Karnataka High Court
Sattyappa Yallappa Wannuri vs Bhimappa Satyappa Sherai on 29 April, 2026
Author: Hanchate Sanjeevkumar
Bench: Hanchate Sanjeevkumar
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RSA No. 100299 of 2014
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 100299 OF 2014 (SP)
BETWEEN:
1. SATYAPPA YALLAPPA WANNURI,
AGE: 58 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. HOSPET GALLI, GOKAK,
TALUK: GOKAK, DISTRICT: BELAGAVI,
NOW R/O. NEW WANTMURI,
TALUK: BELAGAVI, DISTRICT: BELAGAVI.
KEMPANNA NINGAPPA JIDDI,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS.
2. SHRI YALLAPPA KEMPANNA JIDDI,
AGE: 40 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O. WANTAMURI, TQ. & DIST. BELAGAVI.
Digitally signed by
MALLIKARJUN 3. SMT. TAIYAWWA KEMPANNA JIDDI,
RUDRAYYA
KALMATH AGE: 38 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD,
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
R/O. WANTAMURI, TQ. & DIST. BELAGAVI.
KARNATAKA
4. SMT. NINGAWWA SATTEYYAPPA
@ SHETTAPPA HOLIKAR,
AGE: 36 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. WANTAMURI, TQ. & DIST. BELAGAVI.
5. SHRI YALLPPA SIDHAPPA MADAGANNAR,
AGE: 34 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. WANTAMURI, TQ. & DIST. BELAGAVI.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI H.M.DHARIGOND, ADVOCATE.)
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RSA No. 100299 of 2014
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AND:
1. SHRI BHIMAPPA SATYAPPA SHERAI,
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: FARMER,
R/O. NEW WANTAMURI,
TQ. & DIST: BELAGAVI.
2. SHRI DASTAGIR HASAN MADIHALLI,
SINCE DECEASED BY LRS.
2A. SRI HASANASAB
S/O. DASTAGIRSAB MADIHALLI,
AGE: 60 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. BASAWANAGAR
1ST CROSS, GOKAK,
TALUK: GOKAK,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591307.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. CHETANA S. BIRAJ, ADVOCATE R1;
R2-DECEASED, NOTICE TO R2(A) IS DISPENSED WITH.)
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION
100 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908, PRAYING TO
ALLOW THE APPEAL AND SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND
DECREE DATED 29.03.2011, PASSED IN R.A.NO.137/2007, BY
THE FAST TRACK COURT-II AND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE,
BELGAUM, WHEREBY ALLOWED THE APPEAL AND REVERSED THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE PASSED IN O.S.NO.167/1999 DATED
03.12.2002, ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE
(JR.DN.) BELGAUM, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR DICTATING JUDGMENT
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR
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RSA No. 100299 of 2014
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ORAL JUDGMENT
Though the appeal is listed for admission, with the consent of learned counsels appearing for appellant and respondent No.1, the matter is taken up for final disposal as it was heard on merits.
2. This regular second appeal is filed by defendants No.2 and 3 questioning the judgment and decree dated 29.03.2011, passed in R.A.No.137/2007 by the Court of Fast Track Court-II and Additional District Judge, Belagavi, which reversed the judgment and decree dated 03.12.2002, passed in O.S.No.167/1999, by the Principal Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) Belagavi, thereby the First Appellate Court has granted the judgment and decree for the relief of specific performance.
3. For the purpose of convenience and easy reference, ranking of the parties is referred to as per their status before the trial Court.
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4. It is the case of the plaintiff that defendant No.1 is the owner of the suit property and the plaintiff has entered into an agreement of sale on 05.06.1998 for a total sale consideration amount of Rs.10,000/- and a sum of Rs.1,000/- was paid as earnest money. But the defendant No.1 has not executed the registered sale deed. Therefore, upon issuing legal notice to defendant No.1 calling upon defendant No.1 for executing the registered sale deed, with making averments that defendant No.1 has not replied to the said notice, filed the suit for specific performance.
Further made averments that after execution of agreement of sale, defendant No.1 has sold the property in favour of defendants No.2 and 3. Therefore, submitted that the sale made by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 is not bona fide one. Thus, filed suit for specific performance.
5. Defendant No.1 appeared through advocate and filed the written statement and denied the plaint averments.
Further submitted that defendant No.1 is owner, therefore, -5- NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR according to his discretion he has sold the property in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 on 15.02.1999. Therefore, the sale made by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 is for bona fide reasons. Hence, prays to dismiss the suit.
