Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Santosh Dutt Patwari vs Govt. Of Nctd on 1 December, 2025
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No.3437 of 2016
With
O.A. No.3581 of 2017
Orders reserved on :20.11.2025
Orders pronounced on : 01.12.2025
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
O.A. No.3437 of 2016
Santosh Dutt Patwari Aged 47 years,
s/oSh.RavinderDutt,
working as Patwari in District West,
GNCT of Delhi, Delhi.
R/o WZ-2 Am Gali No.13, Shadipur,
New Delhi-08
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri Yogesh Sharma)
VERSUS
1. Govt. of NCT of Delhi through The Chief Secretary,
New Sectt., Players Building,
I.P.Estate, New Delhi.
2. The Divisional Commissioner,
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
Revenue Department,
5 Sham Nath Marg, Delhi-52
3. The Deputy Commissioner (Revenue),
North West District,
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
Kanjhawala, Delhi-81
4. The Deputy Commissioner (Revenue),
West District,
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
Old Middle School Building,
Rampura, Delhi-35
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Shri Amit Yadav)
2025.12.09
RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49
+05'30'
Item No.60/C-2 2 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017
OA 3581/2017
Santosh DuttPatwari, Aged- 48 Years,
S/o Sh. RavinderDutt,
Working as Patwari in District North,
GNCT ofDelhi, Delhi.
R/o WZ-2Am Gali No.13, Shadipur,
New Delhi-08
....Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri Yogesh Sharma)
Versus
1. Govt. of NCT of Delhi through The Chief Secretary,
New Sectt., Players Building,
I.P.Estate, New Delhi.
2. The Divisional Commissioner,
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
Revenue Department,
5 Sham Nath Marg, Delhi-52
3. The Deputy Commissioner (West),
West District,
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
Old Middle School Building,
Rampura, Delhi-35.
4. The District Magistrate (North)
North District,
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
D.M. Office Complex, G.T. Karnal Road,
Alipur, Delhi-36.
....Respondents
(By Advocate: Shri Amit Yadav)
2025.12.09
RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49
+05'30'
Item No.60/C-2 3 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. RajinderKashyap, Member (A):
Since both matters are inter-connected and have been instituted by the same applicant, Shri Santosh Dutt Patwari, seeking substantially similar reliefs, and as learned counsel for the parties agreed, they were heard together. Accordingly, they are being disposed of by this common order.
2. In OA No.3437/2016 filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has sought the following reliefs:-
"(i) That the Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an order directing the respondents to treat the entire suspension period from 6.6.2005 to 3.9.2005 and w.e.f. 23.8.2007 to 14.8.2008 as on duty for all purposes with all the consequential benefits including the arrears of difference of pay and allowances.
(ii) That the Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an order directing the respondents to consider and to grant the benefits of 1st Financial Upgradation on completion of 12 years of service w.e.f. 27.11.2007 under ACP Scheme and 2nd financial upgradation on completion of 20 years of service w.e.f. 27.11.2015 under MACP scheme with all the consequential benefits with arrears of difference of pay and allowances with interest.
(iii) That the Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an order directing the respondents to re-fix the pay of the applicant after granting due increments from 6.6.2005 till 14.8.2008 (for the year 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008) with all the consequential benefits including the arrears of difference of pay and allowances.
(iv) That the Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an order directing the respondent to consider and to grant the promotion to the applicant to the post of Kanangoo on ad hoc basis from the date of promotion of junior and similarly situated persons with all consequential benefits.
(v) Any other relief which the Hon'ble Tribunal deem fit and proper may also be granted to the applicants along with the costs of litigation."
3. In OA No.3581/2017 filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has sought the following reliefs:-
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 4 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 "(i) That the Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an order quashing the impugned charge sheet 25.3.201 7 (Annex. A/1) with all the consequential benefits.
(ii) Any other relief which the Hon'ble Tribunal deem fit and proper may also be granted to the applicants along· with the costs of litigation."
FACTS OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was appointed on 27.11.1995 as Patwari in the Revenue Department, Government of NCT of Delhi, and has been working on the same post since his initial appointment. 4.1 The applicant was placed under suspension vide order dated 6.6.2005 (Annexure A/2). It is stated by the applicant that aggrieved by the aforesaid order of suspension, the applicant submitted a representation dated 27.6.2005, which was not considered. As the suspension was not extended within the statutory period of 90 days, the applicant submitted further representations dated 20.2.2006, 4.4.2006, 9.6.2006 and 10.7.2006 requesting revocation of suspension and reinstatement.
4.2 Despite the expiry of the statutory period, the respondents illegally extended the suspension for a further period of 180 days w.e.f. 26.9.2006 vide order dated 25.9.2006 (Annexure A/3), after an unexplained and impermissible gap of 474 days. The applicant submitted a representation dated 9.3.2007 (Annexure A/4) against such illegal extension.
4.3 The competent authority, vide order dated 22.8.2007 (Annexure A/5), revoked the suspension retrospectively, holding that the applicant was deemed to have been reinstated w.e.f. 4.9.2005, 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 5 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 i.e., upon completion of 90 days from the date of his initial suspension. However, on the very next day, i.e., 23.8.2007, the applicant was again placed under suspension by the disciplinary authority (Annexure A/6), without assigning any reason or issuing any charge sheet. The suspension was further extended for 180 days vide order dated 12.11.2007 (Annexure A/7).
4.4 Aggrieved by the same, the applicant preferred an appeal dated 23.10.2007 before the Divisional Commissioner (Annexure A/8). Ultimately, the suspension was revoked by the respondents vide order dated 14.8.2008 (Annexure A/9), again without issuance of any charge sheet or initiation of any disciplinary proceedings. As such to total suspension period of the applicant is as under:-
1. 6.6.2005 to 3.9.2005 - 90 days
2. 23.8.2007 to 14.8.2008 - 355 days 4.5 Applicant stated that both suspensions were wholly unjustified, illegal, and without basis. However, both suspension periods remain unregularized till date. Because the suspension period has not been regularized, the applicant has been denied the following statutory benefits:
1. Due increments from 6.6.2005 to 14.8.2008 (for the years 2005-
2008).
2. 1stFinancial Upgradation under the ACP Scheme w.e.f. 27.11.2007 (completion of 12 years).
3. 2ndFinancial Upgradation under the MACP Scheme w.e.f. 27.11.2015 (completion of 20 years).
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 6 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 4.6 Besides the above, vide order dated 1.11.2011, juniors and similarly situated persons were promoted to the post of Kanungo on ad hoc basis. The applicant was not considered for promotion solely on the ground that his suspension period had not been regularized, although pendency of suspension matters has no bearing on such promotion.
4.7 Thereafter, the applicant submitted a detailed representation dated 9.3.2016 (Annexure A/1) requesting regularization of suspension periods and grant of all due benefits, including ACP/MACP entitlements and ad hoc promotion. However, no response has been given by the respondents. Hence, the OA No.3437/2016 has been filed by the applicant.
