Karnataka High Court
Dr. Kruthi Priya. M vs The State Of Karnataka on 13 December, 2024
Author: Suraj Govindaraj
Bench: Suraj Govindaraj
-1-
NC: 2024:KHC:53069
WP No. 2598 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
WRIT PETITION NO. 2598 OF 2024 (EDN-RES)
BETWEEN
1 . DR. KRUTHI PRIYA. M
D/O NAGARAJ M B
AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO. 6/78 A
30TH CROSS, 2ND BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
NEAR BASAVESHWARA SCHOOL,
RAJAJINAGAR, BENGALURU-560010.
2 . DR MANASA S
D/O SIDDAIAH K
AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS
NO. 17/9-3 1ST CROSS,
1ST MAIN MARENAHALLI, VIJAYANAGAR,
BENGALURU-560040.
3 . DR HADIYA REHMAN
AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS,
D/O LATE KHAZI ABDUL REHMAH,
Digitally signed
by SHWETHA RESIDING AT NO. 28-1
RAGHAVENDRA KANKERE ROAD, BALEHONNUR
Location: HIGH
COURT OF N.R PURA (TQ), CHIKKAMAGALURU (D)
KARNATAKA KARNATAKA-577112.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. S. SATHYARATHY, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY
ITS ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY,
HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE
SERVICES (MEDICAL EDUCATION)
-2-
NC: 2024:KHC:53069
WP No. 2598 of 2024
VIKASA SOUDHA, DR AMBEKDAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
2. THE DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL EDUCATION
ANAND RAO CIRCLE,
BENGALURU-560009.
3. KARNATAKA EDUCATION AUTHORITY
SAMPIGE ROAD, 18TH CROSS
MALLESHWARAM,
BENGALURU-560012
REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
4. RAJIV GANDHI UNIVERSITY OF HEALTH SCIENCES
4TH T BLOCK, JAYANAGAR,
BENGALURU-560041
REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR
5. SRINIVAS INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES AND
RESEARCH CENTRE
SRINIVASNAGAR, MUKKA VILLAGE,
SURATHKAL, MANGALORE
DAKSHINA KANNADA (D)
KARNATAKA-574146
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. R.K. PRATHIBHA., AGA FOR R1 & R2;
SRI. RAMESH., ADVOCATE FOR R3;
SMT. FARAH FATHIMA., ADVOCATE FOR R4;
SRI. D.R. RAVISHANKAR., SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. B.R.VYASAKIRAN UPADHYA., ADVOCATE FOR R5)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION,
DIRECTING THE 5TH RESPONDENT COLLEGE TO REFUND THE
AMOUNTS COLLECTED FROM THE PETITIONERS IN EXCESS OF THE
AMOUNT OVER AND ABOVE THE FEES PRESCRIBED AND STIPULATED
BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE KEA IN ANNEXURE-C FOR THE YEAR
2018-19 AND ETC.
-3-
NC: 2024:KHC:53069
WP No. 2598 of 2024
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING
BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 02.12.2024, THIS DAY, THE
COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
CAV ORDER
1. The Petitioners are before this Court seeking for the
following reliefs:
a. Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate
writ, order or direction, directing the 5th Respondent
College to refund the amounts collected from the
petitioners in excess of the amount over and above
the fees prescribed and stipulated by the
Government and the KEA in Annexure-C for the year
2018-2019; and
b. Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate
Writ, order or direction, directing the 5th Respondent
College to refund the excess fees collected from the
petitioners as per the order of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Civil Appeal Nos. 3978-3995/2017
& connected matters dated 19.05.2022 at Annexure-
J and the Judgement and order of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in Court in Special Leave
Petition (Civil) Nos. 2969-2970-2021 dated
07.11.2022 at Annexure-H and;
c. Cost of this Petition and such other and further
reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to grant,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case, in the interests of justice and equity.