6. Defendants No.2 and 3 have filed the written statement stating that defendant No.1 is owner and he has sold the property in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 for a valuable sale consideration. Therefore, defendants No.2 and 3 are bona fide purchasers for a total sale consideration of Rs.15,000/-. Therefore, for higher price defendants No.2 and 3 have purchased the property from defendant No.1.
Therefore submitted that the suit filed by the plaintiff is only with an intention to harass and causing hardship to defendants No.2 and 3. Therefore, prays to dismiss the suit.
7. The trial Court after framing of issues and receiving evidence on record and after appreciation of evidence on record has decreed the suit in part directing -6- NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR defendant No.1 to reimburse the amount of Rs.1,000/- with interest at the rate of 10% p.a. from the date of suit till realization of the amount. The trial Court has dismissed the claim of the plaintiff for decree for specific performance.
Being aggrieved by it, the plaintiff has filed Regular Appeal before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and granted decree in full giving relief of specific performance directing defendant No.1 to execute the registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff by receiving balance sale consideration amount of Rs.9,000/-.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, defendants No.2 and 3 have preferred this Regular Second Appeal by raising various grounds by stating that substantial questions of law arise for consideration.
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9. Upon hearing the arguments and perusal of the records, the following substantial questions of law arise for consideration.
i) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, the plaintiff makes out sufficient grounds for grant of relief of decree of specific performance as per Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act?
ii) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, defendants No.2 and 3 make out a case that they are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration of the suit property?
iii) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, considering the position of law that Section 20 of Specific Relief Act is discretionary one, whether granting decree of specific performance in favour of plaintiff would result into arbitrary and hardship to defendants No.1 to3?
iv) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, the plaintiff making prayer of cancellation of sale deed in the year 2005 during the appeal before the First Appellate Court, but without claiming such relief in the suit, is barred by limitation as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act?
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10. Heard Sri H.M.Dharigond, learned counsel for appellants and Smt.Chetana S. Biraj, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and perused the material placed before the Court.
11. Learned counsel for appellants submitted that defendants No.2 and 3 are the bona fide purchasers of the suit property from defendant No.1 and purchased for valuable sale consideration of Rs.15,000/-. The agreement of sale between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 is for Rs.10,000/- only. Therefore, when defendant No.1 has sold the property in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 for higher consideration to what the plaintiff claim as per agreement of sale, therefore the transaction of sale is bona fide one.
Further, defendants No.2 and 3 have purchased the suit property before selling the same to the plaintiff. Further, the suit filed by the plaintiff without seeking the relief of cancellation of sale deed, the suit is not maintainable.
However, the amendment made by the plaintiff during the first appeal seeking the relief of cancellation of sale deed is -9- NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR barred by limitation as per Article 58 of the Limitation Act.
Therefore justified the order passed by the trial Court.
Hence, prays to allow the appeal.
12. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1/plaintiff submitted that there was a valid agreement of sale between the plaintiff and defendant No.1.
Defendants No.2 and 3 have purchased the property from defendant No.1 during the subsistence of agreement of sale and thus purchase of defendants No.2 and 3 is not bona fide one and is taking away the right of the plaintiff.
Further, it is submitted that, upon execution of agreement of sale to the plaintiff, possession was given to the plaintiff and accordingly the plaintiff has put up construction.
Therefore, the agreement of sale executed in favour of plaintiff is valid and possession was also handed over in favour of the plaintiff and subsequently the sale effected by defendant No.1 in the year 1999 is not bona fide one.
Therefore, on all these grounds raised, prays to dismiss the appeal.
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13. The suit is filed for specific performance. As per the plaint averments, the suit agreement was executed on 05.06.1998. The total sale consideration was Rs.10,000/-
and it is alleged that the plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs.1,000/- as earnest money to defendant No.1. Admittedly the agreement of sale is unregistered one and thus the trial Court has held that defendant No.1 had executed the agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff, but the First Appellate Court has held that execution of sale is proved.
The finding on this issue is concurrent finding. But the relief granted is different. The trial Court has rejected the claim of plaintiff for grant of decree of specific performance, whereas, the First Appellate Court has decreed the suit in full granting decree of specific performance. Therefore, in this context whether grant of decree by the First Appellate Court is proper or not as per Section 20 of the specific relief Act, is to be considered in the legal position and the evidence adduced on record.
