Karnataka High Court
Sri Timmana Gowda vs The Ministry Of Defence on 11 October, 2018
Author: R Devdas
Bench: R Devdas
1
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2018
BEFORE
THE HON' BLE MR.JUSTICE R DEVDAS
WRIT PETITION NOs.36980-36992 OF 2014 (GM-RES)
c/w
WRIT PETITION NOs.52716-52717/2014, 20138/2016,
20136-20137/2016 (GM-RES)
IN W.P. NOs.36980-36992/2014
BETWEEN
1. SRI TIMMANA GOWDA
S/O MALLANGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
OCC:BUSINESS
ADD:H NO.10, GUNDAPPA LAYOUT
HESARAGHATAA MAIN ROAD
BANGALORE-90
2. SRI A NARAYANA SWAMY
S/O LATE ANATHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
OCC:RETD
ADD:98-B1, NAVY LAYOUT
SEDEHALLI, NAGASANDRA POST
BANGALORE-73
3. SRI AVINASH NAIK
S/O LATE KRISHNA NAIK
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
OCC:BUSINESS
ADD:NO.98B, NAVY LAYOUT
3RD CROSS, NEAR CHIMANY HILLS
NAGASANDRA POST
2
BANGALORE-73
4. SRI NANJUNDIAH
S/O BYLAPPA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
OCC:CONTRACTOR
ADD:7TH MAIN, MEI LAYOUT
NAGASANDRA POST
BANGALORE NORTH-73
5. SRI PRABHAKAR
S/O LATE R K MURTHY
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
OCC:CLERK
ADD:NO.35, 2ND WARD,
DODDABALLAPUR
RAJHAGHATTA POST-561203
6. SRI LOHIT D K
S/O KRISHNAMURTY
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
OCC:SERVICE
ADD:98A, NAVY LAYOUT
NAGASANDRA POST
BANGALORE-73
7. SRI CHANDRASHEKAR
S/O SRINIVAS SHETTY
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
OCC:CONTRACTOR
ADD:NO.235, 11TH MAIN
MEI LAYOUT
BAGALKUNTE
BANGALORE-73
8. SMT SUNANDAMMA
W/O BASAVARAJU
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
OCC:HOUSE MAKER
ADD:NO.247, KIRLOSKAR
3
LAYOUT, I MAIN,
BANGALORE-73
9. MRS ANSHU BASTI
W/O GOUTAM BASTI
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
OCC:HOUSE WIFE
ADD:NO.3, 3RD CROSS
NMH LAYOUT
HESARAGHATTA MAIN ROAD
BANGALORE-73
10. SRI B SHAMA SHETTY
S/O LATE NARAYANA SHETTY
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
OCC:RETD
ADD:NO.32-B, NAVY LAYOUT
HESARAGHATTA ROAD
BANGALORE-90
11. SRI RAMAKRISHNAPPA
S/O BEERAPPA
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
OCC:SERVICE
ADD:NO.52/38,1ST A CROSS,
MARENAHALLI
BANGALORE-40
12. SRI MALLAIAH
S/O LATE K ASHWATHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
OCC:SERVICE
ADD:NO.F-2, 1ST FLOOR
GOLDEN ENCLOVAE APARTMENTS
SIDDESHWARA LAYOUT
NAGASANDRA POST
BANGALORE-73
13. SRI B M SATISH
S/O LATE MALLIKARJUNA RAO
4
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
OCC:SERVICE
ADD:NO.522, 11TH A MAIN
MEI LAYOUT, BAGALAGUNTE
NAGASANDRA POST
BANGALORE-73
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. VENKATESH P DALWAI, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
RASKSHA BHAVAN
NEW DELHI-1
BY ITS SECRETARY
2. THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
AIR FORCE STATION
CHIMNEY HILLS
CHIKKABANAVARA POST
BANGALORE-90
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER &
BANGALORE CITY DISTRICT MAGISTRATE
BANGALORE-560001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRADEEP SINGH, CGC FOR R1 & R2,
SRI. T.S. MAHANTESH, AGA FOR R3)
THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
& 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH
THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION DATED 13.1.2010 ISSUED BY
THE R-1 VIDE ANNEXURE-G QUASH THE NOTIFICATION DATED
20.8.2010 ISSUED BY THE R-3 DATED 20.8.2010 VIDE
ANNEXURE-H.
