Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Kusuam Lata vs Kendriya Vidyalaya Sanghthan on 29 March, 2023
1
O.A. No. 1032/2019
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench: New Delhi
O.A. No. 1032/2019
Reserved on: 23.02.2022
Pronounced on: 29.03.2023
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Smt. Kusum Lata, aged 67 years, 'A'
W/o Sh. R.K. Singh,
Retired Principal from KVS,
R/o C-207, Nirala Nagar,
Lucknow (UP).
...Applicant
(By Advocate(s): Mr. Yogesh Sharma)
Versus
1. Kendariya Vidyalaya Sangathan,
Through the Commissioner,
18, Institutional Area, Shahzed Jeet Singh Marg,
New Delhi.
2. The Deputy Commissioner,
Kendariya Vidyalaya Sangathan,
Regional Officer, Sector J, Aliganj,
Lucknow.
...Respondents
(By Advocate(s): Mr. Anil Nag)
2
O.A. No. 1032/2019
ORDER
This Original Application has been filed by the applicant under Section 19 of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following relief(s):-
"(i) That the Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an order of quashing the impugned order dated 7.9.2017 (Annex.A/1) only to the extent of directing the Deputy Commissioner, to charge interest on the refund of management share of CPF amount from the applicant, declaring to the effect that the same is illegal and arbitrary and consequently pass an order directing the respondents to refund the interest amount to the applicant with interest at an early date.
(ii) Alternatively, in case of not granting the prayed relief
(i), the Hon'ble Tribunal may further graciously be pleased to pass an order directing the respondents to grant the interest on the delayed payment of pension @ 18% PA from the date of retirement till the date of payment of pension at an early date.
(ii) Any other relief which the Hon'ble Tribunal deem fit and proper may also be granted to the applicant with the cost of litigation."
2. Brief facts:-
2.1 Applicant was appointed as a Primary Teacher (PRT) on 04.07.1973 in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS). She was later appointed as Trained Graduate Teacher (TGT) (Hindi) on 07.08.1975 and thereafter as Post Graduate Teacher (PGT) (Hindi) on 15.12.1981 and finally as Principal on 19.10.1993. All these appointments of the applicant in KVS were on direct recruitment basis. She retired from the service on 31.01.2011 as Principal of KV, RDSO, Lucknow. Further, it has been highlighted that in the year 1985, specially w.e.f. 01.01.1986, i.e., 3 O.A. No. 1032/2019 from the date of implementation of the recommendations of the 4th Pay Commission, the Govt. of India decided to close the CPF Scheme for fresh appointment and all the Govt. Servants appointed after 01.01.1996 are governed by the GPF-cum-
pension scheme and the Govt. servants appointed after 01.01.1986 were deemed to be in GPF-cum-pension scheme as there was no CPF Scheme for them. However, she was not granted the aforesaid benefits, accordingly, she approached the Tribunal vide OA No. 4675/2015 and the same was decided at the admission stage vide Order dated 03.07.2017 with the following directions:
"5. Since the case of the applicant is identical to that of the applicant in Santosh Kumar Verma (supra) and both the parties have also agreed that this OA may be disposed of in terms of the judgment in Santosh Kumar Verma (supra), the OA is allowed in terms of the Judgment in Santosh Kumar Verma (supra). The respondents are directed to extend the benefit of GPF cum- Pension Scheme to the applicant."
2.2. Thereafter, in compliance of the aforesaid directions of this Tribunal passed in the said OA, the respondents converted the case of the applicant from CPF scheme to GPF scheme. It is submitted that while converting the same, the respondent No.1 vide order 07.09.2017 directed the applicant to refund the management share of the CPF with interest, i.e., Rs. 9,64,897/-
Principal amount and Rs.8,15,852/- as interest(total Rs.
17,80,749/-).
