Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Shri Ranjeet Singh vs Deputy Commissioner Of Police on 16 May, 2014
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH: NEW DELHI OA No.1431/2013 Order reserved on: 13.02.2014 Order pronounced on: 16.05.2014 HONBLE MR. SUDHIR KUMAR, MEMBER (A) HONBLE MR. V. AJAY KUMAR, MEMBER (J) Shri Ranjeet Singh S/o Shri Mala Ram Godara R/o Village Narsipura, Post Chalkoi Tehsil Churu, District Churu Rajasthan-331304. -Applicant (By Advocate: Shri Rakesh Kumar) Versus 1. Deputy Commissioner of Police Office of the Deputy Commissioner of Police Recruitment Cell, New Police Lines Kingsway Camp, Delhi-110009. 2. Union of India Through Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs Department of Personnel & Training Lok Nayak Bhawan, New Delhi. 3. Government of the NCT Through Commissioner of Police Delhi Police Headquarters, 9th Floor, MOS Building I.P. Estate, New Delhi-110002. -Respondents (By Advocate: Shri N.K. Singh for Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat) O R D E R Per Mr. Sudhir Kumar, Member (A):
The applicant of this OA is aggrieved by the order passed by the respondents on 21.03.2013 cancelling his candidature for the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police. The applicant is a resident of District Churu in Rajasthan, and he had applied for the post of Constable (Exe.) Male in Delhi Police. He has submitted that he has pursued his educational qualifications from Vardhaman Mahaveer Open University, Kota, and has also cleared the Rajasthan Teachers Eligibility Test, and had also participated in Training Course organized by Rajasthan Scouts and Guides, from which he holds a certificate, all of which certificates he has produced as Annexures with his O.A.
2. The applicant responded to the advertisement taken out by the respondents in the year 2011 inviting applications for filling up 2622 vacancies for the post of Constable (Executive) Male in Delhi Police, for which he submitted his application. While he was pursuing his studies, one FIR No.56 of 2008 had been lodged against the applicant and his family members on 13.08.2008 by one of his relatives Shri Chet Ram under Sections 307, 447, 341, 323 and 143 of IPC, alleging that the applicants father and six other persons had attacked him and his wife on account of previous enmity, and the applicant has submitted that in order to cast the net wide, the names of the applicant and his brother were also wrongly added in the FIR, since the complainant of FIR was motivated by his desire for revenge against applicants father. Two charges were framed in that Criminal Case by the Trial Court, under Sections 447/341/323/325, and under Sections 148/149/307 of IPC, and the criminal trial was held, and six witnesses were examined by the prosecution, but since the prosecution witnesses did not support the version of the facts put forth by the prosecution in their depositions before the Trial Court, the applicant and his family members were acquitted for lack of evidence by the order of the Learned Trial Court Judge dated 26.11.2009. However, while filling up his application for employment in Delhi Police, the applicant had disclosed the fact of his involvement in the concerned FIR/ the criminal case.
3. The applicant was successful at the examination held on 06.05.2012, underwent a medical examination held on 04.07.2012, and was provisionally selected for the post applied for. The applicant also submitted his signed agreement and his surety bonds, binding the applicant to serve the Government for a period of 5 years on, 21.11.2012. However, in March 2013 he was served with a Show Cause Notice in regard to the criminal case, in which it was stated that the Screening Committee had taken a view that even though he was acquitted by the Trial Court, since he had been involved in a heinous crime, it was clear that he did not have respect for law, and, accordingly, he was asked to show cause as to why his candidature for the post applied for should not be cancelled.
4. The applicant filed his reply dated 20.03.2013, reiterating his above mentioned contention that he and his brother Krishan Kumar were wrongly named in the FIR, and that the matter was later amicably resolved between the parties, and the applicant, along with his family members, was acquitted after full fledged trial. He has also submitted that in respect of his good character and antecedents, he had submitted the character certificate dated 16.03.2013 issued by the Office of the Sarpanch of his village, and the character certificate issued by the Headmaster of a school, stating that he knows the applicant from birth, and his character and conduct are good, and also a Major Nama dated 17.03.2013, given by 52 respectable citizens of his village, stating that his character and conduct are excellent, and he has always been engaged diligently in his educational pursuits.
