Orissa High Court
Criminal Procedure Code vs State Of Odisha on 31 March, 2026
Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 16-Apr-2026 19:53:09
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLA No.565 of 2023
(In the matter of an application under Section 415(2) of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 corresponding to Section 374(2) of
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973).
Kinnar Gouri Naik .... Appellant (s)
-versus-
State of Odisha .... Respondent (s)
Advocates appeared in the case throughHybrid Mode:
For Appellant (s) : M/s. C. Kasturi, Adv.
For Respondent (s) : Ms. Gayatri Patra, ASC
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-18.02.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-31.03.2026
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. The present appeal arises out of the judgment dated 12.05.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Court under the POCSO Act, Bhawanipatna, in C.T. Case No.73 of 2022 (POCSO)/T.R. No. 100 of 2022, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 384 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and 3 years respectively with fines.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
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(i) The prosecution case originated from an FIR lodged on 28.06.2022 by the mother of the victim boy aged about 16 years 8 months, alleging that the appellant had developed acquaintance with the victim during Durga Puja 2020 and subsequently established contact through phone and invited him to his residence.
(ii) It is alleged that over a period of time, the appellant induced the victim and his friend to visit his residence multiple times, gave them gifts including gold ornaments and a second-hand car, and allegedly engaged in acts of sexual misconduct with the victim, coupled with threats of blackmail.
(iii) The victim (P.W.7), his friend (P.W.2), and other family members were examined as prosecution witnesses, and the victim's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as well as medical examination report were brought on record; the medical evidence did not indicate signs of recent sexual intercourse or injury.
(iv) The defence of the appellant was one of complete denial and false implication, asserting that the victim had voluntarily maintained contact, received monetary and material benefits, and that a prior FIR had been lodged by the appellant against the victim.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
3. The learned counsel for the Appellant respectfully and earnestly made the following submissions in support of her contentions:
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(i) The impugned judgment is assailed on the ground that it suffers from non-appreciation and misappreciation of evidence, particularly in overlooking material contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
(ii) It is contended that the medical evidence does not support the allegation of sexual assault and that there is absence of corroborative material to substantiate the prosecution case.
(iii) The appellant asserts that the relationship between the parties was voluntary in nature, as evident from repeated visits, continued contact, and acceptance of gifts by the victim without informing his family.
(iv) It is argued that there was an inordinate delay of nearly two years in lodging the FIR, which renders the prosecution case doubtful and indicative of afterthought and ulterior motive.
(v) The appellant contends that the essential ingredients of Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 384 IPC are not made out, and that the findings of the trial court are based on presumptions rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
(vi) It is further submitted that the defence version, including prior dispute and allegation of monetary exploitation by the victim, has not been properly considered, leading to grave miscarriage of justice.
III. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
4. The Trial Court, upon perusal of the facts, observed as under:
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(i) The learned trial court framed charges under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 384 IPC, but upon appreciation of evidence, altered the conviction to Section 4 of the POCSO Act, holding that the acts proved did not amount to aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
(ii) The court relied primarily on the testimony of the victim, holding it to be credible and trustworthy, and observed that in sexual offence cases, conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the victim if it inspires confidence.
(iii) The age of the victim was determined to be below 18 years based on oral evidence and the school admission register, which was accepted without challenge from the defence.
(iv) The court invoked the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act and held that once foundational facts were established, the burden shifted to the accused, which, according to the court, was not discharged.
(v) On the aspect of extortion, the court concluded that the appellant had put the victim in fear of injury and blackmail and thereby dishonestly induced him to maintain the relationship, thereby satisfying the ingredients of Section 384 IPC.
(vi) The court rejected the defence version of false implication, observing that it was not substantiated by cogent evidence and that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
Page 4 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 16-Apr-2026 19:53:09 IV. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
5. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed before this Court.
