Uttarakhand High Court
Prem Chand vs Life Insurance Corporation Of India And ... on 4 December, 2017
Author: U.C. Dhyani
Bench: U.C. Dhyani
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition No. 583 of 2014 (M/S)
Prem Chand ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 925 of 2014 (M/S)
S.K. Kohli ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 922 of 2014 (M/S)
Mohd. Rafi ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 923 of 2014 (M/S)
S.K. Kohli ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 924 of 2014 (M/S)
S.K. Kohli ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 934 of 2014 (M/S)
Gyan Chand ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 926 of 2014 (M/S)
Bhim Sain Virmani ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 936 of 2014 (M/S)
S.K. Kohli ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
2
with
Writ Petition No. 935 of 2014 (M/S)
S.K. Kohli ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 956 of 2014 (M/S)
Om Prakash Khanna ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 957 of 2014 (M/S)
Smt. Kalpana ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 954 of 2014 (M/S)
Sudhir Chandra Khanduri ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 959 of 2014 (M/S)
Prem Chand Gupta ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 960 of 2014 (M/S)
Smt. Shakuntala Devi Mehta ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 961 of 2014 (M/S)
Jagdish Chandra ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1008 of 2014 (M/S)
Balbir Singh ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
3
Writ Petition No. 1077 of 2014 (M/S)
Ashok Kohli ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1078 of 2014 (M/S)
Ashok Kohli ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1071 of 2014 (M/S)
Amarjeet Singh ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1074 of 2014 (M/S)
Amarjeet Singh ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1072 of 2014 (M/S)
Ramesh Kapoor ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1070 of 2014 (M/S)
Ved Prakash Sharma & another ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1084 of 2014 (M/S)
Umesh Chand Verma ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1101 of 2014 (M/S)
Smt. Santosh Gupta & others ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
4
Writ Petition No. 1100 of 2014 (M/S)
Smt. Santosh Gupta ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1109 of 2014 (M/S)
Irshad Hussain & others ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1128 of 2014 (M/S)
Mrs. Shashi Garg ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1161 of 2014 (M/S)
Kamal Khurana ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1162 of 2014 (M/S)
Surendra Singh ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1163 of 2014 (M/S)
Promila Bahuguna ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1164 of 2014 (M/S)
Surendra Singh ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1234 of 2014 (M/S)
Irshad Hussain & others ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
5
Writ Petition No. 1233 of 2014 (M/S)
Smt. Damyanti Sharma ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1231 of 2014 (M/S)
Madan Mohan Narang ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1239 of 2014 (M/S)
Smt. Bala Sharma ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1241 of 2014 (M/S)
Satpal Singh ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1240 of 2014 (M/S)
Mukesh Kumar Mongia & another ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1262 of 2014 (M/S)
Munesh Gupta ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1517 of 2014 (M/S)
Pitambar Dutt Bijalwan ....... Petitioner
Versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1292 of 2014 (M/S)
Anil Arora & others ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
6
Writ Petition No. 1368 of 2014 (M/S)
Ms. Aruna Pal ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1414 of 2014 (M/S)
Smt. Indira Passi ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1422 of 2014 (M/S)
Union of India & another ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1577 of 2014 (M/S)
Ved Prakash Jain ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1623 of 2014 (M/S)
M.M. Malhotra ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1706 of 2014 (M/S)
Surendra Singh ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1708 of 2014 (M/S)
Shekhar Tripathi ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1714 of 2014 (M/S)
Gajender Pal Singh ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
7
Writ Petition No. 1861 of 2014 (M/S)
Yogendar Nath Gossain ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1888 of 2014 (M/S)
Amarjeet Singh ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1889 of 2014 (M/S)
A.K. Aggarwal ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 1915 of 2014 (M/S)
C.B. Sharma ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2250 of 2014 (M/S)
Surendra Kumar Bhutani ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2249 of 2014 (M/S)
Vipin Khanna ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2269 of 2014 (M/S)
Asha Kohli ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2426 of 2014 (M/S)
Harish Chandra ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
8
Writ Petition No. 2427 of 2014 (M/S)
Smt. Sumitra Negi & others ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2458 of 2014 (M/S)
Mukesh Kumar Mongia ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2471 of 2014 (M/S)
Smt. Krishna Matta & others ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2470 of 2014 (M/S)
Dharma Devi ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2504 of 2014 (M/S)
Saroj Panwar & others ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2510 of 2014 (M/S)
R.L. Taneja ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2514 of 2014 (M/S)
Smt. Prabha Mehra & others ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2014 (M/S)
Ramesh Narula ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
with
9
Writ Petition No. 95 of 2015 (M/S)
Harish Chandra ....... Petitioner
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
and
Writ Petition No. 1826 of 2016 (M/S)
Raj Kumar Shukla & another ....... Petitioners
versus
Life Insurance Corporation of India & another ....... Respondents
Mr. Siddhartha Singh, Mr. Dharmendra Barthwal, Mr. Sudhir Kumar, Mr. Pooran
Singh Rawat, Mr. Piyush Garg, Mr. Vikas Bahuguna, Mr. Karan Anand,
Advocates for the petitioner(s).
