Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Ravindra Nath @ Virendranath vs State Of Rajasthan on 6 July, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1995(2)WLC273, 1994(2)WLN381
Author: R.R. Yadav
Bench: R.R. Yadav
JUDGMENT R.R. Yadav, J.
1. The instant criminal miscellaneous petition Under Section 482 Cr. P.C. has been filed against the order dated 3.11.1989 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge, Salumbar in criminal case No.618/89 by means of which cognizance has been taken against the petitioner Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 I.P.C. The present petition has been filed by the accused petitioner Ravindra Nath & Virendranath claiming speedy trial emanating from Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
2. The facts giving rise to the claim to speedy trial by the accused petitioner briefly stated are as follows: It is alleged by the prosecution that on 25.3.1974, one Khubilal son of Shri Meghraj Sharma, resident of Udaipur, who was Assistant Engineer, Public Works Department, Salumbar, failed a written report to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rishabhdeo, which was sent to the Police Station, Salumbar, to the effect that one L.D.C. Ravindranath (accused-petitioner) working in his office prepared forged vouchers No. 1676 dated 10.1.1973, No. 2012 dated 27.2.1973 No. 130 dated 4.5.1973, No. 683 dated 9.10.1973 and No. 68A dated 9.10.1973 for a total amount of Rs. 3381.12 and after putting his forged signatures, withdrew the amount from the State Bank Salumbar, but he did not credit the same in the cash book of the office and put the same with himself.
3. After receipt of the aforesaid information, a Crime Case No. 20/74 was registered against the petitioner Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 I.P.C. and the police started investigation. The petitioner was arrested on 27.3.1974 and was enlarged on bail.
4. During the investigation, the statements of only few witnesses were recorded Under Section 161 Cr. P.C. and the last statement is alleged to have been recorded on 10.3.1976, but then thereafter the investigation did not proceed at all.
5. The learned Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge, Salumbar vide his order dated 4.6.1976 was not satisfied with the slow speed of investigation, therefore, he discharged the accused petitioner on the said date.
6. It is strange to note that irrespective of the fact that the learned Magistrate, vide his order dated 4.6.1976, had arrived at a conclusion that since the investigation is not speedily proceeding for a long time and there is no fault of the accused petitioner in completing the investigation, therefore, he discharged him, but for the reasons best known to learned Magistrate, after lapse of nine years, vide his order dated 19.8.1985, ordered for re-investigation against the accused petitioner. I am constrained to observe that after the order of reinvestigation against the accused petitioner, the investigating agency remained idle and no further effective investigation was conducted and from the stage where it was left earlier and the accused was discharged by the Court vide order dated 4.6.1976 on the same material in the garb of reinvestigation, challan was filed before the Court by the prosecution agency on 3.11.1989 against the accused petitioner Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 I.P.C.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid challan submitted by the investigating agency, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge Salumbar, vide his order dated 3.11.1989, took congnizance against the accused petitioner Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 I.P.C.
8. From the aforesaid narration of facts, it is apparent on the face of record that in the present case, FIR was lodged against the accused petitioner on 25.3.1974, charge-sheet was filed against the accused petitioner before the Court on 3.11.1989 and the congnizance was taken against the accused petitioner Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 I.P.C. on the same day by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge, Salumbar.
9. I have heard the learned Counsel for the accused petitioner as well as the learned Public Prosecutor at length.
10. The learned Counsel for the accused petitioner submitted that in the instant case, the prosecution was initiated against the petitioner on 25.3.1974 and now we are running in 1994. Thus, according to him, more than 20 years have elapsed, but the trial against the accused petitioner has not been completed for the offence Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 I.P.C., as such, the accused petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of speedy trial as contemplated Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The second submission of the learned Counsel for the accused petitioner is that after submission of challan on the basis of reinvestigation, the learned Magistrate had taken congnizance on 3.11.1989, but up-till-now i.e. 12.1.1994 only complete challan papers have been handed over to the counsel for the accused petitioner. The last submission of the learned Counsel for the accused petitioner is that the instant case is a glaring case of negligence and inordinate delay on the part of prosecution to complete the trial against the accused petitioner Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 I.P.C. In support of his aforesaid submission, the learned Counsel for the accused petitioner placed before me a decision of the apex court reported in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, and unreported decision in Ganga Ram v. The State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 412 of 1989 and S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 5 of 1990) rendered by Hon'ble Rajesh Balia, J On 26th August, 1993. The learned Counsel for the accused petitioner has also invited my attention towards the unreported decision given by me on April 28, 1994 in Smt. Kesar and Ors. v. Smt. Anshumala (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 154/94).
11. The learned Public Prosecutor has refuted the aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of the accused petitioner and has submitted that the present case is not covered under the norms formulated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 54 in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra), therefore, the benefit of speedy trial cannot be extended in the present case to the accused petitioner. The second submission of the learned Public Prosecutor is that in the aforesaid judgment rendered by the apex court no outer limit is specified for extending the benefit of speedy trial.
12. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid rival contentions revised by the learned Counsel for the parties and I am of the opinion that the arguments advanced on behalf of the learned Counsel for the accused petitioner have substantial force.
