Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Kanwal Dass vs M/O Personnel,Public Grievances And ... on 1 August, 2024
(1) O.A. No.200/2017
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
O.A. No.200/2017
Reserved on :18.07.2024
Pronounced on :01.08.2024
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjit More, Chairman
Hon'ble Mr. Sanjeeva Kumar, Member (A)
Kanwal Dass (Retd)
s/o Shri Jamuna Dass
93 B DDA Flats,
Mata Sundari Road,
Delhi-110002. ...Applicant
(By Advocate :Shri Deepak Verma)
VERSUS
Union of India through
1. The Secretary
Ministry of Personnel, PG & Pensions
Dept. of Personnel & Training
North Block, New Delhi-110001.
2. The Secretary,
Union Public Service Commission (UPSC)
Dholpur House, Shahjehan Rd,
New Delhi-110069.
3. The Disciplinary/Reviewing Authority
(The Hon'ble President of India)
Rashtrapati Bhawan, New Delhi-110001
4. The Secretary,
Dept. of Expenditure, Staff Inspection Unit (SIU),
Ministry of Finance, North Block, New Delhi.
5. The Secretary,
Dept. of Indian System of Medicine
& Homeopathy (ISM&H), Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi-110001. ...Respondents
(By Advocate :Shri Gyanendra Singh)
(2) O.A. No.200/2017
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Sanjeeva Kumar, Member (A):
In the instant OA filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has challenged the order dated 26.09.2016 wherein a penalty of 25% cut in pension on permanent basis has been inflicted upon him. The applicant has sought the following relief(s):-
"(i). Quash & set aside the Order dated 29.6.2016, Order No.109/8/2003-AVD-I dated 25.01.2010, and others (Annexure-A1-A5).
(ii) Pay all the consequential and monetary benefits to the applicant with 18% interest from the date 25% of his pension is withheld every month till it is paid.
(iii) Any other or further relief the Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and necessary in the interest of justice with costs."
2. The allegation against the applicant is that while he was working as Under Secretary in the Department of Indian System of Medicine & Homeopathy (ISM&H) during the period 1997-2002 he colluded with some Senior Technical Assistant (STA) (Ay)/Research Assistant (RA)to place them in the scale of Rs.8000-13,500 and added "plus Non Practising Allowance" with effect from 01.01.1996, which has caused loss to the Public (3) O.A. No.200/2017 Exchequer. Also, he connived with some STA (Ay) to add their names while issuing the order regarding grant of Annual Allowance/PG Allowance as per Memo dated 10.09.2003.
3. The applicant has claimed that before issuing the charge sheet, no specific approval of the competent authority i.e. President of India was taken. Also, the Inquiry Officer (IO) reached the conclusion that out of two charges, first was not proved and the second was partly proved.
4. The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the IO report. Though the respondents conceded that there was no collusion of the applicant with officials namely Shri Vaidya Chottey Lall, STA and Vaidya M.N. Rangne to place them in the pay scale of Rs. 8000-13,500 but disagreed with other findings of the IO. By order dated 25.01.2010 (impugned order), the respondents relying on the advice of the UPSC dated 01.12.2009, copy of which was never supplied to the applicant in advance, inflicted a major penalty of withholding 25% of his monthly pension under Rule 9 (1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
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5. The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) also vide its OM dated 20.05.2003 erroneously came to the conclusion that the applicant and Shri S.R.Yadav, Section Officer had added the names of two officials and also added the admissible of "Non Practising Allowance" in issuing order and put up the note as a result of which the upgradation of pay scale of STA/RA as well as grant of Annual Allowance, PG Allowance were given to the incumbents who were not eligible.
6. The applicant also submits that in the instant case Shri S.R.Yadav, Section Officer faced similar charges as the applicant but no penalty major or minor was imposed on him, which is a clear act of discrimination against the applicant.
7. The applicant submits that copy of the UPSC advice was not supplied to him during the enquiry, denying him the opportunity to defend himself properly and thereby causing serious to him. In this regard, he draws our attention to the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Others vs. S.K.Kapoor, 2011 (4) SCC 589 wherein it was held as under:
"8. There may be a case where the report of the Union Public Service Commission is not relied upon by the disciplinary authority and in that case it is (5) O.A. No.200/2017 certainly not necessary to supply a copy of the same to the employee concerned. However, if it is relied upon, then a copy of the same must be supplied in advance to the employee concerned otherwise there will be violation of the principles of natural justice. This is also the view taken by this Court in S.N.Narula vs. Union of India."
It is therefore contended that the principle of natural justice has clearly been contravened his case.
8. The applicant submits that he preferred a Review under Section 29 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 to the Hon'ble President of India through the Secretary, Department of Personnel & Training dated 17.04.2013 wherein the illegality and irregularity committed by the respondents in awarding penalty was highlighted but his review petition remained undecided despite several reminders. Left with no option, the applicant approached this Tribunal by filing OA No.3696/2015, which was disposed of on 07.10.2015, directing the respondents to decide the Revision/Review Petition in accordance with law and keeping in mind the submissions made by the applicant. However, the respondents rejected the Revision/Review Petition without answering all the points raised by the applicant. Aggrieved by such rejection, the applicant has filed this O.A. (6) O.A. No.200/2017
9. The respondents in their counter reply have made a preliminary submissions that the disciplinary proceedings under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 were initiated against the applicant vide charge memo dated 10.09.2003. An inquiry was held for alleged misconduct while the applicant was working as Under Secretary in the Department of ISM&H, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. On conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority after taking into consideration the findings of the inquiry officer, evidence on record, the advice of CVC and the UPSC, imposed a major penalty of withholding 25% of monthly pension otherwise admissible to him on permanent basis vide order dated 22/25.01.2010. The applicant had submitted a review petition on 17.04.2013. Subsequently, the applicant filed OA No.3696/2015 and the Tribunal vide order dated 07.10.2015 directed the Revisionary Authority to decide the Revision Petition. Thereafter, the competent authority found that no new material or fact has been brought out by the applicant in his Review Petition and accordingly the same was rejected vide order dated 26.09.2016. It is also submitted that due approval of competent authority was taken for initiation of major penalty proceeding under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. It is also (7) O.A. No.200/2017 submitted that a copy of the inquiry report, disagreement note and CVC 2nd Stage Advice were forwarded to the charged official (CO) for submitting his representation and a copy of the UPSC report was also supplied along with the order of penalty. It is contended that instructions for providing a copy of UPSC advice/report during enquiry came into vogue only subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court dated 16.03.2011, cited by the applicant in Union of India and Others vs. S.K.Kapoor (supra). Subsequently, the executive orders were issued vide DoP&T OM No.11012/8/2011-Estt. (A) dated 06.01.2014 and 05.03.2014 in this regard. Thus supplying copy of UPSC advice was not mandatory at the relevant time.
