Orissa High Court
Land Acquisition Officer (N.H.) & vs Kavita Jain And Anr on 26 August, 2025
Author: S.K. Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K. Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
ARBA No.30 of 2024
(From the Judgment/Order dated 12.8.2024 passed by the Learned
District Judge, Cuttack in an Application filed under Section 34 of the
A & C Act, 1996 i.e. in ARBP No.10 of 2023)
Land Acquisition Officer (N.H.) & .... Appellant (s)
Competent Authority,
Bhubaneswar
-versus-
Kavita Jain and Anr. .... Respondent (s)
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Appellant (s) : Mr. Ajit Patnaik, Adv.
For Respondent (s) : Mr. Ashok Parija, Sr. Adv.
Along with
Mr. Arnab Behera, Adv.
(For Res. No.1).
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K. PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-23.07.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-26.08.2025
Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.
1. This Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the "A&C Act") is preferred by the Appellant challenging the Judgment/Order dated 12.8.2024, in ARBP No. 10 of 2023, passed by the Learned District Judge, Cuttack, in an Application filed under Section 34 of the A & C Act, which was filed against the Arbitral Award, dated 23.8.2023, in L.A. Arbitration Case No.36 of 2017, Page 1 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 passed by the Arbitrator-cum-Collector, Cuttack, wherein the learned District Judge, Cuttack, allowed the aforesaid Application setting aside the aforesaid Arbitral Award being contrary to the law as also passed directions for enhancement of compensation amount to be paid to present Respondent No. l.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
2. The facts giving rise to the present Petition can be pithily summarised as under:
a. The present Appellant is the Land Acquisition Officer & Competent Authority (NH), Khordha, appointed and designated by the Central Government by Notification in the Official Gazette as the "Competent Authority", under the provisions of Clause (a) of Section 3 of the National Highways Act, 1956, to perform the functions of such Authority, under the NH Act, for such areas as is specified in the Notification, in respect of acquisition of land for the building (widening/six-laning, etc.), maintenance, management and operation of the National Highway No. 16 (Old NH-5), in the State. In this connection, the Competent Authority & Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to as 'CALA') is authorised to assess the valuation of 'Land', hear the objections of the land-loser, and award due compensation for the same.
b. In the instant case, the Central Government issued the Preliminary Notification under Section 3A of NH Act, 1956, in the Official Gazette on 3.10.2012, declaring its intention to acquire land, in respect of various Villages (Mouza), including the impugned land of the Respondent No. l, located at Mouza-Page 2 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 Bandalo, under Plot No. 1403, in Khata No. 751/159, pertaining to an area of Ac.1.670 dec., in Kisam-Gharabari, for the public purpose, namely, expansion and four-laning of the National Highway No. 16. Later, the same was published in the local newspapers on 19.11.2012 as mandated under Section 3A(3) of the NH Act, 1956. Subsequently, as mandated under extant law, the Land Acquisition Proceeding, was initiated for the purpose, by the present Appellant, vide L.A. Case No. 38/81/2013.
c. The Competent Authority-cum-Land Acquisition Officer (CALA) awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,38,18,998/- for acquisition of Ac 0.170 decimals, Kisam - Gharabadi pertaining to Khata No. 751/159, Plot No. 1403, Mouza - Bandalo belonging to the Respondent No. 1. The said compensation was awarded on the basis of benchmark valuation report of the CALA, which calculated Rs. 20 lakh/ acre for Mouza- Bandalo.
d. Aggrieved by the compensation granted by the CALA, Respondent No.1 invoked arbitration under Section 3G(7) of the NH Act. The primary contention of Respondent No.1 was that the CALA has not followed the procedure laid down under Section 26 of the RFCTLAR&R Act, 2013.
e. Vide award dated 23.8.2023, in L.A. Arbitration Case No.36 of 2017, the Arbitrator-cum-Collector, Cuttack was pleased to hold that the CALA had followed proper procedure and the present Respondent No. 1 had not made out any case for higher compensation.
Page 3 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 f. On appeal under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, at the behest of the Respondent No.1, the Ld. District Judge vide the impugned order has held that the Ld. Arbitrator has committed "patent illegality" in contravention of Section 3G(7)(a) of the NH Act read with Section 26 of the RFCTLAR&R Act, 2013 and remanded the matter for re-consideration strictly in line with the relevant provisions. It is pertinent to mention here that the present Appellants were set ex-parte for non-appearance on 11.7.2024 by the Ld. District Judge.
3. At this juncture, the Petitioner has preferred the present Appeal challenging the legality and validity of the impugned order. As the facts leading up to the instant Petition have been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to summarise the contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been raised to seek the exercise of this Court's writ jurisdiction.
