Madhya Pradesh High Court
Laxmikant Sahu vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 March, 2026
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:22040
1 WP-9113-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 17th OF MARCH, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 9113 of 2026
LAXMIKANT SAHU
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Hakim Khan Qureshi - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Alok Agnihotri - Govt. Advocate for respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition is filed seeking the following reliefs :
(i) That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased issue an appropriate writ of Certiorari and set-aside the order dated 30-08-1993 passed in Revenue Case No.-23B/121/1993-94, whereby the land Survey No.-
325 area 0.494 Hectare has been declared as excess land under the provisions of section 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
(ii) That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of Mandamus by protecting the ownership rights of petitioner upon the aforesaid purchased land by the father of petitioner vide sale deed dated 23-09-1999 (Annexure P/1).
(iii) That, any other writ direction order as may be deemed fit in the circumstances may also be granted to the petitioner.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the land of petitioner's father was declared as excess land by the competent authority. It is submitted that in the year 1999, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has been repealed by the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, which provided that if any proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act i.e. Act of 1976 is pending Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 20-03-2026 18:15:18 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:22040 2 WP-9113-2026 immediately before commencement of Act of 1999 before any court, tribunal or other authority, said proceedings shall abate. On 23.04.1999, the petitioner's father purchased the property in question. Thereafter, the possession was also handed over to the petitioner's father by the previous owner. It is argued that the land in question is still showing as excess land. Therefore, this petition.
3. The fact remains that there is no explanation tendered by the petitioner that once the land was declared surplus in the year 1993 when the father of petitioner was alive upto 16.06.2016 why suitable action was not taken by him. It is a specific case of the petitioner that the land in question was purchased by his father on 23.04.1999 as per Annexure P/1. Once the land in question has already been declared as excess land by the Government then how the said land could be purchased by him is also a question to be answered by the petitioner. In absence of any explanation tendered by the petitioner's counsel to the aforesaid, no relief can be extended to the petitioner.
4. Once the land is acquired and vested in the State Government, then the land can always be utilized for any other purpose in terms of the settled provisions of law. In the case of Govt. of A.P. vs Syed Akbar reported in (2005) 1 SCC 558, it is held as under :
"14. From the position of law made clear in the aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances; (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilised for any other public purpose; and (3) the acquired land which is vested in the Government free from all encumbrances cannot be reassigned or reconveyed to the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order."Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 20-03-2026 18:15:18
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:22040 3 WP-9113-2026
5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T.N. Housing Board vs Keeravani Ammal, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 255 has held as under :
"15. We may also notice that once a piece of land has been duly acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the land becomes the property of the State. The State can dispose of the property thereafter or convey it to anyone, if the land is not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired, only for the market value that may be fetched for the property as on the date of conveyance. The doctrine of public trust would disable the State from giving back the property for anything less than the market value. In State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai [(1997) 5 SCC 432] in a similar situation, this Court observed :
"The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value."
6. In the present case, there is an inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Court. The Court never tolerate an indolent litigant since delay defeats equity. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Balu vs State of Kerala, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 479 has held as under :
" 1 7 . It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 20-03-2026 18:15:18 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:22040 4 WP-9113-2026 delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage. In NDMC v. Pan Singh [(2007) 9 SCC 278 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 398] this Court held: (SCC p. 283, para 16) "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction."
7. In State of Orissa vs Mamata Mohanty reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436, it is observed thus :
54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court within a reasonable time. (See Rup Diamonds v. Union of India (1989) 2 SCC 356], State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya (1996) 6 SCC 267 and Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana (1997) 6 SCC 538).
8. In view whereof, there is substantial delay in approaching the Court which is unexplained by the petitioner. The land in question was declared surplus in the year 1993. The petitioner's father purchased the land in the year 1999 and since 1999 to 2016 i.e. upto the death of his father, no steps were taken by his father. The record indicates that no proper proceedings has been initiated by the petitioner as per law. The petitioner has not offered reasonable explanation for the inordinate delay. Delay defeats equity. If the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, no Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 20-03-2026 18:15:18 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:22040 5 WP-9113-2026 relief can be extended to the petitioner.
9. Consequently, the petition is dismissed. However, no order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA) JUDGE VV Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 20-03-2026 18:15:18