OA No.3581/2017 4.8 The respondents issued the impugned charge sheet vide Memorandum dated 25.03.2017 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 (Annexure A/1). The following article of charge was framed against the applicant:
"Sh. Santosh Dutt, Patwari of Village Sultanpur Dabas, Delhi, while posted in District North-West during the year 1988, conspired and misused his official position and thereby illegally allowed the sale/transfer/mutation of Gram Sabha land 'Makbooja Kumharan' in the name of an individual, causing wrongful loss to the Government and corresponding gain to a private person."
4.9 The applicant submitted a detailed representation dated 09.06.2017 (Annexure A/3), pointing out, inter alia, that an identical charge sheet on the same allegations had already been quashed by this Tribunal in Than Singh vs. GNCT of Delhi in OA No.1929/2010 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 7 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 vide order/judgment dated 8.8.2011 and other grounds. Despite this, the respondents did not withdraw the charge sheet. 4.10 Instead of considering the representation, the disciplinary authority issued a corrigendum dated 20.07.2017 (Annexure A/2), merely correcting the year 1988 to 1998. Subsequently, vide order dated 18.09.2017 (Annexure A/4), an Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed to proceed with the inquiry. Hence, this OA (3581/2017) has been filed by the applicant.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT
5. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant's suspension was revoked long ago vide order dated 14.08.2008 without initiation of any disciplinary proceedings. In the absence of any misconduct being established or proceedings being initiated, the entire suspension period is rendered unjustified. Consequently, the period of suspension ought to be regularized and treated as duty for all purposes.
5.1 Learned counsel argued that as per the Government of India instructions, where departmental proceedings initiated for a major penalty conclude with only a minor penalty, the suspension is deemed wholly unjustified, entitling the employee to full pay and allowances for the suspension period. In the present case, the applicant stands on a stronger footing, as no departmental proceedings whatsoever were ever initiated. Hence, the suspension was wholly unjustified and the applicant is entitled to full benefits for the entire period. 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 8 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 5.2 In support of above contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bank of India v. Degala Suranarayana, reported in 1999 (2) SC SLJ 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where suspension is unjustified and not followed by disciplinary action, the employee is entitled to all consequential benefits, including promotion from the due date.The applicant's case is squarely covered by this precedent, and therefore he is entitled to similar relief.
5.3 Learned counsel further argued that the applicant became eligible for the first financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme on completion of 12 years of service w.e.f. 27.11.2007, and the second financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme w.e.f. 27.11.2015 upon completion of 20 years of service. The respondents' failure to consider and grant these financial upgradations is arbitrary, discriminatory, and contrary to the applicable policy. It is a settled principle that fair and non-discriminatory consideration for promotion is a legal and fundamental right. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme court in Dwarka Prasad & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2004 (1) ATJ (SC) 591, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that every employee has the right to be considered for promotion on an equal and fair basis. The denial of promotion to the applicant from the date on which his juniors were promoted is thus illegal, arbitrary, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
5.4 Learned counsel produced a copy of DoP&T's OM dated 24.02.2003. According to which, by referring to para 7 of OM dated 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 9 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 14.09.1992 which provides that if a Government servant has been recommended for promotion, but before actual promotion any adverse circumstance arises (such as disciplinary proceedings or a criminal case), then the person is to be treated as if he had been placed in sealed cover and cannot be promoted until complete exoneration. However, keeping in view the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgment in Delhi Jal Board v. Mohinder Singh, reported in JT 2000 (10) SC 158 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the right to be considered for promotion is a fundamental right under Article 16, provided eligibility conditions are met. Sealed cover procedure is permissible but once the disciplinary inquiry ends in exoneration, the officer must be given promotion benefits from the date the DPC originally considered him. Crucially, if after the first inquiry ends in favour of the employee and the sealed cover is opened, the fact that a second inquiry has started later cannot defeat the benefit of the first DPC recommendation. Because exoneration relates back to the date of initiation of first charges. Keeping in view the aforesaid directives of the Hon'ble Supreme Court through this OM, it is clarified that Para 7 of the 14.09.1992 OM does not apply where a second disciplinary proceeding is initiated after the junior has been promoted. In such cases, once the employee is exonerated in the first inquiry, he is entitled to promotion from the date his junior was promoted, based on the first DPC's sealed cover recommendation. If the second inquiry (initiated after the junior's promotion) results in a penalty before exoneration in the first inquiry, and the Government servant is subsequently promoted retrospectively on exoneration then the 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 10 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 penalty may need to be modified and applied with reference to the promoted post. The promotion order should specifically indicate this to avoid confusion.
5.5 So far as challenge to the issuance of the impugned charge sheet dated 25.03.2017 (Annexure A/1 in OA 3581/2017) is concerned, learned counsel argued that the only allegation in the statement of imputation is that the applicant did not raise an objection to the complaint dated 10.07.1997 submitted by Sh. Dharam Singh regarding non-registration of a sale deed of the land in question in his report submitted before Shri Than Singh Tyagi, the then Sub-Registrar VI-A, Narala, Delhi on 28.07.1998. However, he raised this objection in his report submitted before Sh. Suresh Chand, the then ACO/Naib Tehsildar, Narela, Delhi on 14.09.1998 at the time of mutation in favour Smt. Keshar Wati, Sh. Savita Gupta and Smt. Kiran Gupta. However, the factual position is very different as the then Sub- Registrar, Sh. Than Singh Tyagi, gave only a verbal direction to the applicant to submit names of persons belonging to the Kumhar community which the applicant complied with by supplying the names of five persons and enclosing a copy of the Chakbandi Khatoni, clearly mentioning that the land belonged to "Makbooja Kumharan". However, no report relating to sale/mutation was prepared by the applicant at that stage. The documents relating to the sale/mutation came before the applicant for the first time on 28.07.1998. At that very moment, the applicant immediately raised a written objection before the competent authority, which was duly considered and accepted. Resulting in cancellation of the sanctioned mutation by the then 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 11 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 Deputy Commissioner (North-West) and the Financial Commissioner. The affected private parties (Kesharvati & Others) challenged the cancellation before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) No. 11797- 99/2006 and the Hon'ble High Court, vide order/judgment dated 07.05.2012 (Annexure A/6) upheld the cancellation of mutation dated 17.12.1998. As such, the objection raised by the applicant was correct and legally justified and the alleged illegal mutation never got validated. Therefore, no loss to the Government and no gain to any private person occurred. Consequently, no misconduct can be attributed to the applicant. Thus, the foundation of the charge sheet is factually and legally incorrect.