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14. The date of agreement of sale is 05.06.1998 for Rs.10,000/-. The defendants No.2 and 3 have purchased the property from defendant No.1 on 15.02.1999 for a sale consideration of Rs.15,000/-. The defendants No.2 and 3 have purchased the property from defendant No.1 before filing the suit for sale consideration of Rs.15,000/-. The suit was instituted on 09.03.1999. Therefore, defendant No.1 has sold the property for higher price to defendants No.2 and 3 than what the sale consideration was mentioned in the agreement. Therefore, the sale deed executed by defendant No.1 is found to be bona fide one and is not found to be causing deprivation of right of plaintiff. The plaintiff is mere agreement holder and not an owner.
Defendant No.1 is owner and he has discretion to sell the property for higher price and accordingly being owner, he has sold the property for higher price of Rs.15,000/- as compared to the sale consideration agreed with the plaintiff.
15. Furthermore, the agreement of sale is unregistered one. Therefore, through unregistered
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR agreement of sale handing over possession of property is not recognised. Though learned counsel for plaintiff submitted that in the agreement of sale there is a clause that possession was handed over to the plaintiff, but such possession do not have any validity since the agreement of sale is unregistered one. Through unregistered document possession cannot be conveyed. Therefore, even the plaintiff does not have the benefit of part performance as per Section 52A of the Transfer of Property Act. In order to claim the benefit of part performance as per Section 52A of the Transfer of Property Act, the document must be registered one. Therefore, even the plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of part performance based on the unregistered agreement of sale regarding possession. Therefore, the agreement of sale is mere an agreement.
16. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act stipulates a discretionary relief. There are parameters to exercise the discretion while granting the relief of specific performance.
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17. This Court in the case of Shri. Hanumantappa (since deceased) and Others Lrs. Vs. Shri. Jagadhish and Another, in RFA No.4137/2012 by judgment dated 13.06.2025, has held as follows:
26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments by interpreting Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the SR Act' for short), has laid down principle of law that granting relief of decree for specific performance is discretionary relief, subject to the principles laid down in Section 20 of the SR Act.
Just because an agreement of sale is proved, that cannot be made a reason to grant decree for specific performance, though it is lawful to do so.
27. The grant of decree for specific performance is guided by the principle of law laid down and what are the criteria that the Court shall consider upon the facts and circumstances involved in the case. It is worthwhile to refer some of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which are as follows:
28. Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of JAYAKANTHAM AND OTHERS v.
1ABAYKUMAR , at paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9 has held as follows:
"7. While evaluating whether specific performance ought to have been decreed in the present case, it would be necessary to bear in mind the fundamental 1 (2017) 5 SCC 178
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR principles of law. The court is not bound to grant the relief of specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 indicates that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary. Yet, the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but is "sound and reasonable", to be "guided by judicial principles". The exercise of discretion is capable of being corrected by a court of appeal in the hierarchy of appellate courts. Sub section (2) of Section 20 contains a stipulation of those cases where the court may exercise its discretion not to grant specific performance. Sub Section (2) of Section 20 is in the following terms:
"20. (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance-
(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or
(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non performance
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff;
(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance."
8. However, Explanation 1 stipulates that the mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, will not constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Moreover, Explanation 2 requires that the issue as to whether the performance of a contract involves hardship on the defendant has to be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract, except where the hardship has been caused from an act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract.
9. The precedent on the subject is elucidated below:
9.1. In Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son2, this Court held that: (scc p. 345, para 14) "...14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion of Courts as to decreeing specific performance. The Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The Court is not 2 1987 Supp SCC 340 : AIR 1987 SC 2328
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The Court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff..."
9.2 A similar view was adopted by this Court in Sardar Singh v. Krishna Devi4: (SCC p.26, para 14) "14....... Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief, merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. The grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary. The circumstances specified in Section 20 are only illustrative and not exhaustive. The court would take into consideration the circumstances in each case, the conduct of the parties and the respective interest under the contract."
9.3. Reiterating the position in K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd3, this Court held thus: (SCC p.91, para 29) 3 (1999) 5 SCC 77
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR "29...... Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the defendant. The principle underlying Section 20 has been summed up by this Court in Lourdu Mari David v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy4 by stating that the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be used arbitrarily; the discretion should be exercised on sound principles of law capable of correction by an appellate court."
