Jharkhand High Court
S K Verma vs State Of Jharkhand And Ors on 19 June, 2017
Author: D.N. Patel
Bench: B.B. Mangalmurti, D.N. Patel
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A No. 507 of 2015
S.K. Verma ... ... Appellant/Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand
2. Secretary, Department of Land Revenue and Reforms, State of
Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi
3. Industrial Area Development Authority at Adityapur having its office
at Adityapur Industrial Area, P.O. & P.S.- Adityapur, Industrial Area,
District: Seraikella Kharswan
4. Secretary, Industries Department, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. &
P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi
5. Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa,
District- Ranchi
6. Tarani Saw, son of Late Shyamlal Saw
6/1. Jugal Kishore Burman, Son of Late Surendra Prasad, Son of Late
Tarani Saw
6/2. Pawan Kumar Burman, Son of Late Surendra Prasad, Son of Late
Tarani Saw
6/3. Laxman Prasad Burman, Son of Late Tarani Saw
6/4. Rajeshwar Prasad Burman, Son of Late Tarani Saw, All residents of
Adityapur, Basti, Main Road, P.O. & P.S. Gamharia, District
Kharsawan, Seraikella
7. Bhim Prasad, Son of Late Dharni Prasad
8. Pitamber Saw, Son of Late Chintamani Saw
9. Sidam Saw, Son of Late Chintamani Saw
10. Ban Bihari Prasad, son of Late Chintamani Saw
10/1. Lakhendra Prasad
10/2 Jagannath Prasad
10/3. Dinesh Kumar
10/4. Mukesh Kumar Prasad,
All Sons of Late Banbihari Prasad and all residents of 126, Shri
Punjab Chowk, P.O. & P.S. Gamharia, Adityapur, District Kharsawan,
Seraikella
11. Shambhu Prasad, Son of Late Mihir Saw
12. Pradip Prasad, Son of Late Mihir Saw
13. Kedar Nath Saw, Son of Late Jagdish Saw
13(a) Sanjay Saw
13(b) Sunil Verma
13(c) Sudhir Kumar Verma,
All Sons of Late Kedar Nath Saw, 126, Sri Punjab Chowk, P.O.-
Gamahria, Dist. Seraikella, Kharsawan
13(d) Lakmi Saw, D/o Late Kedar Nath Saw, B.K. Z. Pur Colony, P.O.-
Deuli, P.S.- Chanda, Mayurbhanj, Orissa.
14. Anil Kumar, Son of Late Lakshmi Narain Saw
15. Sunil Prasad, Son of Late Lakshmi Narain Saw
16. Prem Chand Prasad, Son of Late Jagdish Saw
17. Ranjit Verma, Son of Late Bhakti Bhushan Saw
18. Nilambar Verma, Son of Late Bhakti Bhushan Saw
19. Dinesh Kumar Verma, Son of Late Bhakti Bhushan Saw
20. Kashi Nath Prasad, Son of Late Jyotindra Prasad Saw
21. Krishna Prasad Son of Late Jyotindra Prasad Saw
22. Shiv Kumar Verma, Son of Late Rasmoy Saw
23. Ashok Kumar Verma, Son of Late Hari Prasad Saw
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24. Sanjay Kumar Verma, Son of Late Hari Prasad Saw
25. Ajay Kumar Verma, Son of Late Hari Prasad Saw
26. Awam Prasad Saw, Son of Late Raj Kishore Saw
27. Anand Prasad, Son of Late Raj Kishore Saw
28. Uma Prasad Verma, Son of Late Raj Kishore Saw
29. Binod Kumar, Son of Late Raj Kishore Saw Serial No. 6 to 29 all
residents of Krishnapuri, P.O.-R.I.T., P.S.- R.I.T., District- Seraikella-
Kharswan
... ... Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.B. MANGALMURTI
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For the Appellant : Mr. Satish Bakshi, Advocate
Mr. T. Kabiraj, Advocate
For the State : Mr. V.K. Prasad, Advocate
For the Resp. nos. (6 to 29) : Mr. S.K. Ughal, A.A.G.
For the AIDA : Mr. A.K. Singh, Advocate
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Order No. 15 : Dated 19th June, 2017
1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner who preferred writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5029 of 2013, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 3rd August, 2015, whereby, the prayer for returning the land, which was already acquired in the year 1963-64, was denied by the learned Single Judge and, hence, to get the land back, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred.
2. Arguments on behalf of the appellant:
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioner submitted that initially the land was acquired for industrial growth in the erstwhile State of Bihar and now it is situated in the State of Jharkhand. The land is situated nearby the city of Jamshedpur. The said area is known as Adityapur Industrial Area in the district of Seraikela-Kharsawan. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the acquired land has been partly utilised for industrial growth and hence, it was prayed to the State Government to release the land which is not utilised and to return it to the original owners. Writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 515 of 2009 was instituted by the owners of the land and the said writ petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 11 th January, 2012 (Annexure-4 to the Memo of this L.P.A.). By virtue of this Judgment, the land acquired and not utilised should have been returned to the original owners by the Government or by the Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority (hereinafter to be referred to as AIADA, for the 3 sake of brevity). It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner and proforma respondents, who are respondent nos. 6 to 29, that it was agreed by the Government to return the land which has been observed in the Annexure-4 to the Memo of this L.P.A. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order and hence, it deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner that as per Annexure-3 to the Memo of this L.P.A., the State Government and the AIADA ought to have returned the land to the original owners or to their legal heirs because of the policy decision taken by the Government and also looking to Annexures-1 & 2.