II. APPELLANT'S SUBMISSIONS:
4. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant vehemently submits that the assessment of compensation has been made on the basis of sale statistics/bench mark valuation of the area and as the information was present, there was no legal requirement to take the neighbouring area's valuation into consideration.
5. It is submitted that there is no patent illegality in the award as all the grounds put forth by the present Respondent No.1 have been considered by the competent authority at the time of arriving at the valuation of land and therefore, the order of the Ld. District Judge ought to be set aside.
Page 4 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 III. RESPONDENT NO.1'S SUBMISSIONS:
6. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 submits that under the same notification and acquisition process, the CALA has awarded near-by Mouza - Kotsahi 50 lakh per acre, Mouza- Baichuan - 45 lakh per acre, Mouza- Bilteruan - 60 lakh per acre, Mouza - Palasa - 60 lakh per acre, Mouza - Manguli - 65 lakh lakh per acre. On the other hand, for Mouza - Bandala, the CALA awarded only Rs. 20 lakh per acre. Under Section 26(l)(b) of the RFCTLAR&R Act, 2013, the Collector ought to have considered that if the average sale price for similar type of land situated in the nearest village or vicinity area is higher, that amount has to be taken into consideration.
7. Furthermore, it is submitted that prior to publication of notification in vernacular newspapers under Section 3A(3) of the NH Act, the Respondent had entered into an Agreement to Sale dated 12.11.2012 for sale of Ac 0.80 decimals for a consideration of Rs. 5 Iakh per Guntha, which translates to Rs.1.25 crore per Acre. Pertinently, the buyer had paid an advance of Rs. 16 lakh to the Respondent on 5.11.2012 and 9.11.2012 through RTGS as advance which was also not considered by the CALA. The Ld. Arbitrator, while recording all the contentions of the Respondent, gave a cryptic award without dealing with any of the contentions.
8. It is finally submitted that there is patent illegality in the award and therefore, the present Petition ought to be dismissed.
IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:
Page 5 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51
9. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record, this Court here has identified the following issues to be determined:
A. Whether this Court ought to interfere in the facts of the present case?
V. ISSUE A: WHETHER THIS COURT OUGHT TO INTERFERE IN THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE?
10. The object of the A&C Act is to provide for a speedy and inexpensive alternative mode of settlement of dispute with the minimum of intervention of the courts. Section 5 of the Act is implicit in this regard and prohibits interference by the judicial authority with the arbitration proceedings except where so provided in Part-I of the Act. The judicial interference, if any, is provided inter-alia only by means of Sections 34 and 37 of the Act respectively.
11. Section 34 of the Act provides for getting an arbitral award set aside by moving an application in accordance with sub-Section (2) and sub- Section (3) of Section 34 of the Act which inter-alia provide for the grounds on which an arbitral award is liable to be set aside. One of the main grounds for interference or setting aside an award is where the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India i.e. if the award is induced or affected by fraud or corruption or is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law or it is in conflict with most basic notions of morality and justice. A plain reading of Section 34 reveals that the scope of interference by the court with the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited and the court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid scope to find out if the award is good or bad.
Page 6 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51
12. Section 37 of the Act provides for a Forum of appeal inter-alia against the order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act. The scope of appeal is naturally akin to and limited to the grounds enumerated under Section 34 of the Act.
13. It is pertinent to note that an arbitral award is not liable to be interfered with only on the ground that the award is illegal or is erroneous in law that too upon reappraisal of the evidence adduced before the arbitral trial. Even an award which may not be reasonable or is non-speaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the courts. It is also well settled that even if two views are possible there is no scope for the court to reappraise the evidence and to take the different view other than that has been taken by the arbitrator. The view taken by the arbitrator is normally acceptable and ought to be allowed to prevail.
14. In paragraph 11 of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. L.K. Ahuja1 it has been observed as under:
"11. There are limitations upon the scope of interference in awards passed by an arbitrator. When the arbitrator has applied his mind to the pleadings, the evidence adduced before him and the terms of the contract, there is no scope for the court to reappraise the matter as if this were an appeal and even if two views are possible, the view taken by the arbitrator would prevail. So long as an award made by an arbitrator can be said to be one by a reasonable person no interference is called for. However, in cases where an arbitrator exceeds the terms of the agreement or passes an award in the absence of any evidence, which is apparent on the face of the award, the same could be set aside."1
(2001) 4 SCC 86 Page 7 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51
15. It is equally well settled that the appellate power under Section 37 of the Act is not akin to the normal appellate jurisdiction vested in the civil courts for the reason that the scope of interference of the courts with arbitral proceedings or award is very limited, confined to the ambit of Section 34 of the Act only and even that power cannot be exercised in a casual and a cavalier manner.
16. In Dyna Technology Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited2, the Apex Court observed as under:
"24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.
25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral 2 (2019) 20 SCC 1 Page 8 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act."