9.4. These principles were followed by this Court in A.C. Arulappan v. Ahalya Naik5, with the following observations: (SCC pp.604 & 606, paras 7 & 15) 4 (1996) 5 SCC 589 5 (2001) 6 SCC 600
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR "7...... The jurisdiction to decree specific relief is discretionary and the court can consider various circumstances to decide whether such relief is to be granted. Merely because it is lawful to grant specific relief, the court need not grant the order for specific relief; but this discretion shall not be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Certain circumstances have been mentioned in Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as to under what circumstances the court shall exercise such discretion. If under the terms of the contract the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the defendant, the court may not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. So also, specific relief may not be granted if the defendant would be put to undue hardship which he did not foresee at the time of agreement. If it is inequitable to grant specific relief, then also the court would desist from granting a decree to the plaintiff." ........
"15...... Granting of specific performance is an equitable relief, though the same is now governed by the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. These equitable principles are nicely incorporated in Section 20 of the Act. While granting a decree for specific performance, these salutary guidelines shall be in the forefront of the mind of the court....."
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR 9.5. A Bench of three Judges of this Court considered the position in Nirmala Anand Vs. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd6., and held thus :
(SCC p.150, para 6) "6...... It is true that grant of decree of specific performance lies in the discretion of the court and it is also well settled that it is not always necessary to grant specific performance simply for the reason that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that the court in its discretion can impose any reasonable condition including payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while granting or refusing decree of specific performance. Whether the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific performance only on account of the phenomenal increase of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be, in a given case, one of the considerations besides many others to be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the pendency of the litigation. While 6 8 (2002) 8 SCC 146
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR balancing the equities, one of the considerations to be kept in view is as to who is the defaulting party. It is also to be borne in mind whether a party is trying to take undue advantage over the other as also the hardship that may be caused to the defendant by directing specific performance. There may be other circumstances on which parties may not have any control. The totality of the circumstances is required to be seen."
29. In the case of Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew Vs. Nedumbara 7 Kuruvila's son , at paragraph No.14, it is held as follows:
"14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion of courts as to decreeing specific performance. The court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff. The High Court has failed to consider the motive with which Varghese instituted the suit. It was instituted 7 (1987) Supp SCC 340
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR because Kuruvila could not get the estate and Mathew was not prepared to part with it. The sheet anchor of the suit by Varghese is the agreement for sale Exhibit A-1. Since Chettiar had waived his rights thereunder, Varghese as an assignee could not get a better right to enforce that agreement. He is, therefore, not entitled to a decree for specific performance."
30. In the case of Sardar Singh Vs. Krishna Devi8, at paragraph No.14, it is held as follows:
"14. The next question is whether the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit for specific performance. Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief, merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. The grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary. The circumstances specified in Section 20 are only illustrative and not exhaustive. The court would take into consideration the circumstances 8 (1994) 4 SCC 18
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR in each case, the conduct of the parties and the respective interest under the contract."
31. In the case of K. Narendra Vs. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd.9, at paragraph Nos.29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34, it is held as follows:
"29. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the 9 (1999) 5 SCC 77
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR defendant. The principle underlying Section 20 has been summed up by this Court in Lourdu Mari David v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy [(1996) 5 SCC 589 : AIR 1996 SC 2814] by stating that the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be used arbitrarily; the discretion should be exercised on sound principles of law capable of correction by an appellate court.
30. Chitty on Contracts (27th Edn., 1994, Vol. 1., at p. 1296) states:
"Severe hardship may be a ground for refusing specific performance even though it results from circumstances which arise after the conclusion of the contract, which affect the person of the defendant rather than the subject- matter of the contract, and for which the plaintiff is in no way responsible."
31. Very recently in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan [(1997) 3 SCC 1] this Court has held: (SCC p. 7, para 10) "10. It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time-limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time- limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. Would it be reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence of the contract, the time-limit(s) specified in the agreement have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity? It would also mean denying the discretion vested in the court by both Sections 10 and 20. As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani [(1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742] :
(SCC p. 528, para 25) '... it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract,
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR the court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are (evident?): (1) from the express terms of the contract; (2) from the nature of the property; and (3) from the surrounding circumstances, for example, the object of making the contract.' In other words, the court should look at all the relevant circumstances including the time- limit(s) specified in the agreement and determine whether its discretion to grant specific performance should be exercised. Now in the case of urban properties in India, it is well- known that their prices have been going up sharply over the last few decades -- particularly after 1973."
