Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 16.09.2025 vs Employees Provident Fund Organization on 22 September, 2025
Author: Ajay Mohan Goel
Bench: Ajay Mohan Goel
2025:HHC:33311 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA .
CWP No. 7746 of 2023
Reserved on: 16.09.2025
Decided on: 22.09.2025
M/s Shashi Sharma ... Petitioner
Versus
Employees Provident Fund Organization ... Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes _____________________________________________________ For the petitioner r: Mr. Amar Deep Singh, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. Raman Sethi, Advocate. Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for the following reliefs:-
"A. That the impugned order 21.08.2023 (Annexure-P-
3) of Hon'ble Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court-1, Chandigarh passed in MA No. 15/2022 may kindly be set aside and the delay of 91 days in filing the appeal before the above authority may kindly be condoned in the interest of justice and the appeal may kindly be directed to be heard on merits.
B. Entire record of the case may kindly be ordered to be called for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court.
C. That, further prayed that the order dated:
1Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 2
2025:HHC:33311 .
27.07.2022 (Annexure-P-1) passed under S. 7-A of the PF & MP Act, 1952 may kindly be set aside and the authority may kindly be directed to make a fresh inquiry in the matter by identifying the beneficiaries and considering the entire record presented/filed by the petitioner in a time bond manner as per direction of this Hon'ble Court."
2. The petitioner is aggrieved by Annexure P-3, which is an order passed by Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Chandigarh, dated 21.08.2023, in terms whereof an application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay of 91 days in filing the appeal has been dismissed.
3. The facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are as under:-
The petitioner herein suffered an order (Annexure P-1) passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, dated 27.07.2022, under Section 7-A of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the 1952 Act'), in terms whereof the petitioner was directed to deposit the amount assessed therein within prescribed time as per the law laid down and procedure of the abovementioned Act and schemes framed thereunder.
4. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a statutory appeal, alongwith an application praying for condonation of delay of 91 days in filing the appeal.
::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 32025:HHC:33311 .
5. In terms of the impugned order (Annexure P-3), this appeal has been dismissed by the learned Appellate Authority by returning the following findings:-
"4. It is admitted fact that the impugned order 27.07.2022 under Section 7 A of the EPF & MP Act, 1952 and this appeal has been preferred on 28.12.2022. The cause of delay in filing the appeal which has been mentioned by the appellant is unreliable. Any person who is doing any business and carrying on attending establishment his office cannot be shut down more than 6 or 7 month. Thus, from the perusal of submission and affidavit, it is apparent that a concocted and imaginary grounds have been created by the appellant. As the respondent has submitted that on the day which the order was passed it was communicated through e-mail and proof of e-mail which reached to the appellant is attached as Annexure R-1. Through replication, the appellant could not dare to deny the facts of respondent. As per Rule 7(2) of the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 1997, the appeal may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order be file before the Tribunal. A proviso has also been attached by which another 60 days on sufficient cause the appeal may be preferred. It would be manifest that Rule 7(7) of the Rules prescribed the period of 60 days from the date of issuance of the notification/order to prefer the appeal before the Tribunal whereas the proviso 2 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:33311 .
of the Rules empowers the Tribunal to extend a further period of 60 days it appellant shows sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed time from the date of order and communication of order. Rather to say the appeal may be preferred within 120 day from the date of order after 120 days if the appeal is filed, the delay in filing the appeal may not be condoned. As per statutory provision and rules, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction/ power to condone the delay after 120 days. As per the averment made by the appellant, it is crystal clear that there is 91 days delay in filing this appeal and this 91 days is beyond 120 days. On the above discussion, the application of the appellant is liable to be rejected. The application to condone the delay moved by the appellant is rejected. Since this appeal is delayed, the appeal is also dismissed accordingly."
6. In terms of the impugned order, learned Tribunal has rejected the application for condonation of delay on the ground that as the appeal herein was filed as per Rule 7(2) of the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997, in terms thereof, a person aggrieved by an order passed by the Central Government or any other Authority under the Employees Provident Fund Act, may within 60 days from the day of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal provided that the ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 5 2025:HHC:33311 .
Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring an appeal within the prescribed period extend the said period by a further period of 60 days, therefore, as the appeal was filed beyond 120 days and in the absence of there being any statutory power conferred upon the Appellate Authority to condone the delay in excess of 60 days, the application for condonation of delay was liable to be rejected.
7. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that the order passed by the learned Tribunal calls for no interference. The statutory scheme of the Employees Provident Fund Act is that a person aggrieved by the order passed by the Authority inter alia under Section 7(A) of the Act, has a right of appeal under Section 7(I) to the Tribunal concerned. Now Section 21 of the said Act deals with the powers of the Central government to make rules and Section 21(2)(b) of the Act provides that Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, make Rules to carry out the provisions of the Act and such Rules may inter alia provide the form and the manner in which and the time within which, an appeal shall be filed before a Tribunal and the fees payable for filing such appeal. In the exercise of the power conferred under Section 21 of the Act, the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 1997 have been framed.
Rule 7(2) thereof reads as under:-
::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 62025:HHC:33311 .
"7(2).Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order prefer an appeal to the Tribunal:
"Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days:
Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by a Tribunal unless he has [deposited with the Tribunal a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing] 75 per cent of the amount due from him as determined under section 7A:
Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under section 7-0."
8. A perusal of the Act and the above mentioned Rules demonstrates that no power is conferred upon the Appellate Authority to condone the delay beyond 120 days.
9. In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Gujrat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited and Others (2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 42, the Hon'ble Supreme court while dealing with the provisions of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, has held as under:-
"4. Section 125 of the Act reads as follows:-
125. Appeal to Supreme Court (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, may, ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 7 2025:HHC:33311 .
file an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908): Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a r further period not exceeding sixty days."
On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear as crystal that this Court, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the period of 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him, may allow the same to be filed within a further period not exceeding 60 days. It is quite clear that this Court has the jurisdiction to condone the delay but a limit has been fixed by the legislature, that is, 60 days. Hon'ble Supreme Court by referring to its earlier judgments in this judgment further held as under:-
"5. In Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, d the issue that arose before this Court was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for allowing the aggrieved person to file an appeal under Section 125 of the Act after more than 120 days from the date of ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 8 2025:HHC:33311 .
communication of the decision of the Tribunal. It adverted to the anatomy of Section 125 and the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of Proceedings) Rules, 2007 and opined thus: (SCC p. 32, para 25) "25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of r the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause f for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression "within a further period of not exceeding 60 days" in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is 9 no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days."
6. The two-Judge Bench placed reliance on Singh Enterprises v. CCE and Commr. of Customs and Central ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:33311 .
Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd. and came to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for maintaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days in view of the prescription under Section 125 of the Act and the proviso appended thereto. In that context, the Court held:
(Chhattisgarh SEB case, SCC p. 36, para 32) "32.... Any interpretation of Section 125 of the r Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory."
7. After so stating, as we find, the Court adverted to the concept of communication and eventually opined:
(Chhattisgarh SEB case, SCC pp. 37-38, para 37) "37. The issue deserves to be considered from another angle. As mentioned above, Rule 94(2) requires that when the order is reserved, the date of pronouncement shall be notified in the cause-list and that shall be a valid notice of pronouncement of the order. The counsel appearing for the parties are supposed to take cognizance of the cause-list in which the case is shown for pronouncement. If title of the case and name of the ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 10 2025:HHC:33311 .
counsel is printed in the cause-list, the same will be deemed as a notice regarding pronouncement of order.
Once the order is pronounced after being shown in the cause-list with the title of the case and name of the counsel, the same will be deemed to have been communicated to the parties and they can obtain a copy through e-mail or by filing an application for a certified copy."
8.r The eventual conclusion that was arrived at by the Court was that there is no escape from the conclusion that the appeal, in the said case, had been filed for more than 120 days from the date of communication of the Tribunal's order and, therefore, as such the same could not be entertained."