5.6 Learned counsel also submitted that as per the provisions of Section 13 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, the "Makbooja Kumharan" were declared Bhumidars after depositing the requisite fee on 19.04.1958. The applicant's report dated 28.07.1998 merely stated this factual position. This report did not grant permission for sale or transfer of the land. Further the RTI information confirms that Makbooja Kumharan were declared Bhumidhar u/s 13 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 as per entries in LR-4, and there is no provision prohibiting a Bhumidhar from transferring land. Thus, the applicant's report was factually correct and legally unobjectionable. 5.7 Learned counsel also argued that an identical charge sheet pertaining to the same land, same period and same allegations was issued to Sub-Registrar Sh. Than Singh Tyagi on 30.10.2009, which was challenged by the said Shri Than Singh Tyagi before this Tribunal by filing OA No.1999/2010 and this Tribunal vide order/judgment 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 12 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 dated 08.08.2011 (Annexure A/5) quashed the same. The applicant's case stands on even stronger footing.
5.8 Learned counsel argued that impugned charge sheet is wholly vague, as it merely alleges that "during the year 1998, the applicant conspired and misused his official position," without disclosing how the applicant misused his position, with whom he allegedly conspired, and what illegal act was committed in the year 1988. In the absence of specific, intelligible particulars, the charge sheet fails to disclose any misconduct and is liable to be set aside as unsustainable in law. 5.9 Learned counsel also argued that the alleged misconduct pertains to the year 1998, whereas, the impugned charge sheet has been issued only in 2017, after an unexplained delay of 19 years, rendering the proceedings vitiated. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, reported in 1998 (4) SCC 154, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that unexplained delay causes grave prejudice to the delinquent and vitiates disciplinary proceedings. Further reliance has been placed on the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that departmental proceedings initiated after long and unexplained delay (8 years in that case) are liable to be quashed. In the present case, the delay is far more 19 years with not even a vague explanation. Thus, the impugned charge sheet is unsustainable. 5.10 Learned counsel submitted that an identical charge sheet issued to Shri Than Singh Tyagi on 30.10.2009 relating to the very same 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 13 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 allegations, same land, and same period was quashed by this Tribunal in OA No.1929/2010, titled Than Singh Tyagi vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, vide order/judgment dated 08.08.2011. The Tribunal held that there was nothing to substantiate allegations of undue advantage. Delay was unexplained. No ulterior motive was shown. In such circumstances, allowing an enquiry after long lapse of time would be unjustified. The above observations squarely apply to the present applicant, and therefore the impugned charge sheet is liable to be quashed.
5.11 Learned counsel for the applicant has also relied upon the common order/judgment of this Tribunal in OA No.1447/2018 and OA No.1527/2018 decided on 20.03.2023 wherein also this Tribunal ruled that delay which is unexplained and unreasonably would cause prejudice to the delinquent employee. Such delay clearly manifests the lack of seriousness on the part of the DA in pursuing the charges against the employee. In the event of any employee deviating from path of honesty, efficiency and diligently, action should expeditiously be taken as per prescribed procedure.
5.12 Learned counsel argued that the applicant, who was appointed on 27.11.1995, completed more than 20 years of service without a single promotion or financial up-gradation. After the applicant approached this Hon'ble Tribunal in OA No.3437/2016 seeking due promotion, the disciplinary authority issued the impugned charge sheet on 25.03.2017 maliciously only to frustrate his legitimate claims. Thus, it is established that the impugned charge sheet is issued with mala fides and colourable exercise of power.
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 14 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 5.13 Learned counsel also submitted that it is well-settled that fair and non-discriminatory consideration for promotion is a legal and fundamental right. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dwarka Prasad & Ors. v. Union of India, reported in 2004 (1) ATJ (SC) 591, wherein it has been held that "Right to be considered for promotion on fair and equal basis without discrimination may be claimed as a legal and fundamental right under Articles 14 and 16." Therefore, denying promotion to the applicant from the date his juniors were promoted is arbitrary, discriminatory, and unconstitutional.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents by referring to the reply submitted that a complaint was received from the CM Office against certain officials of North-West District, whereupon an enquiry was conducted by the then ADM (NW) and a report was submitted to the Vigilance Department, GNCTD. The said enquiry report was thereafter forwarded by the Directorate of Vigilance, GNCTD to the Anti-Corruption Branch for further action. In the charge sheet issued by ACB, it was alleged that Shri Than Singh (then Sub-Registrar), Shri Suresh Chand (then CO/NT), Shri Santosh Dutt (then Patwari) (applicant herein), and Shri R.S. Sehrawat (then BDO), North-West District, abused their official position and illegally allowed sale/transfer/mutation of Gram Sabha land "Makbooja 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 15 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 Kumharan" in favour of private individuals, causing wrongful loss to the Government and corresponding gain to private persons in respect of land situated at Village Sultanpur Dabas. An FIR No. 41/2006 dated 06.06.2006 was registered at PS-ACB on the basis of the above allegations. It has been further alleged that the applicant, while working as Halka Patwari, Village Sultanpur Dabas, failed to place on record the objection dated 10.07.1997 submitted by Shri Dharambir Singh S/o Shri Harkishan, objecting to registration of the land in question. It is also alleged that the applicant submitted his report before Shri Than Singh, the then Sub-Registrar VI-A, Narela on 28.07.1998 without mentioning the objection, and only later raised this objection in his report submitted before Shri Suresh Chand, ACO/NT, Narela on 14.09.1998 at the stage of mutation in favour of Smt. Kesharwati, Smt. Savita Gupta and Smt. Kiran Gupta.
6.1 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant was appointed as Patwari on 27.11.1995. The applicant was placed under suspension vide order dated 06.06.2005. The Competent Authority vide order dated 22.08.2007 revoked the suspension w.e.f. 04.09.2005 (the date of completion of 90 days), and the applicant was deemed to have been reinstated with effect from the same date. However, on 23.08.2007, the applicant was again placed under suspension, which was subsequently extended for 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 16 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 180 days vide order dated 12.11.2007. The second suspension was revoked vide order dated 14.08.2008.
6.2 Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that a charge sheet has been served upon the applicant under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 alleging gross misconduct and misbehaviour, and further, an FIR bearing No. 41/2006 has been registered by the Anti-Corruption Branch against the applicant (then Patwari). The applicant is yet to submit his reply to the said charge sheet and in view of the pendency of disciplinary and criminal proceedings, the applicant is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
6.3 Learned counsel also submitted the applicant is not entitled to consideration for promotion, regularization of his suspension period, or benefits under the ACP/MACP Scheme, in view of the pendency of disciplinary proceedings against him. As long as such proceedings remain unresolved, the applicant cannot be granted any financial or promotional advancement under the applicable rules. The Competent Authority under the respondents shall take appropriate action upon conclusion of the enquiry, and all admissible salary and benefits, as determined thereafter, will be released to the applicant.