32. Referring to the principle that mere rise in prices is no ground for denying the specific performance the Court has emphasized the need for being alive to the realities of life and inflationary tendencies judicially noticeable and observed: (SCC p. 9, para 11) "Indeed, we are inclined to think that the rigor of the rule evolved by courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case of immovable properties -- evolved in times when prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown --
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR requires to be relaxed, if not modified, particularly in the case of urban immovable properties. It is high time, we do so."
33. The Court has further proceeded to hold: (SCC pp. 9-10, para 11) "All this only means that while exercising its discretion, the court should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time-limit(s) for taking steps by one or the other party, it must have some significance and that the said time-limit(s) cannot be ignored altogether on the ground that time has not been made the essence of the contract (relating to immovable properties)."
34. Having noticed the Constitution Bench decision in Chand Rani [(1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742] the Court has further held: (SCC p. 11, para 14) "Even where time is not of the essence of the contract, the plaintiff must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property."
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32. In the case of A.C. Arulappan Vs. Ahalya Naik10, at paragraph No.7, 8, 9, 10 and 15, it is held as follows:
"7. The jurisdiction to decree specific relief is discretionary and the court can consider various circumstances to decide whether such relief is to be granted. Merely because it is lawful to grant specific relief, the court need not grant the order for specific relief; but this discretion shall not be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Certain circumstances have been mentioned in Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as to under what circumstances the court shall exercise such discretion. If under the terms of the contract the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the defendant, the court may not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. So also, specific relief may not be granted if the defendant would be put to undue hardship which he did not foresee at the time of agreement. If it is inequitable to grant specific relief, then also the court would desist from granting a decree to the plaintiff.
8. In Damacherla Anjaneyulu v. Damcherla Venkata Seshaiah [1987 Supp SCC 75 : AIR 1987 SC 1641] the High Court declined to grant a decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff, even though the 10 (2001) 6 SCC 600
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR defendant was guilty of breach of agreement. That was a case where the defendant had constructed costly structures and if a decree for specific performance was granted, the defendant would have been put to special hardship. This Court directed the defendant to pay compensation to the plaintiff.
9. In Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son [1987 Supp SCC 340 : AIR 1987 SC 2328] this Court cautioned and observed as under: (SCC p. 345, para
14) "14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion to courts as to decreeing specific performance. The court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff."
10. In Lourdu Mari David v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy [(1996) 5 SCC 589 : AIR 1996 SC 2814] the plaintiff, who sought for specific performance of an agreement to purchase immoveable property, filed a suit with incorrect and
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR false facts. In the plaint, it was alleged that the plaintiff was already given possession of Door No.2/53 as a lessee and he was given possession of Door No.1/53 on the date of the agreement itself. But he did not give any evidence that he had got possession of Door No.1/53 on the date of the agreement. It was found that his case as regards Door No.1/53 was false. He also alleged that he had paid Rs.400 in addition to the sum of Rs.4000 paid as advance, but this was proved to be an incorrect statement. He alleged that the third defendant had inspected the house during the course of negotiations, but this also was found to be false. This Court held that it is settled law that the party who seeks to avail of the jurisdiction of a court and specific performance being equitable relief, must come to the court with clean hands. In other words, the party who makes false allegations does not come with clean hands and is not entitled to the equitable relief.
15. Granting of specific performance is an equitable relief, though the same is now governed by the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. These equitable principles are nicely incorporated in Section 20 of the Act. While granting a decree for specific performance, these salutary guidelines shall be in the forefront of the mind of the court. The trial court, which had the
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR added advantage of recording the evidence and seeing the demeanour of the witnesses, considered the relevant facts and reached a conclusion. The appellate court should not have reversed that decision disregarding these facts and, in our view, the appellate court seriously flawed in its decision. Therefore, we hold that the respondent is not entitled to a decree of specific performance of the contract."