5
IN W.P. NOs.52716-52717/2014
BETWEEN
B.MINAKSHI
D/O BHAIRAPPA,
AGE:47 YEARS, OCC: NIL,
ADD: NO.512, 5TH MAIN, 4TH CROSS,
BHUVANESHWARI NAGAR,
BANGALORE-57.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI VENKATESH P DALWAI, ADVOCAE)
AND
1. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
RASKSHA BHAVAN,
NEW DELHI-1,
BY ITS SECRETARY.
2. THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER,
AIR FORCE STATION,
CHIMNEY HILLS,
CHIKKABANAVARA POST,
BANGALORE-90.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
BANGALORE CITY
KANDAY BHAVAN
K.G.ROAD, BANGALORE-560 001
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRADEEP SINGH, CGC FOR R1 & R2,
SRI. T.S. MAHANTESH, AGA FOR R3)
THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
& 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH
THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION DT.13.1.10, ISSUED BY THE R1
IN SRO 4 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-E AND ETC.
6
IN W.P. NO.20138/2016
BETWEEN
SMT. MANJULA D S
W/O SHIVASHANKARIAH,
AGE 42 YEARS,
OCC:SDA
ADD NO.165/13, DORESWAMY PALYA
IIMB POST, B.G.ROAD,
BANGALORE-76.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI VENKATESH P DALWAI, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
RASKSHA BHAVAN,
NEW DELHI-1
BY ITS SECRETARY.
2. THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
AIR FORCE STATION
CHIMNEY HILLS
CHIKKABANAVARA POST,
BANGALORE-90.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE CITY
AMBEDKAR VEEDHI ROAD
BANGALORE-560 001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRADEEP SINGH, CGC FOR R1 & R2,
SRI. T.S. MAHANTESH, AGA FOR R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 &
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION DTD:13.1.2010 ISSUED BY THE R-1
IN SRO.4 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-C AND ETC.
7
IN W.P. NOs.20136-20137/2016
BETWEEN
SRI T R MUNIRAJU
S/O LATE P.RAMAIAH,
AGE 62 YEARS,
OCC:AGRICULTURE,
R/AT THAMMENAHALLY VILLAGE,
DASANAPURA HOBLI,
BANGALORE NORTH (TQ)
BANGALORE-560 024.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI VENKATESH P DALWAI, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
RAKSHA BHAVAN,
NEW DELHI-110 001
REPT BY ITS SECRETARY.
2. THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
AIR FORCE STATION,
CHIMNEY HILLS,
CHIKKABANAVARA POST,
BANGALORE-90.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE CITY, BANGALORE-560 009.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRADEEP SINGH, CGC FOR R1 & R2,
SRI. T.S. MAHANTESH, AGA FOR R3)
THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
& 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH
8
THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION DTD:13.1.2010 ISSUED BY THE
R-1 IN SRO.4 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-D AND ETC.
THESE PETITIONS ARE COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
R.DEVDAS J., (ORAL):
The petitioners are the owners of residential sites, in a Layout formed in old Sy.No.11, new Sy.Nos.30 and 31, measuring about 10 acres, situated at Chimney Hills, Hesaraghatta, Bangalore. It is stated that some of the petitioners have put up residential buildings in the sites owned by them. The respondent-Ministry of Defence, in exercise of powers conferred under Sections 3 and 7 of the Works of Defence Act, 1903 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act 1903' for short), issued a notification dated 13.01.2010, Gazetted on 23.01.2010 in the Central Gazette. In the said notification, restriction is placed upon the use and enjoyment of land in the vicinity of Air Force Station, Chimney Hills, Bangalore. The notification states no building or structure shall be constructed, created or erected or no tree shall be planted on any land within the limits of 100 meters from the crest of the outer parapet of 9 Indian Air Force Stations and Installations as given in Annexure 'A' to the notification.