6.4 So far as challenge to the aforesaid charge sheet on the ground that identical charge sheet had been quashed by this Tribunal in the case of Than Singh is concerned, learned counsel 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 17 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 submitted that the charge sheet issued to Shri Than Singh cannot be termed as 'identical' to the one issued to the applicant. The duties, responsibilities, and statutory powers of a Tehsildar/Sub- Registrar are entirely distinct from those of a Patwari. Accordingly, the allegations and their legal implications cannot be equated, and the applicant cannot claim parity with the proceedings or outcome in Shri Than Singh's case. 6.5 Learned counsel also submitted that there is no inordinate or unexplained delay in the present case. The status report from ACB, Delhi in FIR No.41/2006 is still awaited, wherein sanction for prosecution was granted only against one individual and not against the others, as recorded by the this Tribunal in its order/judgment dated 08.08.2011. Learned counsel argued that a Government servant is liable to face disciplinary action for misconduct committed during service, or even after retirement, as provided under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Accordingly, the charge sheet issued to the applicant has been served strictly in accordance with Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
6.6 Learned counsel further submitted that it is not understood why the applicant seeks to avoid the disciplinary proceedings if he maintains that he has committed no wrongdoing. The appropriate course is to allow the enquiry to proceed so that the truth may emerge. The applicant is fully entitled to present his defence 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 18 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 before the Inquiry Officer, who has already been appointed, and obtain justice in accordance with law.
6.7 Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of A.P. and others vs. V. Appala Swamy in Appeal (Civil) No.393 of 2007 decided on 25.01.2007 and placed reliance on the following observations:-
12. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case must be determined on its our facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are:
(1) Where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapsee on the part of the employee;
(2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee.
Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the Inquiry officer.
13. This aspect of the matter is now squarely covered by the decisions of this Court in Secretary to the Govt. Prohibition & Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan, [1996] 3 SCC 157; P.D. Agrawal. v. State Bank of India and Ors., (2006) 5 SCALE 54; Deputy Registrar, Co-op Societies. Faizabad . v. Sachindra Nath Pandev & Ors., [1995] 3 SCC 134."
6.8 Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the both the OAs deserve to be dismissed by this Tribunal.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings as well as the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties.
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 19 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 ANALYSIS
8. Since this matter pertains to departmental proceedings, we deem it apt to observe that it is settled principle of law that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority, normally the Court/Tribunal may not interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court/Tribunal, since the High Court/Tribunal does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review. The Tribunal cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. 8.1 In this regard, it is profitable to mention that by referring catena of judgments on the point of scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunals, the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it has been held as under:
"13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 20 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 (emphasis supplied) 8.2 In another case in the matter of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while re-appreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings as under:-
"13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the
same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
8.3 In another judgment rendered by the Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612: (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457, by referring the law laid down in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) and catena of other judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
"22. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority............"
23. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 21 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 India [Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 103] .
24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.
25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:
(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;
(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;
(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
(emphasis supplied)
26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.
27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings.
28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 22 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained."
(emphasis supplied) 8.4 Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Karnataka & Anr. vs. Umesh (2022) 6 SCC 563: (2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 321, emphasised about the scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunal in the matter of disciplinary/departmental inquiry and held that: -
"22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct."
9. Keeping in view the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the facts and submissions of the counsel for the parties, we find that the following issues are required to be adjudicated in these cases:
(i) Whether the suspension orders (6.6.2005-3.9.2005 and 23.8.2007-14.8.2008) are justified and/or the periods of suspension are liable to be regularised as duty for all purposes?
(ii) Whether the impugned charge-sheet dated 25.03.2017 is liable to be quashed on the grounds of vagueness and/or long and unexplained delay?
(iii) Whether the applicant is entitled to consequential reliefs such as increments, ACP/MACP benefits, and ad-hoc promotion on account of the non-regularisation of suspension and other facts on record?
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 23 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017
10. Before delving upon the issue (i) as mentioned in para 9 above, i.e., whether the impugned suspension orders (6.6.2005 - 3.9.2005 and 23.8.2007 - 14.8.2008) are justified and/or the periods of suspension are liable to be regularised as duty for all purposes, we observe that there is no disputed that both the aforesaid suspension orders were subsequently revoked by the respondents. However, while revoking the aforesaid suspension orders and reinstating the applicant in service, the respondents have not taken any decision on the treatment of the above mentioned suspension periods. At this we deem it appropriate to refer to the provision of FR-53-B, which reads as under:-
"F.R. 54-B. (1) When a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension, the authority competent to order re-instatement shall consider and make specific order-
(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement or the date of his retirement on superannuation, as the case may be, and
(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 53, where a Government servant under suspension dies before the disciplinary or the Court proceedings instituted against him are concluded, the period between the date of suspension and the date of death shall be treated as duty for all purposes and his family shall be paid the full pay and allowances for that period to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, subject to adjustment in respect of subsistence allowance already paid.
(3) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8), be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended:
Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within sixty days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him and after considering 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 24 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct, for reasons to be recorded in wilting, that the Government servant shall be paid for the period of such delay only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine.
(4) In a case falling under sub-rule (3) the period of suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes.
(5) In cases other than those falling under sub rules (2) and (3) the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rules (8) and (9) be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period (which in no case shall exceed sixty days from the date on which the notice has been served) as may be specified in the notice.
(6) Where suspension is revoked pending finalization of the disciplinary or Court proceedings, any order passed under sub-rule (1) before the conclusion of the proceedings, against the Government servant, shall be reviewed on its own motion after the conclusion of the proceedings by the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) who shall make an order according to the provisions of sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (5) as the case may be.
(7) In a case falling under sub-rule (5), the period of suspension shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose:
Provided that if the Government servant so desires, such authority; may order that the period of suspension shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the Government servant. Note.- The order of the competent authority under the preceding proviso shall be absolute: and no higher sanction shall be necessary for the grant of-
(a) extraordinary leave in excess of three months in the case of temporary Government servants; and
(b) leave of any kind in excess of five years in the case of permanent or quasi permanent Government servant.
(8) The payment of allowances under sub-rule (2), sub-rule (3) or sub-
rule (5) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible.
(9) The amount determined under the proviso to sub-rule (3) or under sub-rule (5) shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under Rule 53."
10.1 A plain reading of the above provisions makes it clear that under F.R. 54-B (1), the Competent Authority must issue a specific order at the time of reinstatement determining how the suspension period is to be treated. Although sub-rules (3) to (6) of FR 54-B permit the Competent Authority to sanction full or partial pay and allowances 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 25 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 even when suspension is revoked during the pendency of disciplinary or court proceedings, a formal order under sub-rule (1) is still mandatory. After the conclusion of such proceedings, this order may be reviewed by the Competent Authority on its own, and a fresh order may be issued in accordance with sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (5) of F.R. 54-B. Consequently, the question of reviewing such an order after the disciplinary proceedings does not arise.
10.2 We deem it appropriate to reproduce the Order dated 22.08.2007 (Annexure A/5 in OA 3437/2016) as under:-
"WHEREAS, Shri Santosh Dutt. Patwari was placed under suspension on 6.6.2005 under sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 vide this office order No. 13/DC(NW)/Vig/05/122-128 dated 06.06.2005.
