Delhi District Court
Rashmi Bajaj vs State on 15 May, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-000148-2022
Criminal Revision No.: 19/2022
SHRI. NAKUL CHAND,
S/o. Shri. Bibhuti Prasad,
R/o. 91, Opp. D-896,
New Friends Colony,
New Delhi. ... REVISIONIST
VERSUS
1. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI)
2. SHRI. PANKAJ BAJAJ,
S/o. Shri. Shridhar Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi.
3. SMT. RASHMI BAJAJ,
W/o. Shri. Shridhar Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of filing : 04.01.2022
Date of institution : 05.01.2022
Date when judgment was reserved : 25.02.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 15.05.2025
AND;
CNR No.: DLCT01-007673-2022
Criminal Revision No.: 261/2022
SHRI. PANKAJ BAJAJ,
S/o. Shri. S.D. Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi. ... REVISIONIST
VERSUS
STATE (GNCT OF DELHI) ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 12.05.2022
Date of institution : 13.05.2022
Date when judgment was reserved : 25.02.2025
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 1 of 58
ABHISHEK Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:47:30 +0530
Date when judgment is pronounced : 15.05.2025
AND;
CNR No.: DLCT01-007671-2022
Criminal Revision No.: 262/2022
SMT. RASHMI BAJAJ,
W/o. Shri. S.D. Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi. ... REVISIONIST
VERSUS
STATE (GNCT OF DELHI) ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 12.05.2022
Date of institution : 13.05.2022
Date when judgment was reserved : 25.02.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 15.05.2025
AND;
CNR No.: DLCT01-014069-2022
Criminal Revision No.: 544/2022
SMT. MEENAKSHI SHARMA,
D/o. Lt. Shri. R.D. Sharma,
R/o. 2344, 2nd Floor, Hudson Lane,
Delhi-110009. ... REVISIONIST
VERSUS
1. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI).
2. SHRI. PANKAJ BAJAJ,
S/o. Shri. Shridhar Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi-110025.
3. SMT. RASHMI BAJAJ,
W/o. Shri. S.D. Bajaj,
R/o. A-118, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi-110025.
4. SHRI. NAKUL CHAND,
S/o. Shri. Bibhuti Prasad,
R/o. 91, Opp. D-896,
New Friends Colony,
New Delhi-110025.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 2 of 58
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:47:35 +0530
5. SHRI. M.L. JAGGI,
(Since deceased and proceedings abated)
R/o. A-283, New Friends Colony,
Delhi-110025. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of filing : 07.10.2022
Date of institution : 10.10.2022
Date when judgment was reserved : 25.02.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 15.05.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present common judgment shall determine the aforenoted criminal revision petitions, preferred in terms of the provisions under Section(s) 397/399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code'), bearing; Cr. Rev. No. 19/2022, Cr. Rev. No. 261/2022, Cr. Rev. No. 262/2022 and Cr. Rev. 544/2022. Pertinently, Cr. Rev. No. 19/2022, Cr. Rev. No. 261/2022, and Cr. Rev. No. 262/2022 have been preferred by accused namely, Nakul Chand ( hereinafter referred to as 'Nakul Chand'); accused, namely, Pankaj Bajaj (hereinafter referred to as 'Pankaj Bajaj') and accused, namely, Rashmi Bajaj (hereinafter referred to as 'Rashmi Bajaj'; hereinafter the said accused persons are collectively referred to as the 'accused persons'), respectively. In contrast, Cr. Rev. 544/2022 has been preferred by Meenakshi Sharma ( hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant'). Appositely, the said revision petitions emanate/impugn a common order dated 06.12.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the 'impugned order'), passed by learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate-01/Ld. ACMM-01, Central, Tis Hazari Court ( hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. ACMM/Ld. Trial Court'), in case bearing, 'State v. Pankaj Bajaj & Ors., Case No. 298098/2016", arising out of FIR No. 234/2011, CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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PS. Crime Branch, under Sections 420/467/468/471/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'). Pertinently, by virtue of the impugned order the Ld. Trial Court directed framing of charges under Section 120B and Sections 199/200/465 read with Section 120B IPC against the accused persons. Notably, the charges were subsequently framed against the accused, namely, Nakul Chand, Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi Bajaj on 07.12.2021. Needless to mention that while the accused persons have sought setting aside of the impugned order of charge dated 06.12.2021 and the consequent framing of such charges on 07.12.2021, however, the complainant has sought for framing of additional charges under Sections 420/467/468/471 IPC against the accused persons.
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution is premised on the complaint of the complainant, wherein she inter alia averred that she had made a complaint on 25.05.2011 at Crime Branch, seeking inquiry. As per the complainant, her father, Late Sh. R.D. Sharma was a member of the New Friends Cooperative House Building Society Limited (hereinafter referred to as the 'society') vide Membership No. 1532, whereupon plot No. A-20, New Friends Colony, New Delhi (435 sq. yds., hereinafter referred to as the 'plot/premise') was allotted to him by virtue of a sub-lease dated 16.06.1982 and possession was also handed over to him. As per the complainant, Delhi Development Authority ( hereinafter referred to as 'DDA') cancelled the sub-lease of the said plot vide order dated 09.02.2001 for the reason of alleged of violation of certain clauses of lease deed. Thereupon, the complainant is asserted to have made a representation before DDA for restoration CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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ABHISHEK Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:47:43
+0530
of lease and mutation in her and upon complainant's representation, sub-lease of the plot was restored in the name of the complainant, and she was asked to deposit the restoration charges vide letter dated 14.05.2009. However, it is further asserted by the complainant in her complaint when she visited her plot on 18.05.2009, she found that accused Pankaj Bajaj was conducting construction activity, in connivance with one M. L. Jaggi, Secretary of the Society (since deceased). Consequently, the complainant is proclaimed to have made a complaint to DDA. However, in support of his claim, accused Pankaj Bajaj relied on sale deed dated 26.03.2007, asserted to have been executed in his favour by Sh. M. L. Jaggi. Thereupon, the Deputy Director, Cooperative Society Cell, DDA, is asserted to have written a letter dated 22.01.2009 to M. L. Jaggi, avowing that the society sold the plot illegally to accused Pankaj Bajaj, violating the clause XVI of the Lease-Agreement dated 13.02.1963 executed between the DDA and the society. Ergo, under such circumstances, the complainant moved an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., whereupon the instant FIR No. 234/11 under Sections 420/467/468/471/120B IPC came to be registered at P.S. Crime Branch, and the investigation ensued.