6. The conviction under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 384 IPC is challenged on grounds of inconsistencies in evidence, unexplained delay, voluntary relationship, and misuse of statutory presumptions. This Court shall address each contention in turn.
7. It is settled that the testimony of a child victim, if found credible, can alone sustain a conviction. In this regard, the Supreme Court in the case of Ganesan v. State of Tamil Nadu1, the Court held that the sole testimony of the victim requires no corroboration if reliable. The Court held as follows:
"11. Law is well settled that generally speaking, oral testimony may be classified into three categories, viz.: (i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The first two category of cases may not pose serious difficulty for the Court in arriving at its conclusion(s). However, in the third category of cases, the Court has to be circumspect and look for corroboration of any material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, as a requirement of the rule of prudence.
12. In Ganesan v. State, this Court held that the sole testimony of the victim, if found reliable and trustworthy, requires no corroboration and may be sufficient to invite conviction of the accused."
8. In the present case, no material contradictions have been pointed out that undermine the core narrative. Minor lapses or variations, which 1 (2020) 10 SCC 573 Page 5 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 16-Apr-2026 19:53:09 often occur over long-drawn investigations, do not automatically discredit the evidence.
9. Likewise, in Bhanei Prasad @ Raju v. State of H.P.2, the Supreme Court reiterated that a credible child victim's evidence must be given due weight and requires no corroboration. The Court held as follows:
"5. The jurisprudence under the POCSO Act has evolved as a bulwark against the predatory crimes targeting the innocence of childhood. Section 29 of the POCSO Act creates a statutory presumption of guilt, once foundational facts are established. In the present case, this presumption stood unrebutted. The victim's testimony was unwavering, medically corroborated, and free from embellishment. Her disclosure, though delayed, was truthful and borne out of perennial trauma and threats she has undergone.
6. It is now well settled that the testimony of a child victim, if found credible and trustworthy, requires no corroboration. The Courts below have not merely accepted the victim's account, they have validated it through unimpeachable scientific evidence. The DNA report sealed the evidentiary chain and has dispelled all doubts in the prosecution case which is sought to be assailed by the petitioner."
10. Here, the victim's deposition and statement under Section 164 CrPC coherently describe repeated sexually exploitative acts by the appellant. We see no reason to view this evidence with suspicion; it inspires confidence and forms a solid basis for conviction.
11. The next issue pertains to delay in reporting. The FIR was lodged in June 2022, nearly two years after the alleged incidents (Durga Puja 2020). Such a delay, however, is not unusual in cases of sexual abuse. 2 2025 INSC 934 Page 6 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 16-Apr-2026 19:53:09 Multiple precedents have observed that families often hesitate to report such offences to protect the child's dignity.
12. In fact, the Supreme Court in Satyapal Singh v. State of Haryana3, it was observed that delay in lodging the First Information Report in a case of this nature is a normal phenomenon. The relevant excerpts are produced below:
"20. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that ordinarily the family of the victim would not intend to get a stigma attached to the victim. Delay in lodging the First Information Report in a case of this nature is a normal phenomenon."
13. Delay must be judged in context. The victim here explained that fear and familial opposition caused the delay, which is plausible. Absent any clear evidence that the delay was a deliberate fabrication, this factor alone cannot invalidate the prosecution's case. We accept that the delay has a reasonable explanation and does not discredit the charge.
14. Now this Court must turn to the issue pertaining to the age of the victim. The victim's age (about 16 years 8 months at the relevant time) is supported by school records and was not controverted. Under the POCSO Act, once the victim's age and a sexual offence are proved, Sections 29 and 30 create rebuttable presumptions. Section 29 provides that if foundational facts are established, the accused is presumed to have committed the offence. However, this presumption is not absolute but applies once the key elements (child's age, penetrative act) are proved.