2. The petitioners were allotted to Respondent No.5-
College during the course of counselling conducted
by Respondent No.3-Karnataka Examination
-4-
NC: 2024:KHC:53069
WP No. 2598 of 2024
Authority (K.E.A.) in July-August 2017 under the
Government quota for MBBS. The petitioners have
made payment of the fees in terms of the letter
dated 15.12.2017 issued by respondent No.5, one of
such letter is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
To whomsoever it may concern
This is to certify that, Ms.Kruthi Priya M. is
provisionally admitted to I MBBS degree programme of
Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences, Bangalore
for the academic year 2017-18 through Government
Quota subject to the rules & regulations of Rajiv Gandhi
University of Health Sciences/Karnataka Examination
Authority/Medical Council of India and the State
Government.
The total expenditure for the MBBS course is as
follows;-
Particulars I Year II Year III year IV year
(July, 2018) (Jan, 2020) (Jan, 2021)
(1½ Years) (1 Year) (1 Year)
Tuition Fee 77,500 1,20,500 77,500 77,500
Other 71,500 1,12,000 60,000 60,000
Fees/Miscellaneous
Books, Medical Kit 20,000 15,000 15,000 15,000
etc.,
Total 1,69,000 2,47,500 1,52,500 1,52,500
This certificate is issued for the purpose of availing Education loan
from the Bank.
-5-
NC: 2024:KHC:53069
WP No. 2598 of 2024
3. The contention of Sri.S.Sathyarthy., learned counsel
for the Petitioner is that;
3.1. The Fee Regulatory Committee having fixed
the admission fee for both Government and
Private Colleges. The respondent No.5-College
cannot charge more than that and what can be
charged is only the tuition fee and no amount
can be charged over and above the tuition fees.
3.2. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of
the Division Bench of this Court in Harish.G &
Another vs. The State of Karnataka &
others1, more particularly para 18 and 24
thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for
easy reference.
18. By careful reading of the aforesaid provisions
clearly indicate that no professional Educational
institution shall collect excess fee over and above
determined by the Fee Regulatory Committee.
Admittedly, the Fee Regulatory Committee has fixed
the admission fee for both the Government and
Private Colleges and fee fixation for the academic
year 2017-18 and 2018-19 made by the Fee
Regulatory Committee was not challenged. Thereby,
the petitioners and the institutions of respondent
1
WP No.52425/2019 and conn. Matters dated 28.9.2022
-6-
NC: 2024:KHC:53069
WP No. 2598 of 2024
No.5 are bound by fee structures fixed by the Fee
Regulations Committee notified. Thereby, any
excess amount collected by respondent No.6 or any
other institution is in utter violation of Articles 14 and
21 of the Constitution of India.
24. In view of the above, we pass the wing:
ORDER
i. The writ petitions filed by petitioners/students are hereby allowed. The ii. Recommendation made by the Admission Overseeing Committee as per report file No.KEA/AOC/87/2018- 19 dated 31.10.2018 is hereby affirmed.
iii. Respondent No.6-college is hereby prohibited not to collect excess amount over and above fee fixed by the Government vide Annexure-C for the academic year 2017-2018 and 2018- 2019 as per Medical Seat Fee Structure.
iv. Respondent No.6 is hereby directed to refund the amount collected from the petitioners for the academic years 2017-2018, 2018-2019, 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 over and above fee prescribed by the State Government and the KEA within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the order without giving any room for contempt with interest @ 6% as per the recommendation made by the Admission Overseeing Committee.
v. It is for the State Government to issue general directions, if the state government is really interested in protecting the rights of the students and ensuring none of the colleges, including respondent No.6 should collect the excess fee over and above that fixed by the State Government and the KEA for the years 2017-2018, 2018-2019, 2019-2020 and 2020- -7- NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 2021 within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the order.
vi. If State Government is really interested in welfare of the parents and citizens of the State, it is the high time for the State Government to issue such general directions.
Ordered accordingly.
3.3. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner by relying upon the said decision is that respondent No.5-College having charged amounts on the heading other fees/miscellaneous/book/medical kit, when the same was not so permissible, it is required to be refunded by Respondent No.5-College.