AND WHEREAS, the suspension case of Shri Santosh Dutt, Patwari could not be placed before the Suspension Review Committee for review within 90 days i.e. mandatory period of review in terms of sub- rule (6) & (7) of rule 10 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
AND WHEREAS, suspension case of the official was placed before the Suspension Review Committee for its consideration and recommendation.
AND WHEREAS, the Suspension Review Committee considered the facts and circumstances of the case, appeal filed by Shri Santosh Dutt. Patwari under rule 23 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, against the suspension order dated 6.6.2005 passed by DC(N/W) and observed that since the mandatory period of 90 days expired on 3.9.2005 and extension of suspension has not bcen granted before due date in terms of Sub- rule (6) & (7) of rule 10 of CCS (CCA), Rules, 1965 and the suspension order has lost its validity as on 3.9.2005, it is recommended that the suspension of the official be revoked with immediate effect which will deemed to be effective from 4.9.2005 as the official completed 90 days of his suspension on 3.9.2005.
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule 10 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and accepting the recommendations of Suspension Review Committee, orders that the suspension of Shri Santosh Dutt, Patwari be treated as revoked with effect from 4.9.2005 (FN) and he is deemed to have been reinstated with effect from the same date i.e. 4.9.2005."
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 26 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 10.3 The order dated 14.08.2008 (Annexure A/9 in OA 2437/2016), whereby the applicant's subsequent suspension was revoked, reads as under:
"WHEREAS, Shri Santosh Dutt, Patwari was placed under suspension w.e.f. 23-08-2007 under rule 10(0) of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965.
AND WHEREAS, the suspension case of the official was placed before the Suspension Review Committee in its meeting held on 12-08-2008 in the chamber of Secretary (Revenue) & Divisional Commissioner, Delhi and after considering the facts and circumstances under which Shri Santosh Dutt, Patwari was placed under suspension, the Suspension Review Committee recommended rev0calion of suspension of the official NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-rule 5 of Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 1965, hereby revokes the said order of' suspension with immediate effect."
10.4 From a simple reading of the contents of the aforesaid orders dated 22.08.2007 and 14.08.2008 revoking the applicant's suspension, it reveals that no specific order under F.R. 54-B(1) was issued, which is a mandatory requirement as held by this Tribunal while deciding the OA No. 1908/1991, titled Girdhari Lal vs. Delhi Administration and others vide Order dated 11.05.1993, the relevant portion of the said order reads as under:-
"19. The order dated 3.5.1980 merely provided that the petitioner had been reinstated with immediate effect without prejudice to the departmental enquiry pending against him and the suspension period will be decided later on.
20. Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules has relevance. In particular, sub-rules (1) and (6) have to be considered for answering the contention. Sub-rule (1) provides, inter alia, that when a Government servant who has been suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period ending with reinstatement, and whether the said period shall be treated as period spent on duty. No order under sub-rule (1) was passed in the instant case. It is apparent that the officer, while passing the order of reinstatement, has to apply his mind then and there on the requirements of Rule 54-B(1). The transaction of reinstatement and the passing of a specific order of pay and allowances during the 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 27 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 period of suspension is one and is inseparable. The process of thinking is also one. In any view of the matter, the officer concerned, after passing an order of reinstatement, should act within a reasonable period for the purpose of passing an order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension. Surely, a period of six months cannot be considered to be a reasonable period.
21. Sub-rule (6) posits that where suspension is revoked pending finalisation of the disciplinary or the court proceedings, any order passed under sub-rule (1) before the conclusion of the proceedings against the Government servant shall be reviewed on its own motion after the conclusion of the proceedings by the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1), who shall make an order according to the provisions of sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (5), as the case may be. Again, in sub-rule (6), the power is given to review the order passed earlier, i.e., under sub-rule (1). The question of reviewing the order arises only if the order exists. In the instant case, no order having been passed, the question of reviewing the same did not arise. Therefore, the punishing authority erred illegally in directing that the period during which the petitioner had been placed under suspension should be treated to be a period not spent on duty.
22. We, therefore, direct that the petitioner shall be paid the usual emoluments during the said period on the footing that he continued to be in uninterrupted service during that period.
23. This application succeeds in part. The order of dismissal passed by the punishing authority and as upheld by the appellate and reviewing authority is upheld. That part of the order of the punishing authority which relates to the payment to be made to the petitioner during the period of suspension is quashed. The respondents shall pay to the petitioner the usual emoluments for that period within a period of 3 months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order by the petitioner to them."
10.5 We also observe that an identical issue had also been adjudicated by the Hon'ble High Court Delhi in the case of Vijay Kumar Aggarwal v. Union of India, 2010:DHC:6044-DB, the relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"25. We note that Rule 5 B of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1969 is pari materia with FR 54 B and in the decisions reported as 1993(25) ATC 321 Girdhari Lai vs. Delhi Administration & Ors. 1993 (24) ATC 641 Basant Ram Jaiswal vs. Area Manager (North) MTNL Bombay. 1996 (3) (Supp.) LLJ 855 Hira Lai vs. PDA & Ors. and AIR 1987 SC 2257 O.P.Gupta vs. UOI & Ors. it has been held that while revoking the suspension it is the duty of the competent authority to pass an 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 28 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 order regarding pay and allowances for the period a government servant remained under suspension and that the composite order has to be a part of the same transaction having two parts and that the power to revoke the suspension cannot be exercised in isolation of the power to pass an order regarding pay and allowances. But, the said decisions do not hold that if no order pertaining to pay and allowances is passed, an order revoking suspension is void and non- est. As clarified by the Tribunal in Basant Ram Jaiswal's case (supra), in such situation the competent authority cannot exercise the power under FR 54 B. Thus, the law is that if while revoking the suspension or within a reasonable time thereof, no order is passed pertaining to pay and allowances for the period of suspension, the authority is denuded from passing such order and the inevitable result would be the Government servant being entitled to the full salary for the period he remained under suspension."
10.6 The aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble High Court Delhi was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of SLP (C) No.6393/2012 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the said decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court vide judgment dated 06.10.2015, the relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:-
"22) According to us, the aforesaid approach of the High Court, under the given circumstances, is without blemish. The High Court has relied upon certain judgments of this Court including the decision in the case of Basant Ram Jaiswal v. Area Manager (North) MTNL Bombay1 which held that in such a situation, the competent authority cannot exercise the power under FR 54B.
23) When the order of suspension is revoked and the suspended employee is asked to join the duty, he is required to do so. How the period of suspension is to be treated is another aspect. At the most, such an employee would be entitled to full salary during the suspension period if no order is passed as to how the suspension period would be governed. That would not mean that order revoking suspension itself becomes bad in law. It is pertinent to mention that even the Tribunal did not say that order revoking suspension was bad in law (In fact that part of the order was favourable to the petitioner). What it held was that in terms of Rule 5(b), the Government should have also decided how the period of suspension is to be treated and, therefore, directed the Government to pass necessary order to that effect."