It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner that the compensation which has been deposited in the Government Treasury is not the payment towards the compensation at all and hence, land acquisition proceeding has continued as per the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and Another Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Others reported in (2014) 3 SCC 183. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner that as per Annexure-6 to the Memo of this L.P.A., an order was passed by the respondent-State authorities upon the representation preferred by this appellant/petitioner in pursuance of order dated 3rd April, 2012 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1299 of 2012 (Annexure-5 to the Memo of this L.P.A.). The aforesaid aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge. Out of several acres of land a good number of acres of land have not been utilised by the AIADA. This appellant/petitioner and the proforma respondent nos. 6 to 29 are concerned with the land, admeasuring to approximately 20.05 acres of land. Even looking to Annexure-6, it appears that, land admeasuring to approximately 0.99 acres, there are residence of this appellant/petitioner and the proforma respondent nos. 6 to 29. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge. Even under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the land can be returned to the original landlord and hence, the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 5029 of 2013 dated 3 rd August, 2015 deserves to be quashed and set aside.
43. Arguments on behalf of the respondent- State Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State submitted that the land was acquired much earlier i.e. several decades ago in the year 1963-64 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by following the proper procedure as established by law. The land is vested upon publication of notification under section 4, and after giving adequate opportunity of hearing of objections under section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Once the notification under section 6 of the Act, 1894 is published, conclusive evidence is that the land is needed for the public purposes. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent-State that after following the procedure of section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the land is absolutely under the Government, free from all encumbrances, and, therefore, the Government is entitled to take possession from the original landlords, even though they are residents of the same. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent-State that once the land is acquired, the said land vests in the Government and it depends upon the Government that the land acquired should be released or not and the Court should be extremely slow in interfering with all such types of diversion of the land to the landlords. Once the land has been acquired by the Government and after some decades the same is asked to be returned, it will upset every development. Perhaps that is not a purpose of enactment of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Once an ownership is transferred from the original owner, only original owner, who has now acquired the land, can divest the land and there is no legitimate right vested with the original owner to get the land back. There is nothing under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 that even after the vesting of the land in the Government, still few rights vests in the original landlord. Ownership is nothing but bundle of the rights, which includes the right of utilisation, right to take possession, right to give gift, right to give the land on lease, right to sell etc. Once an ownership of the land is transferred from "Mr. A" to "Mr. B". Then only "Mr. B" can utilise the ownership. There is no legitimate right vested in the original owner to get the land back. These aspects of the matter have now been settled by a catena of the decisions and the counsel for the State Government has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Syed Akbar reported in (2005) 1 SCC 558 and other decisions. These aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the W.P.(C) No. 5029 of 5 2013 vide judgment and order dated 3 rd August, 2015. Hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court.
4. Argument on behalf of the respondent-AIADA Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.3, AIADA supported the arguments canvased by the learned counsel for the State and further submitted that the land was acquired in the year, 1963-64 under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and has also referred to the Annexure- 6 to the Memo of this L.P.A. On the representation of the petitioner the respondent-State Authorities ordered that the said land has also been partly utilised for the development of industrial growth now it cannot be given back to the original owners- "Rome was not built in a day". Development is bound to take sometime, particularly, the land which was acquired for the industrial growth cannot be utilised over-night. Industrial growth cannot take place in 25 or 50 years. Sometimes, it may take even more than that time, which does not mean that the land acquired for the public purposes should always be returned to the original owners. Industrial growth is a slow phenomena in every country, but, that does not mean that AIADA can be compelled to return the land to the original owners and that too by using writ of mandamus. It is further submitted by the counsel for respondent no.3 that now the ownership is vested in the AIADA by virtue of various notifications of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and more particularly under section 16 of the same. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the AIADA that more than 600 industrial units have installed their factories. Such a huge industrial growth has taken place nearby the vicinity of Jamshedpur in the State of Jharkhand. It may happen that a part of the land has been utilised for the ancillary development like development of ponds, roads, schools and playgrounds etc. Such utilisation is also for the public purposes. Thus, AIADA has not wasted the land, whereas, the development of the AIADA is in a phase-wise manner. The whole land cannot be utilised at a time. Some portion of land is still awaiting the allotment to the industrial units, that does not mean that the same should be returned to the original owners. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent also relied upon the several decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of:-
a. Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State Maharashtra, (1996) 6 SCC 405, 6 b. State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, (1997) 5 SCC 432, c. Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558, d. Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport, (2010) 8 SCC 467 e. V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer, (2012) 12 SCC 133
5. Reasons:-
Having heard learned counsel for both the parties and looking to the facts of the case, we see no reason to entertain the present Letters Patent Appeal for the following facts and reasons:-
I. The land, in question, is situated at Mauza- Asangi, Thana no. 131, Mauza-Krishnapur, Thana no.132 situated in the district of Seraikella-Kharsawan, nearby the city of Jamshedpur, which is popularly known as AIADA. These lands alongwith other lands were acquired in the year 1963-64 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The land acquisition proceedings have also been completed much earlier.