13. In the instant case, the basic question would be as to whether the ratio decided of the decision given in Abdul Rehman Antulay's case (supra) is attracted. Their Lordships in the aforesaid judgment had clearly ruled that the guidelines formulated under paragraph 54 are not exhaustive. Secondly, fair, just and reasonable procedure is implicit Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India which creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. According to their Lordships' view, the speedy trial is also in public interest. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances of a particular case. Their Lordships' further held that right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. According to their Lordships', the benefit of speedy trial must be taken into account by Courts from the point of view of the accused are:
a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;
b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and
c) undue delay, may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, dis-appearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.
8) Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors 'balancing test' or 'balancing process'- and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
9) Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed.....
10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulder of the prosecution. In every case of complaint denial or right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of U.S.A. too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit in-effectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial.
11) An objection based on denial of right to seedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.
14. In my humble opinion, the present case is squarely covered by the ratio decidendi laid down by their Lordships' of the Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay's case (supra).
15. In the light of the aforesaid proposition laid down by the apex court, the facts of the present case may be examined. In the instant case, FIR was lodged on 25.3.1974, but the prosecution agency failed to complete investigation upto 4.6.1976 causing harassment to the present accused petitioner and looking to the negligence of the prosecution agency in conducting the investigation and committing delay, the learned Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Salumbar vide his order dated 4.6.1976 had discharged the accused petitioner. But, curiously enough, the learned Magistrate, after, a lapse of nine years, vide his order dated 19.8.1985, ordered for reinvestigation against the accused petitioner. After the order dated 19.8.1985 passed by the learned Magistratre for reinvestigation, challan was filed in Court on 3.11.1989 without examining even a single witness after the order dated 19.8.1985 passed by the learned Magistrate. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge, Salumbar took cognizance against the accused petitioner on 3.11.1989 Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 I.P.C. and the case remained pending and for the reasons best known to the prosecution agency, the complete challan papers were handed over to the counsel for the accused petitioner on 12.1.1994 after the expiry of about more than 4 years. In my considered opinion, the present case is a glaring example of negligence and inordinate delay on the part of investigating agency as well as the prosecuting agency to complete the trial against the accused petitioner, which is to be depricated.
16. It is true that in Abdul Rehman Antulay's case (supra), the apex court has not fixed any outer limit for extending the benefit of speedy trial, but in the present case, I am fully satisfied that about more than 20 years have elapsed and only the case has proceeded upto the stage of fixing date of framing charges on 28.2.1994 by the learned Magistrate, which amounts to abuse of the process of the Court and the criminal proceeding against the accused petitioner Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 deserve to be quashed.
17. A close scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the present case leads towards an irresistible conclusion that for this inordinate delay of more than 20 years in completing the trial against the accused petitioner, he has not contributed anything in delaying either investigation or prosecution. In the present case, the learned Public Prosecutor has failed to explain the inordinate delay of more than 20 years in completing the trial against the accused petitioner; causing the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to the accused petitioner's vocation and peace, resulting from undue prolonged investigation and trial in the present case, which ought to have been minimal cannot be reconciled by a court of conscience. In the instant case, my conscience is pricking as to how the investigating agency and the prosecuting agency are reluctant to complete the investigation and trial against the accused petitioner. In the present case, the investigating and prosecuting agencies are responsible for inordinate delay of 20 years in completing the trial against the accused petitioner.
18. Since the right to speedy trial emanating from Article 21 of the Constitution of India includes all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry and trial, therefore, not completing even framing of charge after expiry of about 20 years, this is a fit case in which the criminal proceedings against the accused petitioner Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 I.P.C. are liable to be quashed and the argument contrary to it raised by the learned Public Prosecutor is not acceptable.
19. On a similar nature of case in Ganga Ram v. The State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 412 of 1989 decided on August 26, 1993) where the criminal proceedings against the accused petitioners of that case Under Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 109 and 120B I.P.C. were quashed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. In that case, there was a delay of 18 years when the accused petitioners in that case approached to this Court and when the matter was taken up 22 years have elapsed while in the present case, more than 20 years had elapsed when the accused petitioner of the present case came before this Court claiming benefit of speedy trial. The ratio decidendi of the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Ganga Ram's case (supra) is applicable to this case. Therefore, the accused petitioner of the present case is also entitled to the same relief which has been given by the learned Single Judge of this Court to the accused Ganga Ram and others in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 412/89 and S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 5/90 decided on 26th of August, 1993.
20. In view of the aforementioned discussion, the present petition Under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is hereby allowed and the criminal proceedings pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge, Salumbar in Criminal Case No. 618/89 Under Sections 409, 467 and 468 I.P.C. against the accused petitioner Ravindra Nath @ Virendranath are hereby quashed.
21. Keeping in view the ratio decidendi of Abdul Rehman Antulay's case (supra), the instant criminal miscellaneous petition Under Section 482 Cr. P.C. expeditiously finally allowed at the admission stage, instead of admitting and granting ad- interim stay order and prolonging harassment to the accused petitioner for a longer period.