10. In response to the applicant's claim that non-supply of copy of the UPSC advice is contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N. Narula vs. Union of India and Others (SLP (c) No.12188/2003 decided on 30.01.2004, it is stated that subsequently issue was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided in its judgment dated 19.04.2007 in Civil Appeal No.2067/2007, UOI & Anr. vs. T.V.Patel wherein the Apex Court had laid down relying on two earlier decisions (8) O.A. No.200/2017 of the Apex Court, one of the Constitution Bench and another of a three Judge Bench it was held that the Disciplinary Authority required to furnish a copy of the advice tendered by the UPSC to the charged officer before the final order of penalty is passed. It is contended that following the judgment in T.V. Patel (supra) dated 19.04.2007, the instructions were issued by the DoP&T vide OM No.11012/10/2007-Estt (A) dated 07.01.2008 accordingly Instructions for providing a copy of UPSC advice/report to the charged officer came into vogue after issuance of DoP&T OM No.11012/8/2011- Estt. (A) dated 06.01.2014 and 05.03.2014, subsequent to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court dated 16.03.2011 in Union of India vs. S.K.Kapoor (supra) whereas the disciplinary proceeding in respect of the applicant was finalized prior to that date, i.e. 25.01.2010 when there was no such requirement to provide a copy of the UPSC advice, it is reiterated.
11. In response to the claim of the applicant that similarly placed Section Officer Shri S.R.Yadav, who was also accused of same charges, wherein a charge sheet was also served upon him, was let off without any penalty, it has been admitted by the respondents that (9) O.A. No.200/2017 there was delay in proceeding with the matter and the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in its order dated 10.02.2011 held that the respondents were granted several opportunities to expedite the inquiry but the respondents failed to do so and hence the relevant proceedings were abated. The Writ Petition (C) No.3515/2011 filed in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi by the respondents against the said order of this Tribunal was also dismissed on 15.03.2012, declaring that inquiry pending against the said Section Officer had abated. The Ministry approached the Supreme Court vide SLP No.17735/2012 which was also dismissed, observing that the High Court had rightly declined to set aside the order passed by the Tribunal. The respondents have admitted that in the light of above, no penalty could be imposed on similarly placed Shri S.R.Yadav because of exorbitant delay in finalizing the proceedings.
12. It is also submitted by the respondents that the officials, who colluded with the applicant, had submitted a representation for upgradation of pay scale to Rs.8000- 13,500 without any request for grant of NPA. However, after approval of the Ministry of Finance which was only for upgradation of pay scale "+NPA" was also added in (10) O.A. No.200/2017 the order of upgradation. Therefore, the averment of the applicant that charge of adding NPA is not proved is incorrect. The respondents made efforts to recover the excess payment made by grant of NPA but the same could not be recovered due to order dated 06.03.2013 passed by this Tribunal in OA No.1751/2012 in Dr. Chhote Lal & Others vs. Union of India & Others. The proposal not to recover the excess amount was subsequently approved by the Ministry of Finance.
13. The respondents also contend that the Disciplinary Authority had taken the tentative decision to impose penalty of suitable cut in pension citing specific reasons for the same and final decision was taken after obtaining the comments of the applicant. Therefore, the averment that the disagreement note was without approval of Disciplinary Authority is incorrect.
14. In the rejoinder, the applicant has reiterated the claims made in the OA and also drawn our attention to the report of the High Level Committee to look into the question of entitlement of pay scale and allowances to Sr.Technical Assistant (STA) (Ay) and Research Assistant (RA) (Ay) in the ISM&H pursuant to 5th CPC which submitted in its report dated 26.02.2010 held as follows: (11) O.A. No.200/2017
"6. In view of the facts stated above, the earlier and latest decision dated 278.07.2009, the committee is of the view that the upgradation of scale and posts for the aggrieved persons were correctly fixed as per 5th CPC recommendations. It is suggested that the concerned Researchers may be allowed to draw the pay scale of Rs.8000-13,500 with NPA, PG & Annual Allowance and their pay may be fixed as per recommendations of 6th Pay commission and may also be given the benefit of time bound promotion under the career progression scheme as recommended."
15. Drawing strength from the above report, the applicant has asserted that there was no malafide intention in granting the scale of Rs.8000-13,500 with admissible P.G. Allowance/NPA for Sr. Technical Assistant/Research Assistant and in fact the same was done with the expressed approval of the Secretary (Expenditure). Similarly grant of allowances was also approved by the Joint Secretary (Pers.) vide order dated 06.04.1999. However, the draft/files relating to approval of Secretary (Expenditure) in the year 1999 to the scale of Rs.8000-13,500 to the Technical Assistant (Ay)/Research Assistant as well as the files containing approval of allowances in the year 2000, are not available/lost by the respondents admittedly. Therefore, it has been reiterated that the applicant had not committed any irregularity and the impugned order needs to be set aside accordingly.