5. The applicant is aggrieved that the Screening Committee had failed to take into consideration his acquittal by the Trial Court dated 26.11.2011, and also his reply to the Show Cause Notice along with supportive certificates, and without any application of mind, merely repeating the contents of the Show Cause Notice itself, his candidature had been cancelled through the impugned order.
6. Re-wording his above contentions, the applicant has taken the following grounds for filing this OA :-
A) That there was no independent material available on record for the Screening Committee to arrive at the conclusion that he had propensity towards crime or mens rea towards women or was unfit for the police force.
B) That the Screening Committee had relied upon the prosecution story before the Learned Trial Court, when even the originators of the FIR, the complainants had not supported the case during the trial.
C) That the applicant had supplied independent material testifying to his good character and antecedents, which had been overlooked by the Screening Committee.
D) That the Screening Committee had failed to appreciate that applicant had been discharged from the offences under Sections 447/341/323/325 of IPC based upon compromise, and had been acquitted under sections 148/149/307 of IPC after trial on the ground of lack of evidence.
E) That since the complainant themselves had not supported the prosecution case during the trial, therefore, the acquittal granted by the Trial Court could not be said to be acquittal on technical grounds.
F) That the Screening Committee had overlooked that the name of the applicant was included in the FIR out of vendetta of the complainant against the applicants father, and not owing to the applicants involvement in the alleged offence.
G) That the Screening Committee had failed to give any rational justification for denial of selection to the applicant, who was otherwise found eligible, and was duly selected in the recruitment process, and when even the allegations against the applicant in the FIR could not have been termed as heinous.
H) That the Screening Committee had failed to appreciate that at the time of the alleged incident, the applicant was barely above 19 years of age, and he could not be labelled as a criminal unfit for public employment for the remaining major part of his life, and was eligible for condonation of youthful indiscretion based on compassion and spirit of reform.
I) That the Screening Committee had erred in taking the allegations in the FIR to be gospel truth, while the contents of the FIR, and Charge Sheet of the Police, were highly disproportionate to the incident, which had actually taken place.
J) That it was not competent for the Screening Committee to overreach the findings of Courts of criminal jurisdiction, and to render a finding on mens rea or guilt of the applicant, when he had already been acquitted at the criminal trial, against which acquittal no appeal had been filed before the higher forums, because of which the decision of the Screening Committee is arbitrary and whimsical, and the impugned order has been issued without application of mind, and without thoughtful consideration being given to the additional material adduced by the applicant in reply to the Show Cause Notice.
M) That the Screening Committee had overlooked the truthfulness of the applicant in having disclosed the fact regarding registration of the FIR, since the applicant was not harbouring any guilt regarding his alleged involvement in that incident, and that the Screening Committee did not pass a speaking order, and had failed to observe the principles of natural justice, to decide the case with a closed mind, and had rejected his candidature with a few cryptic sentences stated in a standardized format, while purporting to consider the case of the applicant.
7. The applicant had, therefore, sought for the following reliefs and interim reliefs:-
Reliefs:-
i) Issue a writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other writ order or direction quashing the Impugned Order dated 21st March 2013 of Respondent No.1.
ii) Issue writ order or direction to the Respondent No.1 for appointment of the Applicant as a Constable (Exe.) in the Delhi Police.
iii) Award costs of this Application against Respondent No.1 and in favour of the Applicant.
iv) Issue any other writ, direction or order as deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Interim Relief:-
i) Issue of a writ order or direction directing the Respondent No.1 to permit the Applicant to join the training of candidates selected in the recruitment of 2011 commencing from May 1, 2013.
ii) Issue any other writ, order or direction as deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.
8. The interim relief as prayed for by the applicant was effectively declined on 01.05.2013 itself, the date when notices were ordered to be issued in the O.A., because the applicants candidature had been cancelled prior to his joining service, and the training of the concerned Recruitment Batch 2011 was commencing from that date itself.
9. The respondents filed their counter reply on 30.08.2013, submitting that the Screening Committee had examined the case of the applicant keeping in view the nature of his involvement of the above said criminal case, gravity of the offence, the judgment of the learned Trial Court, and also the grounds of acquittal in the case, which was registered on the statement of one Shri Chet Ram, who was admitted for treatment at Govt. D.B. Hospital, Churu, soon after the incident. They had then described the incident, which had taken place, in which the applicant was stated to have resorted to use of lathies for beating the wife of the complainant Shri Chet Ram, and had inflicted injuries on the head and body of both the complainant and his wife. The respondents further submitted that when, on 13.11.2009, at the time of arguments on framing of charges, the complainant and his wife had sought permission of the learned Trial Court for compromising the matter with accused persons u/s 447/341/323/325 of IPC, the learned Trial Court had, after hearing both sides, allowed the compromise, and had discharged the accused in those sections, but had gone ahead to frame charges u/s 307/147/148/149 of IPC against all the accused persons, and had proceeded ahead with the trial of the Criminal Case on that second charge, in-spite of the compromise having been reached among the parties in respect of the first charge, which was accepted by the learned Trial Court.