4 O.A. No. 1032/20192.3. Learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that there was no fault on the part of the applicant as she was wrongly and illegally placed in the CPF scheme and this mistake has been corrected by the respondents after the said directions of the Tribunal and, therefore, there is no question of charging interest on the Management share of the CPF amount, but the applicant has deposited the Management share of the CPF amount with interest under protest, as at that time, there was no option left with the applicant, as the respondents clearly stated that they will not going to issue PPO unless the payment of management share of CPF amount with interest is refunded by the applicant.
2.4. Learned counsel for the applicant contends that firstly, the charging of interest from the applicant on the management share of the CPF amount is itself illegal, as there was no fault on the part of the applicant, and even otherwise also, the applicant has not been granted any interest on the delayed payment of arrears of her pension. It is submitted that once the respondents charging the interest on the payment of management share of CPF amount, they are also liable to pay the interest on the delayed payment of pension to the applicant and not granting the same is totally illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory in the eyes of law. The applicant requested the competent authority to provide a copy of the calculation sheet of interest and principal amount, as the respondents only directed to deposit the total amount of 5 O.A. No. 1032/2019 Rs. 17,80749/- and the respondents vide letter dated 06.04.2018 provided a copy of the same.
2.5 Upon receipt of the same, she submitted her representation dated 20.8.2018 to the respondents, to pay either the interest on the amount of arrears of her pension amount or return back the interest amount paid to KVS on the management share of CPF, but till date no reply has been received and hence, this OA has been filed for the reliefs as quoted hereinabove.
2.6 In support of the claim of the applicant, learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance upon the well settled principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Dua Vs. State of Haryana and Ors, reported in 2008(3) SCC 44, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that the interest on the retrial dues can be claimed under Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India even if no other rule is there. The relevant part of the judgment reads as under:-
"The fact remains that proceedings were finally dropped and all retiral benefits were extended to the applicant. But it is also cannot be denied that those benefits were given to the applicant after four years. In the circumstances, prima facie, we are of the view that the grievance voiced by the appellant appears to be well founded that he would be entitled to interest on such benefits. If there are Statutory Rules occupying the field, the appellant could claim payment of interest relying on such Rules. If there are Administrative Instructions or Guidelines or Norms prescribed for the purpose, the appellant may claim benefit of interest on that basis. But even in absence 6 O.A. No. 1032/2019 Statutory Rules, Administrative Instructions or Guidelines, an employee can claim interest under Part-III of the Constitution relying on Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution."
3. Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondents states that there is neither any Rules nor there is any precedents in support of the claim of the applicant to justify that the applicant is entitled for the interest on the arrears of pension, when the same is revised from the back date.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and recorded the submissions they have made. Learned counsels confirm that they have nothing more to add.
5. Analysis 5.1 Firstly, analyzing the facts of the present case to the in-
applicability of the doctrine of approbate and reprobate in the case of Union Of India Vs. N Murugesan rendered on 07.10.2021, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:-
"APPROBATE AND REPROBATE:
26.These phrases are borrowed from the Scott's law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he 7 O.A. No. 1032/2019 objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest.
A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.
27. We would like to quote the following judgments for better appreciation and understanding of the said principle:
Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, 1956 SCR 451:
"But it is argued by Sri Krishnaswami Ayyangar that as the proceedings in OS. No. 92 of 1938-39 are relied on as barring the plea that the decree and sale in OS. No. 100 of 1919-20 are not collusive, not on the ground of res judicata or estoppel but on the principle that a person cannot both approbate and reprobate, it is immaterial that the present appellants were not parties thereto, and the decision in Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Company Ltd. [(1921) 2 KB 608], and in particular, the observations of Scrutton, LJ, at page 611 were quoted in support of this position. There, the facts were that an agent delivered goods to the customer contrary to the instructions of the principal, who thereafter filed a suit against the purchaser for price of goods and obtained a decree. Not having obtained 8 O.A. No. 1032/2019 satisfaction, the principal next filed a suit against the agent for damages on the ground of negligence and breach of duty. It was held that such an action was barred. The ground of the decision is that when on the same facts, a person has the right to claim one of two reliefs and with full knowledge he elects to claim one and obtains it, it is not open to him thereafter to go back on his election and claim the alternative relief. The principle was thus stated by Bankes, L.J.:
"Having elected to treat the delivery to him as an authorised delivery they cannot treat the same act as a misdelivery. To do so would be to approbate and reprobate the same act".