2. The petitioners aver that the Officers of the Air Force Station, Chimney Hills, visited their houses on 10th and 11th of July 2014 indicating that their houses will be demolished and a complaint in this regard has been lodged with the jurisdictional police. It appears that the residents of the said locality also lodged a counter-complaint against the respondent-Officials. It is stated in the petition that during the talks held between the residents of the area and the respondent-authorities, it was given to understand that a notification has been published in this regard, restraining the owners of the lands from putting up any construction. The petitioners were also informed that another notification dated 20.08.2010 under Section 3(2) of the Act 1903, also published on 04.09.2010. The petitioners are, therefore, before this Court seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari by quashing the impugned notifications dated 13.01.2010 and 20.08.2010.
3. Sri Venkatesh P.Dalwai, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the matter in fact, stands covered by a 10 decision of this Court, wherein at an earlier instance, similar notification was issued by the respondents in the year 2007. To be specific, a notification dated 03.03.2007 was published in the Central gazette placing similar restrictions on the user of the lands around the Air Force Station and installations at Chimney Hills. When the said notification was questioned before this Court in W.P.No.5444/2009, the respondents seem to have admitted that the validity of the notification was for a period of 18 months and the said period had expired. This Court proceeded to hold that after the expiry of 18 months, the land owners could proceed with the construction and there was no necessity to obtain 'No objection certificate' from the respondents. The respondents took up the matter in appeal when the Division Bench, in W.A.No.4442/2009, upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge and disposed of the appeal granting liberty to the appellants therein to proceed in accordance with law, if they are to exercise their right regarding security of the installation after providing an opportunity to the parties concerned, while invoking the provisions contained in the Act.
11
4. Learned counsel submits that pursuant to this Court holding that the notification issued by the respondents had lapsed, the respondents have again issued the impugned notification dated 13.01.2010. The learned counsel further submits that the respondents complied with the provisions of Section 3(2) of Act 1903, by getting a notification published through the Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, Bangalore District, in the Karnataka State Gazette, on 04.09.2010. The notification is dated 20.08.2010. The learned Counsel submits that after the notification under Section 3(2) of Act 1903 was published by the respondents, nothing has happened in this regard and no notification as contemplated under Section 9 of the Act 1903, was issued or published by the respondents. Therefore, the learned Counsel submits that the respondents have once again committed the same mistake as was committed earlier and inspite of being pointed out by this Court that unless there is compliance of Section 9 of Act 1903, inasmuch as, causing issuance of notification through the Deputy Commissioner, issuance of a public notice at convenient places, stating the effect of the said declaration and calling for claims of 12 compensation, within a period of 18 months as provided under Section 9(1)(a) of the Act 1903, the impugned notifications issued under Sections 3 and 3(2) of the Act 1903 stand lapsed by efflux of time.
5. The learned Counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments:
(i) Mackinnon Mackenzie and Company Limited Vs. Mackinnon Employees Union :
(2015) 4 SCC 544, wherein it is held that if a statutory provision prescribes a particular procedure to be followed by the authority to do an act, it should be done in that particular manner only. If such procedure is not followed in the prescribed manner as provided under the statutory provision, then such act of the authority is held to be null and void ab initio in law.
(ii) K.T.Plantation Private Limited and
Another Vs. State of Karnataka : (2011) 9 SCC,
Whether Article 300-A of the Constitution is
construed as providing for deprivation of property without any compensation at all, or illusory compensation, and hence providing for expropriation and confiscation of property, whether the said article 13 would violate the rule of law and would be arbitrary and unconscionable violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, thus violating the basic structure of the Constitution?
