Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Magapu Satyanarayana vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 18 August, 2025
APHC010275472025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
WRIT PETITION NO: 13785 OF 2025
Between:
Magapu Satyanarayana, S/o. Manyalu, R/o. Dr. No. 34-2-18, Chavarla Vari
Veedhi, Mangala Varapu Peta, Rajahmundry Urban, Andhra Pradesh-533
101.
...Petitioner
AND
1. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, General
Administration (SC-I) Department, Secretariat Buildings, Amaravati,
Guntur.
2. The Collector and District Magistrate, East Godavari District.
3. The Superintendent, Special Prison for Women, Rajamahendravar am.
...Respondents
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be
pleased to issue an order or direction more particularly one in the nature of the
Habeas Corpus under Article 226 of Constitution of India setting aside the
Detention Order dated 03.05.2025 bearing Ref. No. M1/521904/2025 passed
by Respondent No.2 which was subsequently confirmed by Respondent No.1
vide G.O.Rt.No.1206 dated 20.06.2025 as arbitrary, illegal, and
unconstitutional and direct the Respondents to produce the detenue i.e..
#
Smt.Polisetti Laxmi, W/o. Kondayya, Aged about 53 years, Caste. Settibalija,
R/o. Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District,
Andhra Pradesh before this Honble Court and set her at liberty
(Main Prayer was amended as per c.o.dt.02.07.2025 Vide I.A.No.2 of 2025
In W.P.No.13785 of 2025)
lA NO: 1 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the High Court may be
pleased may be pleased to permit the Petitioner and other relatives of
detenue to in the prison. It is submitted that it is both a statutory right as well
as a constitutional right of the detenu to get a visit from their kith and kin and
any violation of such right would infringe the basic principles of justice and
equity pending disposal of the above writ petition.
Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI S.V. MARUTHI SANKAR, RESPESENTING
SRI CHALLA VENKAT
Counsel for the Respondents: SRI KIRTHI TEJA KONDAVEETI GOVT.
PLEADER ATTACHED TO THE OFFICE OF THE ADDL ADVOCATE
GENERAL
The Court made the following order:
'
/ 3
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
* * *
WRIT PETITION No. 13785 of 2025
Between:
Magapu Satyanaratyana
PETITIONER
AND
The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep.by its Principal Secretary,
General Administratin (SC-I) Department,
Secretariat Buildings,
Amkaravati, Guntur and 2 others
RESPONDENTS
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: I'B .08.2025
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers ^/es/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be v^es/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the ^Yes/No
fair copy of the Judgment?
RNT. J&MRK, ,1
Wi' No. 13785 of 2025
2
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
+ WRIT PETITION No. 13785 of 2025
% 15.08.2025
Between:
Magapu Satyanarayana
PETITIONER
AND
The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep.by its Principal Secretary,
General Administratin (SC-I) Department,
Secretariat Buildings,
Amkaravati, Guntur and 2 others
RESPONDENTS
! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri S. V. Maruthi Sankar,
Representing Sri Venkat
Challa
Counsel for the Respondents : Sri Kirthi Teja Kondaveeti
Govt. Pleader,
Attached to the Office of the
Addl.Advocate General
< Gist :
> Head Note:
? Cases Referred:
1. 2020(5) ALT 160
2. WP.No.5469/2022, APHC, decided
On 11.07.2022
3. (2025) 4 see 476
4. 1989 Supp(2)See576
5. (1975) 3 see 198
6. AIR2012Se(Supp)61
7. AIR 1975 Se 623
8. AIR 1966 se 740
9. 1989 Supp(l) see 322
10. (1969) 1 see 10
3
0 982) 2 see 403
12. (2013) 5 see 470
13. (2009) 14 see 302
14. (2010) 13 see 336
15. (2018) 12 see 150
16. (2023) 14 see 641
17. (1992) 2 see 177
18. (1975) 2 see 81
19. (2023) 9 see 587
RN I', .1 & MRK. .1
4 VVP No. 137X5 or 2025
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON^BL SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
WRIT PETITION No. 13785 of 2025
JUDGMENT:(per Hon'ble Sri Justice. Ravi Nath Tilhari) Heard Sri S. V. Maruthi Sankar, learned counsel, representing Sri Venkat Challa, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri Kirthi Teja Kondaveeti, learned Government Pleader, attached to the Office of the Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents .
2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed for writ of Habeas Corpus to set aside the Order of detention dated 03.05.2025 baring Ref.No.Ml/521904/2025 passed by the 2 nd respondent-The Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District with respect to the petitioner's wife Smt. Polisetti Laxmi (m short 'the detenue') and to set her free.
During the pendency of the writ petition, the detention Order was confirmed by the State/1"' respondent vide G.O.Rt.No.l206 dated 20.06.2025, served to the petitioner on 28.06.2025. By way of amendment, the petitioner has challenged the G.O.Rt.No.l206 dated 20.06.2025 as well.
I Facts:
3. By the detention Order, the detenue was detained on the ground that she is 'bootlegger' as defined under Section 2 (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (in short 'the 4 Act 1986'), as she was repeatedly indulging in committing offenses of 5 possession, supp/y and sale of illicitly distilled I'Quor in I ^(B) read Section 8 (B) of Andhra rantra^entionoPSefflon 2020 (in short 'the Act Prohibitio n 2020') to (Amendment) Act, Prejudicial to prevent her from acting in TOintenance of public health and manner public order.
fiStent!oj3.0rderb ^^^tetCoHector;
The detentio n Order passed by the 2''^ "strict Magistrate, ^ast Godavari respondent-the f Collector & District, dated under: 03.0S.202S, ;si reproduced as "Tile IVo.REVEG
-MACL0Ml(PREDy7/2„j5 RefNo.M]/52l904/2025 -M(MAGL-1).col -RJY-eg Date: 03/05/2025 Collector's office East Godavari District Tajamahend ravaram of the Collector j,., .
Cffavari
*** '"■"'I, f.A.S.,
omms
2CDETEbmON
UNDER section
TRAEEIC
offenders
Read:
1986 (ACT N 0.1
1. Govt.
(General
29.10.2014.
2.
^ D.O.Ms.No IR n ^ Department). Dated:
(Law &
General
Order)
Dated: 07.03.2025, ' Administration
District ^
(SCJ) Department,
Tajamahend ravaram. ' of the
an District,
-oOo-
RNT. .1 & MKK. J
6 WP No. 13785 of 2025
Whereas, as per the information laid before me by the District Prohibition & Excise Officer, East Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram, which reveals that, one individual Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o. Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija^ R/o. Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District ISi repeatedly indulging herself in clandestine possession, supply & sale of illicitly distilled liquor in contravention of Section 7(B) 'read with 8 (B) of A.P. Prohibition (Amendment) Act 2020. She indulged in bootlegging activities in the manner prejudicial to the public healHi.and public order and she has involved in 05 cases.
Whereas, the following 05 cases are considered as grounds for her detention under the above act.
SI. Cr. No. & Date I.D.Liquor
No.
seized
Cr.No.220/2024, dated 22.03.2024, under 55 liters of ID
Section 34 (a) of A. P. Excise Liquor and 8
(Amendment) Act 17 of 2020 and 7-B bottles of
r/w. 8-B of A. P. Proh.(Amendment) Act IMFL
of 2020 of SEB Station,
Rajamahendravaram South
2.
Cr.No.389/2024, Dated 12.07.2024, 52 liters of ID
U/Sec.7-B r/w. 8-B of A.P. Prohibition Liquor
(Amendment) Act . of 2020 of SEB
Station, Rajamahendravaram South
j.
Cr.No. 16/2025, Dated 16.01.2025, 30 liters of ID
U/Sec.7-B r/w. 8-B of Andhra Pradesh Liquor
Prohibition (Amendment) Act No. 18 of
2020 of Prohibition & Excise Station,
Rajamahendravaram South
4. Cr.No.l 17/2025, Dated
21.02.2025, 20 liters of ID
U/Sec.7-B r/w. 8-B of Andhra Pradesh Liquor
Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 2020 of
Prohibition & Excise Station,
Rajamahendravaram South
5. Cr.No. 145/2025, Dated 12.03.2024, 20 liters of ID
U/Sec.7-B r./w. 8-B of Andhra Pradesh Liquor
Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 2020 of
Prohibition & Excise Station,
Rajamahendravaram .South
RNT. J & mrk t
7
WP No. 13785 of 2025
Against Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o. Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, K/o.Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District who IS repeatedly indulging herself in committing the offences of possession, supply & sale ot l.U. Liquor m contravention of section 7(B) r/w 8(B) of AP Prohibition (Amendment) Act 2020 which comes under the category of "BOOTLEGGER" as defined U/Sections 2 (b) of "The Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous activities of Bootleggers, Deceits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 and it is necessary to make an order invoking powers conferred under Sec.3 (2) of the Act (Act No.l of 1986) directing that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District be detained m Special Prison for Women, Rajamahendravaram, with immediate ettect, with a view to preventing her from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of public health and public order.
The District „ . ^ ^ Prohibition & Excise Officer, East Godavari, Rajamahendravaram further submitted that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o
Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/SettibaliJa, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban East Godavari District is spoiling the health of people by manufacturing and selling ID Liquor to the local persons and making them addicted to ID Liquor. Ihus the above individual has been spoiling/disturbing the society/Community at length leading to health related issues and law and order problems not only in Hukumpeta Village but also in surrounding areas of Rajamahendravaram Urban and Rural Mandals. Hence her activities are dangerous to the society and needs to be curtailed and m the above cases after analysis the contraband seized is found to be Illicitly distilled liquor containing ftisel oil as such unfit for human consumption and injurious to health.
Therefore I Smt. P. Prasanthi, I.A.S, Collector & District Magistrate East Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram in exercise of the powers conferred upon me under Sub Section 2 of Section 3 of the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous ' Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoran Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 198^ vide G.O. Rt. No. 486, General Administration (SC.I) Department, Dated: 07.03.2025 do hereby direct under Sub Section (1) of Sectioij 3 of the said Act that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A^3 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District shall be detained in Special Prison for Women Rajamahendravaram, Andhra Pradesh State as per G.O.Ms.No.l8, General Administration (Law and Order) Department, Dated: 02.03.2015 until further orders to be received from the Government in order to prevent the detenue from indulging "Bootlegger" activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order and as per the provisions laid down under the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986.
The District Prohibition &
Excise Officer, East Godavari,
Rajamahendravaram, is directed to take necessary action in serving the "Detention RN'[. J & MRK. .1 8 WP No. 13785 of 2025 English and Telugu Languages to Smt. Pohsetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappana«ar Rajamahendravaran, Urban, East Godavari District and expLinTo in It is also acknowledgment immediately to the under signed, also directed to take the detenue into the custody and handover her to the socfn soon aft n after serving the Detention Order. R^J^'T^^hendravaram, Andhra Pradesh section^i section 10oTf A P P '"'''T'' '"in of A.P.Prevention ""'I Dacoits of Dangsrous Activities of Boot-letters ""''P'' , ml86 ?ict (Act m986ra"''d's'7"p1-™''"
1/1986) and Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 Aeti yrs, C/Settibalija, r„H ■ n- . ■, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District has right to make representation (i) to authority who paised the mil 'tie Ch,VfT7 "7" '"7 " proved by thi Oo"t o ll tl alfof ttm '■ " (iii) to the Advisory Board Given under my hand and seal on this day 03/05/2025.