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 29 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 10.7 Further recently the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Tushar Ranjan Mohanty vs. Union of India (supra) in which also exactly delved into the identical issue. The relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"23. From the above, it is evident that not passing an order under F.R. 54-B(1) immediately or within a reasonable time of passing of an order revoking the suspension, denudes the Competent Authority of the power to pass such an order thereafter. The effect thereof is that the employee/officer is treated as on duty during the period of his initial suspension as well and, therefore, is entitled to full pay and allowances.
24. As noted hereinabove, on conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, it is only an order which is initially passed under F.R. 54-B (1), which can be reviewed; if there is no such order, there can be no order to review. The subsequent Order dated 18.06.2020 passed by the Disciplinary Authority was therefore without any authority.
25. Accordingly, the Impugned Order passed by the learned Tribunal is set aside. The petitioner is held entitled to be treated as being on service during the initial period of his suspension, that is, between 26.12.2017 to 25.03.2018. The pay and allowances for the said period of the petitioner shall be released by the respondent to the petitioner along with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. within a period of eight weeks from today.
26. The petition is allowed in the above terms. The pending application is also disposed of."
10.8 The legal principle emerging from the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and this Tribunal (supra) is unequivocal that the authority is required to determine the manner in which the period of suspension is to be treated at the very time the suspension is revoked. In the present matter, it is undisputed that the respondents did not pass any such orders when the applicant's suspensions were revoked. Consequently, the aforesaid orders 22.08.2007 and 14.08.2008 suffer from a clear legal infirmity.
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 30 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 10.9 In view of the above discussion and the well-settled legal position under FR-54-B, we hold that the respondents were legally bound to pass a specific and reasoned order regarding the treatment of the applicant's suspension periods simultaneously with the order revoking his suspension. As such this issue is answered in favour of the applicant.
11. So far as issue (ii) as mentioned in para 9 above, i.e., Whether the impugned charge-sheet dated 25.03.2017 is liable to be quashed on the grounds of vagueness and/or long and unexplained delay, is concerned, we observe that the sole imputation in the impugned charge-sheet is that during the year 1998, the applicant conspired and misused his official position and thereby illegally allowed sale/transfer/mutation of Gram Sabha land 'Makbooja Kumharan'...". However, the impugned charge-sheet does not specify the precise acts constituting the alleged "misuse" and identify with whom the applicant is alleged to have conspired, and fails to particularise the acts relied upon facts which are essential for an intelligible charge and to enable effective defence. These defects render the charge vague and lacking in particulars.
11.1 The alleged events took place in 1997 - 1998; the charge-sheet was issued in 2017, i.e., a gap of approximately 19 years. No plausible or detailed explanation for that delay has been placed on record by the respondents in respect of the framing of the impugned departmental charge. The record does show earlier ACB action (FIR No.41/2006) and a prior, separate charge-sheet against Shri Than Singh which this 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 31 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 Tribunal had quashed in OA No.1929/2010 vide Order/Judgment dated 08.08.2011, but that does not explain the 19 years delay in issuing the present impugned charge sheet to the applicant. 11.2 It is noticed that the aforesaid order/judgment of this Tribunal in Than Singh Tyagi (supra) was upheld by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi while deciding the WP(C) No.351/2012 vide Order/Judgment dated 18.01.2012, which reads as under:-
"This writ petition is directed against the order dated 08.08.2011 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, in O.A. No.1929/2010. The respondent had filed the said OA challenging the issuance of a charge sheet just two hours prior to his superannuation on 30.10.2009. The article of charge annexed with the charge dated 30.10.2009 indicated that the respondent while functioning as Sub-Registrar(Narela) during the period July, 1998 committed gross misconduct inasmuch as he had extended undue advantage to a party by registering a sale deed executed by Mahender Singh as General Attorney of Mange Ram, Prahlad Singh, Om Prakash, Chet Ram and Lakhi Ram in favour of (1) Smt. Kesar Wati; (2) Smt. Savita Gupta and (3) Smt. Kiran Gupta even though the land as per the revenue record was recorded as Makbooza Kumharan and did not belong to the said individuals.
The Tribunal allowed the Original Application filed by the respondent on two grounds. The first ground being that there was delay in filing the charge sheet which was unexplained. The incident was of 28.07.1998, whereas the charge sheet was issued on 30.10.2009. The second ground was that it is a settled position in law that it is not the duty of the Registrar to verify the title of the property before the registration of a sale deed in respect thereof. On both counts, we find that the Tribunal had arrived at the correct conclusion. Even if we ignore the point of delay, it is a settled position of law that while registering a sale deed, it is not the duty of the Registrar to verify the title of the property. That being the position, the Tribunal had rightly quashed the charge sheet. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition is dismissed.
As a consequence of the setting aside of the charge sheet, the Tribunal had directed that the respondent would be entitled to his full pension as also payment of withheld post-retiral dues and directed that the same shall be made over to him within a period of six weeks from the date of the order. We extend that period to 31.03.2012."
11.3 It is also relevant to quote the relevant paras of the common Order/Judgment dated 20.03.2023 of this Tribunal in OA Nos.1447/2018 and 1527/2018 in which the similar issue had been adjudicated by the coordinate Bench of this Tribunal, which reads as under:-
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 32 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017
8. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Union of India & Anr. V. Hari Singh, W.P.© No.4245/2013 & CM No.9885/2013, while affirming the decision of this Tribunal, vide their order and judgment dated 23.09.2013 held that the respondents have not been able to provide a sufficient and reasonable explanation for the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The relevant part of the order and judgment of the Hon'ble High Court dated 23.09.2013 is reproduced as follows:
"20. The question which arises for consideration in the present matter is whether the delay in issuance of the charge sheet stands adequately explained and what is the impact of the delay so far as the rights of the respondent are concerned.
21. It is an admitted position before this court that the transaction on which the disciplinary action is based related to the period of 1999. The petitioners do not dispute that they had full knowledge of the transactions. The communications received from the DRI are admitted before us. This correspondence manifests that proceedings had been initiated against the exporter on the documents which adequately informed the petitioners of the nature of the inquiry as well as the charges.
22. The disciplinary proceedings against the respondent were commenced by issuance of the charge memo dated 25th February, 2011.
23. We may first examine the principles of law which would govern the consideration of the issues raised herein. So far as delay in issuance of the charge sheet is concerned, we may usefully refer to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Another. Just as the case before us, in Bani Singh as well, the State had appealed against the order of the Tribunal on the ground that it ought not to have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches. The alleged irregularity had allegedly taken place in 1975-77 and the department was aware of them. The Supreme Court held that it is unreasonable to think that it would take more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. The contention was rejected by the court holding as follows:-
"4. The appeal against the order dated December 16, 1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and latches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigation were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal."