The observations of Scrutton, LJ on which the appellants rely are as follows:
"A plaintiff is not permitted to 'approbate and reprobate'. The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election -- namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument: Ker v. Wauchope [(1819) 1 Bli 1, 21] :
Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby [(1908) AC 224, 232] . The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction".
It is clear from the above observations that the maxim that a person cannot 'approbate and reprobate' is only one application of the doctrine of election, and that its operation must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto. The law is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XIII, p. 464, para 512:
9 O.A. No. 1032/2019"On the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais, and may conveniently be referred to here. Thus a party cannot, after taking advantage under an order (e.g. payment of costs), be heard to say that it is invalid and ask to set it aside, or to set up to the prejudice of persons who have relied upon it a case inconsistent with that upon which it was founded; nor will he be allowed to go behind an order made in ignorance of the true facts to the prejudice of third parties who have acted on it".
State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, (2014) 15 SCC 144:
"22. The doctrine of "approbate and reprobate" is only a species of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of parties. As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute. (Vide CIT v. V. MR. P. Firm Muar [CIT v. V. MR. P. Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216]).
23. It is settled proposition of law that once an order has been passed, it is complied with, accepted by the other party and derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on any ground.
(Vide Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329] .) In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir [R.N.Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683] this Court has observed as under: (SCC pp. 687-88, para 10) "10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that 'a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he 10 O.A. No. 1032/2019 could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage'."
25. The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corpn. v. Diamond and Gem Development Corpn. Ltd.
[Rajasthan State Industrial Development and
Investment Corpn. v. Diamond and Gem
Development Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470 :
(2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153] , made an observation that a party cannot be permitted to "blow hot and cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience.
26. It is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel, the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when he has to speak, from asserting a right which he would have Rajasthan otherwise had." State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470:
"I. Approbate and reprobate
15. A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot-blow cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate".
Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an order, he is estopped from denying the validity of, or the binding effect of such contract, or conveyance, or order upon himself. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a manner so as to violate the 11 O.A. No. 1032/2019 principles of what is right and of good conscience. [Vide Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [AIR 1956 SC 593] , CIT v. V. MR. P. Firm Muar [AIR 1965 SC 1216] , Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement [(2008) 14 SCC 58 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 706 : AIR 2009 SC 713] , Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD [(2011) 5 SCC 270 :
(2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 712 : AIR 2011 SC 1869] , Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Co. Ltd. [(2011) 10 SCC 420 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 685] and V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer [(2012) 12 SCC 133 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 136 :
JT (2012) 9 SC 260] .]
16. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel--the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had." ARTICE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA:
28.We would not dwell deep into the extraordinary and discretionary nature of relief under Article 226of the Constitution of India. This principle is to be extended much more when an element of undue delay, laches and acquiescence is involved. The following decisions of this Court would suffice: UP Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464:
"8. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya [(1996) 6 SCC 267 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1488] . In that case the respondents woke up to claim the relief which was granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. Therefore, the state approached this Court and this Court after considering the matter observed as under: (SCC p. 268) "Although it is not necessary to give an 12 O.A. No. 1032/2019 explanation for the delay which occurred within the period mentioned in sub- sections (1) or (2) of Section 21, explanation should be given for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper. In the instant case, the explanation offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately thereafter.
That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain under sub- sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the delay."
9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana [(1997) 6 SCC 538 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1550] this Court reaffirmed the rule that if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the Court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542) "The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Virpal Singh Chauhan case [Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (1995) 6 SCC 684 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1995) 31 ATC 813] . The appellants desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage."