Mr. Devesh Ghildiyal, Standing Counsel for petitioner-Union of India in WPMS
no. 1422 of 2014.
Mr. Siddhartha Bisht, Advocate for the respondent LIC.
U.C. Dhyani, J.(Oral)
Since the facts and law governing the field of aforementioned writ petitions are identical, therefore, they are being decided together by this common judgment and order for the sake of brevity and convenience.
2) Writ Petition no. 583 of 2014 (M/S) shall be the leading case.
3) Above noted writ petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing the order dated 07.11.2007, passed by the Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, in case no. D-10/2003, Life Insurance Corporation of India vs Prem Chand, whereby the petitioner was held to be unauthorized occupant and was directed to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the premises to the Life Insurance Corporation of India (for brevity here-in-after referred to as 'LIC') within 15 days from the date of publication of the order. The petitioner was also directed to pay LIC a sum of Rs.1,00,800/- as arrears of rent and damages accrued and pendentelite. The petitioner has also assailed the judgment and order dated 28.02.2014, passed by IV Addl.
10District Judge, Dehradun, in P.P. Appeal no. 127 of 2017, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed, affirming the order passed by the Estate Officer.
4) Briefly put, LIC in its notice dated 30.09.2002, under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, sent through registered post with A.D. as well as under the postal certificate, determined the tenancy of the petitioner, who was also directed to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the property in question after the expiry of period of notice, i.e., 30 days from the date of receipt of notice. The petitioner was also called upon to pay the arrears of rent and damages for unlawful occupation and use of said premises. When petitioner failed to comply with the notice, LIC moved an application before the Estate Officer under Section 5(1) read with Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short here-in-after referred to as 'Act no. 40 of 1971'), who issued notice to the petitioner under Section 4 of the Act no. 40 of 1971, enclosing therewith copy of the application moved by LIC, mentioning therein as to why order of eviction and payment of arrears and damages be not passed against the petitioner on the ground that tenancy of the petitioner stood terminated vide legal notice. Notice was also affixed on the premises in question.
5) Undisputedly, building in question was occupied by LIC in the year 1960. The petitioner was in possession of the same, as a tenant, even before that. Service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as under
Section 4 of the Act no. 40 of 1971 is admitted and is not in dispute. As per Section 2(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short referred as 'U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972'), any building of which 11 the Government or local authority or a public sector corporation or a Cantonment Board is the landlord, provisions of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 shall not apply. It is not in dispute that LIC is a Public Sector Corporation and the tenancy in question is not governed by the provisions of the U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972.
6) The words "public premises", according to the Act no. 40 of 1971, means any premises belonging to any corporation or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1980 (61 of 1980), under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat.
7) This fact is under no dispute that LIC is established under the Central Act. As per Clause (2) of sub-
section (e) of Section 2 of the Act no. 40 of 1971, any premises belonging to any corporation established by or under a Central Act and under or controlled by the Central Government shall be public premises. It has been mentioned above that in view of non applicability of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972, Central Act no. 40 of 1971, is applicable in the present case.