6. The learned Counsel would further point out that the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in K.T.Plantation case (supra) had held that in Article 300-A the right to claim compensation can be inferred. It is further stated that Article 300-A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be reasonable. It must comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive.
7. In the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, it was submitted that the respondents are bound to follow the procedure laid down in Act 1903 and by issuing a notification under Sections 3 and 3(2) of Act 1903, the respondents cannot place restrictions on the user of the land for 14 eternity. While submitting that the Division Bench of this Court had already held that such notification which do not follow the procedure prescribed under Act 1903, is bound to fail and therefore, the impugned notification should also meet the same fate as the earlier notification that was issued by the respondents.
8. Sri Pradeep Singh, learned CGC appearing for the respondents submits that the facts of the case as was obtained in the earlier writ petition and writ appeal is not the same as the case on hand. It was vehemently submitted that in the earlier case, a notification under Section 3(2) of Act 1903 was not issued and therefore the earlier notification failed. It is pointed out that in the present case, a notification under Section 3(2) of Act 1903 has been issued and therefore the judgment in the earlier case does not hold good in the present situation. The learned CGC would further place heavy reliance on a judgment of a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Travels Star Hotels (India) Limited Vs. Union of India reported in 2009 SCC Online P & H 6164.
15
9. The learned CGC submits that the decision in Travels Star Hotels case (supra) is very similar to the one on hand. In that case too, notifications under Sections 3 and 3(2) of Act 1903 were issued, while notification under Section 9 of Act 1903, was not issued.
10. Under similar circumstances, a prayer was made in the petition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court, where notification dated 31.01.1983 was issued under Section 3 of the Act 1903, the Central Government imposed restrictions under Section 7(b) of the Act on use and enjoyment of the land and buildings within the distance of 1000 yards from the crest of outer perimetre ammunition Sub-Depot (17 Fad) Baddowal in the State of Punjab. On 29.05.1999, a notice was issued to the petitioners therein to remove the structures constructed within 1000 yards. A writ petition was filed following the notice, which came to be allowed directing the respondents to afford opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and thereafter to pass necessary orders. Thereafter, the Collector heard the affected parties and passed an order directing demolition of the buildings. 16 Once again, the affected parties approached the Division Bench in CWP No.8707/1999.
11. The learned CGC submits that the question raised before the Division Bench was whether notification dated 31.01.1983 had lapsed or is otherwise liable to be quashed? and whether the order of the Collector rejecting objections to demolition was liable to be interfered with?
12. The learned CGC further submits that while adverting to the relevant provisions i.e., Section 3 and Section 9 of the Act 1903, the Division Bench has clearly held that there is no indication in Section 9 of the Act that if before the period stipulated therein, public notice is not given, notification under Section 3 read with section 7 will lapse. The Division Bench further held that there is no warrant for inferring such a consequence.
13. The learned CGC further points out from the decision of the Division Bench of this Court which dealt with the earlier notification, had considered the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Travels Star Hotels (supra) and it was submitted that the Division Bench was in agreement 17 with the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and therefore, the fact situation in this case is similar to the fact situation obtained in the Travel Star Hotels case and not the earlier proceedings which ensued before this Court.
14. The learned Counsel places reliance on another unreported judgment of a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Bakshish Singh And Others Vs. Union of India And Others in Civil W.P.No.23259/2011, decided on 30.07.2013. It is submitted that the Division Bench in similar situation followed the decision in Travel Star Hotels case (supra). It was also pointed out that the Division Bench has taken note of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.T.Plantation (supra), while adverting to the requirement of compliance of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. It was pointed out that in the case of Bakshish Singh also, no notification under Section 9 was issued, while the Division Bench held that non-issuance of notification under Section 9 by itself will not render the notification issued under Section 3 non-est or lapsed.