2.1. Relevantly, during the investigation, the concerned police official(s)/IO is asserted to have recorded the statement as well as collected relevant reports/documents from the complainant as well as various authorities. Correspondingly, it is recorded under the chargesheet that the consequent investigation unearthed that a land measuring 828 bighas and 15 biswas, situated in the areas of village Kilokari and Khizrabad, including the premise/plot CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:47:47 +0530
in question, was allotted to the society through its President, Sh. Ram Lal Jaggi (father of co-accused M.L. Jaggi) and its Secretary, namely, Bal Mukund Vig on 13.02.1963 against an agreement. Subsequently, in the year 1971, Sh. Bishambar Dayal, filed a WP (C) No. 764/71 against DDA and society before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, against the acquirement of his land, i.e., khasra No. 60/3, Village Khizrabad, New Delhi and a stay was granted by the Hon'ble High Court against the dispossession of Sh. Bishambhar Dayal. However, the society had already developed the whole land and carved out 1116 plots including four plots bearing number A-13, A-14, A-19 and A-20 which were carved out of khasra No. 60/3. Markedly, as aforenoted the plot was allotted in favour of complainant's father vide sub-lease on 16.08.1982 by DDA and a letter of possession was correspondingly handed over to him by the society on 20.06.1988, followed by execution of a supplementary lease-deed on 19.09.1988. Relevantly, the allottees of plots bearing A-13, A-14 and A-19 are asserted to have settled and compromised their matters with Sh. Bishambhar Dayal, out of the court, however, dispute of the plot/premise preserved. Significantly, in 1992, Sh. R.D. Sharma/complainant's father sole the premise/plot to Jaju and Sethi family, in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease-agreement, leading to eventual cancellation of the lease in favour of Sh. RD Sharma on 22.01.2001. However, subsequently, the complainant is asserted to have settled her matter/dispute with Jaju and Sethi family on 05.02.2003 and the breaches were removed. Thereafter, the complainant submitted her representation and the DDA vide letter dated 14.05.2009 restored the sub-lease in respect of plot in favour CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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of the complainant, against the payment of restoration charges, as aforementioned. The chargesheet further chronicles that in the meanwhile, M.L. Jaggi approached Bhishamber Dayal and amicably compromised the matter pertaining to WP(C) No. 764/71, out of the court on 19.04.2005, in the absence of other respondents of WP(C) No. 764/71. The matter was consequently disposed off by the Hon'ble High Court and Sh. Bishambhar Dayal acknowledged that the society had already taken possession of the plot and paid a consideration amount of Rs. 48,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Eight Lakhs only) to him as well as his heirs against such settlement.
2.2. The chargesheet further records that pursuant to the investigation, it was determined that on 07.06.2004, Lt. Col. D. R. Thukral (membership No. 1500) withdrew his membership with the society and M. L. Jaggi inducted accused, Rashmi Bajaj in place of Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral, without taking necessary approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. As per the prosecution, the minute book of the society was also manipulated by Mr. M.L. Jaggi with the help of accused, Nakul Chand, Office Supt. of the society. It is noted under the chargesheet that Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral never mentioned in his application or affidavit that his membership may be transferred to any other person. Concomitantly, Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral further denied having transferred his membership to any other person, since he had already withdrawn his membership and taken back his deposit and there is no question of transfer of his share to any other as he took back his deposit. However, Mr. Pradeep Mohan, son-in-law of Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral, who is stated to have signed the share transfer CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:47:55 +0530
certificate as a witness, stated that Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral had signed the said certificate in his presence when they went to collect the cheque from the society. Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral could not be examined in this regard as he was settled in San Francisco, USA, and reportedly expired on 19.08.2012. Consequently, since there was contradiction in the versions, therefore, admitted signatures of Late Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral were collected from the society and Central Bank of India and the same were sent to FSL Rohini, along with the said certificate for expert opinion. However, the report of FSL, Rohini, New Delhi, corroborated the version of Mr. Pradeep Mohan that the signature of Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral (Q11) on the share transfer certificate was found genuine when it was matched with his admitted signatures (A8 to A14).
2.3. The chargesheet further records that, though, accused Rashmi Bajaj had applied for membership on 09.12.2004, however, she was granted membership on 27.11.2004, prior to the date of application, by resolution No. 6 of the society. Further, the membership no. 1500 was again transferred to accused Pankaj Bajaj vide resolution No. 3 of the society dated 25.02.2005, while accused Pankaj Bajaj had applied for membership only on 30.03.2005. Concomitantly, consequent to the ensuing investigation, it was determined that the assertion of M. L. Jaggi that he wrote letters on 10.02.2005 to 90 (ninety) waiting list members regarding offer of allotment of the plot was determined to be uncorroborated as out of 88 (eighty eight) letters sent to the waiting list members, 50 (fifty) letters were returned undelivered and only 20 (twenty) waiting list members responded, who categorically denied regarding the receipt of any such letter/offer CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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by them, except the two members. Subsequently, co-accused M.L. Jaggi is proclaimed to have also written a letter to DDA and Registrar Cooperative Societies for draw of the plot, however, from the letter, it is asserted that the plot had already been allotted to Pankaj Bajaj as there is no mention of any such draw, as per the society's record. On the contrary, it was determined that M.L. Jaggi already handed over the possession of the said plot to accused Pankaj Bajaj and gave two possession letters dated 03.06.2005 and 13.06.2005. Correspondingly, it was determined that the sale deed was executed on 26.03.2007 in favour of Pankaj Bajaj, on a stamp papers purchased on 01.07.2005, after a gap of about two years. As per the chargesheet, no plot was allotted to Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral who had been a member of the society for around 30 (thirty) years, leading to him withdrawing his membership of the. However, soon after the withdrawal of Lt. Col. D.R. Thukral's membership, the plot was illegally transferred to accused Pankaj Bajaj, immediately on his induction in the society in the year 2005. Relevantly, as per the chargesheet, the consideration amount of Rs. 48,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Eight Lakhs only) was also taken from accused Pankaj Bajaj in 2005, to settle the accounts/matter with the Sh. Bishambar Dayal and his family members.