II. The total land acquired is approximately 183.49 acres, in which industrial growth is going on in a phase wise manner. At present approximately 600 industrial units have been established in the entire AIADA. Thus, the grant of land to the industrial units is a continuous phenomena. It all depends upon the applications and presentations of the manufacturing process etc. and, thereafter, allotment is made by AIADA.
III. It ought to be kept in mind that whenever any land is acquired for industrial growth, the total land cannot be utilised at a time. On the contrary, it ought to be utilised in a phase-wise manner, so that there may be a proper industrial growth keeping in mind the need of the society, the need of the State, the capacity of the industrial units and keeping in mind the development of science and also the fact that the Rome was not built in a day. The whole 183.49 acres of land cannot be utilised in over night by the AIADA and merely because part of such land is not utilised, that can never be a ground to return the land to the original owners. There are proposal for settlement of new industrial units and there shall be allotment to more 7 industrial units in such area. At a time several applications are pending before the committee of AIADA for scrutiny etc. which also takes time.
IV. It appears that desperate original owners preferred initially W.P.(C) No. 515 of 2009 which was decided by this Court vide order dated 11th January, 2012 (Annexure-4) whereby some observations have been made by the learned Single Judge that land can be returned to the original owners, but, it does not mean that the land ought to be returned to the original owners. Looking to section 48 of the Act, 1894 a land can be returned, but, not on the ground that the AIADA has not utilised the land for industrial growth, because, industrial growth is a slow phenomena- It is not like a cooking of food which can be over within 3 or 4 hours. No period can be fixed for industrial growth. Some time it takes half a century also or even more than that. Therefore, even though there are few observations made by the learned Single Judge while passing an order dated 11th January, 2012 in W.P.(C) No. 515 of 2009 that does not mean that unutilised land should be returned to the original owners.
V. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon Annexures 1 & 2 to the Memo of this L.P.A. to the effect that even the Government has also taken some policy decisions to return the land. Be that as it may, the land is acquired in the year 1963-64 for the public purpose and for establishment of industrial units. The acquired land has been partly utilised and now more than 600 industrial units are working at the said place nearby the city of Jamshedpur. The land is now vested in the AIADA (respondent no. 3) and that too, free from all encumbrances. As per section 16 of the Act, 1894, AIADA has not taken any policy decision to return the land to this petitioner. If such types of prayer is allowed to return the land to the original owners because partly it is not utilised, it will lead to chaotic situation. The representation, which was permitted to be preferred by the appellant/petitioner before the respondent-authorities vide order dated 3 rd April, 2012 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1299 of 2012, has also been rejected at Annexure -6 dated 17th April, 2013. Being aggrieved by this order W.P.(C) No. 5029 of 2013 was preferred, which was also rejected by the learned Single judge vide order dated 3 rd 8 August, 2015 against which the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed.
VI. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation & Another Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Others reported in (2014) 3 SCC 183 in paragraph nos. 19 and 20 are as under:-
19. Now, this is admitted position that award was made on 31.01.2008. Notices were issued to the landowners to receive the compensation and since they did not receive the compensation, the amount (Rs. 27 crores) was deposited in the Government treasury. Can it be said that deposit of the amount of compensation in the Government treasury is equivalent to the amount of compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested? We do not think so. In a comparatively recent decision, this Court in Agnelo Santimano Fernandes, relying upon the earlier decision in Prem Nath Kapur, has held that the deposit of the amount of the compensation in the State's revenue account is of no avail and the liability of the State to pay interest subsists till the amount has not been deposited in Court.
20. From the above, it is clear that the award pertaining to the subject land has been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer more than five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It is also admitted position that compensation so awarded has neither been paid to the landowners/persons interested nor deposited in the Court.
The deposit of compensation amount in the Government treasury is of no avail and cannot be held to be equivalent to compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the subject land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
(Emphasis Supplied)
6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, we see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single judge, while deciding W.P.(C) No. 5029 of 2013 vide order dated 3rd August, 2015. No error has been committed by the learned Single judge in deciding the said writ petition.
7. In view of the aforesaid decisions and looking to the peculiar facts of the present case it appears that the land acquisition process was initiated in the year 1963-64, the land has been utilised by the AIADA and several industrial units have been established upon the said land. These facts make the present case different from the facts of the case upon which the reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner. Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent 9 Appeal and the same is, hereby, dismissed. The Judgment and order dated 3rd August, 2013 delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 5029 of 2013 is, hereby, upheld.
(D.N. Patel, ACJ) (B.B. Mangalmurti, J) MM/RS