(12) O.A. No.200/2017
16. We have heard both the counsels and perused the pleadings and also statement of articles of charge framed against the applicant. There are two articles of charge against the applicant which are reproduced as below:
"Article I That Shri Kanwal Dass while functioning as Under Secretary in the Department of ISM &H during the period 1997- 2002 colluded with the incumbents of Senior Technical Assistant (STA) (Ay.) & Research Assistant and managed their placement in the scale of Rs. 8000-13,500 and while Issuing the order regarding placement in the said scale deliberately added the words "Plus Non-Practising Allowance (NPA) as admissible from time to time w.e.f. 1.1.96"
although neither the Pay Commission had recommended it nor Ministry of Finance had approved it and so much so that even the incumbents had never asked for it thereby resulting in huge recurring loss to the public exchequer and concomitant gain to the Incumbents of the post of RA & STA. By the aforesaid act Shri Kanwal Dass, Under Secretary has shown lack of integrity, devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government Servant thereby contravening the provisions of Rule 3(1) (1), 3(1)(II) and 3(1) (III) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Article II That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office Sh. Kanwal Dass, Under Secretary colluded with Vaidya Chottey Lall, STA (Ay.) and Vaidya M.N. Rangne, RA (Ay.) and added their name while issuing the order regarding grant of Annual allowance and PG allowance to ISM &H physicians at revised rate thereby causing recurring loss to the Public Exchequer and concomitant gain to Valdya Chottey Lal, STA (Ay.) and Vaidya M.N. Rangne, RA (Ay.). By the aforesaid act Shri Kanwal Dass, Under Secretary has shown lack of integrity, devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant thereby contravening the provisions of Rule 3(1)(i), (13) O.A. No.200/2017 3(1) (ii) and 3(1)(iii) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
17. After hearing both the counsels and going through the pleadings at length, the following issues are framed for consideration:
(i) Was the disciplinary proceeding initiated/charges framed without the approval of competent authority?
(ii) Had the Disciplinary Authority already made up his mind before issuing the disagreement note or in other words whether the disagreement was tentative or definitive?
(iii) Was serving a copy of the UPSC advice to the applicant before completion of disciplinary proceedings, more so after giving him a copy of the enquiry report was mandatory at the relevant time?
If so, was it followed?
(iv) Was there any financial loss to the exchequer by the act of applicant and did it constitute serious misconduct?
(v) If the Section Officer, who initiated the file and was served with the same charges as the applicant, let off without any penalty, why the applicant should be treated differently?
(14) O.A. No.200/2017
18. We start with first issue, i.e. whether initiation of disciplinary proceedings/charge sheet had the approval of competent authority or not. The learned counsel by drawing our attention to the Memorandum dated 10.09.2003 contends initiation of departmental proceeding and charge sheet were never approved by the Hon'ble President of India/his delegate (the Minister in- charge) who happened to be the Disciplinary Authority in the instant case and thus the entire proceeding is per se illegal. Drawing attention to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors vs. B.V.Gopinath & Ors. (supra) wherein the Supreme Court has laid down the law that if the charge memo has not been approved by the competent authority, the same was non est in the eyes of law. However, we find that such assertion of the learned counsel is not factually correct, as the Disciplinary Authority i.e. Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister as Minister in charge of DoP&T had approved the following on 01.09.2003:
(a) Initiation of major penalty proceedings under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 against Shri Kanwal Das, Under Secretary, as in the draft charge sheet placed on file; and
(b) Appointment of Inquiry Officer/Presenting Officer, if the charges are denied by the officer.(15) O.A. No.200/2017
Therefore, the aforementioned contention of the learned counsel does not appear to be correct.
19. With regard to the second issue, i.e. the nature of disagreement note, our attention is drawn to the disagreement note of the Disciplinary Authority wherein he agreed with the findings of the IO with regard to Article-I of charge. However, he did not agree with the findings of the IO with regard to his contention that inclusion of STA and RA for grant of PG Allowance/Annual Allowance did not cause recurring loss to the Public Exchequer. The DA observed that the word "Physicians" has been used by the Pay Commission to denote Doctors of ISM&H and the IO's contention that the Ministry of Finance later approved grant of Annual Allowance and PG Allowance to Sr. TA and RA is not correct as the PG and Annual Allowances were subsequently withdrawn. Therefore, disagreeing with the IO, the DA concluded as below:
"In view of this, the findings of the I.O. in respect of Article II of charge is not acceptable and the Article II of Charge is held as proved."
20. The learned counsel for the applicant submits that the said disagreement note (Annexure A5 colly) was not (16) O.A. No.200/2017 tentative and it clearly recorded that the findings of the DA is applicant guilt.
21. We have perused the aforesaid disagreement note which makes it evident that the Disciplinary Authority had not only made up his mind to hold the applicant guilty of the Charge II but he also in no uncertain terms opined that the Charge-II is proved.