3.4. Reference is also made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Narayana Medical College vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors2. more particularly para 6 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference;
6. Now so far as the directions issued by the High Court to refund the amount of tuition fee collected under G.O. dated 06.09.2017 and to 2 SLP. (Civil) No.2969-2970/2021 dated 7.11.2022 -8- NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 refund the balance amount after adjusting the fee paid pursuant to the earlier determination as per G.O. dated 18.06.2011 is concerned, we are of the opinion that the High Court has not committed any error in issuing such directions. The management cannot be permitted to retain the amount recovered/collected pursuant to the illegal G.O. dated 06.09.2017. The medical colleges are the beneficiaries of the illegal G.O. dated 06.09.2017 which is rightly set aside by the High Court. The respective medical colleges have used/utilized the amount recovered under G.O. dated 06.09.2017 for a number years and kept with them for a number of years on the other hand students paid the exorbitant tuition fee after obtaining loan from the financial institutions/banks and paid the higher rate of interest. If at all the AFRC determines/fixes the tuition fee which is higher than the tuition fee fixed earlier it will be always open for the medical colleges to recover the same from the concerned students, however, the respective medical colleges cannot be permitted to retain the amount collected illegally pursuant to G.O. dated 06.09.2017. Therefore, even the directions issued by the High Court to refund the amount of tuition fee collected pursuant to G.O. dated 06.09.2017 after adjusting the amount payable as per the earlier determination is not required to be interfered with.
3.5. Based on the above, he submits that the amounts having been retained by the college for a long period of time, even though not being entitled to firstly charge and secondly retain, -9- NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 interest is required to be paid by respondent No.5-College.
4. Sri.D.R. Ravishankar., learned Senior counsel appearing for Respondent No.5-College would submit that;
4.1. The fee fixed by the K.E.A. is not applicable to the Respondent No.5-College. The Respondent No.5-College being a Private Minority Medical College is a member of the Association of Minority Professional Colleges in Karnataka with whom the Government of Karnataka has entered into a consensual agreement. Whereby, Tuition fees entitled to be charged by the colleges are fixed and as per the said agreement it is claimed that for the academic year 2018-19 respondent No.5-College is entitled to charge a sum of Rs.97,350/-, for academic year 2019-20 a sum of Rs.1,11,953/-
for academic year 2020-21 and for academic year 2021-22 a sum of Rs.1,28,746/-.
- 10 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 4.2. Thus, he submits that the fees which have been charged by respondent No.5 being in terms of the consensual agreement between the Association and the Government of Karnataka, the Government of Karnataka having permitted such fees to be charged, there is no excess fee which has been charged and as such there is no amount which is required to be refunded.
4.3. In this regard he relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd.
v. Ram Gopal3, more particularly para 10, 11, 12 & 13 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference;
10. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the respondent has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the respondent, would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 1990. In a similar situation, where the appellant belatedly challenged the promotion of his junior(s), this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22] , held as follows : (SCC p. 154, para 2) 3 (2021) 13 SCC 225
- 11 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 "2. ... if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court even in the year 1957, after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. ... In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot be reproduced now. ... It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters."
11. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and the writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence-sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala [S.S. Balu v.
- 12 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 388] , this Court observed thus : (SCC p. 485, para 17) "17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". ... It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment."
(emphasis supplied)
12. Similarly, in Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India [Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 610 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 491] this Court while considering the claim of candidates who, despite being higher in merit, exercised their right to parity much after those who were though lower in merit but were diligently agitating their rights, this Court observed that : (SCC pp. 617-18, para 27) "27. ... It becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time."
13. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered in rem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected in such category of cases to themselves, extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees
- 13 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava [State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 191] , laying down that : (SCC pp. 363-64, para 22) "22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well- recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence- sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
- 14 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence."