10. In Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and others vs. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, (2020) 19 Supreme Court Cases 681, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold as under:-
"16. Indubitably, the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed on this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Article 142 is a conglomeration and repository of the entire judicial powers under the Constitution, to do complete justice to the parties. Even while exercising that power, ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 11 2025:HHC:33311 .
this Court is required to bear in mind the legislative intent and not to 12 (1997) 5 SCC 536 render the statutory provision otiose. In a recent decision of a threeJudge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited & Ors.13, the statutory appeal filed before this Court was barred by 71 days and the maximum time limit for condoning the delay in terms of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 was only 60 days. In other words, the appeal was presented beyond the condonable period of 60 days. As a result, this Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days. Notably, while admitting the appeal, the Court had condoned the delay in filing the appeal. However, at the final hearing of the appeal, an objection regarding appeal being barred by limitation was allowed to be raised being a jurisdictional issue and while dealing with the said objection, the Court referred to the decisions in Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Ors.14, Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. Hongo India Private Limited & Anr. 15, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity 13 (2017) 5 SCC 42 14 (2008) 3 SCC 70 15 (2009) 5 SCC 791 Regulatory Commission & Ors.16 and Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited vs. Electricity Department represented by its Superintending Engineer, ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:33311 .
Port Blair & Ors.17 and concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court for maintaining an appeal beyond maximum prescribed period in Section 125 of the Electricity Act.
17. The principle underlying the dictum in this decision would apply proprio vigore to Section 31 of the 2005 Act including to the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Notably, in this decision, a submission was canvassed by the assessee that in the peculiar facts of that case (as urged in the present case), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, so that complete justice can be done. This argument has been considered and plainly rejected in the following words: (ONGC case, SCC pp. 48-51, paras 12-
16) "12. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, while explicating and elaborating the principles under Article 142, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) opined thus: (SCC p. 656, para 50) "50. ... The fact that the rule was discretionary did not alter the position. Though Article 142(1) empowers the Supreme Court to pass any order to do complete justice between the parties, the 16 (2010) 5 SCC 23 17 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 13 2025:HHC:33311 .
(2016) 16 SCC 152 court cannot make an order inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. No question of inconsistency between Article 142(1) and Article 32 arose. Gajendragadkar, J., speaking [Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996] for the majority of the Judges of this Court said that Article 142(1) did not confer any power on this Court to contravene the provisions of Article 32 of the Constitution. Nor did Article 145 confer power upon this Court to make rules, empowering it to contravene the provisions of the fundamental right. At AIR pp.
100203, para 12 : SCR p. 899 of the Report, Gajendragadkar, J., reiterated that the powers of this Court are no doubt very wide and they are intended and "will always be exercised in the interests of justice". But that is not to say that an order can be made by this Court which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. It was emphasised that an order which this Court could make in order to do complete justice between the parties, must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 14 2025:HHC:33311 .
laws. The court therefore, held that it was not possible to hold that Article 142(1) conferred upon this Court powers which could contravene the provisions of Article 32."
13. The said decision has been clarified by a Constitution Bench in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584, wherein M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the majority, ruled that: (SCC pp. 63435, para 83) "83. It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are matters of serious public importance. The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the Apex Court under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous. In both Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996, as well as A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, cases the point was one of violation of constitutional provisions and constitutional rights. The observations as to the effect of inconsistency with statutory ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 15 2025:HHC:33311 .
provisions were really unnecessary in those cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on the breach of constitutional rights. We agree with Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Article 142 insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by Section 320 or 321 or 482 CrPC or all of them put together. The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might embody and reflect the scheme of a particular law, taking into account the nature and status of the authority or the court on which conferment of powers
-- limited in some appropriate way -- is contemplated.
The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental considerations of public policy. Shri Sorabjee, learned Attorney General, referring to Garg case [Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996], said that limitation on the powers under Article 142 arising from "inconsistency with express statutory provisions of substantive law"
must really mean and be understood as some express ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 16 2025:HHC:33311 .
prohibition contained in any substantive statutory law. He suggested that if the expression "prohibition" is read in place of "provision" that would perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such prohibition should also be shown to be based on some underlying fundamental and general issues of public policy and not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of "complete justice" of a cause or matter, the Apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142, but only to what is or is not "complete justice" of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise."