10. Later, during the trial, since the complainant and his wife also turned hostile, the accused persons were acquitted u/s 307/148/149 of IPC due to lack of evidence, and the reason of the witnesses turning hostile was recorded to be the compromise arrived at by both the parties in respect of the first charge.
11. It was submitted that the Screening Committee had observed that the applicant was involved in a heinous crime of attempt to murder, with the intention to take revenge, along with his family members, and did not hesitate to attack a woman, which also reflects his mens-rea towards women, and had, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that the act of the applicant shows his criminal propensity towards indulging in heinous crime, and that he has no respect for law, and being of such a nature, that they did not recommend his case for appointment to the post of Constable (Executive). Even then, the Screening Committee had ordered for a Show Cause Notice to be issued, the response of the applicant to which was also considered by the Committee, but was not found justifiable, in view of the observations already recorded, leading to the cancellation of his candidature.
12. The respondents thereafter relied upon the ratio of the Honble Apex Courts judgment in Commissioner of Police and Anr. vs. Mehar Singh delivered on 02.07.2013 in Civil Appeal No.4842/2013, arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 38886 of 2012, with Civil Appeal No.4965 of 2013 arising out of SLP (Civil) No.4057 of 2013, in the case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. vs. Shani Kumar, to submit that the Honble Apex Court had held that it would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who were likely to erode its credibility do not enter the Police Force at all.
13. After giving para-wise replies of the submissions and grounds raised by the applicant, it was submitted that as per the policy framed vide Standing Order No.398/2010, such candidates, against whom Charge-Sheets had been filed in the Criminal Trial Courts, and charges fall in the category of serious offences of moral turpitude, though they may have been later acquitted, or acquitted by extending benefit of doubt, or on account of the witnesses having turned hostile, he/she is generally not considered suitable for Government service in Delhi Police. All other grounds and submissions were denied, and it was submitted that when with the intention to take revenge along with his family members the applicant had indulged in a crime, and did not hesitate to attack a woman, his propensity of indulging in crime was rightly adjudged by the Screening Committee, which had rightly decided to cancel the candidature. It was, therefore, prayed that the OA be dismissed with costs.
14. Learned counsel for the applicant filed a rejoinder on 27.09.2013, giving the entire history of the property dispute, which led to filing of the FIR No.56 of 2008 (supra), and submitted that the complainant Shri Chet Ram, and his wife Santosh Devi were got admitted in the Government Hospital, Churu, with the intention of registering an FIR full of exaggerations, and it was denied that the applicant had ever assaulted them, much less harboured the alleged intention to kill them. It was reiterated that the Screening Committee had failed to take into account the additional independent material submitted by the applicant along with his reply to the Show Cause Notice, and his excellent character and academic performance. It was submitted that the Screening Committee had erroneously come to the conclusion that he was involved in a heinous case. It was denied that the applicant has any criminal propensity, and has no respect for law, and it was also denied that he had ever attacked women. It was submitted that the Screening Committee decision is not sound, as the Committee had ignored the additional material available on record, and had drawn totally perverse conclusions based on FIR No.56 of 2008.
15. It was submitted that the applicant fulfills all the requirements enumerated in the Honble Apex Courts above cited verdict, namely, rectitude, integrity and discipline, and that there was no material available on record, which could have enabled the Screening Committee to arrive at a conclusion regarding the applicants criminal propensity, and not having respect towards women. Without having laid a challenge to the policy framed through Standing Order No.398/2010 of the respondents, the applicant had denied that the so called policy framed by Standing Order No.398/2010 of the respondents is constitutional and legal. It was submitted that the so-called mechanism of Screening Committee is a mere smokescreen, and the Screening Committee sits to decide on such cases with a closed mind. It was denied that the actions of the respondents are legal and justified, or that the applicant is not suitable for public service in any manner whatsoever. It was also denied that the observations of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police and Anr. vs. Mehar Singh (supra) relied upon by the respondents in any manner apply to his case, and it was, therefore, prayed that the OA be allowed.