47. In this regard, I place reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.N.KRISHNAMURTHY (SINCE DECEASED) AND OTHERS LRS. vs. A.M.KRISHNAMRTHY, reported in (2023) 11 SCC 175, at paragraph Nos.32, 33 and 34, it is held as under:
"32. In a suit for specific performance of a contract, the Court is required to pose unto itself the following questions, namely:
32.1. Whether there is a valid agreement of sale binding on both the vendor and the vendee.
32.2. Whether the plaintiff has all along been and still is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as envisaged under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
33. There is a distinction between readiness and willingness to perform the contract and both ingredients are necessary for the relief of specific performance. In Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar [Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526] cited by Mr
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR Venugopal, this Court said that there was a difference between readiness and willingness to perform a contract. While readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which would include his financial position, willingness relates to the conduct of the plaintiff. The same view was taken by this Court in Kalawati v. Rakesh Kumar [Kalawati v.Rakesh Kumar, (2018) 3 SCC 658 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 609] .
34. Even in a first appeal, the first appellate court is duty-bound to examine whether there was continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform the contract. This proposition finds support from Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan [Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan,(1999) 8 SCC 396] and H.P.Pyarejan v. Dasappa [H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa, (2006) 2 SCC 496] where this Court approved the views taken by the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon [Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43 : (1927-28) 55 IA 360 at p. 372 : AIR 1928 PC 208] ."
48. In the case of P.DAIVASIGAMANI vs. S.SAMBANDAN11, at paragraph Nos.21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, it is held as under;
"21.Readiness and willingness are not one, but two separate elements. Readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract, which would include the financial position to pay the purchase price. Willingness refers to the intention of the plaintiff as a purchaser to perform his part of the contract.11
(2022) 14 SC 793
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR Willingness is inferred by scrutinising the conduct of the plaintiff purchaser, including attending circumstances reported in See para 2 in Ganesh Dassji V. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 52612. Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff purchaser from the date the balance sale consideration was payable in terms of the agreement to sell, till the decision of the suit, is a condition precedent for grant of relief of specific performance reported in See para 5 in N.P.Thirugnanam V. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115. Also see Anleshir Manu V. flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC Online PC 43: (1927-
28) 55 IA 360: Air 1928 PC 208.
22. The expression "readiness and willingness" used in Section 16 (c) of the said Act, has been interpreted in a catena of decisions by this Court, in the light of facts and circumstances of the cases under consideration for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant the relief of Specific Performance of a contract. The said expression cannot be interpreted in a straitjacket formula. In a very apt decision of this Court in Syed Dastagir vs. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty (1999) 6 SCC 337, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, construing a plea of "readiness and willingness to perform"
in view of the requirement of Section 16(c) and its explanation, observed as under: (SCC p. 341, para 9) "9. So the whole gamut of the issue raised is, how to construe a plea specially with reference to Section
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR 16(c) and what are the obligations which the plaintiff has to comply with in reference to his plea and whether the plea of the plaintiff could not be construed to conform to the requirement of the aforesaid section, or does this section require specific words to be pleaded that he has performed or has always been ready and is willing to perform his part of the contract. In construing a plea in any pleading, courts must keep in mind that a plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression through words to place fact and law of one's case for a relief. Such an expression may be pointed, precise, sometimes vague but still it could be gathered what he wants to convey through only by reading the whole pleading, depending on the person drafting a plea. In India most of the pleas are drafted by counsel hence the aforesaid difference of pleas which inevitably differ from one to the other. Thus, to gather true spirit behind a plea it should be read as a whole. This does not distract one from performing his obligations as required under a statute. But to test whether he has performed his obligations, one has to see the pith and substance of a plea. Where a statute requires any fact to be pleaded then that has to be pleaded may be in any form. The same plea may be stated by different persons through different words; then
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR how could it be constricted to be only in any particular nomenclature or word. Unless a statute specifically requires a plea to be in any particular form, it can be in any form. No specific phraseology or language is required to take such a plea. The language in Section 16(c) does not require any specific phraseology but only that the plaintiff must aver that he has performed or has always been and is willing to perform his part of the contract. So the compliance of "readiness and willingness" has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and form. So to insist for a mechanical production of the exact words of a statute is to insist for the form rather than the essence. So the absence of form cannot dissolve an essence if already pleaded".
23. It was further observed therein that:
(Syed Dastagir case13, "11........It is significant that this explanation carves out a contract which involves payment of money as a separate class from Section 16(c).
Explanation (i) uses the words "it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court". (emphasis supplied) This speaks in a negative term what is not essential for 13 Syed Dastagir V. T. R. Gopalkrishna setty, (1999) 6 SCC 337
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR the plaintiff to do. This is more in support of the plaintiff that he need not tender to the defendant or deposit in court any money but the plaintiff must [as per Explanation (ii)] at least aver his performance or readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract".