18
15. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the Division Bench proceeded to issue directions to the respondents to take steps to make an award, while following the procedure as prescribed under Act, 1903. It was therefore submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, that as an alternative, he would invite this Court to direct the respondents to take steps to make an award by following the procedure as prescribed under Act, 1903. It was submitted that in the case of Bakhshish Singh, the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court had directed the respondents to make an award within a period of four months from the date of receiving certified copy of the order and therefore similar directions could be issued in this matter also.
16. Having heard the learned counsels, the questions that arise for consideration are; "whether the impugned notifications should be held to be lapsed or whether it could be held that non- issuance of notification under Section 9 of the Act 1903, could be considered as a curable defect?".
19
17. Much reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Division Benches of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Travels Star Hotels and Bakhshish Singh. No doubt the fact situation in the two decisions of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana were that notification under Section 3 was published in the Central Gazette and no notification was issued under Section 9 of the Act, 1903. Whereas, in the case on hand, in the earlier round of litigation when the respondents had issued notification under Section 3 of Act, 1903 and when the matter came up before this Court, it was admitted by the respondents that validity of the notification is only for a period of 18 months and if the time is not extended, the notification stands lapsed. When the matter was taken up in appeal, the Division Bench has specifically held that notification under Section 9 of the Act having not been issued within the period prescribed under Section 9(1)(a), the notification issued under Section 3 stands lapsed. What is to be noted is that the Division Bench had taken notice of the decision rendered by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana in the case of Travels Star Hotels (supra) and proceeded to hold that the notification issued under Section 20 3 had lapsed. This Court is therefore of the opinion that the impugned notifications in these writ petitions should also meet with the same fate.
18. If the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents is to be accepted, that inspite of non- issuance of notification under Section 9, the notification issued under Section 3 and 3(2) do not lapse, such an interpretation would reader the provisions under Section 9(1)(a) & (b) nugatory and otiose.
19. It is well settled principle of law that an attempt should be made to give effect to each and every word employed in a statute and such interpretation which would render a particular provision redundant or otiose should be avoided. This rule of interpretation is found in any number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, including the decision in High Court of Gujarat and another /vs./ Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and another, reported in (2003) 4 SCC
712. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that if such an interpretation is given, then the period fixed under Section 9(1)(a)&(b) would have no relavence and the restriction imposed 21 on the land owners will continue to operate for an indefinite period and such a situation is frowed upon under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.
20. In the case of K.T.Plantation (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that Article 300-A would be equally violated if the provisions of law authorising deprivation of property have not been complied with. It was also held that Article 300A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be reasonable. Which means, it should comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive. These pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court fortifies the opinion of this Court that no authority can be allowed to impose restrictions on the owner of the land for its beneficial use, except by strictly following the procedure laid down in the law that provides for imposition of such restriction. As stated earlier, if the limitation imposed under Section 9(1)(a)&(b) is not followed, 22 it would leave the land owner under the mercy of the authorities, who issue a notification placing restriction on the user of the land and do not take steps to issue further notification as provided under Section 9.
21. Moreover, the statement of objects and reasons of Act, 1903 exemplifies the intent of the Legislature. It is stated therein that having studied the principles adopted in France and the English statutes, Act, 1903 strives to provide a safe cover to strategic defence installations, subject, however to the important concession that the period within which all Acts in pursuance of such rights must be completed within a period of six months to three years. The last sentence assumes greater importance when it says, "......as the sites of works of defence must ordinarily be acquired in conformity with that enactment, the imposition of restrictions upon adjoining property should be subject to equally stringent safeguards in the interests of land owners." Their Lordships, in the case of Reserve Bank of India Vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424 held that:
23
"33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the basis of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place."24
22. Bearing in mind the textual interpretation and the context, the sentences extracted above from the statement of objects and reasons of Act, 1903, leaves no doubt in the mind of this Court that the procedures laid down under Sections 3 and 9 require strict interpretation. The time prescribed under Section 9(1)(a)(b) are to be strictly adhered to. Failure, would therefore render the notifications issued under Section 3 void ab initio.