2.4. Markedly, DDA vide its letter dated 22.01.2009 held that the sale of plot in favour of accused Pankaj Bajaj was void-ab- initio and thereafter vide letter dated 15.04.2009, it was intimated to M.L. Jaggi that the society was not entitled to sell any plots. Concomitantly, as aforenoted, the lease of the plot was restored in the name of the complainant, whereupon in the facts and CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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circumstances noted herein, the complainant, initiated proceedings against the accused persons, determining illegal occupation of the premise/plot in question by accused Pankaj Bajaj. Further, upon ensuing investigation, it is stated to have been further determined by the IO that under the minutes of meeting of managing committee of the society related to the premise/plot, several manipulations, deletions, amendment by application of white fluid, etc., were noted and the same are asserted to have been determined from FSL report to have been carried out by accused Nakul Chand, while acting in connivance with other accused persons, in particular, on the directions/instructions/criminal conspiracy with M.L. Jaggi.
2.5. Remarkably, on conclusion of the investigation, chargesheet was filed by the concerned police official(s) before the Ld. Trial Court, whereupon cognizance of offence was taken by the Ld. Trial Court on 07.08.2013. Relevantly, during the course of proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, co-accused, namely, Maqsudan Lal Jaggi @ M.L. Jaggi left for heavenly abode and the proceedings qua the said accused were abated by the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 28.05.2014, upon receipt of death verification report of accused, Maqsudan Lal Jaggi @ M.L. Jaggi. Subsequently, on the compliance of the provisions under Section 207 Cr.P.C. and upon arguments on charge having been addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the accused persons, Ld. Counsel for the complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the State, as aforementioned, charges were directed to be framed by the Ld. Trial Court against the accused persons vide order dated 06.12.2021, the impugned order herein. Apposite at this stage, to CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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reproduce the relevant extract(s) from the order dated 06.12.2021 of the Ld. Trial Court/impugned order, as under;
"...I have heard Ld. APP for the state assisted by Counsel for the complainant and respective counsels for the accused persons.
Accused no. 1 Pankaj Bajaj is son of accused no. 2 Rashmi Bajaj and alleged to have got alloted plot bearing no. A-20, New Friends Colony, New Delhi in their favour, illegally in conspiracy with accused no. 3 M.L. Jaggi (now deceased), who was the President of New Friends Colony Cooperative House Building Society, by filing false affidavits, getting the same alloted even prior to becoming the member of the society, manipulating and overwriting the resolution of the society in connivance with accused no. 4 Nakul Chand who was working as a superintendent in the society during the relevant time.
As per the record, the allotment of plot in question in favour of complainant/her Predecessor in interest was cancelled in the year 2001 and only restored in 2009. However, it does not give right to any person to take advantage of the same and bypass the rules and regulations of allotment of the plots of a cooperative society or jump the queue. No doubt the temptation was there after the allotment was cancelled but same can not be a ground to justify illegal acts or acquire the same by illegal means. In the present case, there is a clear evidence that both accused Rashmi Bajaj and Pankaj Bajaj were granted the membership of the society even prior to the date of application. IO has also seized the affidavit of Rashmi Bajaj, wherein she has stated that "I do no own, either in full or in part, on lease hold or free hold basis, any plot of land or a house in Delhi / New Delhi / Delhi Cantt, nor does my husband or any of my dependent relations including unmarried children, own either in full or in part, on lease hold or free hold basis, any plot of land or a house in Delhi/New Delhi / Delhi Cantt." While her husband Sh. S.D. Bajaj was the owner of the Flat No. A/18, NFC, New Delhi and H.No. 200, Sukhdev Vihar, New Delhi. Further the record reveals that Rashmi Bajaj transferred her membership further to her son accused Pankaj Bajaj on 25.02.2005 within a period of three months again in violation of Clause 9(1) of by-laws.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:48:13 +0530
Moving further prima facie there is also evidence that accused Nakul Chand had manipulated with the minutes of our meeting. IO has seized the same which is in register form. The minutes of meeting of Managing Committee dated 27.11.2004 on Page 40-
43. Resolution No.1 pertaining to Plot No.820 is in comparatively in small font and resolution No.6 has been amended after applying white fluid. As per the IO it clearly suggest that same has been inserted later and therefore charge of forgery is made out against accused Nakul Chand. The FSL report confirms the same in the handwriting of accused Nakul Chand. An accused cannot seek discharge merely by claiming that same was done under coercion or as per the directions of other co-accused.
To conclude prima facie it is established that all the accused persons conspired to illegally grab plot No.820 New Friends Colony by resorting to criminal conspiracy and forgery and thereby induction of Smt. Rashmi Bajaj against membership No.1500 by manipulating records and in contravention to prescribe rules and regulations. Accused Rashmi Bajaj also gave false affidavit on 09.12.2004 to get the membership of the society, further transfer of membership No.1500 also done in contravention of the by-laws of the society. Hence, prima facie a case U/s 120 B, 465, 199 and 200 IPC, is made out against accused- Rashmi Bajaj, Pankaj Bajaj and Nakul Chand. Accused M.L. Jaggi has ready expired. However, this court is in agreement with the submission of counsel for the accused that when the entire transactions took place complainant was not in picture i.e. her allotment was cancelled therefore, there was no aducement, deception or dishonest and fraudulent intention directed against the complainant and therefore, no charge of cheating is made out. Ld APP for the state and counsel for the complainant has also pressed for the charges U/s 118(5) and 118 (7) of Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 2003 against the accused persons for tampering with the record of Co-operative Society and also getting allotment of the plot in contravention with the provisions of above act. However, Section 121 of Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 2003 clearly states that no prosecution shall be instituted under this act without the previous sanction of a Registrar and such sanction shall not be given unless the person concerned has been provided a reasonable opportunity CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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to represent in a case. In the present case this court has failed to find any such previous sanction of the Registrar and Ld APP for the state assisted by counsel for the complainant have also failed bring to the notice of this court any such document wherein any such sanction has been granted. Accordingly, no charge under any of the provisions of Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 2003 can be made out..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.6. Apposite at this stage to further reproduce the consequent charges that were framed against the accused persons on 07.12.2021, pursuant to the aforesaid order/impugned order, as under;
"I, ***, ACMM-01 (Central), Delhi do hereby charge you accused person (1) Pankaj Bajaj (2) Rashmi Bajaj and (3) Nakul Chand follows:
That at unknown time and place, you all entered into a conspiracy of which accused M.L Jaggi was also part (now deceased) to illegally grab plot bearing no. A-20 situated in New Friends Cooperative Housing building society. NFC New Delhi or to grab it by illegal means and you accused Rashmi Bajaj and Pankaj Bajaj in furtherance of the same became members of the above society even prior to you applications for membership and further by bypassing the waiting list and you all thereby committed offence punishable u/s 120-B IPC.