16. During arguments, learned counsel for the applicant heavily relied upon the well known case of Commissioner of Police & Ors. vs. Sandeep Kumar (2011) 4 SCC 644, in which the Honble Apex Court had held that youthful indiscretion should be condoned. He had further relied upon Para-18 & 19 of the Honble Apex Court judgment in the case of Commissioner of Police and Anr. vs. Mehar Singh (supra), emphasizing that the Screening Committee will have to consider the nature and extent of such persons involvement in the crime, and his propensity of becoming a cause of worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In order to assail the final decision of the Screening Committee, the learned counsel for the applicant had further relied upon the Honble Apex Courts judgment in Commissioner of Police vs. Dhaval Singh AIR 1999 SC 2326, in which it was held that when the cancellation of the candidature was without any proper application of mind, and without taking into consideration all relevant material, the Tribunal had rightly set aside the order of cancellation of appointment.
17. Learned counsel for the applicant further relied upon the judgment of the Honble Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dilip Kumar Samadhiya vs. State of M.P. and Others in Writ Petition No.3875/2013 decided on 07.10.2013, in which it was held as follows:-
..Cases are not unknown where quarrel takes place between two persons and complainant registers report against the all family members and relatives of the other person. In such cases, many a times good sense prevails on the parties subsequently and they enter into a compromise. If as a thumb rule it is decided that all cases where acquittal of candidate is on Rajinama makes them disentitled for recruitment in police/Government job, it will be an extreme decision which will result into serious injustice to genuine and otherwise innocent candidates. ( Emphasis supplied )
18. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents heavily relied upon the case of Commissioner of Police and Anr. vs. Mehar Singh (supra), and also pointed out two judgments of the Honble Delhi High Court in WP (C) No.2265/2012 Deepak Kumar vs. Commissioner of Police & Anr dated 15.07.2013, and in WP (C) No.4444/2013 in Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. vs. Mahendra Singh, in both of which judgments the Honble Apex Courts judgment in Commissioner of Police and Anr. vs. Mehar Singh (supra) has been noticed and relied upon. In the first judgment in Deepak Kumar (supra), the Honble High Court of Delhi had cited its own earlier order dated 24.04.2013 in WP (C) No.4052/2012 Commissioner of Police vs. Mukesh Kumar, in which the following observations had been made by the Honble High Court, which had found favour even with the Honble Apex Court in Commissioner of Police and Anr. vs. Mehar Singh (supra):-
22. Where an acquittal is on the finding that a false complaint was lodged i.e. the best evidence led by the prosecution failed under the weight of admissions extracted during cross-examination of witnesses, whatsoever may be the offence alleged, it has to be held that the innocent accused cannot be made to suffer for the second time by denying him public employment merely because in the past a false complaint; proved to be false, was registered against him. But where the acquittal is on account of the high standard of proof required at a criminal trial or is based upon some critical facts not being proved or is the result of witnesses turning hostile, one has to be careful. Further facts have to be considered.
23. While considering the nature of acquittal, it would not be enough to simply observe that the witnesses had turned hostile and therefore W.P.(C) No.4052/2012 & Conn. Matters Page 12 of 26 it would be presumed that the accused had created a terror twice over; firstly when the offending act constituting the crime was committed and secondly when the witnesses were suborned. The judgment of the criminal court has to be taken into consideration with all the aspects leading to acquittal. The manner of acquittal and in particular whether it is on a benefit of doubt. Insofar as the nature of offence is concerned, the facts disclosed in the FIR supported with other material has to be considered. The gravity of the acts alleged the narration of the facts in the FIR and medical evidence has to be considered. Witnesses may not depose in tune with their statements made before the police and thus it would have to be looked into as to whether it was a case where the Investigation Officer did not seek full and complete version from the witness. It being settled law that while appreciating the deposition of witnesses, vis-`-vis their statements made before the police, on the issue of variation and improvements it has to be kept in mind that many a times a person informs facts which he thinks are relevant and ignores to tell facts which he thinks are irrelevant, but in law the relevance or irrelevance may be in converse and hence the duty of he who seeks information to elicit all relevant information.
(Emphasis supplied).