(emphasis in original)
24. In Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh14 this Court had laid down that law is not in doubt and it is not a condition that the respondents (Plaintiffs) should have ready cash with them. It is sufficient for the respondents to establish that they had the capacity to pay the sale consideration. It is not necessary that they should always carry the money with them from the date of the suit till the date of the decree. The said principle was followed in A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed15, in case of C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy16.
25. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (Pre-amendment), which confers discretion on the court to exercise jurisdiction to decree of specific performance, states that this exercise should not be arbitrary, but guided by sound and reasonable judicial principles. Interpreting and elucidating on Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (pre-amendment) and factors to be considered, this Court in Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi17 has also referred to Sections 16(c), 22, 23 and 24 of the Specific Relief Act 14 (1997) 2 SCC 200 15 (2017) 4 SCC 654 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 596 16 (2020) 3 SCC 280 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 90 17 (2019) 3 SCC 704 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 405
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR and Forms 47/48 of Appendix A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to summarise:
(SCC pp.705-706, paras 7-8) "7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance are:
7.1 First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property;
7.2 Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract.
7.3 Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract.
7.4 Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff.
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR 7.5 Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money etc. and, if so, on what grounds.
8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of the statutory requirements [See Sections 16
(c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of Appendix A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure]. These requirements have to be properly pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings and proved with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It is only then the Court is entitled to exercise its discretion and accordingly grant or refuse the relief of specific performance depending upon the case made out by the parties on facts."
49. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.P.BUILDERS AND ANOTHER VS.
18A.RAMDAS RAO AND ANOTHER , at paragraph Nos.20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27, it is held as under:
Readiness and willingness "20. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides for personal bars to relief. This provision states that:18
(2011) 1 SCC 429
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR "16.Personal bars to relief:--- Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person ---
a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or
b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or
c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
Explanation.- For the purposes of clause (c),-
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court;
(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction."
21. Among the three clauses, we are more concerned about clause (c).
"Readiness and willingness" is enshrined in clause (c) which was not present in the old Act of 1877. However, it was later inserted with the recommendations of the 9th Law Commission's report. This clause provides that the person seeking specific performance must prove that he has performed or has been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him.
22. xxx.xxxx........
23. In N.P. Thirugnanam vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao19., at SCC para 5, this Court held: (SCC pp. 117-18) "5......Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that the plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the 19 (1995) 5 SCC 115
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract."
24. In P.D'Souza vs. Shondrilo Naidu20, this Court observed: (SCC p. 654, paras 19 and 21) "19. It is indisputable that in a suit for specific performance of contract the plaintiff must establish his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. The question as to whether the onus was discharged by the plaintiff or 20 (2004) 6 SCC 649
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down in this behalf....
21......The readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract would also depend upon the question as to whether the defendant did everything which was required of him to be done in terms of the agreement for sale."
25. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates "readiness and willingness" on the part of the plaintiff and it is a condition precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific performance. It is also clear that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must allege and prove a continuous "readiness and willingness" to perform the contract on his part from the date of the contract. The onus is on the plaintiff.
26. It has been rightly considered by this Court in R.C. Chandiok. vs. Chuni Lal Sabharwal21., that "readiness and willingness"
cannot be treated as a straightjacket formula. This has to be determined from the entirety of the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned.
27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance 21 (1970) 3 SCC 140
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR with this statutory mandate, the Court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. "Readiness and willingness" to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties."
50. Further rely on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ZARINA SIDDIQUI vs. A. RAMALINGAM ALIAS R.AMARNATHAN22 at paragraph Nos.30, 33, it is held as under:
"30. In a recent judgment dated 22.9.2014 in Civil Appeal No.9047 of 2014 entitled K. Prakash vs. B.R. Sampath Kumar23, this Court observed that: (SCC p.605 and paras 16 & 18-19) "16. The principles which can be enunciated are that where the plaintiff brings a suit for specific performance of contract for sale, the law insists a condition precedent to the grant of decree for specific performance: that the plaintiff must show his continued readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract in accordance with its terms from the date of contract to the date of hearing. Normally, when the trial court exercises its discretion in one way or other after appreciation of entire evidence and materials on record, the appellate court should not interfere 22 (2015) 1 SCC 705 23 (2015) 1 SCC 597
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR unless it is established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against judicial principles. The appellate court should also not exercise its discretion against the grant of specific performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic considerations. It is true, as contemplated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, that a party is not entitled to get a decree for specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless once an agreement to sell is legal and validly proved and further requirements for getting such a decree are established then the Court has to exercise its discretion in favour of granting relief for specific performance.