10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta [(1997) 3 SCC 395 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 821] it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9) "9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi [R.P. Joshi v. Union of India, OA No. 497 of 1986 decided on 17-3-1987] gives relief 13 O.A. No. 1032/2019 only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case [R.P. Joshi v. Union of India, OA No. 497 of 1986 decided on 17-3-1987] . In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3- 1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief."
( emphasised) 5.2 In OA Nos.1027/2014 and 1039/2014 on 25.03.2014, the Tribunal has passed the following orders:-
"2. According to the learned counsel for the applicants, their cases are squarely covered by the order of the Ernakulam Bench of this Tribunal in OA No.457/2011-Johnson P. John v. The Assistant Commissioner, Kendriya Vidayala Sangathan and Ors. The operative part of the said order reads as under:-
5. Applicant in person argued the case and succinctly brought out the entire facts and contended that he cannot but be a subscriber to the GPF cum Pension scheme and CPF scheme is not applicable to him at all.
6. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the applicant has been brought under CPF as he had exercised his option.
7. Arguments were heard and documents perused.
Though the respondents have contended that the applicant had opted for CPF, no such option stated to have been exercised has been produced, nor did the respondents give the details thereof. In fact, the question of asking for option from an employee whose induction in the service is posterior to 01-09-1988 does not arise at all. The reference vide Annexure R-1 relates to post 01-01-2004 entrants and not to the applicant. The applicant is thus right when he asserted that the said government order is alien to his 14 O.A. No. 1032/2019 case. Apparently, the respondents have by mistake applied the CPF Scheme to the applicant, whereas, the same was not holding the field at the time when the applicant was inducted into the service.
8. In view of the above, the OA succeeds. It is declared that the applicant is covered only by the GPF cum Pension Scheme. His CPF account shall be converted into G.P.F. Account and the extent of employer's contribution at the credit of the CPF account including the interest element for the said amount shall be deducted from the total credit balance reflected in the GPF account of the applicant. There shall be a pre- audit in this regard and statement of GPF account should be made available to the applicant. In the service Book/Personal file for the applicant the details of the applicant's entitlement to GPF and Pension Scheme shall be conspicuously reflected so that in future, no confusion shall arise. The applicant be informed of the action taken in this regard.
9. This order shall be complied with, within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order. However, the GPF subscription as per the Rule shall be deducted from the salary of the applicant from the ensuing financial year, i.e. from the pay for the month of April, 2012 onwards.
10. Under the above circumstances, there shall be no orders as to cost."
5.3 Initially, the applicant preferred OA No.2455/2015 and the same was disposed of vide Order dated 10.7.2015 at the admission stage itself with the directions to the respondents to dispose of the representation of the applicant.
5.4 As can be seen, based on above, the case of the applicant is a second round of litigation as OA No.4675/2015 preferred by the 15 O.A. No. 1032/2019 applicant was decided on 3.7.2017 with the directions as highlighted above.
5.5 In compliance of order dated 10.7.2015, the respondents revisited the case of the applicant and passed an office order dated 1.9.2017 (Impugned herein as Annexure-A1), wherein following corrective order was passed:-
"5. Whereas Ministry of Human Resource Development vide their letter dated 8th December 2016 after due examination informed as under:-
(a) The cases referred by KVS to Ministry of HRD do not involve any policy issues concerning switch over from CPF to GPF-cum-
Pesnion scheme but are cases where KVS has not appropriately given effect to the Provisions of OM dated 1.9.1988 in terms of which the decision relating to change over of the KVS employees from CPF to GPF-cum-Pension Scheme was circulated.
(b) The cases where such departure in the provisions of the OM dated 1.9.1988 has been made by KVS during the period from 1.1.1986 to 31.12.2003 when the same was operative, may be reconsidered any necessary corrective action taken by KVS in all cases having regard to relevant facts of each individual case.