P. Prasanthi, I.A.S Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram"
5. The grounds of detention as per the detention Order are as under:
"FileNo.REVEG-MAGL0Ml(PRED)/7/2025-JA(MAGL-l)-COL-RJY-EG Ref.No.Ml/521904/2025 Collector's office Date; 04/05/2025 East Godavari District Raj amahendravaram grounds of DETFNTT01V Sub:
Grounds for Detention Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o. Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District U/Section 3 (2) of "The Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Daeoits Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Aet, 1986 (Act No. 1 of 1986) - Communicated.
-oOo-
Whereas, as per the Information laid before me by the District Prohibition & Excise Officer, East Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram, which reveals that, Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, F<NT. J & MRK, J 9 WP No. 13785 of 2025 C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District is repeatedly indulging herself in committing the offences of possession, supply & sale of I.D. Liquor in contravention of Section 7 (B) read with 8 (B) of A.P. A.P. Proh (Amendment) Act 2020.
You, Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kiondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District is not a licensee or holder of any permit to deal in any kind of intoxicants under the provisions of A.P. Excise Act, 1968. Further, there is a "Prohibition" on procurement supply, sale and possession of illicitly distilled liquor, only allowing the sale of Indian made liquor ,(I.M.L) and Indian made foreign liquor (IMFL) from licensed premises by the licence holders only in the state of Andhra Pradesh from L* April 1997. As such sale of illicitly distilled liquor is an offence. The I.M.L is being supplied through the I.M.L depots under the control of Government of Andhra Pradesh and those who intend to trade the I.M.L were issued licenses as per the procedure laid down by the State Government through the Prohibition & Excise Department as per the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 after collection of prescribed fees. But the material placed before me reveals that you have been indulging in clandestine manufacturing, possession, transport and sale of illicitly distilled liquor.
You have been involved in the following acts so far.
1. Cr.No.220/2024, Dated: 2^33.2024, U/Sec 34 (a) of A.P. Excise (Amendment) Act 17 of 2020 and 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Proh (Amendment) Act of 2020 of SEB Station, Rajamahendravaram South.
On 22.03.2024 at about, 12.30 PM, on reliable information, the ESI, DTF, Rajamahendravaram along with staff reached the Grama Sachivalayam, Veerabhadra Nagar and requested the VRO to act as mediator regarding illegal sales of ID Liquor and duty paid bottles in Veerabhadranagar, then he agreed and proceeded with the raid party and reached the scene of offence i.e., beside bridge at 100 feet road near wambay houses in Veerabhadra Nagar of Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal, we found one female person standing with a gunny bag kept in front of her. On seeing the raid party the female person tried to escape from the place, but the raid party stopped her with the assistance RNT. .1 & MRK, .1 WP No. 13785 ol' 2025 10 of Staff and questioned about the contents in the hand bag and gunny bag. Then she stated that hand bag contain IML bottles and gunny bag contain ID liquor. When verified the gunny bag in the presence of mediator and found 55 Ltrs of ID Liquor in 11 polythene covers each cover contains 05 Ltrs of ID Liquor (11x05=55 Ltrs). Then the raid party verified the hand bag in the presence of mediator and found i) Amber Horse Superior whisky - 180 ML - 04 bottles, B.No.230, dt. 13.03.2024. ii) Mansion House French brandy - 180 ML 01 bottle, B.No.249, dt.Ol .03.2024. iii) old Tavern Deluxe whisky - 180 ML - 01 bottle, B.No.91/44, dt.13.03.2024. iv) Silver Strips Reserve Whisky - 180 ML - 01 boftle B.N0.72/L11, dt.08.0L2024. v) Sterling Reserve Whisky - 90ml loose in 180ml bottle - 1 bottle, B.No.175, dt.12.12.2023 Total 8 (180 ML - 7, 90 ML
- 01) bottles of Duty paid liquor without HEALS and also found "For sale in Andhra Pradesh only" printed on the bottle label, On questioning in the presence of mediator she revealed her identities noted as A2) Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, Age:52 years, C/o. Kapu, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal. When questioned about the said ID Liquor in the presence of mediator she revealed that she purchased the above ID Liquor for Rs.I50/- per I Ltr from'Al) Magapu Satyanarayana, S/o. Tatarao, Age; 47 years, C/o. Kapu, R/o. Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal and she sells the ID Liquor for Rs.200/- per I Ltr for her livelihood. In the presence of mediator the ESI, DTF arrested her duly informing the reasons for arrest, drawn 5 sample bottles (each brand one bottle) and also drawn 300 ml of ID Liquor in a bottle as sample for analysis, seized the remaining duty paid liquor bottles and ID Liquor. Sealed and affixed identity slips on the sample bottles and seized property under the cover of mediator report drafted at the scene of offence. Further the ESI, Rajamahendravaram South register the F.I.R in Cr.No.220/2024, U/s 34(a) of A.P. Excise (Amendment) Act 17 of 2020 and 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Proh (Amendment) Act of 2020 and A-2 was produced before the Hon'ble VII AJFCM Court, Rajamahendravaram for judicial Custody, during enquires the P&ESI, Rajamahendravaram South arrested A-1 on 27.03.2024 and produced before- the Hon'ble VII AJFCM Coiurt, RNT, J & MRK. J 11 WP No. 13785 of 2025 Rajamahendravaram for judicial custody. Subsequently they were released on bail.
The Chemical Examiner, REL, Kakinada opined that the samples S.No.22207 to 22211 is Indian Made Liq uor and S.No.22212 is illicitly distilled liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health and issued an analysis report vide C.E.No. 1482/2024, Dt: 12.04.2024. Charge sheet filed. C.C. No awaited.
2. Cr.No.389/2024, Dated: 12.07.2024, U/Sec 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Proh (Amendment) Act of 2020 of SEB Station, Rajamahendravaram South.
On reliable information, on 12.,07.2024 at about 01.45 PM 1 (B. Srinivasa Rao) ESI, DTE, Rajamahendravaram South along with his staff contacted the VRO, Hukumpeta through phone and requested the VRO to act as mediator regarding illegal sales of ID Liq in the village, then he agreed.
uor proceeded with the raid party and reached the scene of offence i.e., near bushes in front of canal right side of AVA Road m i Hukumpeta village of Rajamahendravaram Rural Mandal. We found one female person sitting on the stone and kept one bag in front of her and also found 2 persons standing near her. On seeing the raid party the 2 persons ran away and female person tried to eseape from the place, on suspicion the raid party stopped her with the assistance of staff and questioning she stated that she is selling ID liquor and ran away persons they came to drink ID Liquor. When verified the bag in the presence of mediator and found 02 Ltrs of ID Liquor in 4 plastic bottles each bottle contains 500ml Ltrs of ID Liquor (04x500ml=02. Ltrs) and also found 20 Ltrs of ID Liquor in a water can and also found 30 Ltrs of ID Liquor in a black plastic can (Total 02+20+30=52 Ltrs) with strong ID liquor smell. On questioning she revealed that her identities noted as Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, Age-52 years, Caste-Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, Mandal. When questioned her about the said ID Liquor, then she revealed that ID liquor purchased from unknown person at Peravaram Lankalu to sell the same at the scene of offence. Then the ESI arrested her duly informing the reasons for arrest at about 01.45 PM, drawn 300 ML of ID liquor as sample for analysis, seized the remaining ID liquor in the presence of mediator. Sealed and affixed identity slips on the sample bottles and seized ID liquor under the cover RN I, .1 & VliiK, .1 12 WP No. 13785 of 2025 of mediator report drafted on the spot. Later the ESI, Rajamahendravaram South register the F.I.R in Cr.No.389/2024, U/s 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Proh (Amendment) Act of 2020 and produced before the Hon'ble VII AJFCM Court, Rajamahendravaram for judicial Ciistody. Subsequently she was released on bail.
The Chemical Examiner, REL, Kakinada opined that the sample is illicitly distilled liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health and issued an analysis report vide C.E.No.3190/2024, Dt; 21.08.2024 in S.No;41296.
Charge sheet filed, C.C. No awaited.
You have been involved in the following acts so far.
3. Cr.No.16/2025, Dated: 06.01.2025, U/Sec 7-B r/w 8-B of Andhra Pradesh Prohibition (Amendment) Act. No.l8 of 2020 of Prohibition & Excise Station, Rajamahendravaram South.
As per the instructions of Proh. & Excise Inspector, Rajamahendravaram South, on 06.01.2025 at about 05.00 PM, the P&ESI, Rajamahendravaram South along with her staff conducting Raids for Prohibition & Excise offences, we reached the scene of offence i.e., Al the bridge at 100 feet road near wambay houses in Veerabhadra Nagar of Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal. We found one female person standing with a mica bag kept beside her legs. On seeing the raid party the person tried to escape from the place, but the P&ESI stopped her with the assistance of staff, ascertained her full name and address Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o D.No:87-l-19/1 3 a. Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, Mandal, East Godavari District and also questioned her about the contents in the mica bag, then she stated that it contain ID liquor. 7'hen the P&ESI deputed one of the staff constable named A. Venkatalakshmi tried to secure mediators, she came back after 15 minutes and told that nobody came forward to act as mediators. The raid party verified the mica bag found 30 Ltrs of ID Liquor packed in 06 polythene covers each cover containing about 05 Ltrs of ID Liquor (06x05=30 Ltrs) with strong ID Liquor smell. Oil questioning she stated that she purchased said ID liquor from unknown person at Veerabhadra Nagar near Ava Road and sells high price and she will get profit. The P&ESl arrested her duly informing RNT. J & MRK. J 13 WP No. 13785 of 2025 the reasons for arrest at about 05.00 PM, drawn one bottle with 300 ML of ID liquor as a sample for analysis, seized the remaining ID liquor. Sealed and affixed identity slips on the sample bottle and seized property under the cover of occurrence report drafted on the spot. Later, the P&ESI, Rajamahendravaram South register the F.I.R in Cr.No. 16/2025, U/s 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 and produced before the Hon'ble VII AJFCM Court, Rajamahendravaram for judicial Custody. Subsequently they were released on bail.
The Chemical Examiner, REL, Kakinada opined that the sample is illicitly distilled liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health and issued an analysis report vide C.E.No.362/2025_in S.No.3293. Charge sheet filed. C.C. No awaited.
You have been involved in the following acts so far.
