Allahabad High Court
Ram Kishore vs Addl. District Magistrate Fandr. ... on 18 September, 2025
Author: Irshad Ali
Bench: Irshad Ali
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:58379
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - C No. - 1001879 of 1998
Ram Kishore
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
Addl. District Magistrate Fandr. Sultanpur And Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
:
S.P.Maurya, Jitendra Maurya, Vinod Kumar Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
C.S.C., B. K. Singh, R.N.Gupta, Raghvendra Kumar Singh-Ii
Court No. - 3
HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.
1. Heard Sri Vinod Kumar Singh and Sri Jitendra Maurya, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Shatrughan Chaudhary, learned Additional CSC for the respondent - State.
2. The petitioner was granted lease by the Bhudan Samiti on 16.06.1979 as gift deed. Shiv Murat Singh filed an application for cancellation of lease on 03.03.1992. The petitioner filed his submission on 18.04.2024, wherein he has taken objection that the time period of lease more than 12 years, therefore, the lease cannot be cancelled on the limitation as provided under Division IIIrd Part II of Schedule of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 that where there is no limitation is provided, limitation is 3 years.
3. Respondent No.1 vide order dated 01.05.1998 cancelled lease of the petitioner.
4. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that respondent No.1 has nowhere considered the limitation point and has proceeded to decide the case by cancelling the lease of the petitioner. He submitted that under Division IIIrd Part II of Schedule of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 limitation has been provided as three years and more than 12 years have passed, therefore, the proceeding is wholly illegal and suffers from apparent illegality.
5. Learned Additional CSC does not dispute in regard to limitation proceeding under Division IIIrd Part II of Schedule of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963. He submitted that there is no limitation provided under Section 15A of U.P. Bhudan Yagya Act, 1952.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment in the case of Babu Lal and others Vs. State of U.P. and others + four other petitions; Writ C No.26944 of 2008 decided on 03.03.2020 and submitted that where there is no limitation provided as per provisions contained under Limitation Act, the time limit is of three years.
7. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record as well as judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner.
8. For deciding the issue involved in the case, Division IIIrd Part II of Schedule of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 is being quoted below:
"137. Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division - Three years - When the right to apply accrues."
9. On perusal of aforesaid provisions, it is evident that where there is no limitation provided is three years, therefore, the action taken for cancellation of lease after more than 12 years is wholly unjustified and without any rational basis. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment in the case of Babu Lal and others Vs. State of U.P. and others + four other petitions; Writ C No.26944 of 2008 decided on 03.03.2020, relevant portion of which is being quoted below:
"Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and another v. D. Narsing Rao and others, (2015) 3 SCC 695 and judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Shakuntala and 25 others v. State of U.P.; 2019(5) AWC 5007 All.
In the case of Smt. Shankutala and 25 Others (Supra), this Court was considering the power of cancellation of leases under Section 198(4) of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act and a specific argument was raised that where no limitation is prescribed, the action for cancellation can be taken at any point of time. This Court on the basis of the pleading exchanged, framed four questions. Question No. (D) framed by the Court is as under:-
"(d) Whether in the case of fraud an action can be taken for cancellation of the lease without any period of limitation?"
This Court answering the said question relying on the judgment of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and another v. D. Narsing Rao and others (Supra) recorded as under:-
"The last question is to be considered whether no limitation is applicable where the allegations of fraud exists. I have already held in foregoing paras that the allegations of fraud were not existent. However, even if the allegations of fraud are existent the question to be considered is whether any limitation period is applicable or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the said question in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and another vs. D. Narsing Rao and others, 2015 3 SCC 695 and held as under:
"25. The legal position is fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions of this Court which have laid down that even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of any power, revisional or otherwise, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period. This is so even in cases where allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of any corrective power. We may briefly refer to some of the decisions only to bring home the point that the absence of a stipulated period of limitation makes little or no difference in so far as the exercise of the power is concerned which ought to be permissible only when the power is invoked within a reasonable period.
31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.
32. In the case at hand, while the entry sought to be corrected is described as fraudulent, there is nothing in the notice impugned before the High Court as to when was the alleged fraud discovered by the State. A specific statement in that regard was essential for it was a jurisdictional fact, which ought to be clearly asserted in the notice issued to the respondents. The attempt of the appellant-State to demonstrate that the notice was issued within a reasonable period of the discovery of the alleged fraud is, therefore, futile. At any rate, when the Government allowed the land in question for housing sites to be given to Government employees in the year 1991, it must be presumed to have known about the record and the revenue entries concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary course of official business. In as much as, the notice was issued as late as on 31st December, 2004, it was delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed."
Thus even the Supreme Court has held that even in the cases of fraud the action should be taken within a reasonable time. In the present case, the action has been taken after a period of 12 years which cannot be termed as reasonable time and thus I hold that even in the cases of fraud action has to be taken within the period of limitation."
In the facts of the present case, even as per the show cause notices, the leases were granted on 26.5.1982 and the show cause notice was issued on 6.2.2003 i.e. after more than 20 years. There is no pleading or material on record as to on what date the alleged irregularity in allotment was discovered. Following the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy (Supra) and Smt. Shakuntala (Supra), I have no hesitation in holding that the initiation of proceedings was well beyond the period, which can be termed as reasonable. Thus, the order dated 8.5.2008 is liable to be set aside on that count alone.
Coming to the perversity of the impugned order and the perversity in the decision making process, it is clear from perusal of the record that a specific request was made for providing copy of the reports, proposed to be relied upon against the petitioners, as they were not supplied to the petitioners on the ground that the same were confidential documents. The specific defence of the petitioners that in fact 50% of the allottees were persons of Scheduled Castes and a list was also annexed along with their defence has not even been considered while passing the orders impugned. The order impugned is based upon the two reports, which were never supplied to the petitioners and were not even based upon the inspection of original files. Thus, on all these counts, the orders impugned are wholly perverse and liable to be set aside.
I am also not inclined to accept the submission of the Standing Counsel that merely because 50% of the land was not allotted to the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes in consonance with the mandate of Section 14 (4) (a), the allotments are liable to be set aside for the following reasons:-
Although on a plain reading of Sub Section 4 (a) of Section 14 it is clear that it prescribes for allotment of at least 50% of the land in favour of the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and persons belonging to Kol, Pathari, Khairwar, Baiga, Dharikar, Panika and Gond Tribes and such other tribes as the State Government on the recommendation of the Committee may notify in this behalf. To attract the mischief of Section 14 (4) (a) there has to be specific allegation as to how much land was available for grant and how much was granted to the persons specified in Clause (a) of Section 4 (4). There is nothing on record to demonstrate as to what was the extent of land available for allotment before the Committee, which had allotted the lands and how much part of the said land was allotted to the persons specified in Sub Section (4) (a) of Section 14 and how much was allotted to the persons, who are not specified in Sub Section 4 (a) of Section 14 and thus there was no material on record to come to a conclusion that the allotment was not carried out in consonance with the mandate of Section 14 (4) (a). In fact the list of allottees relied upon by the petitioners was not even considered while passing impugned order. "
10. On perusal of aforesaid judgment, it is crystal clear that where there is no limitation provided, limitation shall be treated to be 3 years, therefore, the ratio of the judgment relied upon is fully applicable to the present case.
11. In view of reasons recorded above, the impuned order dated 01.05.1998 being wholly illegal is hereby quashed.
12. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed.
(Irshad Ali,J.) September 18, 2025 Adarsh K Singh