22. The learned counsel for the applicant also draws our attention to the recent judgment of this Tribunal decided on 08.07.2024 vide OA No.136/2014 in M.George vs. Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Another wherein the following was held:
"10. We have considered the rival submissions by the respective counsels. We find merit in the application. For ready reference the disagreement note dated 08.09.2022 is reproduced below:-
"11... In the light of these conclusive findings of respondent/disciplinary authority, we find merit in the applicant's plea that such a disagreement note is unsustainable in law and, consequently the impugned penalty order is liable to be set aside. While issuing disagreement note, the disciplinary authority is expected to provide only the tentative reason why he proposes to differ with the view taken by the inquiry officer and take a final decision only after considering the stand/representation of the employee. In this regard, reference may be made to the observation of the Apex Court as contained in paragraph nos. 31 and 52 of its decision in Yoginath D. Bagde (supra):-
"31. In view of the above, a delinquent employee has the right of hearing not only (17) O.A. No.200/2017 during the enquiry proceedings conducted by the Enquiry Officer into the charges levelled against him but also at the stage at which those findings are Item No.31 considered by the Disciplinary Authority and the latter, namely, the Disciplinary Authority forms a tentative opinion that it does not agree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. If the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are in favour of the delinquent and it has been held that the charges are not proved, it is all the more necessary to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before reversing those findings. The formation of opinion should be tentative and not final. It is at this stage that the delinquent employee should be given an opportunity of hearing after he is informed of the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority has proposed to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. This is in consonance with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as it provides that a person shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. So long as a final decision is not taken in the matter, the enquiry shall be deemed to be pending. Mere submission of findings to the Disciplinary Authority does not bring about the closure of the enquiry proceedings. The enquiry proceedings would come to an end only M George vs Employees State Insurance Corporation ... on 8 July, 2024 Indian Kanoon -
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/45344366/ 4 when the findings have been considered by the Disciplinary Authority and the charges are either held to be not proved or found to be proved and in that event punishment is inflicted upon the delinquent. That being so, the "right to be (18) O.A. No.200/2017 heard" would be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away by any legislative enactment or Service Rule including Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution. 52. In the instant case, we have scrutinised the reasons of the Disciplinary Committee and have found that it had taken its final decision without giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant at the stage at which it proposed to differ with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. We have also found that the complainant's story with regard to the place at which the demand was allegedly made by the appellant was inconsistent. We have also noticed that the trap laid by the A.C.B., Nagpur against the appellant had failed and was held by the Enquiry Officer to be a farce and not having been laid with the permission of the Chief Justice. We have also noticed that there was absolute non-consideration of the statements of defence witnesses, namely, Dr.Naranje and Mr. Bapat, advocate, by the Disciplinary Committee. This Item No.31 factor in itself was sufficient to vitiate the findings recorded by that Committee contrary to the findings of the Enquiry Officer."
12. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ms. Saraswati Rawat (supra) in similar circumstances quashed and set aside the disagreement note and consequent penalty also......"
23. Our attention is drawn to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Yoginath D. Bagde vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. JT 1999 (6) SC 62. Relevant paras of the judgment read as follows:
(19) O.A. No.200/2017
"33. In view of the above, a delinquent employee has the right of hearings not only during the enquiry proceedings conducted by the Enquiry Officer into the charges levelled against him but also at the stage at which those findings are considered by the Disciplinary Authority and the latter, namely, the Disciplinary Authority forms a tentative opinion that it does not agree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. If the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are in favour of the delinquent and it has been held that the charges are not proved, it is all the more necessary to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before reversing those findings. The formation of opinion should be tentative and not final. It is at this stage that the delinquent employee should be given an opportunity of hearing after he is informed of the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority has proposed to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. This is in consonance with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as it provides that a person shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. So long as a final decision is not taken in the matter, the enquiry shall be deemed to be pending. Mere submission of findings to the Disciplinary Authority does not bring about the closure of the enquiry proceedings. The enquiry proceedings would come to an end only when the findings have been considered by the Disciplinary Authority and the charges are either held to be not proved or found to be proved and in that event punishment is inflicted upon the delinquent. That being so, the "right to be heard" would be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away by any legislative enactment or Service Rule including Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution.
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53. It was lastly contended by Mr. Harish N. Salve that this Court cannot reappraise the evidence which has already been scrutinised by the Enquiry Officer as also by the Disciplinary Committee. It is contended that the High Court or this Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution, act as the Appellate Authority in the domestic enquiry or trial and it is not open to this Court to reappraise the evidence. The proposition as put forward by Mr. Salve is in very broad terms and cannot be accepted. The law is well-settled that if the findings are perverse and are not supported by evidence on record or the findings recorded at the domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person would have reached, it would be open to the High Court as also to this Court to interfere in the matter. In Kuldeep Singh vs. The Commissioner of Police &Ors., JT 1998(8) SC 603 = (1999) 2 SCC 10, this Court, relying upon the earlier decisions in Nand Kishore vs. State of Bihar AIR 1978 SC 1277 = (1978) 3 SCC 366 = (1978) 3 SCR 708; State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723 = (1964) 3 SCR 25; Central Bank of India vs. Prakash Chand Jain AIR 1969 SC 983; Bharat Iron Works v.
BhagubhaiBalubhai Patel &Ors. AIR 1976 SC 98 = (1976) 2 SCR 280 = (1976) 1 SCC 518 as also Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) &Ors. AIR 1984 SC 1805 = (1985) 1 SCR 866 = (1984) 4 SCC 635, laid down that although the court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiry Officer in a departmental enquiry, it does not mean that in no circumstance can the court interfere. It was observed that the power of judicial review available to a High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and the Courts can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse.
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55. For the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment dated 21.6.1996 passed by the Bombay High Court by which the appellant's Writ Petition was dismissed. We hereby allow the Writ Petition and quash the order of dismissal dated 08.11.1993 passed by the State Government with the direction that the appellant shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all consequential benefits, including all arrears of pay which shall be paid to him within three months. There will be no order as to costs. (Emphasis supplied)
24. We have perused the disagreement note which reads as follows:
"In view of this, the contention of the IO that the grant of PG Allowance/Annual Allowance did not cause recurring loss to the Public Exchequer as the Finance later approved grant of Annual Allowance and PG Allowance to Sr.TA and RA is not correct as the PG and Annual Allowances were subsequently withdrawn."