4. Cr.No.117/2025, Dated: 21.02.2025, U/Sec 7-B r/w 8-B of Andhra Pradesh Prohibion (Amendment) Act.No.18 of 2020 of Prohibition & Escise Station, Rajamahendravaram South As per the instructions of Proh. & Excise Superintendent, Rajamahendravaram, on 21.02.2025 at 04.00 PM, on reliable information, the P&EI, ESTF, Rajamahendravaram along with her staff conducting raids for Proh.& Escise offences they reached the scene of offence i.e. left side of 4 roads junction in front of the road leads to Wambay houses to Morampudi in Hukumpeta village of Rajamahendravaram Rural Mandal. Then the raid party requeted the pedestrian person named Kammirilli Raju, S/o. Apparao to act as mediator regarding illegal sales of ID Liquor, then Jie agreed and proceeded with the raid party. In the presence of mediator the raid party found one person kept the mica bag beside his legs near the road left side bushes. On seeing the raid party the person tried to escape from the place, but the P&EI stopped him with the ' assistance of staff and questioned him about the contents in the mica bag, for which he stated that the bag contained lA Liquor. On questioning in the presence of mediator he revealed his name and address noted as Al) Mohammad Gouse Mohiddin @ Rafi, S/o. Amear, Age: 34 Yrs C/o. Muslim, R/o. Danavayipeta, Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal and Al also stated that he was working as RNT. .1 & MRK, ,1 14 Wl> No. 13785 of 2025 daily wages coolie for 500/- per day and the above ID Liquor given to him for sale purpose by A2) Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, Age about 56 years, Caste-Settibalija, R/o Ayyappana^ar, Rajamahendravaram, Urban Mandal and A1 also stated that the above ID Liq uor bringing by A3) Magapu . Satyanarayana @ Sathibabu, S/o. Manyalu, Age about - 45 years, Caste Kapu, R/o. Mangalavarapupeta, Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal. In the presence of mediator the AI stated that the A2 and A3 are selling the ID Liquor through Al. In the presence of mediator then raid party verified the mica bag found 20 Ltrs of ID Liquor packed in 4 polythene covers each cover containing about 05 Ltrs of ID liquor (04x05=20 Ltrs) with strong ID Liquor smell. In the presence of mediator the P&EI arrested the Al duly informing the reasons for arrest at about 04.00 PM, drawn one sample bottle with 300 ML of ID Liquor. Sealed and affixed identity slips on the sample bottle and seized property under the cover of mediator report drafted on the spot. Later the P&ESI, Rajamahendravaram South register the F.I.R in Cr.No.l 17/2025, U/s 7-B r/w 8- B of A.P. Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 and A-1 was produced before the Hon'ble VII AJFCM Court, Rajamahendravaram for judicial Custody. Subsequently he was released on bail. During the course of investigation the accused A2) Polisetti Laxmi was produced before the Hon'ble V AJFCM Court Rajamahendravaram through P.T. Warrant on 19.03.2025. Subsequently she was released on bail. The accused A3) Magapu Satyanarayana @ Sathibabu got anticipatory bail from the Hon'ble High Court of AP, Amaravati vide CRLP.No.2703 of 2025, Dt.28-03-2025.
The Chemical Examiner, REL, Kakinada opined that the sample is illicitly distilled liquot;, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health and issued an analysis report vide C.E.No.767/2025, Dt; 11.03.2025 in S.No.5838. The case is Under investigation.
You have been involved in the following acts so far.
5. Cr.No.145/2025, Dated: 12.03.2025, 7-B r/w 8-B of Andhra Pradesh Prohibitino (Amendment) Act.No.l8 of 2020 of Prohibition & Excise Station, Rajamahendravaram South.
On 12.03.2025 at about 08.15 AM, on reliable information the P&EI, Rajamahendravaram South along with staff reached the Sachivalayam - 39, 16''' RNT, J & MRK, J IS" • WP No. 13785 or 2025 ward, Veerabhadra Nagar and met the VRO and requested him to act as mediator regarding illegal possession of ID Liquor, then he agreed and proceeded with the raid party in their jeep No.AP02 TV 0297 and reached the scene of offence i.e., At the bridge at 100 feet road near wambay houses in Veerabhadra Nagar of Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal. In the presence of meditor the raid party found one female person standing with mica bag holding in her right hand. On seeing the raid party the person tried to escape from the place by leaving her mica hand bag, but the P&EI stopped her with the assistance of staff and questioned about the contents in the mica hand bag, for which she stated that the bag contains ID Liquor. In the presence of mediator ■ the raid party verified the mica hand bag and found 20 Ltrs of ID Liquor (04x05=20 Ltrs) with strong ID Liquor smell. On questioning in the presence of mediator she revealed that her identities noted as Al) Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, Age: 53 years, Caste: Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban Mandal and also stated that she purchased the the above ID Liquor from A2) Palivela Veera Venkata Ramaita @ Bujji, S/o. Nageswara Rao, Age about 36 Yrs, Caste: Yadava, R/o. Raghunadhap uram village, Rajanagaram Mandal for lower price and according to sell for higher price at wambay house. In the presence of mediator the P&EI arrested the AI duly informing the reasons for arrest at about 08.30 AM, drawn one sample bottle with 300 ML of ID Liquor as sample for chemical analysis, seized the remaining ID Liquor. Sealed and affixed identity slips on the sample bottle and seized property under the cover of mediator report drafted on the spot. Later the P&ESI, Prohibition & Exeise - Rajamahendravaram South register the F.I.R in Cr.No. 145/2025, U/s 7-B r/w 8-B of A.P. Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 and A-1 was produced before the Hon'ble VII AJFCM Court, Rajamahendravaram for judicial Custody. Subsequently she was released on bail.
The Chemical Examiner, REL, Kakinada opined that the sample is illicitly distilled liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health and issued an analysis report vide C.E.No. 1063/2025, Dt: 09.04.2025 in S.No.7836. Case is UI for arrest of the accused A2 Palivela Veera Venkata Ramana @ Bujji.
RN r, ,1 & MRK. ,i 16 Wl> No. 13785 of 2025 Thus, you are "Boot-legger" defined under section 2(b) of the A.P. * Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, ^ Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act 1/1986) and your activities are causing injury to the public health. In the above cases after analysis the contraband seized is found to be illicitly distilled liquor containing fusel oil as such unfit for human consumption and injurious to health. It is evident from the above facts that you are actively indulging in bottlegging activities of supply, possession and sale of illicitly distilled liquor within the limits of Hukumpeta Village and the surrounding vicinities of Rajamahendravaram Urban and Rural Mandals and deliberately violating the provisions of A.P.Prohibition Act in spite of ban on arrack. Further, it is clear that in spite of booking number of cases by the Prohibition & Excise Station, Rajamahendravaram South against you. You are continuing activities in violation of the provisions of A.P. Prohibition Amendment Act, 2020. The illicitly distilled liquor sold by you is injurious to health, thereby ^ affecting Public Order. The said illicitly distilled liquor was being manufactured by adopting crude and unscientific methods. Because of all these crude and unscientific methods, the illicitly distilled liquor contains all types of impurities, fusel oil and also it is found acetic.
The consumption of illicit distilled liquor causes Liver diseases, CNS depression, Metabolic Acidosis, V isual Symptoms like decreased visual acuity. Hemorrhagic Pancreatitis, Convulsions. Basal Ganglion problems like Parkinson's due to methyl alcohol (wood alcohol). Ethylene Glycol can cause metabolic Acidosis, Acute Renal Failure, Come / Seizures / Arrythmias, ARDS, Hypertension. Ethyl Alcohol can cause Cerebella Disorders, Depression, Psychosis, Convulsions, Cardiomyopathy. Benzodiazepines can cause Depression, Respiratory failure and. Hypotension. Chloral Hydrate can cause Hypoglycemia. Seizures and Excessive sedation.
Process of prosecution of cases against you in the above-mentioned cases under the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 also takes long time to have any desired impact to your clandestine, boot-legging activities since prosecution proceedings take sufficiently long period of time. You are causing wide spread 17 danger to public health ""'"8 of'"<==™,yan,iong the general ICO t at ocality. If your activities are allowed unhindered and unchecked, there is every danger of leading to liquor tragedies costing many lives of poor people within the limits of Rajamahendravai am Urban and Rural Mandals and Its surrounding villages and there by affecting the public order. While the Government is implementing various schemes for the benefit and welfare of the downtrodden, the sales of illicitly distilled liquor is badly affecting consumer's health, the financial status, social status of publiic and ultimately the public order, As this trade is found to be most convenient to get easy and fast money and huge profits with small investments, i offenders the same offences without are again and again resorting to A p p vm ■ ''""ked under the .he department to at every occasion of commission of the offence. To detect an offence While violating the law of land ISi a laborious process involving meticulous planning and hundreds of man-hours, Further, an execution of criminal prosecution launched against her under normal process of law will take a long • time. Hence, it is not possible to immediately prevent you from indulging i m similar prejudicial activities to public health and order. Your activities are adversely affecting and public health i community, creating a feeling of insecurity, danger life m that locality. Thus your activities are affecting the life of jmmuni^ in .hat locality and having impact on public Action taken against her under noimal provisions of health and public order sending for remand and law by registering the cases.
unlawful activities which putting her up for trial had no effect in curbing her Therefore there IS i are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, no other option except to invoke the jurisdiction conferred extraordinary on the District Collector and District Magistrate under section 3 (1) of Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous activities of Boot Loggers, Dacoits, Drug offenders. Goondas, Immoral Traffic offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 as an extreme measure in order to activities of this prevent bootlegging person and save public from grave threat to fheir health and requesled that the said individual be demined under A.P. Prevention of RNT, ,1 & MRK. .1 18 WP No, 13785 of 2025 Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers. Dacoits, Drug Offenders. Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land-Grabbers Act, 1986. Thus, I am satisfied after thorough verification of the material placed before me that you are fall under the category of "BOOTLEGGER" as defined in Sec 2
(b) of The Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous activities of Bootlegger s. Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986" and you are a fit person to be detained U/Sec.3 (2) of the said Act and accordingly I will issue orders with a view to preventing you from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. The District Prohibition & Excise Officer, East Godavari, Rajamahendravaram further submitted that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District, is spoiling the health of people by possession, supply & sale of illicitly distilled liquor to the local persons and making them addicted to ID Liquor. Thus the abbve individual has been spoiling/disturbing the Society/Community at length leading to health related issues and law and order problems not only in Hukumpeta Village but also in surrounding areas of Rajamahendravaram urban and rural Mandals. Hence her activities are dangerous to the society and needs to be curtailed and in the above cases after analysis the contraband seized is found to be illicitly distilled liquor containing fusel oil as such unfit for human consumption and injurious to health. The request made by the District Prohibition & Excise Officer, East Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram is hereby considered and after thorough verification of the material evidences placed before me, I am satisfied that this is a fit case to initiate the powers conferred on me U/Sec 3 (1) & (2) of A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 agaunst Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A753 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District. Therefore, I, Smt. P. Prasanthi, I.A.S. Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram in exercise of the powers conferred upon me under Sub Section 2 of Section 3 of the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous RN f, J & MRK. J 19 Wl> No. 13785 or 2025 >■1 A Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits. Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 vide G.O. Rt. No.486, General Administration (SC.I) Department, Dated: 07.03.2025 do hereby direct under Sub Section (I) of Section 3 of the said Act that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District shall be detained in Special Prison for women, Rajahmundry, Andhra Pradesh State as per G.O.Ms.No.18, General Administration (Law and Order) Department, Dated:
02.03.2015 until further orders to be received from the Government in order to prevent the detenue from indulging Bootlegging activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order and as per the provisions laid down under the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986.
