Karnataka High Court
Smt.Vandana Venkatesh vs State Of Karnataka on 27 November, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 KAR 2437
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2020
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE B.A. PATIL
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.3946/2020
BETWEEN:
Smt. Vandana Venkatesh,
W/o. Mr. Thejaswi Udupa,
Aged about 28 years,
No.C-4, 2nd Floor,
Chandana Apartment,
No.82, Infantry Road,
Bengaluru - 560 001.
...Petitioner
(By Sri. Mahesh S., Advocate)
AND:
1. State of Karnataka,
By Commercial Street
Police Station,
Represented by
State Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Karnataka,
Bangalore - 01.
2. Smt. Honey Hilori,
W/o. Ajay Hilori,
Aged about 36 years,
R/a - No.A-3, Building No.82,
Chandana Apartment,
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Infantry Road,
Bengaluru - 560 001.
...Respondents
(By Sri. R.D. Renukaradhya, HCGP for R1;
Sri. R. Swaroop Anand, Advocate for R2)
This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. praying to quash the complaint and FIR by the
Commercial Street Police Station arising out of
Cr.No.60/2020, for the offences P/U/S 341, 504 and 506
of IPC and under Section 3 of Epidemic Diseases Act
pending on the file of the XXIX A.C.M.M., Mayo Hall at
Bengaluru against the petitioner.
This Criminal Petition coming on for Reporting
Settlement 'through Video Conference', this day, the
Court made the following:
ORDER
Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri. Mahesh S. is present. Learned High Court Government Pleader Sri. R.D. Renukaradhya for respondent No.1-State is present. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 -
complainant Sri. R. Swaroop Anand is also present.
2. Today they have filed joint memorandum of settlement dated 27.11.2020 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The said joint compromise petition has been -3- filed by both the petitioner-accused and respondent No.2 - complainant and the same has been endorsed by both petitioner-accused and respondent No.2 -
complainant and by the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
3. In the said petition it has been submitted that an unconditional apology has been tendered by the petitioner to respondent No.2 and in that light respondent No.2 does not want to pursue the case further and respondent No.2 has requested to permit them to compound the offences in Crime No.60/2020 dated 29.06.2020 for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 504 and 506 of IPC and also under Section 3 of Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 pending on the file of XXIX Additional CMM Court, Mayohall, Bengaluru.
-4-4. Though this Court is exercising the power under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., but Section 482 of Cr.P.C gives wider power to the High Court to compound the offences when the parties are intending to compromise the matter amicably. Hence, I feel that by exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. as well as under Legal Services Act, if the parties are permitted to compound the offences, the ends of justice can be made in this behalf.
5. In the case of Narinder Singh & others v/s State of Punjab & another reported in (2014)6 SCC 466 by considering the provisions of Section 482 and 320 of Cr.P.C., it has been observed that a wider power is available under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and if material on records shows that the ends of justice would be met then the same is justified.
Under such circumstances, the power can be ultimately exercised to acquit the accused by -5- dismissing the complaint. At paragraphs 8 to 13 it has been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under:
"8. We find that there are cases where the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code to quash the proceedings in those offences which are uncompoundable has been recognized. The only difference is that under Section 320(1) of the Code, no permission is required from the Court in those cases which are compoundable though the Court has discretionary power to refuse to compound the offence. However, compounding under Section 320(1) of the Code is permissible only in minor offences or in non-serious offences. Likewise, when the parties reach settlement in respect of the offences enumerated in Section 320(2) of the Code, compounding is permissible but it requires the approval of the Court. Insofar as serious offences are concerned, quashing of criminal proceedings upon compromise is within the discretionary -6- powers of the High Court. In such cases, the power is exercised under Section 482 of the Code and proceedings are quashed. Contours of these powers were described by this Court in B.S.Joshi vs. State of Haryana which has been followed and further explained/elaborated in so many cases thereafter, which are taken note of in the discussion that follows hereinafter.
9. At the same time, one has to keep in mind the subtle distinction between the power of compounding of offences given to the Court under Section 320 of the Code and quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 482 of the Code. Once, it is found that compounding is permissible only if a particular offence is covered by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code and the Court in such cases is guided solitarily and squarely by the compromise between the parties, insofar as power of quashing under Section 482 of the Code is -7- concerned, it is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. Such a distinction is lucidly explained by a three- Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab. Lodha, J. speaking for the Court, explained the difference between the two provisions in the following manner:(SCC pp.340-41, paras 57 & 59) "57.Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is -8- circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
59.B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji this Court has compounded the non- compoundable offences indirectly? We do -9- not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section
482. The two powers are distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment."
10. Apart from narrating the interplay of Section 320 and Section 482 of the Code in the manner aforesaid, the Court in Gian singh case also described the extent of power under Section 482 of the Code in quashing the criminal proceedings in those cases where the parties had settled the matter although the offences are not compoundable. In the first instance it was emphasized that the power under Section. 482 of the Code is not to be resorted to, if there is specific provision in the Code for redressal of the grievance of an aggrieved
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party. It should be exercised very sparingly and should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. The Court also highlighted that in different situations, the inherent power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by the High Court before it exercises inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.
11. As to under what circumstances the criminal proceedings in a non- compoundable case be quashed when there is a settlement between the parties, the Court provided the following guidelines:(Gian Singh case, SCC pp.340- 41,para 58) "58.Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the facts that the dispute between the offender
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and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
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committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The
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above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast rule can be prescribed."
12.Thereafter, the Court summed up the legal position in the following words:(Gian Singh case, SCC pp,342-43 para 61) "61.The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or an FIR or a complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plentitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guidelines engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal
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proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases
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having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavor stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to
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the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
The Court in Gian Singh case was
categorical that in respect of serious
offences or other offences of mental
depravity or offence of merely dacoity under special statute, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servant while working in that capacity. The mere settlement between the parties would not be a ground to quash the proceedings by the High Court and
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inasmuch as settlement of such heinous crime cannot have imprimatur of the Court.
13. The question is as to whether an offence under Section 307 IPC falls within the aforesaid parameters. The first limb of this question is to reflect on the nature of the offence. The charge against the accused in such cases is that he had attempted to take the life of another person (victim). On this touchstone, should we treat it as a crime of serious nature so as to fall in the category of heinous crime, is the poser. Finding an answer to this question becomes imperative as the philosophy and jurisprudence of sentencing is based thereupon. If it is a heinous crime then it has to be treated as a crime against the society and not against the individual alone. Then it becomes the solemn duty of the State to punish the crime-doer. Even if there is a settlement/compromise between the perpetrator of crime and the victim, that is of no consequence."
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6. Keeping in view the aforesaid guidelines and on personal perusal of the complaint and the compromise petition, the alleged offences are not as such a grave crime and alleged offences are triable by the Court of Magistrate and are not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. They are neighbors and all disputes have been settled in between them.
Therefore, in order to maintain peace in the society, I am of the considered opinion that if the settlement entered into between the parties has been accepted by exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., it is going to meet the ends of justice. In that light, I hereby accept the joint memo filed by the parties to compound the offences and quash the proceedings for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 504 and 506 of IPC and also under Section 3 of Epidemic
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Diseases Act, 1897 pending on the file of XXIX Additional CMM Court, Mayohall, Bengaluru.
7. In that light, I pass the following:
ORDER Petition is allowed and proceedings in Crime No.60/2020 for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 504 and 506 of IPC and also under Section 3 of Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 pending on the file of XXIX Additional CMM Court, Mayohall, Bengaluru have been quashed and the petitioner-
accused is acquitted of all the charges levelled against her. Parties to bear their own cost.
Sd/-
JUDGE NS