"In view of this, the findings of the I.O. in respect of Article II of charge is not acceptable and the Article II of Charge is held as proved."
25. It is evident from the above that the disagreement note which culminated in the penalty order clearly recorded the finding of the applicant guilt and it was not tentative at all, though the impugned order mentions the term "tentative" but the disagreement note does not communicate such expression. Though the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated 26/25.01.2010 does mention that in terms of Rule 15(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and extant instructions on consultation with (22) O.A. No.200/2017 CVC, a copy of the inquiry report, Note containing tentative reasons for disagreement with the findings in IO's report and a copy of CVC's 2nd stage advice were forwarded to the charged officer vide Memorandum dated 29.05.2007 with the request for representation, if any, to be made within 15 days of the receipt of memorandum. But as stated we do not find anything to suggest that the tone and tenor of disagreement note was not definitive and tentative in nature.
26. So far as contention about not communicating UPSC advice to the applicant is concerned, the leaned counsel for the respondents reiterating the claim made in the counter reply that instructions for providing a copy of UPSC advice/report to the charged officer came into vogue only subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court dated 16.03.2011 and accordingly DoP&T OM No.11012/8/2011-Estt.(A) dated 06.01.2014 was issued. Since the disciplinary proceedings in respect of the applicant was concluded on 25.01.2010. There was no occasion for the respondents to supply a copy of the same to the applicant. However, countering this claim of the respondents, learned counsel for the applicant draws our attention to the order of the Mumbai Bench of this Tribunal in OA No.766/2011 decided on 03.07.2015 in (23) O.A. No.200/2017 M.P.Arya vs. Union of India & Others wherein various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were considered and the following was held:
"33. There is another serious flaw to be noted in the matter that although the Appellate Authority relied on the advice of UPSC but the said advice was not supplied to the applicant giving him opportunity to represent against the advice of UPSC.
34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. S.K. Kapoor, 2011(2) SLJ 63 (SC)-2011(1) SCC (L&S) held that if authorities consult UPSC and rely on its report for taking disciplinary action then copy of report must be supplied in advance to employee concerned.
Otherwise, it would amount to violation of principles of natural justice. In S.K. Kapoor's case as well as S.N. Narula's case, S.N. Narula v. Union of India & Others, 2011 (1) SCC (L&S) 727, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while giving liberty to the appellant to submit a representation to the Disciplinary Authority against the advice of UPSC finally directed the Disciplinary Authority to dispose of the disciplinary enquiry within a time frame.
35. In a recent judgment (Union of India v. R.P. Singh, 2015(1) SLJ 17 (SC)-AIR 2014 SC 2541) the Hon'ble Supreme Court while agreeing with the decision rendered in S.K. Kapoor's case declined to interfere with the judgment and order of the High Court. The Hon'ble High Court in the said case directed the respondents to allow the petitioner to make his representation in respect of the UPSC's advice which was made available to him along with order of punishment.
36. In the instant case, we find that UPSC's advice was never supplied to the applicant. The applicant received the said advice through RTI application. However, the applicant has challenged the legality, validity and propriety of the entire disciplinary proceeding. After going through the records and pleadings, we find that apart from serious flaw of not supplying the UPSC's advice which was (24) O.A. No.200/2017 received in 2007, the conclusion drawn by the Disciplinary Authority regarding guilt of the applicant is not supported by the evidence on record. It is also evident that the applicant's contention that all that he wanted was to ensure no loss of Government revenue was not considered, This aspect of revenue loss has not been dealt with by the authorities at all." (Emphasis supplied)
27. The applicant also draws our attention to the order passed by Allahabad Bench of this Tribunal in OA No.1414/2002 decided on 12.10.2012 in D.P.Singh vs. Union of India & Others wherein the Tribunal has held as follows:
"24. Yet another legal flaw in this case is that the advice of the UPSC had been made available to the applicant only along with the penalty order. A similar situation arose in another case of S.N. Narula v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 591 and the Tribunal had set aside the penalty order and remanded the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority. This was challenged before the High Court and the High Court interfered with the order of the Tribunal. The applicant therein preferred SLP against the judgment of the High Court and the Apex Court has allowed the petition. The order of the Apex Court reads as under:-
1. Leave granted. The appellant was initially appointed as Station Master in the Northern Railways in 1955 and during the relevant time when he was Senior Commercial Manager a charge-sheet was issued to the appellant and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, and the enquiry officer filed report holding that Charge 5 was partly proved and Charge 7 proved. As regards other charges he was exonerated. After considering the report of the enquiry officer, the Disciplinary Authority proposed a punishment suggesting a suitable cut in the pension and the appellant was not heard on this proposal.(25) O.A. No.200/2017
2. Thereafter, the proceedings were sent for opinion of the Union Public Service Commission and the Union Public Service Commission gave an opinion to the effect that the appellant's pension shall be reduced to the minimum and he shall not be granted any gratuity. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the proposal of the Union Public Service Commission and imposed the said punishment.
3. It is to be noticed that the advisory opinion of the Union Public Service Commission was not communicated to the appellant before he was heard by the Disciplinary Authority. The same was communicated to the appellant along with final order passed in the matter by the Disciplinary Authority.
4. The appellant filed OA No. 1154 of 2002 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi and the Tribunal held that there was violation of the principles of natural justice and the following direction was issued:
"We are of the considered opinion that this order is a non-speaking one and as such we are of the view that the same cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, we quash the impugned order and remand the case back to the Disciplinary Authority to pass a detailed reasoned and speaking order within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order in accordance with Instructions and law on the subject."