And that this case shall be referred 'to the Advisory Board for review and report under Section 10 of A.P. Preventio of Dangerous Activies of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986. Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs. C/Settibalija, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District has right to make representation (i) to authority who passed the order i.e., to the under signed before this order is approved by the Government or (ii) to the Chief Secretary, Govt, of A.P, Amaravathi or (iii) to the Advisory Board or to all of them.
The Government on the basis of the opinion of the Advisory Board may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person under Section 12 & 13 of A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986.
Given under my hand and seal, on this day 04/05/2025.
P Prasanthi, I A S Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, Rajamahendravaram"
V KN I - .1 & MKK. I 20 \VP No. I .^785 ol' 202'
6. On reference to the Advisory' Board, the Advisory Board submitted its • report to the Government that there was sufficient cause for the detention and vide G.O.Rt.No.l206, dated 20.06.2025, on consideration of the report of the Advisory Board and the material available on record, the State confirmed the Order of detention under Section 12 (1) read with Section 13 of the Act 1986.
Order of Confirmation bv State:
7. The detention Order dated 03.05.2025 was confirmed by the State/1 St ■respondent vide G.O.Rt.No.l206, dated 20.06.2025, which reads as under:
"GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ABSTRACT PREVENTIVE DETENTION - Detention,order passed against Smt. Polisetti Laxmi. W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh State, by the Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District and approved by the Government, under the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act No: 1 of 1986) - Confirmed - Orders - Issued.
GENEFLAL ADMINISTRATION (SC-I) DEPARTMENT
G.O.RT.No. 1206 Dated: 20-06-2025
Read the following: -
1.
From the Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, Letter No.M 1/521904/2025, Dated: 07-05-2025, together with Proceedings No.M 1 /521904/2025, Dated:03-05-2025.
2. Radio Message Lr.No.SPWR/JR./859/2025, Dated: 05-05-2025, From the Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, along with Ackmowledgement received from Superintendent, Special Prison for Women, Raj amahendravaram.
3. G.O.RT.No.892, General Administration (SC-I) Department, Dated: 09-05- 2025.
4. W.M.No:2821442 /SC-I/A.3/2025-1', Dated: 09-05-2025.
5. Letter No. 2821442/SC-I/A3/2025-2, General Administration (SC-I) Department, Dated: 15-05-2025.
6. Letter No. 2821442,/SC-I/A3/2025-3, General Administration (SC-I) Department, Dated: 27-05-2025.
7. From the Chairman, Advisory Board Report on Preventive detentions Opinion & Minutes of the meeting Dated: 28-05- 2025.
RNT, J & MRK, J 21 WP No. 13785 of 2025 ORDER;
WHEREAS the Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District has "ec ion%Tbr Section 2(b) off ft the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of DangerousSection (2) Cw Activities nf Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offender and ' Kol™ ndayya T/sf'■ ' A/53 yrs, R/o Ayyappanagar, PoHseltifaltw;
Rajamahendravaram Urban East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh State, She is repeatedly indulging her'seR? clandestine possession, supply & sale of illicitly distilled liq uor m contravention of in mria^^n^h "if (Amendment) Act 2020. She nfhhf a '1''= manner prejudicial to the public health and pubhe order and she has involved in 05 cases. She is spoiling the health of people addicted to ID Liquor. Thus the above individual has been spoiling/disturbfng the socjety/Community a, length leading to health related issues and laf and orte problems not only m Hukumpeta Village but also i in surrounding areas of Rajamahendravaram Urban and Rural Mandals. Hence, her activities are .
dangerous I • 1 to the society and needs to be curtailed and in the above cases after tuel oil as such unfit for human consumption and injurious to health She i is sX of i n' committing the offences of possession, supply & (AmeudmenfZilfo "tT""™ V*" Prohibition defined U/Sectio„s 2 (b) of "The Andhra Pradesh frevention of D^gerous ■ as achvities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Iraffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 and it is necessary to make an ordfr invoking powers conferred under Sec 3 (2) of the Act (Act No, I of 1986) directing Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs C/Settibaliia R/n sSrPrifof Special Urban, East Godavari Prison for Women, Rajamahendravaram, District beeffect with immediate detailed with a in
2. AND WHEREAS, the Government have accorded approval of the said detention order under sub-section (3) Section 3 of the Act, vide Government Orders 3rd read above.
weeks weeks from from tf Ae rlT date off adetention of a person under the G°''cnrment within three order shall place the case before the Advisory Board on Preventive Detentions and the Advisory Board shall R^rH ' R ./"f'I'P Act. The above said case was placed before the Advisory Boa d constituted under Section 9 of the said Act, comprising of Juste Sri Md Ir etU Choiiman and two Members forIts consideration referencfsTh onof r rea'dT" °"''™ment, under Section 11 (1) of the said Act, vide The case was reviewed by the Advisory Board on 28-05- 2025 through video conference. After having heard the detenue and the RNT. .I& VIRK. ,1 WP No. 13785 of 2025 22 Investigating Officer, who have attended the Video Conference and also upon perusing the grounds of detention and the connected records, the Advisory board has unanimously opined and reported that "there is sufficient cause for the detention of the detenue.
4. AND WHEREAS, the Government after careful examination of the entire record, observed that Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh State, is found to be involved in as many as in Five (05) cases mentioned in the grounds of detention. All the instances mentioned above clearly establish that he is an habitual offender and his activities are habitual in nature and which are registered under various Sections, i.e. U/Sec 34 (a) of A.P. Excise (Amendment) Act 17 of 2020 and U/Sec 7-B r/w 8-B Andhra Pradesh Prohibition (Amendment) Act. No. 18 of 2020. As such, the activities of the individual falls under and within the meaning of "Bootlegger" as defined under section 2(b) of Act 1 of 1986. The detaining authority having taken into account and consideration of indulgence of the detenue in the above said activities repeatedly at regular intervals and having satisfied that the penal laws have failed to curb her illegal activities, has passed the detention order against the detenue by invoking the provisions under the Act 1 of 1986, in order to prevent her from indulging further in such activities, which are prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The Advisory Board after review of the case, has opined that there is sufficient cause for the detention of the detenue. As such, the detenue deserves the maximum period of detention, as provided under Section 13 of the Act.
5. Now, therefore, after due consideration of the report of the Advisory Board and the material available on record, and in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 12 read with Section 13 of the said Act, the Order of Detention made by the Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, in the reference 1st read above, as approved in the G.0.3rd read above are hereby confirmed by the Government. The detention of Smt. Polisetti Laxmi, W/o Kondayya, A/53 yrs, R/o Ayyappanagar, Rajamahendravaram Urban, East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh State, shall be for a period of 12 (Twelve) months from the date of his detention, i.e., 05- 05-2025 under Section 13 r/w Section 12(1) of the said Act 1/1986.
(BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH) K. VIJAYANAND CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
8. The respondents filed counter affidavit justifying the Order of detention.23
RNT, J & MRK, J WP No. 13785 of 2025
9. The petitioner submitted that there was no need to file rejoinder affidavit.
Submissions of the Ipam^iri counsel for the Petitinnf>r-
10. Sri S. V. Maruthi Sankar, learned counsel for the petitioner. submitted that the Order of detention and confirmation does not mention about the bail conditions. He submitted that there are 5 criminal cases, as mentioned in the detention Order, but in all those cases, the detenue was granted bail. He submitted that there was no violation of the bail conditions. He submitted that the conditions in the bail were sufficient safeguard and there was no justification for passing the detention Order.
The authority, the 2"^ respondent, as also the respondent did not satisfy about the pre-requisites for passing the detention order, i.e., with a view to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public health and public order. He submitted that the detenue was on conditional bail and had been visiting the police stations in compliance with the bail orders and hence, there was no necessity to issue detention order, He submitted that the detention order was served on the detenue while she was enlarged on bail in connection with Crime No.145 of 2025, dated 12.03.2025 on the file of the Prohibition and Excise Station, Rajamahendravaram South.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the detention Order was passed mechanicaliy and without arriving at a subjective satisfaction. The normal penal laws were adequate enough to deal with the RNT. J & MRK. .1 24 WP No. 13785 of 2025 offences and mere apprehension to commit a crime in near future could not be a valid ground to detain the detenue.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in the cases of (1) Md. Marufv. State of Telangana^, (2) Chittipothula Chinna Muthyalu v. State of A.P.^, (3) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India^ and (4) Omprakash v. Commissioner of Ponce"^ in support of his contentions.
HI- Submissions of the learned Government Pleader:
13. Sri Keerthi Teja Kondaveeti, learned Government Pleader, submitted that the detenue was repeatedly engaging herself in committing the offences of possession, supply and sale of illicitly distilled liquor (ID liquor) in contravention of the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020. The detenue after being released on bail, though subject to condition, was again and again indulging in the same offence. He submitted that those cases were registered in one year. He submitted that there was material before the District Collector to pass the Order of Detention, as also for the Order of Confirmation by the State.
The report of the analyst clearly revealed adversely affecting the maintenance of public health thereby effecting the public order. The detenue was not holding licence or permit to-deal any kind of intoxicants under the provisions of the A. P. Excise Act, 1968. He submitted that the sale of illicitly distilled liquor was an offence. The detenue was indulging in clandestine 2020(5) ALT 160 ^ WP.No.5469/2022, APHC, decided On 11.07.2022 ^ (.''025) 4 see 476 ^ 1989Supp(2) see 576 RNT. J & MRK. j 25 WP No. 13785 of' 2025 manufacture, publish, transport and sale of illicit distilled liquor. She was a bootlegger and her activities were causing injury to the public health, effecting public order. If the activities of the detenue were allowed to continue, that was prejudicial to giving effect to the various schemes of the Government for the benefit and welfare of the downtrodden, badly affecting the consumers health, financial status, social status of public and ultimately the public order. The activities of the detenue were creating a feeling of insecurity, danger to the life and public health in the locality having an impact on public order. The normal provisions of law of legislature, sent her for remand, for trial, had no effect in curbing her unlawful activities and there was no other option except to invoke the provisions of Section 3 (1) of the Act 1986 to prevent the bootlegging activities of the detenue for maintenance^ of the public order.
14. Sri Keerthi Teja Kondaveeti, learned Government Pleader, further submitted that the detention order was informed, the grounds of detention were also informed, the right of the detenue to make representation, as also the right to approach personally to the Advisory Board, if she desired and thus, the statutory provisions in passing the detention order were duly complied. The matter was placed before the Advisory Board which reviewed the case of the detenue and submitted the report that there was sufficient cause for her detention and considering the report and also the material, the Government confirmed the detention Order for a period of 12 months from the date of detention i.e., 05.05.2025. The Approval Order and Confirmation Order were also served to the detenue under acknowledgment. He submitted that the.