8) In the instant case, tenancy of the petitioner was terminated by a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act issued by the LIC, which was duly received by the petitioner. Therefore, after expiry of the period of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, petitioner falls within the definition of 'unauthorised occupant'. In the case in hand, the Estate Officer has complied with the 12 provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Act no. 40 of 1971 before passing final order of eviction and payment of arrears of rent & damages against the petitioner. The tenancy of the petitioner was determined by the landlord LIC by a legal notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, therefore, after the determination of the tenancy, even if the petitioner is holding over such public premises, petitioner shall be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant. Section 4 of the Act no. 40 of 1971 deals with issuance of notice to show cause against order of eviction and Section 5 deals with eviction of unauthorised occupants.
9) In the instant case, the tenancy of the petitioner originated prior to purchase of the said premises by the LIC. The fact of occupation at the material time is sufficient for the purposes of eviction under Section 5 of the Act no. 40 of 1971.
10) Para nos. 9 and 10 of a decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company vs Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, (1980) 4 SCC 435, helps LIC in the context of present controversy. The said paras are being reproduced here-in-below for convenience:
"9. Thus, it would appear that both the scope and the object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in Section 2 of the Premises Act. The object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a corporation nor government or corporate bodies. It would be seen that even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under Section 25-B which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity. Thus, Section 25-B itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that the Premises Act as compared to the Rent 13 Act, which has a very broad spectrum, is a special Act and overrides the provisions of the Rent Act.
10. .... in view of Section 3(a) of the Rent Act, which is extracted below, it would appear that the intention of the legislature in passing the Rent Act was merely to exclude from its operation only premises belonging to the government and if the intention was to exclude other premises belonging to corporate Bodies or corporations, then Section 3(a) should have been differently worded:
3. Nothing in this Act shall apply :-
(a) to any premises belonging to the government.
This, in our opinion, does not advance the case of the appellant any further because once the Premises Act becomes a special Act dealing with premises belonging to Central Government, corporations and other statutory Bodies, the Rent Act stands superseded. We have to consider the provisions of the two Acts, they having been passed by the same legislature, viz., Parliament, and the rule of harmonious construction would have to apply in such cases."
[emphasis supplied]
11) In para 4 of the decision rendered in Jiwan Dass vs Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 694, Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as below:
"4. Section 106 of the T.P. Act does indicate that the landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy by giving 15 days' notice, if it is a premises occupied on monthly tenancy and by giving 6 months' notice and if the premises are occupied for agricultural or manufacturing purposes; and on expiry thereof proceedings could be initiated. Section 106 of the T.P. Act does not contemplate of giving any reason for terminating the tenancy. Equally the definition of the public premises "unauthorised occupation" under Section 2(g) of the Act postulates that the tenancy "has been determined for any reason whatsoever". When the statute has advisedly given wide powers to the public- authorities under the Act to determine the tenancy, it is not permissible to cut down the width of the powers by reading into it the reasonable and justifiable grounds for initiating action for terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. If it is so read Section 106 of T.P. Act and Section 2(g) of the Act would become ultra vires. The statute advisedly empowered the authority to act in the public interest and determine the tenancy or leave or licence before 14 taking action under Section 5 of the Act. If the contention of the appellant is given acceptance he would be put on a higher pedestal than a statutory tenant under the Rent Act. Take for example that a premises is let out at a low rent years back like the present one. The rent is unrealistic. With a view to revise adequate market rent, tenant became liable to ejectment. The contention then is, action is violative of Article 21 offending right to livelihood. This contention too is devoid of any substance. An owner is entitled to deal with his property in his own way profitable in its use and occupation. A public authority is equally entitled to use the public property to the best advantage as a commercial venture. As an integral incidence of ejectment of a tenant/licensee is inevitable. So the doctrine of livelihood cannot discriminately be extended to the area of commercial operation. ...."