23. The other alternative submission that was made by the learned counsel for the respondents that direction could be issued to the respondents to proceed and make an award within a prescribed period, also runs counter to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the case of Jayamma and Others /vs./ Deputy Commissioner, Hassan District, Hassan and Others reported in (2013) 7 SCC 554, their Lordships have held, that as to whether to acquire a particular property or not is for the Government to decide. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Court to compel the Government to acquire any property. It was further held that no doubt, the High Court exercises judicial review of administrative action or inaction. But having 25 regard to the various facts and circumstances or factors, it is for the Government to consider at the permissible stage as to whether a particular property is to be acquired or whether an award is to be passed pursuant to proceedings already initiated. The Act is a complete code as far as such decisions are concerned and the Government is well within its jurisdiction to act as per the scheme provided under the Act. Merely because proceedings under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act has been initiated, it is not required under law to acquire the land. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Court to compel the Government to pass an award pursuant to notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, even when it is followed by a declaration. Therefore the invitation given by the learned counsel for the respondents that similar directions could be issued to the respondents to pass an award, is clearly not acceptable while holding that it is not within the jurisdiction of this Court.
24. The learned counsel for the respondents would place reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India and another /vs./ Yadav 26 Engineer & Contractor reported in (1982) 2 SCC 499, and Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar /vs./ Ratilal Motilal Patel and others reported in AIR 1968 SC 372 to submit that this Court is bound by the decision of the Division Bench, even if it is of another High Court and therefore persuades this Court to follow the decision of the Division Benches of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Travels Star Hotels and Bakhshish Singh. This Court is aware that a decision of the Division Bench of the same High Court is a binding precedent over a single judge of this Court. A reading of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, makes it clear that if a single judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Jude, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench, or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. 27
25. As stated earlier, this Court is bound by a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court and in the Division Bench decision involving notifications issued by the very same respondents on an earlier occasion, in W.A.No.4442/2009 the Division Bench of this Court has clearly held that when notification under Section 9 of the Act is not issued within the period prescribed under Section 9(a), the notification issued under Section 3 would stand lapsed. Therefore, this Court would only follow the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court, where, under similar circumstances, the notification issued by this very respondents has been quashed and set aside.
26. Answering the question raised, this Court holds that the impugned notifications have lapsed due to efflux of time and it is not a curable defect. On facts, it is also to be noticed that the respondents herein are before this Court for the second time under similar circumstances. The earlier notification that was issued under Section 3 of the Act was quashed and set aside. The respondents have not learnt from the past lessons and inspite of the previous notifications having been quashed, the 28 respondents have proceeded in the same manner as was done on the previous occasion, except that the notification was got published through the Deputy Commissioner, in the State Gazette under Section 3 (2) of the Act. The matter can also be viewed from another angle. The lenience shown by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana, keeping in mind the sensitiveness of the military installations of the respondents, and directing the respondents to proceed to make an award, in a sense, was already given to the respondents herein, although by quashing of the previous notification.
27. The respondents are well aware that after issuance of the notification under Section 3, being published in the gazette under Section 3(2) of the Act, within a period of 18 months or within the extended period of three years as provided under Section 9(1)(a)&(b) of the Act, the respondents should have published the notification under Section 9(1) calling upon the landlords, whose interest in such lands are affected, to make claims for seeking compensation. Inspite of suffering adverse orders at the hands of this Court and the Division Bench, the 29 respondents are oblivious of the provisions of the Act. Viewed from any angle, the contentions raised by the respondents cannot be accepted.
28. For the reasons stated above, the petitions deserve to be allowed. The petitions are accordingly allowed and the impugned notifications dated 13.1.2010, in so far as the item No.47 is concerned and notification dated 20.08.2010 are declared to have lapsed. No order as to costs.
SD/-
JUDGE JT/KLY