In pursuance and furtherance of the above conspiracy you accused Rashmi Bajaj prepared a false affidavit on 09.12.2004 to get the membership of the above society wherein you stated that, inter alia, your husband did not own either in full or in part, on leasehold or freehold, any plot or land or a house in Delhi New Delhi / Delhi Cantt. whereas your husband Sh. S.D Bajaj was owner of flat no. A-118. NFC New Delhi and house no. 200 in Sukhdev Vihar New Delhi and you thereby committed offence punishable under section 199 IPC/120-B IPC.
Further you used the above declaration as true knowing it to be false and committed offence punishable under section 200 IPC.
Further also in pursuance of the above conspiracy and to illegally transfer the above plot in the name of CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:48:21 +0530
Rashmi Bajaj you accused Nakul Chand while working with New Friends Cooperative Housing building society tempered the minutes of meetings of the managing Committee dt. 27.11.2004 on page no. 40 to 43 concerning the resolution related to plot no.
A-20, further amended the resolution no. 6 relating to the above plot by applying white fluid, further the minutes of meeting of Managing committee dt.
13.5.2005 on page no. 58 to 60 and minutes and meeting of managing committee dt. 27.5.2005 relating to the above plot were also amended by applying fluid and you thereby committed offence of forgery punishable u/s 465 IPC read with 120-B IPC. And I hereby direct that you be tried by this court on the said charge..."
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Learned Counsel for accused persons have submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled cannons of law, deserving to be set aside at the outset, as suffering with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent reasons have been delineated under the said order. Ld. Counsel further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that the entire story of the complainant is concocted, false and unreliable. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court passed the impugned order by totally misinterpreting the law and material on record, as well as wrongly framed the charges against the accused persons. Ld. Counsel further submitted that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court further failed to appreciate that from the material placed on record, even the basic ingredients of the provisions/offences under Sections 120B IPC and Sections 465/199/200 IPC read with CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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Section 120B IPC are not even prima facie established against the accused persons. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for accused, Nakul Chand submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the said accused was a fourth-class employee at the relevant point in time, totally dependent on the Society as well as its office bearers for his livelihood and accommodation. Ld. Counsel further submitted that no mens rea for commission of any offence against Nakul Chand is forthcoming from the material placed on record, besides, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not discuss that whatever was performed by Nakul Chand was performed under threat/compulsion, in order to save his job. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, there is no consensus/commonality of any action or mens rea between the accused persons in the instant case. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 , the ingredients of offence under Section 464/465 IPC are not even prima facie made out in the instant case. Even otherwise, it was vehemently asserted that under the garb of its criminal complaint, the complainant has endeavored to give a criminal hue to the entire proceedings, whereas the dispute, if any, is purely civil in nature. In this regard, Ld. Counsel fervently argued that the matter between New Friends Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. and co-accused, Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi Bajaj is covered under the provisions of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act and is purely civil in nature. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, it is not the case of the prosecution that the accused Nakul Chand received any profit or advantage in the present matter, besides the prosecution CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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has even failed to attribute any motive or advantage to the said accused.
3.1. Ld. Counsel for accused Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi Bajaj, while supplementing the aforenoted arguments, further asserted that the Ld. Trial Court acted mechanically and passed the impugned order, oblivious to the correct facts and circumstances. As per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the complainant had earlier filed a complaint before the local police station and the Economic Offences Wing for registration of FIR, which were found meritless by the said authorities. However, it is only after lapse of significant time, the complainant approached Crime Branch-Daryaganj, Kotwali, notwithstanding the fact that the property in question, did not lie within the local limits of said police station/authority, which fact was not considered by the Ld. Trial Court. Even otherwise, as per the ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the investigating agency miserably failed to assign any mens rea to the accused persons or to demonstrate even prima facie that they were a part of any conspiracy. It was further submitted that the ingredients of offence under Section 120B IPC are completely missing in the instant case. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the ingredients of offence under Section 199/200 IPC are not even made out in the instant case. In this regard, it was argued that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that there is nothing on record to indicate that accused Rashmi Bajaj knowingly made a false declaration in her affidavit. On the contrary, as per the Ld. Counsel, accused Rashmi Bajaj did not know that her husband was a member of another society and that she had withdrawn from the membership, as soon CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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as it came to her attention. Correspondingly, it was asserted that no fraud, dishonest or wrongful intention/mens rea can be attributed to the accused persons for the offences alleged against them. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, merely for the factum of membership of the said accused persons to the Society, no culpability can be attributed against them. It was further submitted that the case of the accused persons is no different from any other members of the society, in the waiting list, who would have come forward to pay the sum of Rs. 48,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Eight Lakhs only), to be disbursed to the farmers. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, it is not the case of the prosecution that the property in question was undervalued in any manner. Ld. Counsel further asserted that the filing of the complaint or getting the plot restored in her name by the complainant, after a lapse of eight years, creates a separate right in favour of the complainant and she cannot allege any conspiracy or any other offence against other members of the society, who have been lawfully assigned the plot against consideration. Concomitantly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that in the instant case, WP No. 764/1971, filed by the bhoomidars of the land in question, namely, Sh. Bishamber Dayal and his legal heirs was disposed off by way of compromise with the society and the money was paid by the society to the farmers/original owners after taking the same from the said accused persons. Ld. Counsel further strenuously contended that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not appreciating that there was no malafide in the transaction in question at any stage and the complainant, with a sole endeavor to pressurize the society CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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to succumb to her unjust demands, converted civil dispute into criminal proceedings.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for accused Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi Bajaj further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the settlement, which was arrived in WP No. 764/1971 has since attained finality, besides the same was duly approved by the division bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and there was no challenge to such order either by the complainant or any of her legal heirs. Correspondingly, it was submitted that there is nothing on record to attribute any culpability for any offence/charges alleged against the accused persons, besides even the investigating authorities failed to point out any motive and/or advantage received by the accused persons to bring forth charges/allegations levelled against them in the instant case. Ld. Counsel for the accused persons further vehemently argued that the Ld. Trial Court grossly erred in not appreciating that there is no grave suspicion against the accused persons and the material on record, clearly demonstrates that the accused persons are innocent and have been wrongly/falsely implicated in the present case by the complainant with vindictive and ulterior designs/motives. It was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court also failed to give any sound, cogent or justified reasons for passing the impugned order, which adversely affects the rights of the accused persons. Consequently, the Ld. Counsel prayed that the impugned order, being passed in gross violation of law and settled judicial precedents, deserves to be set aside, outrightly. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr., (1979) 3 SCC 4; Public Prosecutor v. CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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Gangadharudu, (1956) ALT 678; Wayne S. Marteney v. United State of America; C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 10 SCC 193; Kehar Singh & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883; Ram Narain Popli v. CBI & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 2748; State v. VC Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 1382; Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1980 SC 439;Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 885; Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2433; Major E. G. Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1762; and Sharad v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, or incorrectness can be attributed to the impugned order, as well as the framing of charges against the accused persons, which was/were passed by the Ld. Trial Court, cognizant of the principles of law, as well as wary of the facts and circumstances brought forth. As per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the arguments contended by/on behalf of the accused persons are in the nature of their defence, which cannot be considered by court(s) at the stage of framing of charge. Even otherwise, sufficiency of the material/evidence placed on record, is not a fact which can be considered at the stage of framing of charges.
