Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Ashok Kumar Mod vs Judge Industrial Tribunal And on 28 February, 2017
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT
JAIPUR
S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 6209 / 2004
Ashok Kumar Mod, son of Shri Nand Lal Ji Mod, aged about 33
years, by caste-Mod, resident of Village- Kulamipura, P.O.
Dhamotar, Tehsil Pratap Garh, District Chhitor Garh. (Rajasthan).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The Judge, Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur
2. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Banswara, through
its Chief Manager.
----Respondents
_____________________________________________________
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Babu Lal Gupta with Mr. Ankul Gupta
For Respondent(s) : Mr. O.P. Sheoran
_____________________________________________________
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA
CAV JUDGMENT
28/02/2017
The petitioner has assailed the order dated 23.02.2001
passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Tribunal) on the ground that the Tribunal has
wrongly approved the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of
1947') submitted by the respondent-Corporation and upheld the
dismissal order passed by them dated 20.11.1993.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was holding the
post of Conductor with the RSRTC when a charge-sheet was
served upon him on 26.12.1990, wherein several allegations were
levelled against the petitioner of having allowed as many as 31
passengers to travel without ticket in the bus after having
collected the amount from them. A charge was also levelled
(2 of 6)
[CW-6209/2004]
against the petitioner that earlier also there were remarks against
him of having allowed 4 passenger, 14 passengers and 7
passengers without ticket on 20.11.1985, 27.05.1988 and
22.08.1988 respectively. The incident for which a charge of
allowing 31 passengers without ticket was framed, is of
07.11.1989.
3. The case set up by the petitioner in defence in the
departmental enquiry was that though the passengers boarded
the bus at one place called Jassakhera, the checking team also
boarded the bus at the same place and before the petitioner could
distribute tickets, his way bill and ticket book were snatched from
him by the checking team and they wrongfully mentioned that
checking was conducted at the subsequent place, namely Bheem.
In support of his averments, the petitioner produced one witness,
namely Kamal Ram Suthar before the Enquiry Officer, who stated
that he was travelling in the said bus and the incident as narrated
by the conductor was true. However, in the cross examination he
admitted that he does not have a copy of the ticket which he has
lost.
4. The Enquiry Officer taking into consideration all the
statements and also the statement of another passenger Champa
Lal, whose statement had been recorded earlier at the time of
checking and who mentioned about the conductor having taken
the money from 31 passengers and not delivering the ticket, held
the petitioner guilty of the charges.
5. Counsel for the petitioner has however submitted that
the procedure required under Section 33-(2)(b) of the Act of 1947
(3 of 6)
[CW-6209/2004]
was not followed inasmuch as the petitioner was not provided with
one month's salary along with a copy of the order of termination
and an application was not simultaneously submitted under
Section 33(2)(b) to the Industrial Tribunal where the general
dispute was pending. He has also relied upon the judgments
passed in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Prakash
Chand Jain, AIR 1969 SC 983, Lalla Ram Vs. D.C.M.
Chemical Works Ltd. And Another, (1978) 3 SCC 1, Bharat
Electronics Limited Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Karnataka,
Bangalore And Another, (1990) 2 SCC 314 and Ministry of
Finance & Anr. Vs. S.B. Ramesh, JT 1998(1) SC 319.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents
supporting the order passed by the Tribunal dated 23.02.2001, has contended that the order of termination dated 20.11.1993 clearly reflects that an amount of Rs.2285/- vide Demand Draft No.046426/043, dated 20.11.1993 as one month's salary was remitted along with the order. In addition, an amount of Rs.200/- was also added as precautionary measure so that there may not be any allegations of the amount being less than required.
7. Counsel for the respondents also points out that in the order dated 20.11.1993 itself, it has been mentioned that an application is being submitted separately along with complete documents relating to the departmental enquiry for approval before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, Jaipur, where general dispute is pending. A copy of the same has also been enclosed. Thus it is submitted that the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 were strictly complied with and the law laid down in (4 of 6) [CW-6209/2004] the judgments as referred by the petitioner has been complied with in view of the factual aspect that all the actions were taken simultaneously by the Corporation, as required under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the domestic enquiry conducted by them was approved by the Industrial Tribunal by a separate order before passing of the impugned judgment dated 23.02.2001. The said order by which the enquiry was approved and was found to be fair, as has been reflected in para 4 of the impugned judgment was not challenged by the petitioner. Thus after the enquiry having been found to be fair, the only requirement for the Industrial Tribunal while passing the judgment on 33(2)(b) application was to record its satisfaction of justification of passing of the order dated 20.11.1993.
9. It is further submitted that punishment awarded to the petitioner is not only for the delinquency of having allowed 31 passengers without ticket on 07.11.1989, but also on account of the petitioner having been punished even earlier for allowing passengers to travel without tickets. Thus he was in a habit of committing such kind of delinquency even prior to 07.11.1989 and considering all the circumstances, the punishment awarded could not have been, in any manner, said to be disproportionate.
10. Having considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that under the limited jurisdiction which this Court has under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Tribunal has examined each and every (5 of 6) [CW-6209/2004] aspect of the matter. It cannot be said, in view of the facts as pointed out by the Counsel for the respondents, that there has been any discrepancy in complying with the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947.
11. A look at the termination order clearly reflects that one D.D. of an amount of Rs.2285/- was enclosed. In the notes below the order, it has been mentioned that application is being submitted for approval to the Tribunal.
12. In view of the compliance having been made strictly, the submissions of the Counsel for the petitioner that there has been violation of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as per the judgments cited above, is factually not tenable. This Court respectfully agrees with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments, as cited hereinabove, which require strict compliance of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947.
13. As the enquiry was found to be fair by the Tribunal and such findings have not been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition, it is not available for the petitioner now to assail the merits of the departmental domestic enquiry. Even otherwise, this Court has looked into the proceedings conducted by the Enquiry Officer and is satisfied that the findings and conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer are in consonance with the evidence which was available before it. The Enquiry Officer has rightly not accepted the statement of the defence witness in view of the fact that he could not prove that he was travelling in the said bus on the fateful day, whereas signatures of Champa Lal have been found on the way bill as well as the statement recorded (6 of 6) [CW-6209/2004] during the inspection. In view of the judgment as cited before the Tribunal in State of Haryana Vs. Ratan Singh, 1982 I L.L.J. 46 SC, the degree of proof in domestic enquiry has to be on a different pedestal than the strict proof required in a Court of law. The preponderance of culpability of an employee is sufficient for bringing home the guilt in a domestic enquiry.
14. Keeping in view these principles, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the well reasoned order passed by the Tribunal.
15. Consequently, the writ petition being devoid of merit is dismissed.
(SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA)J. KKC/(Reserved)