[emphasis supplied]
12) A decision rendered by Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Mrs. Rani Sevakram (since deceased) by heirs and legal representatives vs The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, decided on 28.02.2017, is also of much importance in deciding present writ petition. Following observations made by Hon'ble Bombay High Court will be of some use in elucidating the controversy in question:
"23. Mr. Sanglikar further submitted that even assuming for the time being that Sevakram was inducted in the year 1952 and the Insurer took over the building in 1972, on 19.07.1983, notice was issued by Insurer to Sevakram determining the tenancy....
39. In paragraph 64 of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. vs Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855, it was observed as under:
"64. .....It would thus appear that, while the Rent Control Act is intended to deal with the general relationship of landlords and tenants in respect of premises other than government premises, the Public Premises Act is intended to deal with speedy recovery of possession of premises of public nature, i.e. property belonging to the Central Government, or Companies in which the Central Government has substantial interest or Corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government and certain corporations, institutions, autonomous bodies and local authorities..... The reason underlying the exclusion of property belonging to the Government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act, is that Government while dealing with the citizens in respect 15 of property belonging to it would not act for its own purpose as a private landlord but would act in public interest. .... the provisions of Public Premises Act have to be construed as overriding the provisions contained in the Rent Control act."
47. In the present case, Sevakram was inducted in the suit premises as a tenant in the year 1952. Thus, she entered into occupation of the suit premises under a valid authority. In 1971, building where the suit premises is situate, was taken over by Insurer. It is not in dispute that the suit premises belongs to Insurer and is a public premises within the meaning of Section 2(e)(2)(i) of the Public Premises Act. It is also established that by notice dated 19.07.1983, tenancy of Sevakram was terminated / determined. Thus, the definition of expression 'unauthorised occupation' contained in section 2(g) covers a case where a person like Sevakram who was inducted as a tenant and thus had entered into occupation legally under valid authority but who continues in occupation after the authority under which he was put in occupation has expired or has been determined. The Constitution Bench held that the words "whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer" in this part of the definition are wide in amplitude and would cover a lease because lease is a mode of transfer under the Transfer of Property Act. The definition of anauthorised occupation contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act would, therefore, cover a case where a person has entered into occupation of the public premises legally as a tenant under a lease but whose tenancy has expired or has been determined in accordance with law. Section 15 of the Public Premises Act mandates that no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of (a) the eviction of any person who is unauthorised occupation of any public premises.
48. .....The entities specified in Section 2(e)(1) and (2) cannot be asked to resort to the provisions of either the Bombay Rent Act or the Maharashtra Rent Act on the ground that the occupant was inducted prior to the premises becoming the public premises. In my opinion, that will be contrary to the provisions of Sections 2(e)(2)(g) and 15 of the Public Premises Act as also it will be contrary to the Statement and Objects and reason for which the Public Premises Act was enacted. Even if a person is inducted prior to 16.09.1958 or prior to the premises becoming a public premises, once it becomes a public premises in terms of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, his tenancy rights are attorned to the concerned entity specified in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act....."
[emphasis supplied] 16
13) Hon'ble Apex Court in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. vs Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855, in para no. 70, has observed as under:
"70. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions contained in the Public Premises Act cannot be applied to premises which fall within the ambit of the Rent Control Act. In our opinion, the provisions of the Public Premises Act, to the extent they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control Act, override the provisions of the Rent Control Act and a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises under Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control Act."
14) Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are not unauthorized occupants as they got entered into the concerned premises as tenants by its original owner Late Sri Mansa Ram, and for the same reason, Public premises Act, 1971, is not applicable in the matter.
15) A perusal of Section 2(g) of Act no. 40 of 1971, especially its second part, reveals that any person may enter into the premises, i.e., into public premises as genuine tenants but may become unauthorized occupant at any point of time if his tenancy is determined for any reason. It is agreed that petitioners entered into the premises as genuine tenants giving (unrealistic) rent of Rs. 30 / 40 per mensem or so, when LIC demanded enhanced rate of rent as per the market value of the premises, petitioners declined, then only the tenancy of the petitioners were determined by LIC by giving notices under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act and the moment the tenancy was determined, petitioners became unauthorized occupants by virtue of II part of Section 2(g) of Public Premises Act. Therefore, the petitioners are unauthorized occupants from the date of determination of their tenancy.