17. It is seen that the scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act is restricted and subject to the same grounds on which an award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. In other words, the powers under Section 37 vested in the court of appeal are not beyond the scope of interference provided under Section 34 of the Act.
18. In paragraph 14 of MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited3 it has been held as under:
"14. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings."
19. Recently a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking4 referring to MMTC Limited (supra) held that the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not like a normal appellate jurisdiction and the courts should not interfere with the arbitral award lightly in a casual and a cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an 3 (2019) 4 SCC 163 4 (2023) 9 SCC 85 Page 9 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 alternative view on facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle the courts to reverse the findings of the arbitral tribunal.
20. In Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v. Samir Narain Bhojwani5, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court followed and reiterated the principle laid down in the case of MMTC Limited (supra) and UHL Power Company Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh6. It quoted and highlighted paragraph 16 of the latter judgment which extensively relies upon MMTC Limited(supra). It reads as under:
"16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. In MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293], the reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act have been explained in the following words : (SCC pp. 166-67, para 11) "11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the 5 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1656 6 (2022) 4 SCC 116 Page 10 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the "fundamental policy of Indian law" would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (CA)] reasonableness. Furthermore, "patent illegality" itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract.""
21. Sections 3-A to 3-J of the National Highways Act, 1956 ("NH Act") exhaustively delineates the process of land acquisition, compensation determination, and disbursal. These provisions collectively establish a self-contained and comprehensive framework. The entire process, from notification of intent to acquire land to the final disbursement of compensation, is conducted under statutory authority.
22. Since Section 3-G(6) of the Act of 1956 makes the provisions of the Act of 1996 applicable, remedy under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is available to the party aggrieved by the award passed by the Arbitrator. It may be noted that Chapter VII of the Act of 1996 in which Section 34 finds place refers to recourse against an arbitral award.
23. The scope of judicial intervention under Section 34 therefore, remains uniformly limited, irrespective of whether the arbitration is statutory or consensual. The Act does not envisage a merits-based review or re- assessment of compensation by the courts; it merely permits setting aside an award on narrowly defined grounds such as patent illegality or violation of natural justice.
Page 11 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51
24. Courts have repeatedly emphasized the need for judicial restraint when called upon to interfere with compensation awards under the National Highways Act. The statute prescribes a detailed methodology for determination of compensation, involving assessment by the competent authority and statutory arbitration. Unless there is an evident and glaring illegality, patent perversity, or manifest error apparent on the face of the record, the courts ought not to disturb the award.
25. The statutory scheme under the NH Act, read with the RFCTLAR&R Act, is unequivocally aimed at safeguarding landowners against inequitable treatment during compulsory acquisition. This Court notes that while the NH Act provides the acquisition framework, the valuation principles are borrowed from the RFCTLAR&R Act, ensuring parity across similarly situated land parcels.
26. Section 26(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (RFCTLAR\&R Act, 2013) lays down the statutory framework for determining the *market value* of land acquired for public purposes. It is a cornerstone provision designed to ensure that compensation reflects the true worth of the land at the time of acquisition, thereby protecting landowners from arbitrary or inadequate valuations. Section 26(1) is reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of convenience:
"26. Determination of market value of land by Collector.
(1)The Collector shall adopt the following criteria in assessing and determining the market value of the land, namely:-
(a)the market value, if any, specified in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) for the registration of sale deeds or Page 12 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 agreements to sell, as the case may be, in the area, where the land is situated; or
(b)the average sale price for similar type of land situated in the nearest village or nearest vicinity area; or
(c)consented amount of compensation as agreed upon under sub-section (2) of section 2 in case of acquisition of lands for private companies or for public private partnership projects, whichever is higher:
Provided that the date for determination of market value shall be the date on which the notification has been issued under section II."
27. Under Section 26(1), the Collector must adopt "whichever is higher"
among three distinct criteria:
1. The market value specified under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 for the registration of sale deeds or agreements to sell in the area where the land is situated; or
2. The average sale price for similar type of land situated in the nearest village or vicinity area; or
3. The consented amount of compensation agreed upon for acquisitions under Section 2(2) (relating to private companies or PPP projects).
28. This "whichever is higher" clause is critical -- it removes administrative discretion to selectively apply the lowest available benchmark, ensuring landowners benefit from the most favourable valuation basis. The provision's design reflects a legislative intent to protect property rights under Article 300A of the Constitution by guaranteeing fair recompense when private property is compulsorily acquired. Page 13 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51
29. The section further aligns with principles of comparative market analysis, requiring that valuation be informed by real, recent transactions in comparable lands. This approach prevents undervaluation based on outdated or artificial benchmarks. Courts have consistently interpreted Section 26(1) as mandatory, meaning failure to consider the highest applicable criterion renders the valuation legally defective.