19. Finally, it was held by the Honble High Court in Deepak Kumar (supra) as follows:-
17. Tested on the unveil (sic anvil) of law as we understand it to be, as long as an administrative decision takes into account relevant circumstances and attracts itself to the correct legal principle the same cannot be questioned with respect to its merits warranting a re-appraisal of the facts and circumstances appraised by the decision maker. It is trite that it is a decision making process which has to suffer a judicial scrutiny and not the decision itself.
20. In the case of Mahendra Singh (supra), the Honble High Court has held in Paragraphs 17,18, 22 & 23 of its judgment as follows:-
17. .The Screening Committee has thus rightly opined that on the subject of character and antecedent verification there was enough material to justify denial of employment to the respondent as a Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police. The view taken by the Competent Authority to accept the report of the Screening Committee keeping in view the reply filed by the respondent was also justified.
18..After all, who would be suitable to serve in Delhi Police has to be left to the Competent Authority; of course, the Competent Authority cannot act arbitrarily and whimsically. As long as the Competent Authority takes note of all relevant facts and circumstances to form an opinion and as long as the opinion does not suffer from unreasonableness of the kind which is popularly known as 'Wednesbury?s? unreasonableness, a hands off approach has to be adopted 19 to 21.xxxxxxxxxxx(Not reproduced here).
22. It was sought to be urged that once a person is acquitted at a criminal trial no authority can sit in review over the decision of the criminal court which has attained finality.
23. The argument overlooks the point that the appraisal is not to sit in review over the decision taken by the criminal court which has attained finality. The appraisal is to determine the suitability of a candidate for a public post; and the two operate in distinct domains.
(Emphasis supplied).
21. We need not reproduce here the ratio of the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in Mehar Singh (supra), as that judgment is already well known.
22. One of the charges in which the applicant had his family members had been acquitted by the learned Trial Court was dropped on account of a compromise reached between the parties of the two sides concerned. Recently, this Tribunal had an occasion to examine the aspect and the ramifications of such a compromise leading to a dropping the charge as framed, or quashing of the F.I.R. itself by the Honble High Court, after taking cognizance of such a compromise. In OA No.3539/2012 Meer Singh vs. Commissioner of Police, decided on 25.02.2014, in which one of us [Mr. Sudhir Kumar, M(A)] was a party to the judgment, it was held as follows:-
34. Therefore, the law as settled by the Honble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police and Anr. vs. Mehar Singh with Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. vs. Shani Kumar (supra), as reproduced above, the Honble Apex Court has clearly laid down that while on the one hand compromises and settlements have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and amicable atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to disputes, and to reduce arrears of cases, but it was held that a Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of such a compromise if it appears to it to be dubious. That is not exactly the case here before us. We are confronted with a case in which such a compromise was taken note of by the Honble Delhi High Court, and the three connected FIRs were all quashed due to compromise. Therefore, the issue before us is as to whether the quashing of the FIR by the Honble Delhi High Court due to the compromise reached among the parties and then reported before it erases the factum of the incident itself or not, or that the respondents can still take note of the violent behaviour exhibited by the applicant for employment in Delhi Police. It is seen that in the instant case even the Honble High Court has, while dismissing the Writ Petition on the basis of compromise, noted that the quarrel which had taken place, including the applicant before us, had resulted in injuries to certain persons who were his neighbours. Since the FIR was quashed and the criminal case was not proceeded ahead, it could never have been proved that the applicant himself had inflicted any of those injuries or not, though in the pleadings before us, such a plea has not been taken even by the applicant, and his involvement in causing injuries to his neighbours family members on the day of the quarrel has also never been denied by the applicant. Even the Honble Apex Court has also, in para 26 of the judgment in Mehar Singh and Shani Kumar (supra) held that the Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to be dubious. In the instant case, the compromise arrived at has perhaps been considered to be dubious by the Screening Committee while considering the case of the applicant before us. Since that administrative decision was taken after taking into account relevant circumstances, and attracts itself to the correct legal principles, it is trite that it is the decision making process only which is subject to judicial scrutiny, and not the decision itself, and we have not been able to discern anything wrong with the decision making process adopted.
35. We, therefore, have to still examine as to whether, going beyond the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in Commissioner of Police vs. Mehar Singh (supra), the Screening Committee can be held to be authorized to take notice of the incident, which had actually undeniably taken place, involving the applicant, even though the Honble High Court had set aside the FIRs concerning the incident.