::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 17
2025:HHC:33311 .
14. In this regard, another Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409] opined: (SCC pp. 43738, para 56) "56. As a matter of fact, the observations on which emphasis has been placed by us from the Union Carbide case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584], A.R. Antulay case [A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602] and Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v.
State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406, go to show that they do not strictly speaking come into any conflict with the observations of the majority made in Prem Chand Garg case [Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996]. It is one thing to say that "prohibitions or limitations in a statute" cannot come in the way of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 to do complete justice between the parties in the pending "cause or matter" arising out of that statute, but quite a different thing to say that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 142, this Court can altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a statute, dealing with the subject and pass orders concerning an issue which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in another statute. This Court did not say so in Union Carbide case [Union Carbide Corpn. v.
Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584] either expressly or ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:33311 .
by implication and on the contrary it has been held that the Apex Court will take note of the express provisions of any substantive statutory law and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. ..."
15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, has ruled that there is no conflict of opinion in Antulay case [A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602] or in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584] with the principle set down in Prem Chand Garg v.
Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996. Be it noted, when there is a statutory command by the legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate that delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584]. As the pronouncement in Chhattisgarh SEB v.
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23, lays down quite clearly that the policy behind the Act emphasising on the constitution of a special ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 19 2025:HHC:33311 .
adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission. The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present nature, when the statute commands that this Court may condone the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution.
16. We had stated earlier that we will be adverting to the passage in Suryachakra Power Corpn. Ltd. v.
Electricity Deptt., (2016) 16 SCC 152. There, the Court had referred to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It fundamentally relied on M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58, wherein the Court after referring to certain authorities, analysed thus: (M.P. Steel Corpn. Case), SCC p. 91, para 43) ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:33311 .
"43. ... when a certain period is excluded by applying the principles contained in Section 14, there is no delay to be attributed to the appellant and the limitation period provided by the statute concerned continues to be the stated period and not more than the stated period. We conclude, therefore, that the principle of Section 14 which is a principle based on advancing the cause of justice would certainly apply to r exclude time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are bona fide and with due diligence pursued, which ultimately end without a decision on the merits of the case.""
(emphasis in italics - in original and supplied) Similarly, in State vs. Mushtaq Ahmad & Ors.18, this Court opined that where minimum sentence is provided for an offence then no Court can impose lesser punishment on ground of mitigating factors.
18. A priori, we have no hesitation in taking the view that what this Court cannot do in exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, it is unfathomable as to how the High Court can take a different approach in the matter in 18 (2016) 1 SCC 315 reference to Article 226 of the Constitution. The ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 21 2025:HHC:33311 .
principle underlying the rejection of such argument by this Court would apply on all fours to the exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
19. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors.19 and also of the Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Company vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (AppealI), Bangalore20. The logic applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31 of the 1995 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition 19 AIR 2015 Guj 97 20 2013 (298) ELT 481 (Kar.) on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice, where no procedure is ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 22 2025:HHC:33311 .
specified. The High Court may accede to such a challenge and can also non-suit the petitioner on the ground that alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the writ petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner choses to approach the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period of 60 days prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle underlying the dictum of a threeJudge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (supra). In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose."
11. Therefore, it is apparent and evident from the above two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in the absence of any power conferred upon the Statutory Authority to condone the delay in excess of what it is authorised to do as per the express provisions of the Statute, the Appellate Authority has no right to condone the ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS 23 2025:HHC:33311 .
delay in excess thereof.
12. Admittedly as per Rule 7(2) of the Rules ibid, the appeal has to be filed within 60 days as from the date of passing of the order and the Appellate Authority or the Tribunal has power to condone the delay beyond 60 days only upto a further period of 60 days.
13. In the present case, as admittedly the appeal was filed beyond the period of 120 days, therefore, learned Tribunal indeed had no jurisdiction to condone the delay and therefore, in this backdrop, the order passed by learned Tribunal to the effect that it had no power to condone the delay beyond the period of 120 days, calls for no interference and this petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.
(Ajay Mohan Goel) Judge September 22, 2025 (narender) ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:26:18 :::CIS