4.1. Ld. Counsel for the complainant submitted that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not framing charges/material charges CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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against the accused persons of the offences under Sections 420/467/468/471 IPC. In this regard, it was submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the accused persons, dishonestly and fraudulently induced the society and thereby all its members, including the complainant herein, by using forged, fabricated and concocted documents in order to cheat it and all its members including the complainant, who would have otherwise been entitled to allotment of the subject. It was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court erred in considering that wrongful loss has been caused to DDA ad the society, including the complainant, with whom the subject property vested and had the accused persons committed their Illegal acts. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record in detail, despite the law being settled that at the stage of framing of charge only the material placed on record for a limited purpose of establishing a prima facie case is to be seen and it is not to be determined at the stage of charge, whether the trial would finally result in conviction or not. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the concept of locus standi is alien to criminal jurisprudence and that any person can set the criminal machinery into motion. In this Ld. Counsel further asserted that it is not necessary that the wrongful loss must have ensued only to the complainant personally as in the instant case, where the acts/illegality on the part of the accused persons has caused wrongful loss to the society and all its members, including the complainant herein, attributing criminality against the accused persons. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the documents forged by the accused persons were valuable CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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security, as specified under Section 30 IPC, attracting the provisions under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC against the accused persons. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel for the complainant submitted as well as entreated that the charges under Sections 420/467/468/471 IPC be directed to be framed against the accused persons herein.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the accused persons, Ld. Counsel for the complainant as well as that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State, heard as well as the records, including the records of the Ld. Trial Court as well as the written argument/submissions and case laws, relied by the party(ies) have been thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the evaluation of the rival contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the accused persons as well as by Ld. Counsel for the complainant, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly note that while the Cr. Rev. No. 19/2022, preferred by accused Nakul Chand is within the statutory prescribed period of limitation of 90 days, as per the provisions under Article 131 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Limitation Act'). However, Cr. Rev. No. 261/2022, and Cr. Rev. No. 262/2022 preferred by accused persons, namely, Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi Bajaj, respectively against the impugned order dated 06/07.12.2021 were preferred only on 12.05.2022, when the statutory prescribed period of 90 (ninety) days had already lapsed. However, in this regard, this Court deems it apposite to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Re:
Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Pet. (C) No. 3/2020, dated 10.01.2022. Pertinently, in the said decision, the CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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Hon'ble Supreme Court, whilst being cognizant of the restrictions and limited operation of courts under the wake of covid-19 pandemic, extended the period of limitation in preferring the proceedings before the concerned court(s) inter alia, noting as under;
"...5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by learned counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the M.A. No. 21 of 2022 with the following directions:
I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasijudicial proceedings. II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022. III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. IV. It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings..."
(Emphasis supplied) CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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7. Ergo, in light of the foregoing judicial dictates, this Court unambiguously observes that even the bar of limitation/statutory period of limitation would not be attracted to the revision petitions bearing; Cr. Rev. No. 261/2022, and Cr. Rev. No. 262/2022 preferred by accused persons, namely, Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi Bajaj, respectively. However, notwithstanding the judicial dictate in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (Supra.), it is noted that the Cr. Rev. 544/2022, preferred by Meenakshi Sharma/complainant has been filed only on 07.10.2022 against the impugned order dated 06.12.2021, with an admitted delay of 125 (one hundred and twenty five) days only. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for the complainant asserted that the complainant is a senior citizen of aged 69 years and suffering with several ailments, including diabetes, thyroid and high blood pressure, placing her under the most vulnerable category of persons vis-à-vis covid-19 pandemic. Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel submitted that the complainant, at relevant point in time, resides with her husband, who was also aged around 72 years, besides the complainant's elder child is a 'special needs' child, suffering with profound and 100% permanent impairment. As per the Ld. Counsel, upon passing of the impugned order, the complainant could not immediately contact her counsel owing to her fear of contracting covid-19 virus and eventually on receipt of booster doze of her medicine, the complainant met with her counsel on 21.02.2022, who informed her that the case ought to be challenged by State, as the same being a State case. Consequently, the complainant remained under a misconception was quite some time, as per the Ld. Counsel, and it was only subsequently when CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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the complainant sought an alternate opinion on 20.04.2022, she was apprised of her right to approach this Court. Thereafter, as per the Ld. Counsel, negotiations on fee structure, obtainment of the records of the present case from erstwhile counsel of the complainant and drafting and preparation of the pleadings/complainant's revision petition ensued, which was eventually filed after considerable effort on the complainant's end, however, not without delay having been occasioned in the said process. Accordingly, it was asserted by the Ld. Counsel for the complainant that the delay in preferring the complainant's revision petition was neither deliberate nor intentional and that in case the delay in preferring the said revision is not condoned, grave and irreparable loss would accrue upon the complainant, whist, no loss/damage would be caused to accused persons, in case the prayer, as sought for by the complainant is permitted. Needless to mention, Ld. Counsel for the accused persons vehemently opposed the said prayer/entreaty for condonation on the ground that considering the period of delay in filing the complainant's revision, no relaxation/indulgence ought/may be granted in favour of the complainant, besides, as per the Ld. Counsel for the accused persons, conduct of the complainant is such that disentitles her to seek any indulgence/leave from this Court.