5. This order was challenged by the Union of India by way of writ petition before the High Court of Delhi and by the impugned judgment the High Court interfered with that order. The writ petition was partly allowed and it was directed that the matter be again considered by the Tribunal. Against that order the appellant has come up in appeal by way of special leave petition.
(26) O.A. No.200/2017
6. We heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned Counsel for the respondent. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that the report of the Union Public Service Commission was not communicated to the appellant before the final order was passed. Therefore, the appellant was unable to make an effective representation before the Disciplinary Authority as regards the punishment imposed.
7. We find that the stand taken by the Central Administrative Tribunal was correct and the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order. Therefore, we set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and direct that the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant be finally disposed of in accordance with the direction given by the Tribunal in para 6 of the order. The appellant may submit a representation within two weeks to the Disciplinary Authority and we make it clear that the matter shall be finally disposed of by the Disciplinary Authority within a period of 3 months thereafter.
8. The appeal is disposed of."
25. In view of the above, the OA succeeds. Order dated 1.10.2002 impugned herein levying the penalty of forfeiture of pension and other pensionary benefits is quashed and set aside. It is declared that the applicant (now his legal heir) is entitled to draw the pension and other pensionary benefits. Consequential benefits, if any, such as family pension, would also accrue to the applicant's legal heir in accordance with and subject to the fulfilment of the conditions contained in the relevant rules. Respondents are directed to work out the arrears of pension and terminal benefits and pay the same to the applicant's son (who is substituted in place of the son) within a period of five months from the date of communication of this order. No costs."
28. As evident from above, the Tribunal had allowed the OA for non-supply of UPSC advice before finalization of the penalty and set aside the order dated 01.10.2002. (27) O.A. No.200/2017 Therefore, it is argued that though in this case penalty order was issued on 26.08.2002 i.e. way before the aforesaid OM of the DoP&T, yet the Tribunal had taken the view citing the principle set up in the case of S.N.Narula vs. Union of India (supra) to quash the penalty order.
29. Learned counsel for the applicant also relies on the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others vs. R.P.Singh decided on 22.05.2014 wherein the following was held:
"12. In the case of S.N.Narula, the Court took note of the fact that the proceedings therein were sent for formation of the UPSC and the UPSC had given the advice indicating certain punishment and the said advice was accepted by the disciplinary authority who, on that basis, had imposed Punishment. Thereafter the Court took note of the factual score how the disciplinary authority had acted. We think it seemly to reproduce the same: -
"3.It is to be noticed that the advisory opinion of the Union Public Service Commission was not communicated to the appellant before he was heard by the disciplinary authority. The same was communicated to the appellant along with final order passed in the matter by the disciplinary authority."
After so stating, the two-Judge Bench proceeded to opine thus: -
"6. We heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent. It is submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the report of the Union Public Service Commission was not communicated to the appellant before the final order was passed. Therefore, the appellant was unable to make an effective representation before (28) O.A. No.200/2017 the disciplinary authority as regards the punishment imposed.
7. We find that the stand taken by the CentralAdministrative Tribunal was correct and the High Court was not justified in interfering with theorder. Therefore, we set aside the judgment ofthe Division Bench of the High Court and directthat the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant be finally disposed of in accordance withthe direction given by the Tribunal in Paragraph 6of the order. The appellant may submit arepresentation within two weeks to the disciplinaryauthority and we make it clear that the mattershall be finally disposed of by the disciplinaryauthority within a period of 3 months thereafter."
xxx xxx xxx xxx
13. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of the submission of Mr.W.A.Qadri that the decision is not an authority because the tribunal had set aside the order of the disciplinary authority on the ground that it was a nonspeaking order. Be that as it may, when the issue was raised before this Court and there has been an advertence to the same, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Qadri. The said decision is an authority for the proposition that the advice of UPSC, if sought and accepted, the same, regard being had to the principles of natural justice, is to be communicated before imposition of punishment.
14. In the case of S.K.Kapoor, the Court accepted the ratio laid down in the case of T.V.Patelas far as the interpretation of Article 320(3)(c) is concerned and, in that context, it opined that the provisions contained in the said Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution of India are not mandatory. While distinguishing certain aspects, the Court observed as follows:
"7. We are of the opinion that although Article 320(3)(c) is not mandatory, if the authorities do consult the Union Public Service Commission and rely on the report of the commission for taking (29) O.A. No.200/2017 disciplinary action, then the principles of natural justice require that a copy of the report must be supplied in advance to the employee concerned so that he may have an opportunity of rebuttal. Thus, in our view, the aforesaid decision in T.V.Patel's case is clearly distinguishable."
15. After so stating the two-Judge Bench opined hat when the disciplinary authority does not rely on the report of the UPSC then it is not necessary to supply the same to the employee concerned. However, when it is relied upon then the copy of the same may be supplied in advance to the employee concerned, otherwise, there would be violation of the principles of natural justice. To arrive at the said conclusion, reliance was placed upon the decision in S.N.Narula's case. Proceeding further, the Court held:
"9. It may be noted that the decision inS.N.Narula's case (supra) was prior to the decision in T.V.Patel's case (supra). It is well settled that if a subsequent co-ordinate bench of equal strength wants to take a different view, it can only refer the matter to a larger bench, otherwise the prior decision of a co- ordinate bench is binding on the subsequent bench of equal strength. Since, the decision in S.N.Narula's case (supra) was not noticed in T.V.Patel's case (supra), the latter decision is a judgment per incuriam. The decision in S.N.Narula's case (supra) was binding on the subsequent bench of equal strength and hence, it could not take a contrary view, as is settled by a Page 11series of judgments of this Court."
16. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the two-Judge Bench in S.K. Kapoor's case could not have opined that the decision in T.V. Patel's case is per incuriam. We have already noticed two facts pertaining to S.N. Narula (supra),
(i) it ws rendered on31.1.2004 and (ii) it squarely dealt with the issue and expressed an opinion. It seems to us that the judgment in S.N. Narula's case was not brought to the notice of their Lordships deciding the lis in T.V. Patel (supra).There cannot be a shadow of doubt that the judgment in S.N. Narula (supra) is a binding precedent to be followed (30) O.A. No.200/2017 by the later Division Bench. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to the decision in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by L. Rs. And Others 7, wherein the Constitution Bench has held as follows:
"We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a division Bench of the same or a smaller number of Judges, and in order that such decision be binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of the Court"
xxx xxx xxx
19. Thus perceived, it can be stated with certitude that S.N. Narula (supra) was a binding precedent and when the subsequent decision in T.V. Patel (supra) is rendered in ignorance or forgetfulness of the binding authority, the concept of per incurium comes into play.
20. In this regard, we may usefully refer to a passage from A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak12, wherein Sabyasachi 9 1989 MPLJ 2010 (1976) 4 SCC 622 11 (2002) 4 SCC 23412 (1988) 2 SCC 602 Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed thus: -
"....'Per incuriam' are those decisions given inignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong."
At a subsequent stage of the said decision it has been observed as follows: -
".... It is a settled rule that if a decision has been given per incuriam the court can ignore it."
21. In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetrev. State Maharashtra and Ors. 13, while dealing with the issue of'per incuriam', a two-Judge Bench, after referring to the dictum in Bristol Aeroplane Co. (31) O.A. No.200/2017 Ltd. (supra) and certain passages from Halsbury's Laws of England and Raghubir Singh (supra), has ruled thus:-
"The analysis of English and Indian Law clearly leads to the irresistible conclusion that not only the judgment of a larger strength is binding on a judgment of smaller strength but the judgment of a co-equal strength is also binding on a Bench of Judges of co-equal strength. In the instant case, judgments mentioned in paragraphs 135 and 136 are by two or three judges of this Court. These judgments have clearly ignored a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Sibbia's case (supra) which has comprehensively dealt with all the facets of anticipatory bail enumerated under Section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure.
Consequently, judgments mentioned in paragraphs 135 and 136 of this judgment are per incuriam."
22. Testing on the aforesaid principles it can safely be concluded that the judgment in T.V. Patel's case is per incuriam.
23. At this juncture, we would like to give our reasons for our respectful concurrence with S.K. Kapoor (supra).There is no cavil over the proposition that the language engrafted in Article 320(3)(c) does not make the said Article mandatory. As we find, in the T.V.Patel's case, the Court has based its finding on the language employed in Rule 32 of the Rules. It is not in dispute that the said Rule from the very inception is a part of the 1965 Rules. With the efflux of time, there has been a change of perception as regards the applicability of the principles of natural justice. An Inquiry Report in a disciplinary proceeding is required to be furnished to the delinquent employee so that he can make an adequate representation explaining his own stand/stance. That is what precisely has been laid down in the B.Karnukara's case. We may reproduce the relevant passage with profit: -
"Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of (32) O.A. No.200/2017 the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice."
30. Citing the above judgment, learned counsel for the applicant argues that non-supply of the inquiry report was a breach of the principle of natural justice. Advice from the UPSC, when utilized as a material against the delinquent officer should have been supplied in advance and such a principle had already been laid down in S.N.Narula vs. Union of India & Others (supra) wherein the judgement passed subsequently in T.V.Patel (supra) was treated as per incuriam.
31. We find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that principle regarding supply of UPSC advice during the course of enquiry was laid down even before the said judgment of S.K. Kapoor (supra) in the case of S.N.Narula (supra) and in fact the subsequent order passed in the case of T.V.Patel's was per incuriam. It is also not in dispute that based on the said judgment of S.N.Narula (supra), the Tribunal vide its judgement in OA No.1414/2002 had set aside the order (33) O.A. No.200/2017 dated 01.10.2002 on the ground that the copy of the UPSC advice was not provided to the charged officer before completion of the inquiry and we do not see any reason to take a contrary view. Therefore, we are of the view that though DoP&T OM came into existence much later but the ground taken by the learned counsel that the applicant was unable to make an effective representation before the Disciplinary Authority as regards the punishment imposed because report of the UPSC was not communicated to him, stands to reason. The above OM of 2014 notwithstanding, copy of UPSC advice should have been given to the charged officer, more so in the light of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N.Narula (supra).
32. Coming to the issue of financial loss, learned counsel for the applicant has reiterated the claim made in the OA and rejoinder to state that the respondents have not been able to show if there was any financial loss to the exchequer as the respondents themselves agreed that the Researchers were eligible to draw NPA Allowance and the same was subsequently given to them. Therefore, in no way, his case qualifies as a case of final misconduct. In this regard, our attention is drawn to the order of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide WP(C) (34) O.A. No.200/2017 No.245/2012 in Union of India & Others vs. R.P.Sharma wherein the High Court held as follows:
"7. We agree with the observation of the Tribunal that the UPSC has dealt with the issue of 'grave misconduct' in a very casual and mechanical manner. There is no discussion as to how the alleged misconduct under Article-II of the charge could be regarded as 'grave misconduct' within the meaning of Explanation (b) after Rule 8(5) of the CCS(Pension) Rules, 1972. Consequently, we agree with the finding of the Tribunal that a case of 'grave misconduct' has not been made out. And, unless that is made out, there can be no order of cut in pension under Rule 9(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. We have taken a similar view in Professor P.N. Bhat Vs. UOI and Ors.; WP(C) No. 8245/2008 decided on 20th September, 2012. We have held that until and unless there is a clear finding of 'grave misconduct', the provisions of Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 cannot be invoked.