1716) Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that Public Premises Act is not applicable to the present case as they entered into the premises prior to its purchase by the LIC, i.e., prior to 1958. The reasoning given for this by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that at that time when the tenancy was originated, Public Premises Act was not in existence, therefore, Rent Control Act is applicable to the present matter. Learned counsel for the petitioners said so in the pleadings placed in WPMS no. 583 of 2014, Prem Chand vs. LIC and another.
17) Said submission is not acceptable for the following reasons:
i) It does not matter how old the tenancy is, for the application of Public Premises Act. The relevant thing is when the premises became Public Premises and whether the occupant of such premises accepted the new owner as his landlord or not. So once it has become Public Premises and the occupant of such premises accepted the new owner as his landlord then only the provision of Public Premises Act shall be applicable to that premises as the protection given to the occupants of the Public Premises by Section 14 of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 was taken out in the year 1985 as soon as Section 2(1)(a) of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 was substituted in U.P. Rent Control Act.
ii) Law does not make any kind of discrimination between two sets of tenants, viz., one who is coming into the premises prior to its purchase by Corporation or Government or coming after that. Para nos. 1, 2, 4 and 10 of the judgment rendered in "Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. vs LIC and another, (1980) 4 SCC 435, are relevant in this context. In this judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court 18 has also dealt with the overriding effect of two Acts, i.e., which Act would be having overriding effect over another, as Delhi Rent Control Act has given protection also to the tenants of Public Premises, therefore, it was necessary for Hon'ble Apex Court to find out which Act would be having overriding effect over another and eventually, by assessing the facts of the case and the relevant laws in question, Hon'ble Apex Court held that "once the Public Premises Act becomes Special Act dealing with Premises belonging to Central Govt., corporations and other statutory bodies, the Rent Act stand superseded". So by virtue of Section 2(e)2(ii) of Public Premises Act, the present premises is public premises and there is no protection to the tenants of public premises, therefore, for this reason the case of LIC / respondent is in much better footing in comparison to the case which has been discussed in Jain Ink's case (supra). Section 2(e)2(ii) of Public Premises Act says -
Any corporation [not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1965 (1 of 1956), or a local authority] established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government.......
Second authority on which LIC / respondent is relying is Ashoka Marketing Ltd. vs Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 (Para 1 and 70). Third authority on which LIC / respondent is relying to substantiate the aforesaid argument is Life Insurance Corporation of India vs Advani and Company, 2003 (3) AWC 2054. Paras 16, 17 and 18 of said decision are important in this context.
iii) Petitioners are not entitled to get retrospective protection of Section 14 of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972, as the protection given by this Section to the tenants of 19 Public Premises has already been taken out by Section 2(1)(a) of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 in the year 1985.
18) Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the notice which has been given by the LIC under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, by which the tenancy of the tenant / tenants was determined, was bad in the eye of law, as the said notice has not mentioned the ground for terminating the tenancy.
19) This argument of learned counsel for the petitioners is also of no relevance, as Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act does not require any reason to be assigned for determining the tenancy, though LIC has specifically mentioned in its notice that the tenancy of the petitioners is going to be determined for the reason of default in giving enhanced rent. This is very clear from Annexure no. 4 and Para no. 4 of the notice dated 30.09.2002 under Section 106 of T.P.A.
20) Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the notice under Section 4 of Public Premises Act was bad in the eye of law, also because, learned Estate Officer, without specifying the ground of eviction, which is mandatory requirement of Section 4, issued the said notice.
21) This argument of learned counsel for the petitioners is also not tenable as the notice dated 03.05.2003, issued by Estate Officer under Section 4 of P.P. Act has specifically mentioned the ground of eviction for the reason that the notice dated 30.09.2003 given under Section 106 of T.P.A. by LIC shall be read as part of notice dated 03.05.2003, issued by Estate Officer, as the said notice under Section 4 of P.P. Act 20 issued by Estate Officer was enclosed with the notice given by LIC under Section 106 of T.P.A. by which tenancy of the concerned tenant was determined. So all the provisions contained in Section 4 of P.P. Act were complied with and there is no infirmity in this notice.
22) Learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that LIC / respondent should have filed SCC suit for the eviction of the petitioners. This argument has no relevance for the following reasons:
(a) SCC suits are of two types. One, which are filed in rural areas within the local jurisdiction of courts, where U.P. Urban Buildings Act is not applicable. In such kind of suits, if the eviction is claimed on the ground of default of rent, then the shelter of Section 20 of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 cannot be taken for the simple reason that the said Act is not applicable over the concerned area and in such cases SCC Act is having its own provisions for eviction. LIC could not have filed such suit, as the premises in question are situated in urban area in the heart of Dehradun city.
The other one are the suits which are filed within the local jurisdiction of courts where U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 is applicable. In such areas, if any suit is filed for eviction on the ground of default of rent, then the landlord has to take shelter of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972, and this could not have been done in the present case, as the said premises come under the definition of P.P. Act and Section 2(1)(a) of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 gives exemption from the operation of the Act over the premises which are owned by Corporations and it is not disputed that the said premises are public premises.
21Therefore, LIC / respondent had no option to file SCC suit, except to approach the Estate Officer.
(b) Section 15 of the Public Premises Act, 1971 bars the jurisdiction of any court in context of the suits for eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises. This is not in dispute that the present premises is public premises as petitioners admitted this fact in their written statements before the Estate Officer (page 99 of WPMS no. 583 of 2014).
(c) Section 15(2) Schedule II Article 44 of Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, itself bars its jurisdiction over the present premises.
Relevant part of S. 15 of the Public Premises Act, in the context of present case, is quoted here-in-below:
No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain suit or proceeding in respect of;
(a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, or
(b) ........
Section 15(2) Schedule II Article 44 of Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, is quoted below for convenience:
"(44) a suit, the cognizance whereof by a Court of Small Causes is barred by any enactment for the time being in force."
A combined reading of aforesaid two sections leads this Court to adopt a view that LIC was not having any option except to file petition before the Estate Officer or, in other words, to invoke the provisions of Public Premises Act, 1971.
23) Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that LIC cannot enhance the rent unilaterally, whether it is realistic or unrealistic. Hon'ble Apex Court in Paras 1 and 4 of 22 the decision rendered in Jeevan Das vs LIC and another, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 694, has turned down such a plea, in favour of LIC. In this case, tenancy was originated in the year 1949, whereas in the present matter tenancy was of 1954. Learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that the judgment rendered by a coordinate bench of this Court in SBI vs Addl. District Judge and another, bearing WPMS no. 210 of 2007 dated 25.03.2015 is per incuriam, as Hon'ble Court, in said judgment did not distinguish the authority of Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal no. 1970 of 2014, Dr. Suhas H. Pophale vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and its Estate Officer, decided on 11.02.2014. In reply to this, learned counsel for the LIC / respondent submitted that applicability of Dr. Suhas H. Pophale's case (supra) has been rejected by coordinate bench of this Court at its threshold by considering the argument of counsel for LIC that there is no applicability of the aforesaid authority into the present matter, i.e., SBI vs Addl. District Judge, for the simple reason that in Bombay Rent Control Act and subsequently in Maharashtra Rent Control Act, there is protection to the tenants of the public premises also.
24) The question before Hon'ble Apex Court in the said matter was -"whether the tenant of a premises whose rights are protected under the Bombay Rent Control Act and subsequently by the Maharashtra Rent Control Act could adversely be affected by the application of Public Premises Act, 1971?" So this question itself reveals that there is protection to the tenants of public premises in Bombay Rent Control Act / Maharashtra Rent Control Act. Therefore, said authority is not applicable to the present case, as the protection which has been provided to the tenants of public premises in State of U.P. / Uttarakhand has already been taken out in the year 1985, by substitution of Section 2(1)(a) of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972.