24. Again in the judgment reported at 1998 (4) SCC 154 State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, the Court considered the same issue and laid down the following principles:-
"19. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 33 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. It is therefore trite that delay which is unexplained and unreasonable would cause prejudice to the delinquent employee. Such delay clearly manifests the lack of seriousness on the part of the disciplinary authority in pursuing the charges against the employee. In the event of any employee deviating from path of honesty, efficiency and diligence, action should expeditiously be taken as per prescribed procedure. The Supreme Court has laid down the principles holding that unexplained and unreasonable delay per se results in prejudice to the charged officer except when the employer can show that the employee was responsible for delay or is otherwise able to explain the delay. While evaluating the impact of the delay, the court must consider the nature of the charge, its complexity and for what reason the delay has occurred.
26. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the judgment dated 3rd July, 2009 passed in WP©No.4757/2007, Union of India v. V.K. Sareen. In this case, the petitioner had proposed to commence disciplinary action against the respondents for imposition of major penalty with regard to his functioning between 12th June, 1990 to 12th April, 1993. An Enquiry Officer was appointed on the 22nd of April, 2003 and the report of the inquiry was submitted on the 1st of July, 2005. The charge sheet and the proceedings were quashed by the Central Administrative Tribunal by an order passed on 20th of March, 2007 which order came to be questioned by way of the writ petition filed before this court. In the judgment dated 3rd July, 2009, this court had culled out the principles as follows:-
"13. It is trite law that disciplinary proceedings should be conducted soon after the alleged misconduct or negligence on the part of the employee is discovered. Inordinate delay cannot be said to be fair to be Delinquent Officer and since it would also make the task of proving the charges difficult. It would also not be in interest of administration. If the delay is too long and remains unexplained, the court may interfere and quash the charges. However, how much delay is too long would depend upon the facts of each and every case and if such delay has prejudiced or is likely to prejudice the delinquent in defending the enquiry ought to be interdicted."
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 34 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 In the judgment in Union of India v. V.K. Sareen (Supra), the court also rejected the explanation for the delay in instituting the disciplinary proceedings as well as in taking final order on the enquiry report. 27. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that disciplinary proceedings are necessary in public interest as well. They are essential in inculcating a sense of discipline and efficiency. The proceedings should not be protracted. In this regard, our attention has been drawn to the pronouncement reported at JT 2005 (7) SC 417 P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board. In this case, a charge memo has been issued to the appellant on the 8th of January, 2000 pertaining to alleged irregularity in issuing a sale deed in the year 1990. There was no explanation for the extraordinary delay of ten years in initiating the proceedings. The respondent had attempted to explain that the irregularities for which the disciplinary action had been initiated had come to light only in the second half of 1994-95, when the audit report was released. This explanation was not accepted by the Supreme Court. The court noted the unbearable mental agony and distress caused to the officer concerned and held as follows:-
"The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a Government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the Government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the Government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer."
28. The judgment of the Division Bench of this court dated 5 th February, 2010 in WP©No.750/2010 Union of India and Another v. M.S. Bhatia is on a similar terms.
29. Mr. R.V. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Tribunal ought not to have interfered in the proceedings inasmuch as the respondent had approached it at the stage of issuance of charge sheet and that the matter had not proceeded to the stage of a final order. It is urged that the issuance of the charge sheet does not infringe the rights of a party and it is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action in his favour.
30. In this regard, reliance is also placed on the judgment reported at 2012 (11) SCC 565 Secretary Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha. Perusal of this judgment would show that the charge memorandum dated 8th of January, 1992 was issued to the respondents on the alleged demand of bribe of Rs.37,000/- and its acceptance on 3rd August, 1991. The Supreme Court did not lay down any absolute proposition that a charge sheet cannot be ever challenged. In para 8 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has specifically noted that the law does not permit quashing of the charge sheet in a 'routine manner'. The case considered by the Supreme Court also shows that a charge sheet in that case had been issued within one year of the alleged action by the employee. In para 9 of the judgment, the Supreme Court had noted that the delay in concluding the domestic enquiry is not always fatal and that it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In para 10 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has noted that a writ application does not ordinarily lie against the charge sheet or show cause notice and that it should not ordinarily be quashed. In para 12, after considering the law on this aspect, the court reiterated the principles thus:-
"Thus the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the charge- sheet cannot generally be a subject-matter of challenge as it does not 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 35 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the ground that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor be to taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings."
31. The Supreme Court has, therefore, reiterated well settled principles that proceedings initiated at belated stage would be quashed if the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee.
32. We have noted above the pronouncements of the Supreme Court wherein the court has observed the manner in which the delay would result prejudice. In view thereof, this judicial precedent is of no assistance to the case of the petitioner in the present writ petition.
33. It is further contended that the respondent had failed to show as to how he has been prejudiced by the delay. Reliance is placed on the pronouncements of the Supreme Court reported at 2007 (3) Scale 1 The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Appala Swamy and JT 2012 (11) SC 533 Chairman, LIC of India & Ors. v. A. Masilamani in support of this submission.
34. We find that in The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Appala Swamy (Supra), the Supreme Court has again reiterated the well settled principles that no hard and fast rule can be laid on the effect of delay in concluding disciplinary proceedings or on the aspect of its impact on the delinquent. It was observed that the employee has to make out a case of prejudice. The court also noted that the question had to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the case keeping in view of the nature of the charges. 35. So far as the judgment in Chairman, LIC of India & Ors. v. A. Masilamani (Supra) is concerned, the Supreme Court in para 10.2 has held as follows:-
"10.2 The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable, in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, have to be examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts and to balance the weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of delay in their conclusion."
(Underlining by us)
9. If one has regard to the above, it is trite that delay which is unexplained and unreasonable would cause prejudice to the delinquent employee. Such delay clearly manifests the lack of seriousness on the part of the DA in pursuing the charges against the employee. In the event of any employee deviating from path of honesty, efficiency and diligence, action should expeditiously be taken as per prescribed procedure. The Supreme Court has laid down the principles holding that unexplained and unreasonable delay per se results in prejudice to the charged officer except when 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 36 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 the employer can show that the employee was responsible for delay or is otherwise able to explain the delay. While evaluating the impact of the delay, the court must consider the nature of the charge, its complexity and for what reason the delay has occurred. In the instant matters the respondents have not tendered any explanation as to the delay in issuing the chargesheet, rather a vague charge has been leveled against him, that too, without application of mind. The respondents have failed to provide a sufficient and reasonable explanation for the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the delay in issuing the charge- sheet after 12 years has greatly prejudiced the applicant in the matter of his defense.
10. We have noticed the judicial pronouncements laying down the applicable consideration in some detail hereinabove only to highlight that the law on the subject is well settled. It is not as if that the respondents were not aware of the above settled position in law. In so far as, judgments referred and relied on behalf of the respondents are concerned, a few of them have already been considered by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the cases referred to hereinabove. Moreover, it is not even the contention on behalf of the respondents that in no circumstances, the Courts and Tribunals are not required to interfere at the stage of issuance of charge-memos, more so when nonapplication of mind and unexplained delay in issuance of the charge memo is writ large on the fact of it.