30. In practice, Section 26(1) serves as the statutory "measuring rod" for fairness in acquisition, ensuring uniformity, transparency, and justice in compensation determinations across varying geographies and acquisition contexts. Its strict application is indispensable for maintaining public trust in the acquisition process.
31. It is axiomatic that compensation in land acquisition matters must truly reflect the genuine market value of the property at the time of acquisition, thereby ensuring fairness and preventing the expropriated owner from suffering an unwarranted loss. The principle recognises that compulsory acquisition is an extraordinary exercise of State power, permissible only when coupled with just recompense. Arbitrary underassessment not only violates statutory mandates but also erodes public trust in the acquisition process. Accordingly, valuation must be based on objective, transparent, and legally prescribed criteria, ensuring that the owner receives an amount equivalent to what the open market would command.
32. The arbitral process under Section 3G of the National Highways Act is not intended to be a mere procedural formality but a substantive, quasi- judicial adjudication on the fair amount of compensation payable for Page 14 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 acquired land. An arbitrator functioning under this provision assumes a statutory role, bound to carefully interpret and apply the governing legal framework, including the valuation principles of the RFCTLAR&R Act, 2013. This duty necessarily entails a thorough examination of all relevant evidence, comparative data, and market indicators placed on record. A mechanical affirmation of administrative determinations, without such active engagement, defeats the very purpose of the arbitral mechanism.
33. It is also well settled in law that an arbitrator, acting under Section 3G of the NH Act, discharges a quasi-judicial function and is bound by statutory constraints. The Arbitrator's failure to compare the CALA's award for Mouza - Bandalo with higher rates in neighbouring Mouzas, despite such data being placed on record, constitutes a breach of this duty.
34. The Arbitrator's perfunctory endorsement of such a deviation, without analytical reasoning, undermines the credibility of the adjudicatory process. The District Judge's decision to set aside the award and direct reconsideration is consistent with judicial duty to prevent arbitrary state action and to protect constitutional guarantees under Article 300A.
35. The function of an arbitrator, especially when acting as a statutory tribunal under the NH Act, is to provide a reasoned adjudication. This Court observes that the award in question failed to engage with the Respondent's documented claim of higher comparable prices, including a pre-notification agreement to sell at Rs. 1.25 crore per acre. Ignoring such material evidence constitutes more than a mere procedural lapse; it strikes at the root of the fairness of the determination. Section 26(1) is Page 15 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 couched in mandatory terms, leaving no discretion to disregard higher comparable prices.
36. The District Judge's reference to Section 3G(7)(a) of the NH Act is also apposite. This provision requires the arbitrator to determine the "amount" payable, which necessarily includes applying the appropriate method of ascertaining market value. The RFCTLAR&R Act's Section 26(1)(b) provides one such mandatory method, directing that whichever is higher among the prescribed criteria be adopted. Ignoring higher comparable sales, as in this case, renders the award legally unsustainable.
37. Arbitral awards under the NH Act are not immune from scrutiny when they ignore mandatory statutory provisions. The Arbitrator's omission to address the Respondent's specific reliance on higher benchmark values from nearby Mouzas constitutes a non-application of mind. Section 26(1)(b) creates a positive obligation to consider the "average sale price" for similar land in the nearest vicinity, and the Respondent produced concrete figures to that effect. The District Judge correctly identified this omission as "patent illegality," a ground squarely falling within the permissible scope of interference under Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration Act. A remand for fresh adjudication in conformity with statutory valuation methods is not only justified but necessary to preserve public confidence in the arbitral process. Thus, this Court finds no infirmity in the impugned judgment and declines to interfere. VI. CONCLUSION:
38. In conclusion, this Court finds that the impugned judgment of the Ld. District Judge is firmly rooted in statutory mandate, sound reasoning, Page 16 of 17 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 31-Aug-2025 15:37:51 and the principles of fairness inherent in compulsory acquisition law. The arbitral award suffered from patent illegality inasmuch as it failed to apply Section 26(1)(b) of the RFCTLAR&R Act, 2013 and ignored uncontroverted evidence of higher comparable market values in neighbouring Mouzas and a contemporaneous sale agreement.
39. Such omissions strike at the core of the valuation process and cannot be condoned under the guise of arbitral finality. The District Judge's decision to set aside the award and remand the matter for fresh consideration ensures that compensation will be determined in conformity with law, thereby safeguarding the Respondent's constitutional and statutory rights.
40. This Court, therefore, sees no merit in the present appeal and upholds the impugned order in its entirety, directing that the remanded proceedings proceed expeditiously.
41. ARBA No.30 of 2024 is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall, however, be no orders as to costs.
42. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr. Sanjeeb K. Panigrahi) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 26th August, 2025 Page 17 of 17