18. Subsequent rise in price will not be treated as a hardship entailing refusal of the decree for specific performance. Rise in price is a normal change of circumstances and, therefore, on that ground a decree for specific performance cannot be reversed.
19. However, the court may take notice of the fact that there has been an increase in the price of the property and considering the other facts and circumstances of the case, this Court while granting decree for specific performance can impose such condition which may to some extent compensate the defendant owner of the property. This aspect of the matter is considered
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nirmala Anand vs. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd...24
33. The equitable discretion to grant or not to grant a relief for specific performance also depends upon the conduct of the parties. The necessary ingredient has to be proved and established by the plaintiff so that discretion would be exercised judiciously in favour of the plaintiff. At the same time, if the defendant does not come with clean hands and suppresses material facts and evidence and misled the Court then such discretion should not be exercised by refusing to grant specific performance."
51. Further I place reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.SHAMA NAIK vs. G.SRINIVASAIAH25 at paragraph Nos.8, 9, 10 and 11, it is held as under:
"8. Section 16(C) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (prior to amendment w.e.f. 1.10.2018) bars the relief of the specific performance of a contract in favour of a person who fails to aver readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.
9. There is a legion of precedents on the subject of readiness and willingness.
10. The law is well settled. The plaintiff is obliged not only to make specific statement and averments in the plaint but 24 (2002) 8 SCC 146 25 2024 SCC ONLINE 3586
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR is also obliged to adduce necessary oral and documentary evidence to show the availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time.
11. There is a fine distinction between readiness and willingness to perform the contract. Both the ingredients are necessary for the relief of specific performance."
52. As per the principle of law laid down above stated, it is the burden on the plaintiffs to prove that they were ever ready and willing to perform their part of contract, but the plaintiffs have not produced any evidence that how they were willing and ready to perform their part of contract. Whether plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 had sufficient amount in their account so as to purchase the property, is not found in the evidence. As per Section 16(c) of the Act, it is the burden on the plaintiffs to prove that they were ever ready and willing to perform their part of contract, but in this regard there is no proper pleading and no evidence. Hence, on this reason also the plaintiffs are not entitled for decree of specific performance of contract.
18. Considering the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated supra, if the grant of a decree for specific performance results in arbitrariness or
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR confers an unfair advantage on the plaintiff, such discretion ought not to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff.
19. Defendant No.1 has sold the property through registered sale deed to defendants No.2 and 3 for a sale consideration of Rs.15,000/-, which is higher to the sale consideration mentioned in the agreement of sale.
Therefore, if decree is granted in favour of the plaintiff, then it would cause hardship to defendant No.1 and defendants No.2 and 3.
20. The right of the plaintiff is a limited right, arising solely from the agreement of sale and nothing more.
Therefore, defendants No.2 and 3 are found to be bona fide purchasers. Therefore, the grant of judgment and decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff is amounting to arbitrary and causing hardship to defendants No.1 to 3. Therefore, the First Appellate Court has not exercised its discretion properly. Accordingly, I answer substantial question of law No.1 in the negative, and
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR substantial questions of law Nos.2 to 4 in the affirmative.
Hence, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER i. The Regular Second Appeal is allowed.
ii. The judgment and decree dated 29.03.2011, in R.A.No.137/2007 passed by the Fast Track Court-II and Additional District Judge, Belagavi, is hereby set aside.
iii. The judgment and decree dated 03.12.2002 in O.S.No.167/1999, passed by the Principal Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.), Belagavi, is hereby confirmed.
iv. Defendant No.1 is directed to reimburse the earnest money of Rs.1,000/- to the plaintiff with interest at the rate of 10% per annum
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:6442 RSA No. 100299 of 2014 HC-KAR from the date of the agreement of sale till realization.
v. No order as to costs.
vi. Draw decree accordingly.
Sd/-
(HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR)
JUDGE
PMP-para 1 and 2.
MRK-para 3 to 19.
ASN-para 20 to end.
CT-AN
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 20