RN r, .1 & MRK. .1 WP No. 13785 of 2025 26 Order of Detention as a precautionary measure was necessary. There was sufficient cause for such detention. The chemical examiner in each of the cases opined that the illicit distilled liquor was unfit for human consumption and injurious to health. The detenue's illegal activities were assessed not only in terms of gravity but also by its potential to cause widespread breach of tranquility affecting persons forming a sizable part of a community or a locality.
He submitted that the detention order was passed with application of mind based on subjective satisfaction of the necessity for such order and was not mechanical order. The detenue in spite of the conditional bail orders in criminal cases, continued to commit offences one after the other, so the order was necessary for preventing her from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and this aspect of grant of bail and the bail conditions was also considered in the detention order.
15. Learned Government Pleader placed reliance in the cases of (1) Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, (2) Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadif and (3) Ram Bali v. State of W.B^ in support of his contentions.
IV. Point for consideration:
16. The point for consideration and determination is the validity of the St detention Order of the respondent and the confirmation Order by the 1 respondent.
^ (1975) 3 see 198 ® AIR 2012 Se (Supp)61 ^ AIR 1975 Se 623 RNT. J & MRK, J 27 WP No. 13785 of 2025 y. Consideration/Analysis;
17. We have considered the aforesaid submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.
18. A citizen has fundamental right to live freely, move from one place to another, live with dignity and decency. Apart from that right to life has got- many other facets and unless due procedure under law is followed, the citizen's right to life and personal liberty cannot be deprived. The personal liberty of the citizen is the most precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, a person can be deprived of his life and personal liberty by authority of law. The personal liberty of the citizens, as such can be taken away only by the procedure established and when it is used to jeopardize in the context of the preventive detention on the grounds permitted by Statute. In a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court has to be satisfied that the detention of the petitioner or the detenue, is as per the prescribed procedure and is not unwarranted by law. The Court has to see that the detaining authority while passing the detention order has ensured the strict compliance of law more particularly, when fundamental rights of the detenue are involved.
19. In Ram ^a//(supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under in para-14:
"14. Every petitioner under Artiele 32 of the Constitution has to establish an infringement of a fundamental right. Hence, this Court cannot order a release from detention, upon a habeas corpus petition, until it is satisfied that a petitioner's detention is really unwarranted by law. This means that, in a case of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, the petitioner has to show a violation of either Article 21 or Article 22 of the Constitution.
RNT. .1 & MRK, ,1 W'P No. 13785 ol' 2025 28 That personal liberty of the citizen which the law so sedulously and carefully protects can also be taken away by the procedure established by law when it is used to jeopardize public good and not merely private interests."
20. The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution.
21. Section 3 of the Act 1986 provides for the 'power to make order •detaining certain persons'. It reads as under:
"3. Power to make orders detaining certain reasons (1) The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any boot-legger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land-grabber that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may 29 f<NT, J & MRK, j WP No. 13785 of 2025 also, if satisfied .
as provided in sub-section (I), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section;
Provided that the period specified in the order made be the Government under this sub-section shall not in the first instance, exceed three months, but the Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it i is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time.
(3) When any order i IS made under this section by an officer mentioned m sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government."
22. Section 3 of Act 1986 thus provides that the Government may if satisfied inter alia respect to any bootlegger with a view vi to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do make an order directing that such person be detained. So, the detention may be on satisfaction of the competent authority that it is necessary for preventing the bootlegger from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.
23. The expression 'Bootlegger' and 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order' have been defined under Section 2 (b) and (a) respectively, of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot- Leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land-Grabbers Act, 1986 as under:
"2(b) ■•boot-legger" means a person, who distils, manufactures, stores, transports, imports, exports sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or RNl. .1 & VIRK. .1 30 \VP No. 137X5 ol' 2025 other intoxicant in contravention of any of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 and the rules, notifications and orders made thereunder, or in contravention of any other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the above mentioned things himself or through any other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such thing;"
2(a) "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order' means when a boot-legger, a dacoit, a drug offender, a goonda, an immoral traffic offender or a land-grabber is engaged or is making preparations for engaging in any of his activities as such, which affect adversely , or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order;"
"Explanation;- For the purpose of this clause public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia, if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in this clause directly, or indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health."
Public Order:
24. Section 2 (a) of the Act 1986 defines what is meant 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order', It means when a bootlegger, a dacoit, a drug offender, a goonda, an immoral traffic offender or a land grabber is engaged or is making preparations for engaging, in any of his activities as such, which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order. The Explanation to Section 2 (a) of the Act 1986 for the purpose of that clause explained that 'public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely 31 KN i; J & MRK, j wp No. 13785 of 2025 inter alia, if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in clause 2(a) directly, or indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health. So, from the explanation, it is evident that if any of the activities, inter alia, of the bootlegger, if directly or even indirectly either cause or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section of the general public or grave or widespread danger even to public health that would be acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.
25. The 'pubiic order' was expiained in Ram Monohar Lohia V. State ofBihai^ in the context of Rule 30 of the Defense of India Rules which permits detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, in which the Hon'ble Apex.Court held that every breach of peace does not lead to public disorder.
There is distinction between 'Public Order' and 'Law and Order'. Public Order if breached must lead to public disorder. If there IS disorder but not pubiic disorder, that can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order, The person cannot be detained on the ground of disorder, which is not public disorder. It was held that the contravention of law always affects order but before i it can be said to effect public order, it must effect the community or the public at large. It was further observed that law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle Iair 1966 sc 740 RNT. ,I&MRK. .1 WP No. 13785 of 2025 32 representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. Paragraphs-54 and 55 of Ram Manohar Lohia are as under:
"54. We have here a case of detention under Rule .30 of the Defence of India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorders or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead tc public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before if can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(6) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.
55. It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is RNT, J & MRK. j 33 WP No. 13785 of 2025 the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State. By using the expression "maintenance of law and order" the District Magistrate was widening his own field of action and was adding a clause to the Defence of India Rules."
26. In Omprakash (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to its decision in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City^ in which the previous judgment in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengai^° was referred wherein the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' was dearly laid down. Paras 6 to 10 of Omprakash are reproduced as under:
6One of us (Dutt, J.) speaking for the bench in the said Piyush Mehta case [19S9 Supp (1) SCO 322 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 438] referred to a decision of this Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal [(1969) 1 SCC 10 . (1969) 2 SCR 635 : 1970 Cri LJ 852] wherein the distinction between "law and order" and "public order" has been clearly laid down and stated as follows:
"In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our opinion, has failed to substantiate that the alleged anti-social activities of the petitioner adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It is true some incidents of beating by the petitioner had taken place, as alleged by the witnesses. But, such incidents, in our view, do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner may be punished for the alleged offences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community. It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger within the meaning of Section ^ 1989 Supp (I) SCC 322 (- 969) 1 SCC 10 RNT. .I& MRK. .1 VVP No. 13785 of 2025 34 Mj r 2(h) of the Act, but merely because he is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laid dovrn in sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, his activities as a bootlegger affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. We have carefully considered the offences alleged against the petitioner in the order of detention and also the allegations made by the witnesses and, in our opinion, these offences or the allegations cannot be said to have created any feeling of insecurity or panic or terror among the members of the public of the area in question giving rise to the question of maintenance of public order. The order of detention cannot, therefore, be upheld."
7. There is a series of decisions explaining what the expression "public order" means. We feel that it is not necessary to refer to all those decisions but suffice to make reference to the following decision in addition to Piyush Mehta case [1989 Supp (1) SCC 322 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 438] .
8. This Court in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration [(1982) 2 SCC 403 :
1982 SCC (Cri) 451] has observed: (SCC p. 410, para 13) "It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudieial to the maintenanee of publie order."
9. See also Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [AIR 1966 SC 740 :
(1966) 1 SCR 709 : 1966 Cri LJ 608] ,Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal [(1970) 1 SCC 98 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 67 : AIR 1970 SC 1228] and4/ay Dixit V. State ofU.P. [(1984) 4 SCC 400 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 625]
10. The view expressed \n Piyush Mehta case [1989 Supp (1) SCC 322 :
1989 SCC (Cri) 438] has been adopted by this Court in Rashidmiya @ Chhava Ahmedmiya Shaikv. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad [(19^9) 3 SCC 321 :
1989 SCC (Cri) 559] and Abdul Razak Nannekhan Pathan Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad [(1989) 4 SCC 43] ."
27. In Omprakash (supra), thus referring the case inter alia of Ashok Ktimar v. Delhi Administration^^ the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated that it is (1982) 2 see 403 RNT. J & MRK. j 35 WP No. 13785 of 2025 the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
28. With respect to 'public order', the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Bali (supra) observed that 'public order' is necessarily an elastic concept which is , in any case, wider than the "security of the State".
Deeming Provision / Public health:
29. The Explanation to Section 2 (a) of the Act 1986 creates a legal fiction that inter alia, where there is grave or widespread danger to the public health, then such acts shall also be deemed to effect adversely to the maintenance of the public order. The expression "deemed to be creates legal fiction. So, the public order shall be deemed to have been affected aversely, also, when there is grave or widespread danger to public health, by legal fiction.
30. In Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limitecf^ the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that when a person is 'deemed to be' something, the only meaning possible is that while in reality he is not that' something, but for the purposes of the Act of legislature he is required to be treated that something and not otherwise. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that in construing the scope of a legal fiction, it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on the basis of which alone such fiction can operate.
'■'' (2013) 5 see 470 RNT, .1 & VIRK. .1 \VI> No. 137X5 or 2025 36
31. Paragraphs - 26 to 29 of Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation read as under:
"VI. ''As if'--Meaning of
26. The expression "as if' is used to make one applicable in respect of the other. The words "as if' create a legal fiction. By it, when a person is "deemed to be" something, the only meaning possible is that, while in reality he is not that something, but for the purposes of the Act of legislature he is required to be treated that something, and not otherwise. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that, in construing the scope of a legal fiction, it would be proper and even necessarj' to assume all those facts on the basis of which alone such fiction can operate. The words "as if' in fact show the distinction between two things and, such words must be used only for a limited purpose. They further show that a legal ifction must be limited to the purpose for which it was created. \y\6.Q Radhakissen Chamria v. Durga Prosad Chamria [(\939-40) 67 lA 360 : (1940) 52 LW 647 ; AIR 1940 PC 167] ,CITv.S. Teja Singh [AIR 1959 SC 352] , Ram Kishore Sen v. Union of India [AIR 1966 SC 644] ,Sher Singhs/. Union of India [(1984) 1 SCC 107 ; AIR 1984 SC 200] , State of Maharashtra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah [(2000) 2 SCC 699 ; 2000 SCC (Cri) 533 : AIR 2000 SC 937] , Paramjeet Singh Pathejav.ICDS Ltd. [(2006) 13 SCC 322 : AIR 2007 SC 168] (SCC p. 341, para 28) and CIT v. Willamson Financial Services [(2008) 2 SCC 202] .]