(emphasis supplied) 4.4. By relying on Ram Gopal's case, he submits that the petitioner's claim is barred by limitation. Inasmuch as the petitioner's having passed out in the year 2021, the above petition filed in the year 2024 is beyond a period of limitation and even insofar as constitutional remedies are concerned, a period of limitation
- 15 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 would apply, requiring this Court to dismiss the above petition as being barred by law of limitation.
4.5. He also relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v.
Union of India4 more particularly para 108
(iv) and (vi) thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference;
(iv) It is not open to any person to make a refund claim on the basis of a decision of a court or tribunal rendered in the case of another person. He cannot also claim that the decision of the court/tribunal in another person's case has led him to discover the mistake of law under which he has paid the tax nor can he claim that he is entitled to prefer a writ petition or to institute a suit within three years of such alleged discovery of mistake of law. A person, whether a manufacturer or importer, must fight his own battle and must succeed or fail in such proceedings. Once the assessment or levy has become final in his case, he cannot seek to reopen it nor can he claim refund without reopening such assessment/order on the ground of a decision in another person's case. Any proposition to the contrary not only results in substantial prejudice to public interest but is offensive to several well- established principles of law. It also leads to grave public mischief. Section 72 of the Contract Act, or for 4 (1997) 5 SCC 536
- 16 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 that matter Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963, has no application to such a claim for refund.
(vi) Section 72 of the Contract Act is based upon and incorporates a rule of equity. In such a situation, equitable considerations cannot be ruled out while applying the said provision.
4.6. By relying on Mafatlal Industries Ltd case, he submits that merely because in any other case a refund has been made would not entitle the petitioners for such refund. Section 72 of the Contract Act would be applicable and it is therefore required for the petitioner to establish their claim and entitlement for the amounts.
The petitioners not having made out such a claim and even the alleged claim being barred by limitation, the above petition is required to be dismissed.
5. Heard Sri.S.Sathyarthy., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Smt.R.K.Prathibha., learned AGA appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 , Sri.Ramesh., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3, Smt.Farah Fathima., learned counsel appearing for
- 17 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 respondent No.4 and Sri.D.R.Ravi Shankar., learned Senior counsel appearing for respondent No.5.
Perused papers.
6. A short question that is required to be answered by this Court in the present matter is;
"Whether there is an excess charge made by Respondent No.5-College, and if so, whether this Court would be required to direct Respondent No.5-College to refund the amounts along with interest?".
7. The contention of Sri.D.R.Ravi Shankar., learned Senior counsel appearing for Respondent No.5- College, is that the fees fixed by the K.E.A. is not applicable to Respondent No.5-College. Since Respondent No.5 is a member of the Association of Minority Profession Colleges.
8. A reliance is placed on the various agreements produced along with the statement of objections to contend that it is in terms of said agreements that the fees could be charged and not as that fixed by
- 18 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 K.E.A. The agreements indicate that the fees which could be charged is;
Sl. Year Amount per year
NO.
1 2017-18 Rs.77,000/-
2 2018-19 Rs.97,350/-
3 2019-20 Rs.1,11,953/-,
4 2020-21 Rs.1,28,746/-
5 2021-22 Rs.1,28,746/-
9. Respondent No.5 as indicated above in the table extracted, has charged in amount of Rs.1,69,000/-
for the first year i.e., 2017-18, Rs.2,47,500/- for the second year i.e., 2018-19, Rs.1,52,500/- for the third year i.e., 2019-20 and Rs.1,52,500/- for the fourth year i.e., 2020-21. Even if the agreement were to be accepted, Respondent No.5-College has charged the following amounts in excess:
Year Fee collected by Fee as per Excess respondent No.5- agreement fee paid College Rs.
Rs.
2018-19 1,69,000 97,350 71,650
2019-20 2,47,500 1,11,953 1,35,547
2020-21 1,52,500 1,28,746 23,754
2021-22 1,52,500 1,28,746 23,264
- 19 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069
WP No. 2598 of 2024
10. This taking into account the bifurcation made by the Respondent No.5-College as tuition fee, miscellaneous fee, books, medical kit, etc., when in fact no such bifurcation could have been made and only fees could have been charged as tuition fees alone as per the agreements detailed hereinabove.