8. Thus, without going into the issue of whether the Disagreement Note of the Disciplinary Authority did or did not conform to the requirement of law in so far as Rule 15(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is concerned, on this ground alone, the cut in pension cannot be sustained."
33. Drawing similarity between the present OA and the judgment cited, it is averred by the learned counsel that pre-condition for imposing cut in pension of there being grave misconduct could not be established. The circumstance under which pension can be withheld has been defined in Rule 9 (1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 reads as under:
"9. Right of President to withhold or withdraw pension (35) O.A. No.200/2017 (1) The President reserves to himself the right to withholding a pension or gratuity, or both, either in full or in part, or withdrawing a pension in full or in part, whether permanently or for a specified period, and of ordering recovery from a pension or gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, if, in any departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of service, including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement:
Provided that the Union Public Service Commission shall be consulted before any final orders are passed;
Provided further that where a part of pension is withheld or withdrawn, the amount of such pensions shall not be reduced below the amount of rupees three hundred and seventy- five."
34. Learned counsel for the applicant states that there was no pecuniary loss caused to the Government. Further, Rule 8 (5) of the CCS (Pension) Rules states that the expression 'grave misconduct' includes the communication or disclosure of any secret official code or password or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information, such as is mentioned in Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), (which was obtained while holding office under the Government) so as to prejudicially affect the interests of the general public or the security of the State. However, the case of the applicant does not fall under the above category in (36) O.A. No.200/2017 any way. The applicant in his submission in the OA has also taken a ground that the major penalty proceedings on similar charge were recommended by the CVC in its letter dated 20.05.2003 against another officer who was working under the CO but the fact remains that no major or minor penalty could be awarded to him and he got all consequential benefits.
35. We find that though the respondents have pointed towards the over payment made because of the action of the applicant to term it as financial loss to the exchequer, but also admitted that the over-payment made to the incumbents could not be recovered due to direction of this Tribunal in OA No.1751/2012 filed Dr.Chhote Lall & Others vs. Union of India & Others wherein in its order dated 06.03.2013 considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents were directed to make any recovery on account of excess amount paid. It is also submitted that the proposal not to recover the excess payment was subsequently approved by the Ministry of Finance. The Tribunal had held that the explanation given by the respondents that the applicant had managed to get the higher scale in connivance with certain Ministry officials was not convincing as it was a genuine mistake of the respondents themselves for which (37) O.A. No.200/2017 the applicant cannot be blamed in any way. The Tribunal also held that the respondents have inordinately delayed rectifying this mistake for which the applicant cannot be held responsible. Subsequent to this, vide order dated 20.02.2014, Ministry of Finance agreed to implementation of the order of this Tribunal by waiving the recovery of overpayments made to the applicants. In the face of above facts, it is clear that there was no financial loss to the exchequer and recovery of excess amount, if any, paid was waived of by the Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance themselves. Therefore, we do not find any element of serious misconduct to invite deduction of 25% of pension of the applicant.
36. We have also considered the ground taken by the applicant in the OA that his junior, who was served with the same charges, was ultimately let off. We find that the said contention of the applicant is not disputed by the respondents. The respondents have admitted that Shri S.R.Yadav, Section Officer was also accused on similar charges and charge sheet served upon him was similar. In this case, there was considerable delay in submitting the inquiry report and obtaining the orders of the competent authority. Shri S.R.Yadav approached this Tribunal vide OA No.2253/2008 for grant of relief by way (38) O.A. No.200/2017 of quashing the aforesaid charge memo, as also the respondents order dated 03.09.2008, appointing a Presenting Officer in the inquiry. Shri Yadav again filed OA No.2607/2010, MA No.873/2011 and MA No.385/2011 in this Tribunal seeking abatement of proceeding for want of compliance within the time frame indicated by the Tribunal. The Tribunal in its order dated 10.02.2011 held that the respondents despite granting several adjournments to facilitate implementation, the respondents failed to do so and order of the relevant proceedings. The respondents filed a Writ Petition No.3515/2011 in the High Court of Delhi against the said order of this Tribunal but the same was dismissed on 15.03.2012. The Ministry approached the Supreme Court vide SLP No.17735/2012 which was also dismissed. The reason that no penalty could be imposed in the case to similarly placed Shri S.R.Yadav was exorbitant delay in finalizing the proceedings. We find that in view of the above admission by the respondents, there was no logic to proceed against the applicant on the ground of parity. Thus, the applicant deserves to be given the same treatment as his junior, who was served with the same charges but let off.
(39) O.A. No.200/2017
37. Learned counsel for the respondents has taken the plea by placing reliance an order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Others vs. Subrata Nath, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617 and argued that the instant case does not call for the Tribunal's intervention and the Tribunal should not act as an Appellate Authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the Inquiry Officer. But it also lays down the principle that the court can intervene, if the inquiry is not held according to the procedure and there is violation of the principles of natural justice. After considering the issues at length we find that this is a fit case for intervention of Tribunal, more particularly when there is deficiency in the procedure followed and violation of the principle of natural justice. In view of the above discussions, the OA succeeds.
38. In normal situation, we would have remanded the matter back to the respondents to take a view but in the light of above analyses, coupled with the fact that the inquiry was concluded long back, we are not inclined to remand the matter back to the respondents. Therefore, the OA is allowed and the order dated 26.09.2016 is set aside. The applicant would be entitled for all consequential and monetary benefits from the date 25% (40) O.A. No.200/2017 of his pension was withheld. He will also be entitled for payment of interest as per the prevailing GPF rate from the date his pension was withheld and till it is paid. The needful in this regard will be done by the respondents as expeditiously as possible and preferably within 8 weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. No costs.
(Sanjeeva Kumar) (Justice Ranjit More) Member (A) Chairman /kdr/