27. In East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952 AC 109 : (1951) 2 All ER 587 (HL)] this Court approved the approach which stood adopted and followed persistently. It set out as under ; (AC p. 133) The statute says that you must imagine certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.
28. In Industrial Supplies (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(1980) 4 SCC j41 . AIR 1980 SC 1858] this Court observed as follows : (SCC p. 351, para 25) "25. It is now axiomatic that when a legal fiction is incorporated in a statute, the court has to ascertain for what purpose the ifction is created. After # 37 RNT, J& MRK j WP No. 13785 of 2025' ascertaining the purpose, fuH effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. The court has to assume all the facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to giving effect to the fiction. The legal effect of the words ' as if he were' in the definition of 'owner' in Section 3(n) of the Nationalisation Act read with Section 2(1) of the Mines Act is that although the petitioners were not the owners, they being the contractors for the working of the mine in question, were to be treated as such though, in fact, they were not so."
(emphasis added)
29. The instant case is required to be decided in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.
32. In Hindustan Cooperative Housing Budding Society Limited V. Registrar, Cooperative Societies^^ on legal fiction and deeming provision, the Hon'ble Apex Court held in para-17 as under:
"17. "75. .
• ■ It is, as noted above, a deeming provision. Such a provision creates a legal fiction. As was stated by James, L.J. mlevy, Re , ex p Walton [(1881) 17 Ch D 746 : (1881-85) All ER Rep 548 (CA)] : (Ch D p. 756) When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction IS to be resorted to.' After ascertaining the puntose ft.ll effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion and to that end it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction operate. [Ed. : This latter sentence does not form part of what was observed can by James, L.J. in ex p Walton, (1881) 17 Ch D 746 : (1881-85) All ER Rep 548 (CA) but is a paraphrase of what was observed by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v.Pandurang Vinayak, (1953) 1 SCC 425 : 1953 SCR 773 at p. 778.
C009) 14 SCC 302 RNT. ,1 & MRK. J WP No. 13785 of 2025 38 A See aho All M.K. v. Stale of Kerala, (2003) 11 SCC 632 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 136, SCC at p. 639, para 13.] [See///7/v. East and West India Dock Co. [(1884) 9 AC 448 (HL)] , State of Travancore-Cochin Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory [{\951)) 1 SCC 826 : AIR 1953 SC 333] , American Home Products Corpn. v. Mac Laboratories (P) [(1986) 1 SCC 465] and Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi [(1996) 4 SCC 76] .] In an oft quoted passage. Lord Asquith stated;
'If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact, existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. ... The statute [states] that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.' (See East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952 AC 109 :
(1951) 2 All ER 587 (HL)] at AC pp. 132-33.) '... The word "deemed" is used a great deal in modem legislation.
Sometimes it is used to impose for the purposes of a statute an artificial constmction of a word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is used to put beyond doubt a particular construction that might otherwise be uncertain. Sometimes it is used to give a comprehensive description that includes what is obvious, what is uncertain and what is, in the ordinary sense, impossible.' [Per Lord Radcliffe in St Aubyn\. Attorney General (No. 2^ [1952 AC 15 :
(1951) 2 All ER 473 (HL)] , AC p. 53.]
14. 'Deemed', as used in statutory definitions [is meant] 'to extend the denotation of the defined term to things it would not in ordinary parlance denote, is often a convenient devise for reducing the verbiage of an enactment, but that does not mean that wherever it is used it has that effect; to deem means simply to judge or reach a conclusion about something, and the words "deem" and "deemed" when used in a statute thus simply state the effect RNT. J & MRK j 39 WP No. 13785 of 2025 or meaning which some matter or thing has the way in which it is to be adjudged; this need not import artificiality or fiction; it may simply be the statement of an undisputable conclusion.' (Per Windener, J. in Hunter Douglas Australia Pty. v. Perma Blinds [(1970) 44 Aust LJ R 257] .)
15. When a thing is to be 'deemed' something else, it is to be treated as that something else with the attendant consequences, but it is not that something else (per Cave, J., in R. v. Norfolk County Court [(1891) 60 LJ QB 379]).
'When a statute gives a definition and then adds that certain things shall be "deemed" to be covered by the definition, it matters not whether without that addition the definition would have covered them or not.' (Per Lord President Cooper in Ferguson v. McMillan [1954 SLT 109] .)
16. Whether the word 'deemed' when used in a statute established a conclusive or a rebuttable presumption depended upon the context (see St. Leon Village Consolidated School Distt. v. Ronceray [(I960) 23 DLR (2d) 32] ). '.... I ..
. regard its primary function as to bring in something which would otherwise be excluded.' (Per Viscount Simonds in Barclays Bank v. IRC [\96\ AC 509 : (1960) 3 WLR 280 : (1960) 2 All ER 817 (HL)] at AC p. 523.) 'Deems' means 'is of opinion' or 'considers' or 'decides' and there is no implication of steps to be taken before the opinion is formed or the decision is taken.
[See R. V. Brixton Prison (Governor), ex p Soblen [(1963) 2 QB 243 : (1962) 3 WLR 1154 : (1962) 3 All ER 641 (CA)] at QB p. 315.]" [Ed. : As observed in Ali .MK. V. State of Kerala, (2003) 11 SCC 632 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 136, SCC at pp. 639-40, paras 13-16.]"
33. In Sant La! Gupta v. Modem Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited^"* the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that it is the exclusive prerogative of the legislature to create a legal fiction meaning thereby to enact (2010) 13 SCC 336 RNT. .1 & MRK. ,1 WP No. 13785 of 2025 40 # a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really exist. Paragraph - 14 of Sant Lai Gupta reads as under:
"14. The legislature in its wisdom has not enacted any deeming provision providing that in case the resolution i« pot considered and finally decided by the Registrar within a period of six months, the resolution shall become effective and operative. It is the exclusive prerogative of the legislature to create a legal fiction meaning thereby to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really exist. Even if a legal fiction is created by the legislature, the court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created, and it must be limited to the purpose indicated by the context and cannot be given a larger effect. More so, what can be deemed to exist under a legal fiction are merely facts and no legal consequences which do not flow from the law as it stands. It is a settled legal proposition that in absence of any statutory provision, the provision cannot be construed as to provide for a fiction in such an eventuality. More so, creating a fiction by judicial interpretation may amount to legislation, a field exclusively within the domain of the legislature. {ViAq Ajaib Singh v. Sir hind Coop. Marketing-cum- Processing Service Society Ltd. [(1999) 6 SCC 82 ; 1999 SCC (L&S) 1054])"
34. In SamaAruna v. State of Telangana^^ the expression acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order' as under Section 2 (a) of the Act 1986 was considered and it was obseiA^ed that the power to detain, under the 1986 Act can be exercised only for preventing a person from engaging in, or pursuing or taking some action which adversely affects or is likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order, or for preventing him from making preparations for engaging in such activities. It was observed that the conduct or activities of the detenue in the past must be taken ' 15 (2018) 12 SCC 150 RNT. J & MRk, j 41 WP No. 13785 of 2025 into account, for many such persons follow a pattern of criminal activities. But, the incidents which are said to have taken place, if are in stale, it could not have been considered as relevant for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the detenue must be detained. The detention order must be based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behavior of a person based on his past conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. The detention order which is founded on stale incidents, must be regarded as an order of punishment for a crime, passed without a trial though purporting to be an order of preventive detention, whereas the essential concept of preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him ^or something he has done but to prevent him from doing it.
35. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Sama Aruna (supra) found that the detention order was vitiated by taking into account incidents so far back in the past as would have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without a trial. The satisfaction of the authority was not in respect of the thing in regard to which it was required to be satisfied. It was observed that the incidents which are stale, cease to have relevance to the subject matter of the enquiry and must be treated as extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute.
36. In Chittipothula Chinna Muthyalu (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court held that the existence of the element of disturbance to the public order is a sine qua non for invoking the provisions of Section 3 of the Act 1986, the power conferred on the authorities by Section 3 of the Act 1986, is required to be exercised with lot of care, caution and circumspection and the same RNT. .1 & MRK. ,1 \VP No. 13785 of 2025 42 cannot be exercised in a routine and mechanical manner and absolutely not on the foundation of assumptions, presumptions and surmises. The power conferred under Section 3 of the Act 1986 is an exception to the normal • procedure under the criminal laws and as the authorities ultimately deal with the fundamental right of personal liberty of the citizens as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India strict adherence to the mandatory provisions of the Statute is indispensible. The satisfaction as stipulated under Section 3 of the Act 1986 should necessarily be a subjective satisfaction and is required to be on the basis of cogent and convincing material and not on the foundation of stale and sterile reasons. It was further held that so long as ordinary criminal law is adequate to deal with the offences, preventive detention without subjecting an individual to the procedure of free and fair trial would infringe the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Part-
Ill of the Constitution of India.
37. On facts, in Chittipothula Chinna Muthyalu (supra), it was found that there was no material to show that there was a feeling of insecurity amongst the general public which was a condition precedent for meddling with the liberty of an individual under the Act 1986. This Court opined that in the case of the detenue therein the order of detention was not justified in the light of the explanation to Section 2 (a) of the Act 1986, observing that simply because an individual is a bootlegger, the same would not be sufficient to press into service the provisions of the Act 1986.
f 43 RNT. J & mRk j wp No. 13785 of 2025 38. In Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh^^ which was a case under the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986, the detention being habitual offender and order was passed, the detenue committing offences against A.P.Prohition (Amendment) Act, 2020 was arrested in 4 cases from January 2021 to March 2022, and was indulging in committing the offences of distributing, storing.
transporting and selling ID liquor which caused huge damage to the public health as well as public peace and tranquility.
39. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Pesa/a Nookaraju (supra), on examination of the provisions of the Act, the provisions of the Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, while drawing distinction between the expressions 'law and order ' and 'public order', observed that there i 's very thin line between the question of, law and order situation si and a public order situation, and some times, the acts of a person relating to law and order situation can turn into a question of public order situation. What is decisive for determining is the connection of ground of detention with the maintenance Of public order. The objert of detention, ISi not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent potentiality. Therefore, for determining whether the ground of detention is relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an objective test based on the intrinsic quality of The an act would not be a safe guide, potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding (2023) 14 see 641 RNT. .I&MRK. .1 W P No. 13785 of 2025 44 circumstances, posterior and anterior for the offences under the Prohibition Act.
It was further observed that just because four cases have been registered against the detenue as in that case under the Prohibition Act, by itself, might ■ not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The detenue might be punished for the offences which have been registered against him. In other words, if the detention is on the ground that the detenue is indulging in manufacture or transport or sale of liquor then that by itself would not become an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order because the same can be effectively dealt with under the provisions of the Prohibition Act, but if the liquor sold by the detenue is dangerous to public health then under the 1986 Act, it becomes an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
therefore, it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to be satisfied on material available to it that the liquor dealt with by the detenue is liquor which is dangerous to public health to attract the provisions of the 1986 Act.
