has been established on record that relationship between the parties was duly terminated in terms of termination/eviction notices dated 14.12.2016 and 29.05.2017. The Defendants have failed to show any ground to remain in possession of the suit property, subsequent to service of the eviction/termination notice. The contentions of the Defendant No.1, in terms of defences raised by him, have already been decided hereinabove in discussion under Issue No.2 to 6 and the same are not being mentioned again to avoid repetition, however the same are relied upon herein. Accordingly, the Plaintiff, on account of pre-ponderance of probabilities, has established his entitlement for a decree possession of the suit property against the Defendants. It is clarified that this Court has only decided the right of Plaintiff as Licensor to obtain possession from his previous Licensees and has not decided the ownership of the Plaintiff and the observations passed in this judgment shall not affect the right(s) of any third party to enforce its rights against the Plaintiff, with regard to suit property, on the basis of ownership or on the basis of any other legal right, if otherwise entitled in law. The Issue No.7 is accordingly decided in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants.
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 44 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 9.6. Issue No.8. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for recovery of sum of Rs.4,68,000/-as prayed for? OPP.
Issue No.9. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for pendente-lite and future interest, if so at what rate and for what period? OPP.
Issue No.10. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for future damages from the institution of the suit till the actual possession of suit property is handed over, if yes at what rate? OPP.
9.6.1. The Issue No.8, 9 and 10 pertain to the entitlement of the Plaintiff to claim the mesne profits/damages from the Defendant and their liability to pay the same and therefore, the aforesaid Issues are taken up for discussion together. The Plaintiff has claimed damages/mesne profits at the rate of Rs.36,000/- per month. Though the Plaintiff has sought the damages in a sum of Rs.36,000/- per month, however the Plaintiff has not proved that the aforesaid rate is rate of rent of the similarly situated properties or the other properties, let out by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has stated that the Defendant are licensees at the monthly license fee of Rs.21,000/-. The aforesaid license deed is signed and executed only by the Defendant No.2 and not by the Defendant No.1, however the Defendant No.1 has also been running commercial activity in the suit property and it has Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 45 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 not been disputed by the Defendant No.1 that the suit property would not fetch a rent of Rs.21,000/-, at the relevant time. No alternative rate of rent has been pleaded by the Defendant No.1 as the rent of the suit property or of the similarly situated properties in the vicinity. In absence of any other evidence, the amount mentioned in the license deed dated 25.05.2015 is the only indicator for ascertaining the entitlement of the Plaintiff for mesne profits/damages and the aforesaid amount is Rs.21,000/- per month. The Defendant No.1 has been directed by the Hon'ble High Court to deposit the amount of Rs.21,000/- per month in term Order dated 07.01.2019 passed in FAO No.85 of 2018, which the Defendant No.1 has been depositing. Therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to claim only Rs.21,000/- with effect from 01.05.2016 till recovery of possession of the suit property. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly in view of the fact that the Plaintiff was only a licensor, this Court is not inclined to grant any further amount towards damages or interest to the Plaintiff. The Issue No.8, 9 and 10 are accordingly decided.
9.7. Issue No.11. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for perpetual injunction, thereby restraining the Defendant or any other person acting on his behalf from parting with the possession of suit property except to the plaintiff? OPP Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 46 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017
9.7.1. Since the Plaintiff has proved his entitlement for the decree of possession, therefore, the Defendants do not have any right to create any third party rights in the suit property and the decree for permanent injunction is only consequential to the same. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of permanent injunction against the Defendants. The Issue No.3 is accordingly decided against the Defendants and in favour of the Plaintiff.
10. Relief/Final Decision:
10.1. The suit of the Plaintiff is decreed against the Defendants for prayer of possession of suit property, i.e., area on the first floor of property No. 18/30, Gali No.5, Railway Line Side, Anand Parbat Industrial Area, Delhi-110005, more specifically shown in site plan Ex.PW-1/4. The decree for permanent injunction is also passed and the Defendants are restrained from creating any third party right in the suit property or from parting with the possession of the same, in contravention of the decree of possession, passed hereinabove. The decree for mesne profits/damages is also passed in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants and the Defendants are directed to make payment of an amount of Rs.21,000/- per-month w.e.f. 01.05.2016 till the recovery of the possession. The Plaintiff is directed to furnish the deficient Court-Fees, if any, towards the decree of mesne profits/damages and in case, the aforesaid Court-
Fees is not paid, the Plaintiff shall not be entitled to execute Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 47 of 48 Civil DJ No. 761/2017 the decree to the extent of the amount, upon which the Court-Fees remains payable. Upon payment of the deficient Court-Fees, the amount already deposited by the Defendant No.1 is directed to be released to the Plaintiff and the aforesaid amount shall also be adjusted in the decree for mesne profits/damages. The decree sheet be drawn up accordingly. The files be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by ANIL ANIL CHANDHEL
CHANDHEL Date: 2025.09.27
17:17:21 +0530
Announced in the open Court (ANIL CHANDHEL)
today 27th of September, 2025 District Judge-04
(West District)
THC/DELHI/27.09.2025
Paramjeet Singh Kalsi Vs. Manoj Shukla @ Vijay Page No. 48 of 48
Civil DJ No. 761/2017