8. As aforenoted, Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation of 90 (ninety) days from the date of order, sought to be revised, as a period of limitation for filing criminal revision. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, inter alia provides for condonation of delay/extension of prescribed period in certain cases on demonstration of 'sufficient cause', which term(s)/words CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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have been repeated asserted by superior courts to be elastic and liberally construed, in the interest of justice. In this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while painstakingly collating the guidelines governing the exercise of court's power to condone delay as well as the meaning of the said words, enunciated as under;
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters..."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Unmistakably, the rules of limitation, which are premised on the principles enshrined in a Latin maxim, 'interest reipublicae up sit finis litium1', are designed not to destroy the legal rights of parties, rather, to ensure that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics. Ergo, considering the objective of the law and further being wary of the fact that there is no presumption under law that the delay in approaching courts was deliberate, courts 2 have repetitively professed for adoption of a pragmatic, justice- oriented approach, in variance to, technical interpretation, while determining 'sufficient case' in a case. In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Satish Chand Shivhare & Brothers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2151, while professing for adoption of a balanced as well as liberal approach in the determination of a prayer for limitation/condonation of delay, reaffirmed as under;
"22. When consideration of an appeal on merits is pitted against the rejection of a meritorious claim on the technical ground of the bar of limitation, the Courts lean towards consideration on merits by adopting a liberal approach towards 'sufficient cause' to condone the delay. The Court considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act may also look into the prima facie merits of an appeal. However, in this case, the Petitioners failed to make out a strong prima facie case for appeal. Furthermore, a liberal approach, may adopted when some plausible cause for delay is shown. Liberal approach does not mean that an appeal should be allowed even if the 1 It is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation.2
J.M. Ramachandra & Sons v. Customs Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1082. CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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cause for delay shown is glimsy. The Court should not waive limitation for all practical purposes by condoning inordinate delay caused by a tardy lackadaisical negligent manner of functioning."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Consequently, in light of the aforenoted judicial dictates/principles governing limitation, in the facts and circumstances and brought forth to the notice of this Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prayer for condonation of delay in filing of the criminal revision petition by the complainant, i.e., of filing of Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 544/2022 in the instant case deserves to be allowed. As aforenoted, the reasons for delay in the present case are stated to have been attributed to a bona fide mistake/misconception as well as of misinformation of the erstwhile counsel for the complainant, besides the medical and personal vulnerability of the complainant in wake of covid-19 pandemic as well as her familial conditions. Needless to mention, the application for condonation of delay of the complainant elaborately enlists the reasons for delay, besides the same is accompanied with necessary/explanatory document. Clearly, the reasons so stated by the Ld. Counsel for the complainant as well as specified under the complainant's application, in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be treated as malicious or dilatory in any manner, especially considering from the record of the Ld. Trial Court to the effect that the complainant had been diligently pursuing the matter/its case before the Ld. Court. Needless to reiterate any omission/misconception/error on the part of the counsel3 for complainant cannot be attributed to her in the instant 3 Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107; Nrisingha Charan Nandy Choudhury v. Trigunand Jha Khoware, 1938 SCC OnLine Pat 77; Rajesh Chandran v MR Gopalakrishnan Nair, OP(C) No. 281 of 2022, dated 22.07.2022 (Kerala HC); and Arjun Singh v. Board of Revenue, 2000 SCC OnLine Raj 657 CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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case. Correspondingly, this Court unswervingly observes that the prayer for condonation of delay in the instant case deserves to be allowed and the period of 125 (one hundred and twenty five) days' delay in preferring the complainant's revision/Cr. Rev. No. 544/2022 be condoned. Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, this Court outrightly allows the complainant's prayer seeking condonation of delay in preferring complainant's revision/ Cr. Rev. No. 544/2022 and the period of 125 (one hundred and twenty five) days' delay in filing/preferring the said revision petition is, hereby, condoned.
11. Germanely, proceeding further, however, before appreciating the rival contentions of the parties, it would be apposite to make a reference to the relevant provisions under law, in particular that under under law/Section 397 Cr.P.C.4, as under;
"397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision - (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to 4 Pari materia to Section 438 BNSS, which provides; "438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.***Explanation--All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 439.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding...." (Emphasis supplied). CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding..."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is quite evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be agitated either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 , wherein the Hon'ble Court while explicating the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. observed as under:
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Similarly, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in V.K. Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1192, in a similar context noted as under;
"67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test the waters of what might happen in the trial. The Revisional Court has to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the impugned order on the face of record."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a settled law5 that trite law that in a case where the order of 5 Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine MP 958. CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality, "merely because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner." Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi expounded as under;
"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Notably in the context of the foregoing, it is further apposite to observe here that it is no longer res integra that the orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature, rather, intermediate in nature 6, and are, therefore, not affected by the bar of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. However, the scope of interference under Section 397 Cr.P.C. at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also equally settled7. In this regard, it is pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manendra Prasad Tiwari v. Amit Kumar Tiwari, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1057, wherein the Hon'ble Court enunciated the law in regard the foregoing as under;
6Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P., (2022) 15 SCC 720.
7State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, (2017) 3 SCC 198. CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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"22. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 of CrPC has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage the final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure.
23. Section 397 CrPC vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to now consider the principles governing framing of charges. In this regard, it is relevant to outrightly note the settled law 8 that at the stage of framing of charges, neither can the truth, veracity and effect of the prosecution case be meticulously9 judged, nor can any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. On the contrary, at such a stage, only the sufficiency of ground for proceeding against the accused, on a general consideration of materials placed before the Court by the investigating police officer is relevant. Further, though, sifting of evidence is 8 State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 9 Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460. CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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permissible10, however, scanning of evidence in detail is not. Quite understandably, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Reena v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC OnLine Del 630 , iterated the said principles in unequivocal terms as under;
"12. Thus it is settled position of law that at the time of framing of charge, the Court is not supposed to look into the evidence of the case in detail and is only to consider whether there is a strong suspicion against the accused on the basis of the material that comes before it. The court has the power to sift the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out, whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused. However, the Court is not supposed to delve deeply into the merits of the matter and start a roving expedition into the evidence that is brought forth it, as if conducting a trial. Further there is no one fixed definition that may be ascribed to the term prima facie' nor can the term strong suspicion have a singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of its own independent facts and circumstances."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Concomitantly, it is settled law11 that the inconsistency in the material produced by the prosecution or the defect in investigation12, cannot be looked into for discharge of an accused, in the absence of full-fledged trial. In fact, the probative value13 of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material placed on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State through Deputy Superintendent of Police v. R. Soundirarasu and Ors., 10 State of Maharashta v. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 393.
11Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476.
12State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police v. N. Suresh Ranjan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709.
13Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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MANU/SC/1103/2022, wherein the Hon'ble Court remarked as under;
"58. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., MANU/SC/1011/2012: (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the Accused had committed the offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the Accused. It was held that the Court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Relevant to further note that it is trite law 14, at the stage of framing of charge, only the police report is required to be considered and the defence of the accused15 cannot be looked into. Needless to mention that the superior courts 16 have persistently deprecated the practice of holding a mini trial at the time of framing of charge. Relevantly, in this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharat Parikh v. CBI, (2008) 10 SCC 109, wherein the Hon'ble Court enunciated the judicial principle(s), as under;
"19. As observed in Debendra Nath Padhi case [(2005) 1 SCC 568: 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] at the stage of framing charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible, and a mini trial cannot be conducted at 14 State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad & Anr. v. P. Suryaprakasam, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 373 and State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568.
15State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294.
16Indu Jain v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 341.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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such stage. At the stage of framing of charge the submissions on behalf of the accused have to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. The accused will get an opportunity to prove the documents subsequently produced by the prosecution on the order of the Court, but the same cannot be relied upon to reopen the proceedings once charge has been framed or for invocation of the High Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Apposite to further emphasize17 that at the stage of charge, court(s) is/are not even required to record detailed reasons for framing charge, rather18, a very strong suspicion founded upon materials placed before it, which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges. In fact19, it is only when no case is made out even after presuming entire prosecution evidence, can an accused be discharged. Needless to accentuate20, "at the stage of framing of charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the purpose of trial." Notably, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715, while inter alia illuminating the principles as well as the scope of enquiry for the purpose of charge/discharging an accused, observed as under;
"14. ...In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of 17 Bhawna Bai v. Dhanshyam & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 217 18 Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 and Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 19 Manjit Singh Virdi v. Hussain Mohammed Shattaf, (2023) 7 SCC 633 20 Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 424 CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused".
The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Ergo, being mindful of the principles hereinunder noted, this Court would now proceed with the determination of the arguments raised by Ld. Counsel for the accused persons, Ld. Counsel for the complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the State. Markedly, one of the primary contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the accused persons is that even from the material placed on record prima facie ingredients of offences/allegations levelled/charges framed against the accused persons are not even prima facie made out. However, in order to appreciate the said contentions, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/IPC as under;
"30. "Valuable security"-The words "valuable security" denote a document which is, or purports to be, a document whereby any legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or whereby any person acknowledges that he lies under legal liability, or has not a certain legal right.
*** *** *** 120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy-When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done-
(1) an illegal act, or CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation-It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.
*** *** ***
199. False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence- Whoever, in any declaration made or subscribed by him, which declaration any Court of Justice, or any public servant or other person, is bound or authorised by law to receive as evidence of any fact, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, touching any point material to the object for which the declaration is made or used, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
200. Using as true such declaration knowing it to be false- Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as true any such declaration, knowing the same to be false in any material point, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
*** *** ***
415. Cheating-Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat".
Explanation-A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.
*** *** ***
420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
*** *** ***
463. Forgery-Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.
464. Making a false document- A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record- First- Who dishonestly or fraudulently-
(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document;
(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record;
(c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record;
(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, singed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly- Who without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly- Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration... CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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465. Punishment for forgery-Whoever commits forgery shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
*** *** ***
467. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.- Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquaintance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquaintance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
468. Forgery for purpose of cheating-Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document or electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
*** *** ***
471. Using as genuine a forged document or
electronic record-Whoever fraudulently or
dishonestly uses as genuine any document or electronic record which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document or electronic record, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or electronic record..."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Notably, it is observed from above that in order to attract culpability under provisions under Sections 465, 467 and 468 IPC, the prosecution is inter alia required to establish21, commission of forgery as defined under Section 463 IPC. Notably, as per the provisions under Section 463 IPC, "Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or 21 Dharmala Venkata Subrahmanya Sarma v. The State of A.P., Criminal Petition No. 10174 of 2018, dated 27.03.2024 (Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh). CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery". Needless to mention, making of false document, as per Section 464 IPC inter alia amounts to the making, signing, sealing or execution of a document or part of a document or electronic record in the manner specified under the said provision, "with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed". Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohd Ibrahim v. State of Bihar (2009) 8 SCC 751, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while enunciating the ingredients of offence of making of false document(s)/Section 464 IPC, noted as under;
"10. An analysis of section 464 of Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories:
10.1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed.
10.2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person.
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
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10.3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration.
11. In short, a person is said to have made a `false document', if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception, or from a person not in control of his senses."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Here, it is further pertinent to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Karan Kohli v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Revision No. 199/2018, dated 11.10.2018, wherein the Hon'ble High Court observed that for liability under Section 468 IPC to attract, prosecution is not required to prove that an accused actually commits the offence of cheating. On the contrary, "what is material is the intention or purpose of the offender in committing forgery. For proving the case under Section 468 of the IPC prosecution is required to establish that the accused had committed forgery and that he did it with the intention that document forged shall be used for the purposes of cheating." Correspondingly, provisions under Section 471 IPC would be attracted22 in a case where an accused, fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine, any document or electronic record, which he knows or has reasons to believe to be forged.