40. The Hon'ble Apex Court referred to Section 2 (a) and its explanation.
and observed that it also incorporates a legal fiction as to the adverse effect on public order. It also referred to the case in Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra^^ to observe that it is the fall out of the activity of the bootlegger which determines whether 'public order' has been affected within the meaning of this deeming provision or not. This legislative intent has to be kept in view while dealing with detentions under the Act.
17' ,(1992)2 see 177
RNT, J& MRK j'
t WP No. 13785 of 2025
45
41. In Joyi Kitty Joseph (supra), the detenue was granted bail imposing stringent conditions as the detenue was engaging in smuggling activities in various offences. However, the detaining authority said nothing in the detention order as to why those conditions were not sufficient to prevent the detenue from engaging in further activities of smuggling. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that it was for the detaining authority to look into it and enter into a subjective satisfaction as to whether the same was sufficient to avoid preventive detention or otherwise, insufficient to restrain him from further involvement in similar smuggling activities. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that if there was consideration, then the reasonableness of the consideration could not have been scrutinized in judicial review. But, as there was no such consideration, the Court had to interfere. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that it was not concerned as to whether the conditions imposed by the Magistrate would have taken care of the apprehension expressed by the detaining authority; of the detenue indulging in further smuggling activities. But, it was more concerned with the aspect that the detaining authority did not consider the efficacy of the conditions and enter any satisfaction, however, subjective it was, as to the conditions not being sufficient to restrain the detenue from indulging in such activities. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the preventive detention is hard law and therefore, it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardized unless his case falls squarely within, and it should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who was involved in a criminal prosecution. The RNT. .1 & MRK. .1 f WP No. 13785 of 2025 46 preventive detention law is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available was such as . would satisfy the requirement of the legal provisions authorizing such detention.
42. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Joyi Kitty Joseph (supra) observed that when a person is enlarged on bail by a competent court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinizing the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal • Court. When bail was granted by the jurisdictional Court, that too on conditions.
the detaining authority ought to have examined whether they were sufficient to curb the evil of further indulgence in identical activities, which is the very basis of the preventive detention ordered.
43. Paragraphs 27 to 35 of Joyi Kitty Joseph {sw^xdi) are as under:
"27. However, nothing is stated by the detaining authority as to why the conditions are not sufficient to prevent the detenu from engaging in further activities of smuggling; which was the specific ground on which the conditions were imposed while granting bail.
28. We are not examining the conditions imposed by the Magistrate since it was for the detaining authority to look into it and enter into a subjective satisfaction as to whether the same was sufficient to avoid a preventive detention or otherwise, insufficient to restrain him from further involvement in similar smuggling activities. As has been held in Rameshwar Lai Patwari v. State of Bihar [Rameshwar Lai Patwari v. State of Bihar, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 142 : AIR 1968 SC I30;i] : (SCC OnLine SC para 7) "7. ... The formation of the opinion about detention rests with the Government or the officer authorised. Their satisfaction is all that the law Rnt, j & mrk j f 47 WP No. 13785 of 2025 speaks of and the eourts are not constituted an appellate authority. Thus the sufficiency of the grounds cannot be agitated before the court. However, the detention of a person without a trial, merely on the subjective satisfaction of an authority however high, ISi a serious matter. It must require the closest scrutiny of the material on which the decision i formed, leaving is no room for errors or at least avoidable errors. The very reason that the courts do not consider the reasonableness of the opinion formed or the sufifciency of the material on which it is based, indicates the needfor the greatest circumspection on the part of those who wield this power over others.
(emphasis supplied)
29. "If there is a consideration, then the reasonableness of the consideration could not have been scrutinised by us in judicial review, since we are not sitting in appeal and the provision for preventive detention provide for such a subjective satisfaction to be left untouched by the Courts. However, when there Ii S no such consideration then we have to interfere.
3Q.Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana [Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754] held that the observations m Rekha v. State of .TN. [Rekhav. State of .TN., (2011) 5 SCC 244 . (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] ; that preventive detention is impermissible when the ordinary law of the land is sufficient to deal with the situation was per to the Constitution Bench decision in Haradhan Saha v. State of mcuriam .W B. [Haradhan Saha v. State of .WB., (1975) 3 SCC 198 :■ 1974
--
SCC (Cri) 816] , in the limited judicial review available to constitutional courts in preventive detention matters. The courts would be incapable of interference by substituting their own reasoning to upset the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority, especially since preventive detention law i IS not punitive but preventive and precautionary.
31. \n Ameena Begum [Ameena Beg . State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC um V 587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754] , this Court was concerned with the true distinction between a threat to "law and order" and , acts "prejudicial to public order", which was not to be determined merely by the nature or quality of the RNT. .1 & MRK. .1 f \VP No.13785 of 2025 48 act complained of, but was held to lie, in the proper degree and extent of its impact on the society. It was held that there could be instances where "disturbance of public order" would not be attracted but still, would fall within the scope of maintenance of "law and order". It was held that : (SCC p. 621) "47. ... preventive detention laws--an exceptional measure reserved for tackling emergent situations--ought not to have been invoked in this case as a tool for enforcement of "law and order", (sic para 47)"
especially when the existing legal framework to maintain law and order is sufficient to address the offences under consideration.
32. Likewise, in the present case, we are not concerned as to whether the conditions imposed by the Magistrate would have taken care of the apprehension expressed by the detaining authority; of the detenu indulging in further smuggling activities. We are more concerned with the aspect that the detaining authority did not consider the efficacy of the conditions and enter any satisfaction, however subjective it is, as to the conditions not being sufficient to restrain the detenu from indulging in such activities.
33.Ameena Begum {Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 754] , noticed with approval Vijay Narain Singh V. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh v. Slate of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 ; 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] and extracted para 32 from the same {Vijay Narain Singh [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361]): (SCC pp. 35-36) "52. ... It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within ... not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it rnay not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should he RN T, J & MRK j f 49 WP No. 13785 of 2025 exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order ofpreventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.'' (emphasis supplied)
34. The criminal prosecution launched and the preventive detention ordered are on the very same allegations of organised smuggling activities, through a network set-up, revealed on successive raids carried on at various locations, on specific information received, leading to recovery of huge cache of contraband. When bail was granted by the jurisdictional court, that too on conditions, the detaining authority ought to have examined whether they were sufficient to curb the evil of further indulgence in identical activities; which is the very basis of the preventive detention ordered.
35. The detention order being silent on that aspect, we interfere with the detention order only on the ground of the detaining authority having not looked into the conditions imposed by the Magistrate while granting bail for the very same offence, the allegations in which also have led to the preventive detention, assailed herein, to enter a satisfaction as to whether those conditions are sufficient or not to restrain the detenu from indulging in further like activities of smuggling."
44. In Ram Bali (supra) it was further observed that the required satisfaction must have reference to a need to prevent what is anticipated from the detenue. The past conduct or activity is only relevant in so far as it furnishes reasonable grounds for an apprehension. Prevention and punishment have some common ultimate aims but their immediate objectives and modes of action are distinguishable.
Order of Detention:
45. Now coming to the Order of Detention passed by the District Collector.
RNT. .1 & MRK, .1 f WP No. 13785 of 2025 50
46. A perusal of the Order of Detention along with the Grounds of Detention passed by the District Collector shows that with respect to every case i.e., 5 criminal cases, in which the detenue was granted bail subject to condition, the District Collector has considered that aspect. So, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the detention order the bail conditions were not considered is unacceptable. The District Collector has recorded specifically that the detenue in spite of her release in those criminal cases on bail, was involving repeatedly in the same activities causing injury to the public health. The District Collector also recorded its satisfaction that the detenue was causing widespread danger to the public health and creating a feeling of insecurity among the general public of that locality and if the activities of the detenue were allowed unhindered and unchecked, there was every danger of leading to liquor tragedies causing many lives of poor persons within the limits of Rajamahendravaram urban and rural mandals and its surrounding villages and thereby affecting the public order. In that regard, with respect to each case, it also referred to the report of ttie chemical examiner, REL, Kakinada in all cases to which the illicitly distilled liquor was sent for examination and which reports opined that the sample was illicitly distilled liquor, unfit for human consumption and injurious to health.
47. The District Collector clearly recorded in the Detention Order that the action taken under the normal provisions of law by registering the cases, sending for remand and putting her up for trial had no effect in curbing the unlawful activities of the detenue which were prejudicial to the maintenance of RNT, J & MRi^^ 51 WP No. 13785 of 2025 public order and therefore there was no other option but to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 3 (1) of the Act 1986.
48. Consequently, we are of the view that the grant of bail was taken care of. The detenue was repeatedly acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the detention was considered necessary and the normal criminal laws were not acting as deterent, as the detenue was repeatedly involving herself in same kind of offences after getting bail.
49. We are of the view that those 5 criminal cases which are the basis of the detention Order were in a span of one year. So, it cannot be said that the criminal activities of the detenue were stale or not relevant for consideration to.
pass preventive detention Order.
50. We are of the view that the District Collector has recorded its satisfaction and such satisfaction is based on consideration of the material before it.
Judicial Review / Scnpp:
51. We shall consider the scope of judicial review against the Order of Detention.
52. The scope of judicial review with the preventive orders of detention was explained in Khudiram Das v. State ofW.B. 18 in para-9 as under;
9. ... There are several grounds evolved by judicial decisions for saying that no subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the authority as required under the statute. The simplest case is whether the authority has not applied its mind at all; in such case the authority could not possibly be satisfied as regards the (1975) 2 see 81 RNT. ,1 & MRK. .1 f WP No. 13785 ol' 2025 52 fact in respect of which it is required to be satisfied. King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee [King Emperor Sibnath Banerjee. 1943 SCC OnLine FC 15] is a case in point. Then there may be a case where the power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper purpose : such a case would also negative the existence of satisfaction on the part of the authority. The existence of''improper purpose", that is, a purpose not contemplated by the statute, has been recognised as an independent ground of control in several decided cases. The satisfaction, moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority itself, and therefore, if in exercising the power, the authority has acted under the dictation of another body as the Commissioner of Police did in Commr. of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji [Commr. of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16] and the officer of the Ministry of Labour and National Service did m Simms Motor Units Ltd. \. Minister of Labour and National Service [Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of Labour and National Service, (1946) 2 All ER 201 (DC)] , the exercise of the power would be bad and so also would the exercise of the power be vitiated where the authority has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case by self-created rules of policy or in any other manner. The satisfaction said to have been arrived at by the authority would also be bad where it is based on the application of a wrong te.st or the misconstruction ot a statute. Where this happens, the satisfaction of the authority would not be in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Then again the satisfaction must be grounded "on materials which are of rationally probative value". Machindar Shivaji Mahar v. R. [Machindar Shivaji Maharv. R., 1950 SCC OnLine FC 4 ; AIR 1950 FC 129] . The grounds on which the satisfaction is based must be such as a rational human being can consider connected with the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached. They must be relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and must not be extraneous to the scope and puipose of the statute. If the authority has taken into account, it may even be with the best of intention, as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or RNT. J & MRk 1 53 WP No. 13785 of 202s not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad.