2325) Learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not the remedy available to the LIC to determine the tenancy of the petitioners as it can only be done in respect of lessee and the petitioners are tenants by the operation of law. There appears to be no difference, as such, between tenant and lessee. Section 3 of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 defines 'tenant' and Section 105 of Transfer of Property Act defines 'lessee'. It is further submitted that definition of 'tenant' cannot be taken into consideration for the disposal of present case by virtue of Section 2(1)(a) of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972. In this section, it is clearly written that nothing in this Act shall apply to the properties of Govt., Corporations etc. and it is not in dispute that the present premises are public premises. Under the Small Cause Courts Act also, for the eviction of tenants / lessees, notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act is required, to determine the tenancy / lease of the tenant / lessee.
26) There is concurrent finding of both the authorities below in favour of LIC / respondent, assigning cogent reasons. There is no infirmity in the judgments rendered by authorities below. Judgments thus rendered are reasoned and well discussed and for the same reasons the petitions filed by the petitioners are liable to be dismissed.
27) This Court has very limited scope to interfere in the concurrent findings of courts below. That can only be done on the ground of perversity and illegality, which is not noticed in the orders impugned.
28) Mr. Sudhir Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, in connected writ petitions, has advanced an argument that, as the tenancy of the petitioner was originated 24 when Temporary Act of 1947 (State Rent Control Act) was in existence, therefore, present case shall be dealt with the provisions of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972, being the successor Act of 1947. It is also contended that petitioners are statutory tenants, therefore, their tenancy can't be terminated under the Public Premises Act. The only remedy with the respondent / Corporation was to take recourse to U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972. This contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is of no help to the petitioners, as the tenants were statutory tenants only upto the date of determination of tenancy. Once the tenancy has been determined, they became unauthorised occupants. Moreover, in the light of judgments referred to above, there is no applicability of either State Rent Control Act, 1947 or U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972, in context of the present controversy.
29) The observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in paras 22 and 23 of the judgment rendered in Qudrat Ullah vs Municipal board, Bareilly, AIR 1974 SC 396, are significant and the same are reproduced here-in-below for convenience:
"22. Moreover, the nature of the Act being temporary, the right, if we can attribute that quality to a disability of the other party to enforce his right unless additional grounds were made out, comes to an end when the temporary Act expires at least by efflux of time, if not by premature repeal. The so-called right is short lived and its longevity where it is derived under a temporary statute, cannot exceed the duration of the statute itself.
23. Let us assume for argument's sake that Section 3 of the Act has conferred a right on the tenant in which case it survives by virtue of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act. What follows? The survival of the right or the continuation of the operation of the Act to the proceedings is all that is ensured, not the expansion or extension of that right. For the normal life of the Act i.e. till September 30, 1972, the dispossession of the tenant is permissible only if the grounds in Section 2 are satisfied by the landlord. This right is circumscribed in content to conditions set out and limited in duration to the period beyond which the Act does not exist. To hold otherwise would be to give more quantum of right to the party than he would have enjoyed had the repeal not been made. Not to affect the previous operation cannot be converted into sanctioning subsequent operation. To read post-mortem operation into a temporary Act because of a premature repeal of it is wrong. To adopt the words Jagannadhadas, J. in Indira Sohanlal vs 25 Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi, AIR 1956 SC 77 at p. 84 has observed:
"What in effect, learned counsel for the appellant contends for is not the "previous operation of the repealed law" but the "future operation of the previous law."
On this footing the right, if any, that the defendant claims terminates with the expiration of that temporary statute."
30) First of all, the Act of 1947 was merely a temporary Act which was extended from time to time and finally repealed. A new Act came into existence w.e.f. 15.07.1972 and is called U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972. From 1983, as soon as Section 2(1)(a) has been substituted in the said Act, there is no protection to the tenants of premises belonging to Corporations etc., therefore, there is no question of the applicability of Rent Control Act to the present controversy. In addition to that, once the Act has been repealed, then the right accrued at the time of its existence could not be extended beyond its survival. The Act of 1947 died its own death and once the Act is repealed, the effect thereof is to obliterate it from its context completely.
31) The abovementioned writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(All pending applications also stand disposed of.)
32) Let a copy of this judgment be placed in each connected writ petition.
(U.C. Dhyani, J.) Dt. December 04, 2017.
Negi 26