3 (2009) 6 SCC 635 Page 7 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 16-Apr-2026 19:53:09
15. . In the present case, these foundational facts are indisputable. The appellant did not discharge the onus of rebutting the statutory presumptions. We therefore uphold the application of Sections 29 and 30, which further fortify the prosecution case. This aligns with the protective purpose of POCSO: to treat a sexual act with a minor as criminal unless convincingly disproven by the accused.
16. As regards to the issue of medical report, it is clear that it has shown no recent injury or signs of intercourse on the victim. While some reliance can be placed on such evidence, its absence does not necessarily negate the offence. The Supreme Court in the case of Satyapal Singh (Supra) accepted that hymenal rupture and semen emission are not indispensable. The Court, referring to the Modi's Medical Jurisprudence held as follows:
"16. In Modi's Medical Jurisprudence, twenty-third edition, at pages 897 and 928, it is stated:
"At page 897: To constitute the offence of rape, it is not necessary that there would be complete penetration of the penis with emission of semen and the rupture of hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the labia majora or the vulva or pudenda with or without emission of semen or even an attempt at penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of law. It is, therefore, quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains. At page 928: In small children, the hymen is not usually ruptured, but may become red and congested along with the inflammation and bruising of the labia."
..."
17. In this case, the child's age (an adolescent) and the setting (private invitations) mean lack of fresh injuries or bleeding is not surprising.
Page 8 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 16-Apr-2026 19:53:09 The trial court correctly assessed the medical evidence in light of the ocular testimony. Hence, this Court finds no contradiction between the medical findings and the witness accounts. The absence of injury or medical proof of intercourse does not undermine the victim's credible statement, especially given the settled principle that a child may not have obvious physical signs.
18. The appellant has also argued that the victim willingly maintained the relationship and accepted gifts. However, under POCSO, a minor's consent is legally irrelevant and gifts do not negate culpability. The fact that the accused gave the victim a car and ornaments suggests inducement, not persuasion by the victim. There is no evidence that the victim gave any property or benefit to the accused in return. Thus, contrary to an extortion scenario, the present facts show the accused as the benefactor and the child as the recipient. In any event, a minor cannot legally consent to such acts, so the concept of a "voluntary relationship" has no legal bearing here. In line with modern jurisprudence, the safety and dignity of the child is paramount, and any notion of consensual contact with a minor is inapplicable.
19. Lastly, this Court must turn to the issue of extortion under Section
384. Under Section 383 IPC, extortion requires that the accused, by putting a person in fear, dishonestly induces him to deliver any property to the accused. Here, the victim did not hand over any property; rather, the appellant gave valuable gifts to the victim.
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20. The seminal judgment in Dhananjay @ Dhananjay Kumar Singh v.
State of Bihar4 laid down the elements: the victim must deliver property under threat. The Court held that if no property is delivered, the offence of extortion is not made out. The Court held as follows:
"A distinction between theft and extortion is well known. Whereas offence of extortion is carried out by over-powering the will of the owner; in commission of an offence of theft the offender's intention is always to take without that person's consent."
21. In the instant case, it is admitted that no such thing happened. On the contrary, threats were allegedly used to force the victim to continue the relationship, not to part with property. This does not fulfill the legal definition of extortion. This Court, therefore, concludes that the conviction under Section 384 IPC is unsustainable for want of its essential ingredient.
V. CONCLUSION:
22. For the reasons discussed above, this Court finds the conviction under Section 4 of the POCSO Act to be fully supported by reliable evidence. The victim's age and testimony have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant has not rebutted the statutory presumptions. In contrast, the conviction under Section 384 IPC cannot stand since no extortion, in law, was shown.
23. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as to the conviction under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, and that conviction and sentence are affirmed.The appeal is allowed as to the conviction under Section 4 (2007) 14 SCC 768 Page 10 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 16-Apr-2026 19:53:09 384 IPC. The conviction under Section 384 and the sentence imposed thereunder are quashed.
24. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr.SanjeebK Panigrahi) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 31st March, 2026/ Page 11