Punjab-Haryana High Court
B.S. Gupta vs Uttari Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam ... on 5 August, 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
C.W.P No.18460 of 2010
Date of Decision:5.8.2011
B.S. Gupta .... Petitioner
Versus
Uttari Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited and others
.... Respondents
CORAM: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Nirmaljit Kaur
Present: Mr. Ashok Arora, Advocate for
Mr. J.K. Goel, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Mohnish Sharma, Advocate for the respondents.
****
1.Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be
allowed to see the judgment?
2.To be referred to the Reporters or not?
3.Whether the judgment should be reported in the
Digest?
NIRMALJIT KAUR, J. (Oral)
Through the present petition, the petitioner herein is praying for quashing of order dated 16.4.2009 (P-7) vide which the suspension period w.e.f. 25.7.2003 to 19.2.2004 has been treated as leave of kind with further prayer for issuance of direction to the respondents authorities to release the amount of DCRG, commutation and other pensionary benefits to him as per his entitlement.
The facts in short that an FIR No.339 dated 25.7.2003 under Section 7/13/49/88 of Prevention of Corruption Act at Police Station City Kaithal was lodged against the petitioner. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 29.7.2003 w.e.f. 25.7.2003. He was reinstated on 17.2.2004. The Special Court, Kaithal, vide its order and judgment dated 17.1.2008 acquitted the petitioner of the charge.
C.W.P No.18460 of 2010 -2-
There is nothing on record to suggest that the respondents have filed any appeal against the order and judgment dated 17.1.2008 vide which the petitioner was acquitted. The order and judgment dated 17.1.2008 acquitting the petitioner has therefore attained finality.
The petitioner retired on 30.4.2004 after attaining the age of superannuation from the service of the respondent authorities. Accordingly, vide order dated 16.4.2009, the respondents regularized the suspension period w.e.f. 25.7.2003 to 19.2.2004 as leave of kind due. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal against the said order before the Appellate Authority. The said appeal was also dismissed vide order dated 13.5.2010 (R-3/1).
As per the provisions or Rule 7.5 CSR Volume I Part I, in case of acquittal, the employee is entitled for all the service benefit of the suspension period.
Thus, the petitioner having been acquitted, the suspension period, which was treated as leave of kind due, is not justified as no leave of the kind due was left. Thus, depriving him of counting the said period towards his retiral benefits.
Praying that the petitioner is entitled to the release of full salary for the suspension period in view of his acquittal, reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shashi Kumar v. Uttri Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam and another (CWP No.14375 of 2003, decided on 7th December, 2004) (P5). Para 8 of the said judgment reads as under:
"The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jag C.W.P No.18460 of 2010 -3- Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secy of Punjab Government, Irrigation and others, AIR 1967 (54) Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punjab). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol.I Part I, it was observed as follows:
"(2) xxx xxx xxx The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect.
The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate honourable acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted'. The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. It is generally held that there being a doubt in the C.W.P No.18460 of 2010 -4- mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted.
I am, therefore, quite clearly in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this; the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either honourable acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal. The reason is obvious, the criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused."
The aforesaid view has also been reiterated in the various judgments rendered by this Court, including Hukam Singh v. The State of Haryana and another 2001(2) SCT 696 (P&H), Kanwal Singh v. State of Haryana and another 2010(3) SCT 464 as well as Ram Dhari v. State of Haryana and others (CWP 2658 of 2010, decided on 5.1.2011).
The case in hand is squarely covered by the judgment rendered in the case of Shashi Kumar (supra).
In view of the above, orders dated 13.5.2010 (R-3/1) and 16.4.2009 (P-7) are quashed with a direction to the respondent authorities to count the suspension period w.e.f. 25.7.2003 to 19.2.2004 as duty period and calculate the same for the purpose of pension etc. However, the above said order shall be subject to the petitioner completing the necessary formalities.
Allowed in the above terms.
5.8.2011 ( NIRMALJIT KAUR ) rajeev JUDGE