53. With respect to the scope of judicial review in Sama Aruna (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that while reviewing the detention order, a-
court does not substitute its judgment for the decision of the executive. Nonetheless, the court has a duty to enquire that the decision of the executive IS made upon matters laid down by the statute as relevant for reaching such a decision. For what is at stake, is the personal liberty of a citizen guaranteed to him by the Constitution and of which he cannot be deprived, except for reasons laid down by the law and for a purpose sanctioned by law.
54. In Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana^^ on the scope of judicial review by a constitutional court when called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive detention, it was laid down as under in para-28, which is reproduced hereunder, as to what the Court would be entitled to examine.
"28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional court when called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive detention would be entitled to examine whethe.r 28.1. The order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power i IS predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being satisfied;
28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining authority has applied its mind to all relevant circumstances and the same is not based on material extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute;
(2t)23)9SCC587 RNT. .1 & MRK, .1 \VP No. 13785 of 2025 54 # 28.3. Power has been exercised For achieving the purpose for which it has been conferred, or exercised for an improper purpose, not authorised by the statute, and is therefore ultra vires:
28.4. The detaining authority has acted independently or under the dictation of another body;
28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-created rules of policy or in any other manner not authorised by the governing statute, has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case; 28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on materials which are of rationally probative value, and the detaining authority has given due regard to the matters as per the statutory mandate;
28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence of a live and proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him or is based on material which is stale;
28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction is/are such which an individual, with some degree of rationality and prudence, would consider as connected with the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction is to be reached;
28.9. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity to make a suitable representation; and 28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been strictly adhered to."
55. In Subramanian (supra), upon which the learned Government Pleader placed reliance, it was held that if the detaining authority on the material before it satisfied that the preventive detention was required and once the order was passed on the subjective satisfaction on the material before the authority and confirmed, such satisfaction, could not be open for interference in 55 RNT. J & iViRk-^ wp No. 13785 of 2^ the exercise of writ jurisdiction, Para-18 on which emphasis was laid reads as under;
"18. The incidents have been highlighted in the grounds of detention coupled with the definite indication as to the impact thereof which have been precsely stated ,n the grounds of detention ntentioned above. All the incidents
-nttoned ,n the grounds of detention clearly substantiate the subjective sattsfacuon arnved at by the detaining authority as to how the acts of the detenu were prejodtcal to the maintenance of public order. All these aspects have been considered by the High Court which rightly affirmed the detention order.
56. In Joy! Kitty Joseph {sum placing reliance upon which learned counsel argued that in the present case the detenue was granted conditional bail and so the detaining authority could not pass the order of detention as the detaining authority did not consider the aspect of grant of bail conditions in all those 5 cases.
However, we are not able to convince ourselves with the argument In Joy/ Kitty Joseph (supra), the detention Order was silent on that aspect.
The Hon'ble Apex Court interfered with the detention Order, Observing clearly, only on the ground of the detaining authority having not looked into the conditions imposed i by the Magistrate while granting bail, the allegations which also have led to the preventive detention, assailed, to enter a satisfaction as to whether those conditions were sufficient or not to restrain the detenue from indulging in further like activities of smuggling. We find from the detention order that It Is not silent on that aspect, but considers grant of bail and records that in spite thereof the detenue was repeatedly indulging in the' same offences.
RNT. .I&MRK. ,1 WP No. 13785 of 2025 56
57. In Md. A/^rf//'(supra) upon which learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance, there was no discussion in the detention order that the detenue has violated any bail conditions. It was observed that an accused has got every right to apply for bail. The grant of bail depends upon several circumstances and the Court while granting bail takes into consideration several factors, like past crime history, the nature of the crime, stage of investigation etc. Opportunity is given to the prosecution (State) to oppose the bail application. In all the three crimes referred to in that case, bail was granted with certain conditions. It was observed that when certain conditions are imposed, while granting bail, there is some check on the conduct and movement of the detenu. In the event of violation of such bail conditions, the prosecution has full opportunity to apply for cancellation of bail. In spite of having such remedy under the provisions of Cr.P.C. the detention order can be passed only as a last resort and not in a routine manner. The detaining authority has to satisfy itself that all other legal avenues have been exhausted either of arrest, prosecution etc. under ordinary law and in spite of the same, if it has become difficult for the authority to control the criminal activities of the detenue, only in such case, the detention order needs to be passed. We are of the view that in the present case the District Collector has given due consideration to the grant of bail and has recorded his satisfaction for passing the detention order.
58. In Pesala Nookaraju (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the detaining authority specifically stated in the grounds of detention that selling liquor by the detenue therein and the consumption by the people of that RNT, J&MRk , 57 WP No, 13 785 of 2025 locality was harmful to their health. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that such statement is an expression of subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenue appellant are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The detaining authority has also recorded his satisfaction that it is necessary to prevent the detenue from indulging further in such activities and such satisfaction has been drawn on the basis of the credible material on record. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that it is well settled that whether the material was sufficient or not is not for the courts to decide by applying the objective basis as it is matter of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
Period of Detention:
59. One more aspect which requires consideration is that the Confirmation Order has been passed for a period of 12 months. The Statute prescribes that period of detention of 12 months which is the maximum period.
We, however, find in that order of confirmation, that no such reason has been ' assigned for the period of detention to be for the maximum statutory period.
60. In Ameena Begum (supra) with respect to maximum period of detention in the confirmation Order of the State, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the period of detention ought to necessarily vary depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and cannot be uniform in all cases.
The objective sought to be fulfilled in each case, whether is subserved by continuing detention for the maximum period, ought to bear some reflection in the order of detention; or else, the Government could be accused of RNT. .1 & WRK. ,1 WP No. 13785 of 2025 58 unreasonableness and unfairness. It was further observed that the detention being a restriction on the invaluable right to personal liberty of an individual and if the same were to be continued for the maximum period, it would be eminently just and desirable that such restriction on personal liberty, in the least, reflects an approach that meets the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex Court, thus, in Ameena Begum (supra), held that if the period of detention is for the maximum period, then at least the order of detention/confirmation must reflect in consideration of that aspect so as to evidence of reasonableness and fairness for such maximum period of detention.
61. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ameena Begum (supra) refrained from pronouncing that an order of detention otherwise held legal and valid, could be invalidated only on the ground of absence of any indication therein as to why the detention has been continued for the maximum period, inasmuch as observing that situation did not arise in that case and was left for decision in an appropriate case.
62. Paragraphs - 72, 75 and 79 of Ameena Begum (supra) are reproduced as under:
"72. Whenever an accused is tried for an offence under a penal law which carries a maximum sentence, the Court is obliged while imposing sentence to apply its mind to the specific facts and circumstances of the case and to either impose maximum sentence or a lesser sentence. It has, therefore, a discretion regarding imposition of sentence. We are inclined to the view that there could be no warrant for the proposition that when it boils down to confirming an order of detention under a preventive detention law, which is not punitive, the Government can seek immunity and enjoy an unfettered, unguided » and unlimited discretion in continuing detention for the maximum period 59 RNT, J & ^ WP No. 13785 of 2025 without even very briefly indicating its mind as to the "imponderables" that were taken into account for fixing the maximum period. The very term "maximum period" in Section 13 vests the Government with discretion, allowing it to be exercised while considering whether the detention is to be continued for the maximum period of 12 (twelve) months or any lesser period, In our opinion, the relevant provisions of the Act have to be so read as to inhere a safeguard against arbitrary exercise of discretionary power.
75. True it is, Deepak [Deepak v. State ofMaharashtra, (2023) 14 SCC 707 :
2022 SCC OnLine SC 99] was not a case arising out of preventive detention laws. However, in situations where discretion is available with authorities to decide the period of detention, as articulated by Lord Halsbury m Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield [Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield, 1891 AC 173 at p. 179 (HL)] , this discretion should be exercised in accordance with "the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law, and not humour; it is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular".
79. Viewed reasonably, the period of detention ought to necessarily vary depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and cannot be uniform in all cases. The objective sought to be fulfilled in each case, whether is subserved by continuing detention for the maximum period, ought to bear some reflection in the order of detention; or else, the Government could be accused of unreasonableness and unfairness. Detention being a restriction on the invaluable right to personal liberty of an individual and if the same were to be continued for the maximum period, it would be eminently just and desirable that such restriction on personal liberty, in the least, reflects an approach that meets the test of Article 14. We, however, refrain from pronouncing here that an order of detention, otherwise held legal and valid, could be invalidated only on the ground of absence of any indication therein as to why the detention has been continued for the maximum period. That situation does not arise here and is left for a decision in an appropriate case.
63. In view of the aforesaid on the point of maximum period of detention, in the Order of detention/confirmation, we find in the present case.
RN I. ,1 & MRK. .1 W'P No. 13785 ol' 2025 60 the Order of Confirmation has not taken into consideration as to why the maximum period was imposed and also that whether by passing the order of detention of continuing the detention of the detenue for a period lesser than the maximum period would or would not serve the objective sought to be fulfilled by such Detention.
Conclusion:
64. We do not find this case for interference with the Order of Detention and the Confirmation Order, for the reasons indicated and discussion made hereinabove. But, on the point of providing the maximum period of 12 months under the Statute for the detenue to be detained, in the absence of any discussion on that aspect in the Confirmation Order as to why the maximum period has been provided, we are of the view that the State Government/respondent No.l shall consider this aspect of the matter by passing fresh order on that aspect, as to whether the Order of Confirmation, is to be continued for the maximum period of 12 months, as provided thereunder.
or in the facts and circumstances of the case of the detenue, considering the objective sought to be fulfilled by the Order of preventive detention, the detention of the detenue should be reduced to such other period, lesser than 12 months or for the period already detained.
Result:
65. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed, but with the observations made herein above and the direction issued to the State/1^' respondent in the following terms;
RNT. J & MRK, ,1 61 WP No. 13785 of 2025
i) The State / Respondent No.l shall pass fresh Order only with respect to the period of detention, indicating the reasons, for continuing the detention for the maximum period of 12 months preventive detention of the detenue or reducing it to a lesser period, i.e, lesser than 12 months, or for the period already detained.
ii) The aforesaid exercise pursuant to the direction (i) shall be undertaken within a period of 3 (three) weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment.
66. No order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions. if any, shall stand closed ii n consequence.
Sd/- N. f4AGAhmA
//TRUE COPY// ASSISTANT R^ISTRAR
y ■
. ' f
SECTION OFFICER
One Fair Copy to the HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI (For His Lordship's kind perusal) One Fair Copy to the HON'BLE SRI /Poru- I j ''^AHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM To, (For His Lordship's kind perusal) . OneCCto Sri Challa Venkat. Advocate [OPUC]
2. Two CCs to The AddI Pradesh [OUT] Advocate General, High Court of Andhra
3. 9 L.R. Copies.
; 11'
6. Two CD Copies Cnr High Court of 1 HIGH COURT DATED: 18/08/2025 L.R. COPIES ORDER WP NO. 13785 OF 2025 DISMISSING THE W.P. WITHOUT COSTS