11. From the above it is clear that there is an excess charge of fees made by Respondent No. 5-College, now the question would be as to whether the present petition filed in the year 2024 can be said to be barred by delay and latches. Since the aspect of limitation per se in the literal meaning of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not be applicable to a writ proceeding.
12. The petitioners have made payment of the fees and after passing out have made the claim is not in dispute. However, the fact remains, that the fees have been paid not on a voluntary basis, if not for the higher demand made by Respondent No.5-
- 20 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 College, the petitioners would not have paid the said amount.
13. That being the case, I am of the considered opinion that the petition has been filed on the petitioners coming to know that the demand which had been made by the respondent was excessive which payment was not required to be made. The payment had been made on the basis of the demand made by Respondent No.5 College which is based on a misrepresentation that the college was entitled to charge the said amounts. This misrepresentation by the Respondent No.5-College, comes within the purview of Section 18 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, the said payment, also having been made on account of a mistake of law in the sense that the students have presumed that the claim by the Respondent No.5-College was in accordance with law.
14. Section 18 of the Contract Act relating to misrepresentation, Section 21 relating to mistake of
- 21 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 law and Section 72 relating to liability of the person to whom money is paid. The said sections are extracted hereinbelow for easy reference.
72. Liability of person to whom money is paid, or thing delivered, by mistake or under coercion.--
A person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it.
18. "Misrepresentation" defined.--
"Misrepresentation" means and includes--
(1)the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true;
(2)any breach of duty which, without an intent to deceive, gains an advantage of the person committing it, or any one claiming under him, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of any one claiming under him;
(3)causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement, to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement.
21. Effect of mistakes as to law.--
A contract is not voidable because it was caused by a mistake as to any law in force in India; but a mistake as to a law not in force in India has the same effect as a mistake of fact.
15. The respondent No.5 being a university of which the petitioners are students. The petitioners being under the impression that if the fees were not paid they would not be continued in the college, to my
- 22 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 considered opinion would act as duress on the petitioners and coercion on the part of respondent No.5-College on the petitioner to make payment of the said amounts claimed by respondent No.5.
16. Thus, looked at from any angle, the demand made by respondent No.5 being on account of misrepresentation that the said amount is required to be legally paid, when in fact Respondent No.5 was not entitled to charge that amount legally, there being a mistake of law under which as also acting under duress on account of the coercion on part of respondent No.5-College, the petitioners made payment of the above amounts. Thus, I am of the considered opinion, that any person who received money which is delivered by mistake or under coercion must return the said money which would be required of Respondent No.5-College to do so.
17. Instead of doing so, Respondent No.5-College has constrained the petitioners to approach this Court by filing the above petition. Despite there being a
- 23 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069 WP No. 2598 of 2024 restriction on the college from collecting any excess amount, Respondent No.5-College has acted contrary to the applicable law and charged more amounts than it was entitled to.
18. The petitioners, having stated that they have obtained educational loans for making payment of the fees, the petitioners would have made payment of interest on the said amounts. Though the said interest would be on the higher side, taking into consideration the illegal demand and receipt by Respondent No.5, I am of the considered opinion that interest quantified at 12% per annum would serve the ends of justice.
19. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered the opinion that Respondent No.5-College would also be required to make payment of interest on the amounts held by Respondent No.5-College in excess from the time of such excess payment by each of the petitioners above.
20. In the above circumstance, I pass the following;
- 24 -
NC: 2024:KHC:53069
WP No. 2598 of 2024
ORDER
i. The writ petition is allowed.
ii. The mandamus is issued, directing respondent
No.5 to refund the excess amounts collected as indicated above along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum collected from the date of receipt by Respondent No.5- College till the date of payment by Respondent No.5-College to each of the petitioners.
iii. Respondent No.3-KEA or such Authority which is authorised is directed to take action according to law as against Respondent No.5- college.
SD/-
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE SR List No.: 2 Sl No.: 1