36. Section-154 of Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. PC, in short) 1973 deals with the subject of Information in respect of cognizable offences. In the case of Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, (1945) 47 BOMLR 245, it was held by the Privy Council that the functions of the judiciary and of the police are complementary, and not overlapping, and the Courts function begins when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. The law is set in motion in regard to the commitment of the cognizable offence when elementary information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is given to an officer incharge of a Police Station under Section 154 (1) of Cr.P.C., and the said officer reduces such information to writing by himself, or under his direction, and every such information, whether given in writing, or reduced to writing, has to be signed by the person giving such information, which had taken place in the case of both the counter FIRs No. 111/08 and 112/08 at Police Station Jaffarpur Kalan Delhi.
37. Section-154 of Cr.P.C. further provides that the substance of such information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence shall be entered into a book to be kept by such officer, or an official working under him, in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. Many State Governments have prescribed for this purpose what is called the Daily Diary, the Urdu/Hindustani/Hindi word for that is Roznamcha. This is the first event to point of time of the law being set in motion in respect to the commission of a cognizable offence. Some of the States have also prescribed a separate Complaints Register to be maintained in every Police Station, but as was held in Vijay Kumar Kaushal vs. State of H.P., 1986 (2) Crimes 672 (HP-DB), the law does not require or permit the maintenance of such a separate Complaints Register at a Police Station in which complaints of ambiguous nature could be entered.
38. But the Daily Diary or General Diary is a legally sanctioned document provided for under Section-154 of the Cr. PC itself. In fact in the case of Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. vs. Tapan Kumar Singh, AIR 2003 SC 4140 : (2003) 6 SCC 175 : (2003) 2 Crimes 300 : 2003 CrLJ 2322 (2326) SC, it was held by the Honble Apex Court that a General Diary entry can itself be treated as a First Information Report (FIR) in an appropriate case, where it discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
39 to 41.xxxxxxxxxxx(Not reproduced here).
42. .There is sufficient case law on the point as to what should be the ingredients of the FIR, which we need not refer to here. Suffice it to state that FIR is not intended to be a very detailed document, and it is meant to give only the substance of the allegations made, and it is not a chronicle of the exhaustive details of the even or the occurrence, nor is it a catalogue of everything, including minor particulars of the events which took place.
43. It is not as if the FIR once lodged becomes final, and cannot be retracted. It may so happen that realizing the falsity of the FIR, the complainant may retract his FIR, and it was held in Umakant Rao v. State of Karnataka 1991 (1) Crimes 688, 699 (Kant-DB) that after its retraction, an FIR cannot be used to gun down the accused. There is also provision for closing of FIRs, and, as was held in the case of Bachittar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1991 CrLJ 2619, 2627 (Del-DB), the mere fact that immediately preceding and succeeding FIRs were relating to theft cases, and those cases were closed as untraced, would not, in the absence of any material to show that they were falsely introduced, make any difference. Therefore, the law as settled by the Honble Delhi High Court was that every FIR would stand on its own legs, in spite of any preceding or succeeding FIRs being closed as untraced.
44. There is also sufficient case law as to what use FIR can be put to, and as to the submissions and confessions made in the FIR, against whom they can be used. There is also sufficient case law as to in what conditions, and with what restrictions, the Honble High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash FIRs, or to quash the Investigation under the FIR.
45. In the instant case before us the Honble High Court has, in view of the compromise reached between the parties concerned, quashed the three FIRs, which were in the nature of complaints and counter complaints by the two parties against each other. The effect of that order of the Honble High Court was that the legal proceedings in regard to the criminal prosecution of the accused of those cases came to an end, and the criminal trial could not have been pursued before the jurisdictional criminal Court. However, the quashing of the FIRs by the Honble High Court for the purpose of doing away with the process of criminal prosecution of the accused of those FIRs does not eliminate or whitewash or cancel in any manner the entries made in respect of the events which took place, and in regard to the commission of the cognizable offence, in the Daily Diary kept at the Police Station, or the Roznamcha as it is called.