11. Even on merit, we find that the respondents have not applied their mind while issuing the charge-sheet to the applicant. It has been issued without ascertaining the facts and has been based on stale and vague allegations. Hence, applying the principles laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Than Singh (supra), the chargesheet is liable to be quashed.
12. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, both the OAs are allowed. The impugned charge-sheet issued vide memorandum dated 01.01.2016 is quashed and set aside. The applicant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. The respondents are further directed to carry out the aforesaid exercise, as early as possible, but not later than 08 weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order." 11.4 In this case also, the respondents have failed to explain the delay of about 19 years in issuing the impugned charge sheet. As such, the case of the applicant is squarely covered by the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble High Court Delhi as well as of this Tribunal (supra). 11.5 The applicant has demonstrated specific prejudice arising from delay, i.e., non-regularisation of suspension period, denial of increments/ACP-MACP and being left out of ad-hoc promotion while juniors were promoted. These are not abstract allegations. Rather they are concrete, calculable consequences, which impair the applicant's career and pecuniary rights.
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 37 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 11.6 On the combined reading of the above, the charge-sheet dated 25.03.2017 is liable to be quashed. This conclusion is consistent with the settled principle that delay will vitiate proceedings where it produces prejudice or where the employer's conduct amounts to condonation, both factors present in this case. As such the issue (ii) is also answered in favour of the applicant.
12. So far as issue (iii) as mentioned in para 9 above, i.e., whether the applicant is entitled to consequential reliefs such as increments, ACP/MACP benefits, and ad-hoc promotion on account of the non- regularisation of suspension and other facts on record, is concerned, since we have already observed above that while revoking the suspensions of the applicant, the respondents have failed to issue any order determining the treatment of the applicant's suspension period at the time of revocation, which is a well settled legal position that an order regarding the treatment of the suspension period must be passed simultaneously with the order revoking the suspension. As such in the facts and circumstances of this case, regularisation of suspension as duty obliges the employer to restore all consequences flowing from continuous service such as increments, seniority and financial upgradations unless specific and valid statutory impediments exist. At this stage, we note that when the applicant's suspension was first revoked vide order dated 22.08.2007 (Annexure A/5 in OA 3437/2016), no charge sheet had yet been issued to him in respect of the alleged misconduct. Although the applicant was again placed under suspension on 23.08.2007, that suspension too was revoked vide order dated 14.08.2008 (Annexure A/9 in OA 3437/2016). It is, therefore, 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 38 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 an admitted and undisputed position that up to 14.08.2008 no charge sheet had been served upon the applicant. The charge sheet came to be issued only on 25.03.2017 (Annexure A/1 in OA No. 3581/2017). In these circumstances, it necessarily follows that until 24.03.2017 there existed no subsisting disciplinary proceedings or statutory impediment against the applicant.
12.1 We observe that the right to be considered for promotion on a fair and equal basis is a facet of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Where an eligible senior employee is denied consideration for promotion due to the employer's wrongful or unjustified action, particularly when juniors have been promoted, the employee is entitled to equitable relief. In the present case, the material on record indicates that the applicant had fulfilled the requisite eligibility conditions for financial upgradations, i.e., 12 years of regular service for ACP w.e.f. 27.11.2007 and 20 years of service for MACP w.e.f. 27.11.2015. It is also undisputed that the applicant's juniors were granted ad hoc promotion on 01.11.2011, whereas the applicant was excluded solely on the ground that his suspension had not been regularised. In view of our findings that the suspension of the applicant was unjustified and remained unregularised for no fault attributable to him, the consequential denial of promotional and financial upgradation benefits is a direct result of the respondents' own actions. As such we hold that the applicant is entitled to increments which fell due during the suspension period, first and second financial upgradations under ACP/MACP with arrears, and consideration for ad-hoc promotion to the post of Kanungo from the date(s) applicable 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 39 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 to juniors/similarly situated persons. If promotion is administrative in character, the respondents shall re-fix pay and seniority, and compute arrears accordingly.
13. We further observe that the mere pendency of criminal proceedings does not, by itself, bar the grant of civil or service-related relief to an employee, particularly where the disciplinary charge is vitiated on grounds such as vagueness, lack of material, or inordinate and unexplained delay causing prejudice. Equally, where a valid criminal sanction has been issued or where sanction for prosecution has been granted on the basis of specific and cogent material against the delinquent employee, the employer may legitimately continue with disciplinary action. Thus, the effect of pending criminal proceedings must be assessed on the facts of each case; pendency alone is not determinative. In the present matter, although FIR No. 41/2006 is on record, it is noted that sanction for prosecution had earlier been granted only in respect of one individual. There is no material before us to indicate that the criminal case against the applicant has resulted in conviction, or that any fresh evidence has emerged that would justify re-framing of the disciplinary charge which is presently being quashed for vagueness and unexplained delay. In these circumstances, the mere subsistence of the FIR cannot operate as a bar to the applicant's statutory or equitable entitlements. The respondents are, of course, at liberty to pursue any bona fide criminal process on the strength of the material available in accordance with law. However, the administrative consequences flowing from the applicant's unjustified 2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 40 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017 suspension and from the issuance of a delayed and vague charge-sheet cannot be sustained and must accordingly be remedied.
14. In the above facts and circumstances of the case and for the forgoing reasons, both the OAs are disposed of with the following directions:-
(i) The impugned charge-sheet dated 25.03.2017 (Annexure A/1 in OA No.3581/2017) is quashed;
(ii) The respondents are directed to regularized the suspension periods 6.6.2005 to 3.9.2005 and 23.8.2007 to 14.8.2008 as duty for all purposes.
(iii) Consequential directions:
a. The respondents shall calculate and pay to the applicant all arrears of pay, allowances and increments, which became due during the said suspension periods, subject to lawful adjustments;
b. The respondents shall grant the applicant the first financial upgradation under the ACP scheme w.e.f. 27.11.2007 and the second financial upgradation under the MACP scheme w.e.f. 27.11.2015 with consequential arrears and benefits, and shall re-fix the applicant's pay/seniority consistent with such upgradations.
c. The respondents shall consider the applicant for grant of ad-
hoc promotion to the post of Kanungo from the date on which juniors/similarly situated persons were promoted and, if found eligible, shall grant all consequential benefits.
(iv) The respondents shall carry out the calculations and make payment or otherwise communicate the action taken to the applicant within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
2025.12.09 RAVI KANOJIA17:27:49 +05'30' Item No.60/C-2 41 OA No.3437/2016 with OA No.3581/2017
15. There shall be no order as to costs.
16. Pending MA(s) shall stand disposed of.
17. Registry is directed to place a copy of this order in another connected OA (3581/2017) as well.
(RajinderKashyap) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/ravi/
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