6. Whereas the case of Smt. Kumsum Lata is similar to the cases referred to Ministry. The Official was selected as Principal through direct recruitment vide Order Nos. F.7-4/93-KVS9Estt-II) dated 5.8.1993 and has joined duty on 19.10.1993 and therefore, she should have been governed under GPF-cum-Pension scheme in terms of this office OM NO.152-1/70-
80.K.V.S.Budget/Part.II dated 1.9.1988 which states that persons joining service in the Sangathan on or after 1.1.1986 shall be governed only by GPF-cum- Pension Scheme and will have no option for CPF Scheme but the official was erroneously covered under the CPF Scheme.
16 O.A. No. 1032/20197. The Competent Authority of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan has now decided to take corrective action in the light of clarification issued by Ministry of HRD vide letter dated 8.12.2016 and accordingly Smt. Kusum Lata, Principal (Retired) will be covered under GPF-cum-Pension Scheme on receipt of Management Share of CPF from Regional Office, Lucknow.
8. The conversion to GPF-cum-Pension Scheme to Smt. Kusum Lata Principal (Retired) is subject to the outcome of pending SLP in case of Shri Johnson P. John with reference to OA No.457/2011.
This issues with the approval of the Competent Authority."
5.6 It is noticeable in para 8 following observation were made in so far as interest "His CPF account shall be converted into G.P.F. Account and the extent of employer's contribution at the credit of the CPF account including the interest element for the said amount shall be deducted from the total credit balance reflected in the GPF account of the applicant."
5.7 Hence, the demand of interest for accounts adjustment, i.e., for conversion from CPF to GPF which was in consonance with the directions passed by the Tribunal in Order dated 03.07.2017.
The applicant was provided the calculation sheet vide communication dated 6.4.2018. The same remain undisputed at the relevant point of time. Hence, the prayer (i) is innocuous and cannot be acceded to. No prayer was made or pressed by the applicant to seek interest on delayed pension amount in OA No.4675/2015.
17 O.A. No. 1032/20195.8 At this stage, it is highlighted that as per the directions in OA No.1027 /2014 and OA No.1039/2014, the said directions were to be carried out within a period of six months from the date of the said Order. Likewise, it is to be seen as per the directions of the Tribunal , as per the applicant's own admission vide Office Order dated 7.9.2017, the CPF account was converted to GPF-
cum-Pension Scheme, i.e., within the period of six months from the date of the Order dated 03.07.2017.
5.9 The applicant has for the first time represented on 20.8.2018 vide representation. On bare perusal of the said representation, it is noticeable is that the applicant deposited the demand raised on 28.11.2017. Thereafter, a PPO has been issued on 12.2.2018, i.e., within six months from date of deposit made by the applicant. It may also be highlighted that in present OA, there is no challenge to the calculation sheet forwarded to the applicant vide communication dated 6.4.2018. Rather, the applicant made a representation dated 12.8.2018. The applicant has also not been able to make out a case that she has been discriminated qua the applicant's in OA No.1027/2014 and OA No.1039/2014 for refund of interest or payment of interest on delayed pension to them.
Hence, the prayer 8(ii) is also untenable at this stage.
18 O.A. No. 1032/20195.10 The fact also remains that the respondents have not passed any speaking order to the representation dated 12.8.2018 till date.
6.6.
6. Conclusion :-
6.1 To put controversy at rest, the OA is dismissed qua the prayers made by the applicant. However, in the event, the applicant has been discriminated qua the applicants in OA No.1027/2014 and OA No.1039/2014 for refund of interest or payment of interest on delayed pension to them, in that eventuality similar benefit be extended to the applicant herein. In the event, there is no discrimination meted out to the applicant, nothing more is required to be done except to verify whether any refund of interest or payment of interest on delayed pension paid to the others. The refund or payment of interest to the applicant, if any, or non-payment (as the case may be) after due verification be carried out and communicated to the applicant by the respondents/ Competent Authority within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this Order accordingly.
11. No order as to costs.
(Manish Garg) Member (J) /sm/