46. The fact remains that offence against the societal norms and public order did take place, and were committed by certain persons, who were named in FIRs, but a compromise was reached between parties of both sides, in order to save their own skin from the prosecution launched by the counter parties, which sort of compromise has been encouraged by the Honble Apex Court also, as we have noted. However, since even after the FIRs had been quashed by the Honble High Court by its order dated 06.10.2010, the Police Station Daily Diary entries are still very much alive and available in regard to the assault on public order, and on the expected societal norms to be followed by law abiding citizens, the quashing of the FIRs under section 482 of Cr.P.C., by the Honble High Court in exercise of its inherent powers cannot prevent the Screening Committee from taking note of the actual events, which events did indeed take place, and records of which events, as recorded under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. in the Daily Diary/Roznamacha at the Police Station, are still available and exist, and would always exist, even after the quashing of the FIRs by the Honble Delhi High Court due to the compromise of mutual convenience reached between the parties. Therefore, it is held that the full force of the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the cases of Mehar Singh with Shani Kumar (supra) would apply in the instant case, and that the Screening Committee was fully within its rights to have considered the violent nature of the applicant before us, and to have considered him unfit to be a member of a disciplined police force like Delhi Police. Within two weeks of that judgment of the Honble Apex Court delivered on 02.07.2013, the Honble Delhi High Court also reiterated the same principle and ratio in the case in WP (C) 2265/2012 Deepak Kumar vs. Commissioner of Police and Anr. in its judgment pronounced on 15.07.2013, with equal vigour and clarity.
23. Further, in respect of the second charge framed against the accused in the concerned criminal case, which was not dropped, but in respect of which the trial was concluded, but the accused were let off due to the witnesses having turned hostile, the observations of the Honble Apex Court in Paragraphs 22 & 23 in the case of Commissioner of Police and Anr. vs. Mehar Singh (supra), already reproduced by us above, reiterated by the Honble Delhi High Court in Deepak Kumar vs. Commissioner of Police and Anr. (supra), and in Commissioner of Police vs. Mukesh Kumar (supra), as already cited above, would apply. In the process of its decision making, the Screening Committee must have taken into account the incidents as had been described in the FIR, which, under the law, as laid down in the above judgments, they were fully entitled to do, when trying to form an opinion about the character and mental make up of the applicant, in order to determine his suitability as a candidate for a public post, and to determine as to whether the applicant would be suitable to serve in Delhi Police. The applicant has nowhere denied the incident, which was recorded in the FIR having taken place. The police investigation into the incident of assault on the complainant and his wife had led to the filing of the Charge-Sheet, with two charges having been framed, judicial mind has been applied to those charges, and on the basis of the compromise between the parties, one of the charges was dropped, but criminal trial was continued in respect of the second charge.
24. The further fact which appear to have weighed with the Screening Committee was that the factum of the applicant having attacked a lady, with a Lathi blow on her, had been a part of the charge as was framed against him. If the Screening Committee has then opined that there was enough material to justify denial of employment to the applicant as a Constable in Delhi Police, after considering the gravity of the acts alleged, and the narration of facts in the FIR, and medical evidence of the complainant and his wife, it has to be left to the wisdom of the Screening Committee, which was the Competent Authority to decide as to who would be suitable to serve in Delhi Police. As was observed by the Honble Delhi High Court in Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. vs. Mahendra Singh (supra), as long as the Competent Authority, the Screening Committee, takes note of all relevant facts and circumstances to form an opinion, and as long as the opinion does not suffer from unreasonableness of the kind which is popularly known as the legal tests of Wednesburys unreasonableness, a hands off approach has to be adopted by the Courts and Tribunals in respect of such a reasonable conclusion.
25. Therefore, here also, it can be reiterated by this Bench also, that mere dropping of a charge by the learned Trial Court due to a compromise having been arrived at between the two parties concerned, cannot and does not prohibit the Screening Committee to look into that aspect of the criminal incident concerned, in respect of which no criminal trial was held, as a result of the compromise having been accepted by the learned Trial Court. And, the Committee was, obviously, fully empowered to look into the aspect as to how the prosecutions case had failed in respect of the second charge, due to the crucial witnesses, including the main complaint himself, turning to be a hostile witness.
26. Therefore, in respectful agreement with the law as laid down by the Honble Apex Court & Honble Delhi High Court, as cited above, it is held that the process adopted by the Screening Committee in the instant case was within the bounds of law, and the conclusion arrived at by the Screening Committee has to be given due weightage, and the O.A. is therefore rejected, but there shall be no order as to costs.
(V. Ajay Kumar) (Sudhir Kumar)
Member (J) Member (A)
cc.