23. Markedly, in so far as the provisions under Section 120B IPC is concerned, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly 22 Deepak Gaba v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 2328 of 2022, dated 02.01.2023 (SC). CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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note that the superior courts have incessantly clarified 23 that Section 120B IPC prescribes punishment for criminal conspiracy, which by itself is an independent offence and punishable separately from the main offence. Clearly, the objective behind inducting the offence of criminal conspiracy under the statute book is to prevent riotous supremacy which an accused may gain by involvement of several persons. In fact, Section 120A/120B IPC specifically envisage that a person, singularly, may not be in a position to commit an offence, however, when he enters into an agreement with other, the others may give him impetus as well as support to commit the same. Apposite at this stage to make reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esher Singh v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2004 SC 3030: 2004 (11) SCC 585, wherein the Hon'ble Court while inter alia explicating the ingredients and scope of provisions under Section 120B, noted as under;
"...The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be: (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object, (c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed to co-operate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means, (d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is framed. From this, it necessarily follows that unless the statute so requires, no overt act need be done in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the object of the combination need not be accomplished, in order to constitute an indictable offence. Law making conspiracy a crime, is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief which is gained by a combination of the minds. The 23 State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan & Anr., AIR 2000 SC 3323: 2000 (8) SCC 203. CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. The conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to encompass all its members wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design. (See: American Jurisprudence Vol.II See 23, p. 559). For an offence punishable under section 120-B, prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agree to do or cause to be done illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. Offence of criminal conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and an act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for use of criminal means..."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Here, it is further apposite to make a reference to the decision in Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, 1993 (3) SCC 609 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court explicitly remarked that in order to attract culpability against an accused/co-conspirator, it is not necessary of all the participants to be aware of each and every detail at every stage, rather, there must be consensus/commonality of mind and action. Relevant extract from the said dictate is reproduced as under;
"...It is not necessary that each conspirator must know all the details or the scheme nor be a participant at every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for design or object of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements: (1) agreement (2) between two or more persons by whom the agreement is effected, and (3) a criminal object, which may be either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the means by which CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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that aim is to be accomplished. It is immaterial whether this is found in the ultimate objects..."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Germane for the present purpose(s) to note that in order to attract culpability under the provisions of Section 420 IPC, prosecution is required to prove the commission24 of, "(i) cheating as defined under Section 415 IPC 25; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security, and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement." Here, it is further pertinent to note that as per Section 415 IPC, cheating encompasses, fraudulently or dishonestly inducing a 'person so deceived' to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or even includes, intentionally inducing a person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Quite evidently, in so far as the latter part of Section 415 IPC is concerned, 'property', at no stage, is involved. In fact, it is the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the person so cheated, as a result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is material. However, even in this regard, law is settled that the damage or harm caused or likely to be caused must be the necessary consequence of the act done by reason of the deceit practiced, or must be necessarily likely to follow therefrom, and 24 Binod Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2014 (10) SCC 663 and Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 3 SCALE 563.
25Section 415 of IPC provides, "Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat"."
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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the law does not take into account remote possibilities that may flow from the act. In other words, law does not take into account remote possibilities that may flow from the act. Clearly, such damage or harm must be proximate and natural result of the act or omission and does not include vague and contingent injury. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in Harendra Nath Das v. Jyotish Chandra Datta, AIR 1925 Cal. 100: (1925) ILR 52 Cal. 188 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while iterating similar sentimentalities, remarked as under;
"6. ...Under Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code, the damage or harm caused or likely to be caused must be the necessary consequence of the act done by reason of the deceit practiced, or must be necessarily likely to follow therefrom, and the law does not take into account remote possibilities that may flow from the act [Mojey v. Queen-Empress (1890) I. L. R. 17 Calc. 606]. The proximate and natural result only of the act has to be judged, and not any vague and contingent injury that may possibly arise [Milton v. Sherman (1918) 22 C. W. N. 1001]. The prosecution allege in the present case that the accused used the name of a bogus or non-existent firm, with the object of not fulfilling the contract in the event of the market going up, and as the market did go up he did not supply the jute with the result that Mr. Pithie suffered loss. Such remote consequences must, in my opinion, be ignored for the purposes of Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code..."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Markedly, in order for the provisions under Section 199 IPC to be attracted in a given case, prosecution is required to prove that an accused indulged in 26; "(i) making of a declaration which a Court or a public servant is bound or authorised by law to receive in evidence; (ii) making of a false 26 Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd. & Ors., Crl. Appeal No. 1979/2010, dated 08.10.2010 (SC).
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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statement in such declaration knowing or believing it to be false; and (iii) such false statement must be touching any point material to the object for which the declaration is made or used ." Correspondingly, Section 200 IPC provides that, "whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as true any such declaration, knowing the same to be false in any material point, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence." Clearly, criminality for the offence under Section 199 IPC lies in making of declaration which a Court or a public servant is bound or authorised by law to receive in evidence. As a corollary, where a document fails to qualify as a declaration which any court or public servant or other person is bound or authorized by law to receive as evidence of any fact or the authority does not qualify as one which has authority under the law to receive any evidence, provisions under Section 199 IPC would not be attracted. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in; Anil Kapoor v. Finance-cum- Health Secretary, Chandigarh, 1974 CrLJ 862, wherein the Hon'ble Court purged the accused therein of criminality of offence under Sections 199/200 IPC. Relevantly, in the instant case the accused had a false affidavit to his application to the Director of Health Services, seeking admission to M.B.B.S. course against the reserved quota. However, under such circumstances, it was held that such declaration was not the one which any court or public servant or other person was bound or authorised by law to receive as evidence of a fact so as to attract culpability against the accused therein for the offence under Sections 199/200 of IPC. Relevant CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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extract from the decision in Anil Kapoor v. Finance-cum-Health Secretary, Chandigarh (Supr.) is reproduced as under;
"...The first contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the declaration contained in affidavit (Exhibit PC/1) is not of the type mentioned in Sections 199 and 200, Indian Penal Code, i.e., it is not a declaration which any court or public servant or other person is bound or authorized by law to receive as evidence of any fact. I asked Mr. Anand Swaroop to point out the existence of any such law in relation to that declaration and he frankly conceded that he could not point out any and that the petitioner could not be said to have committed any offence falling under Section 199 or Section 200 of the Indian Penal Code even if that declaration was false to the petitioner's knowledge. In this view of the matter, I accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner and hold that the charge framed against the petitioner under the two sections, just above-mentioned, cannot be sustained..."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Consequently, being mindful of the above, when facts of the present case are conscientiously evaluated, in light of aforenoted judicial precedents as well as the arguments addressed, it is outrightly observed that there are specific allegations that the accused persons, namely, Pankaj Bajaj and Rashmi Bajaj, acted in connivance and criminal conspiracy with M.L. Jaggi (since deceased) and accused Nakul Chand, to illegally grab the land of DDA, i.e., plot/premise in question by engaging in cheating and conspiracy. There are further allegations that accused Rashmi Bajaj was inducted as a member of society under membership no. 1500 by M.L. Jaggi, Secretary/President of Society by manipulating the records of the society, with the help of Nakul Chand, Officer Superintendent of the Society, in violation of prescribed rules and regulations. In fact, it is explicitly recorded under the chargesheet, it was determined during the investigation CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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that though accused Rashmi Bajaj applied for membership of the society on 09.12.2004, however, she was granted the membership on 27.11.2004, i.e., prior to the date of application, by resolution 6 of the society. In this regard, investigations are asserted to have further unearthed that from the original minute book w.e.f. 12.12.2003 to 28.11.2008 of the society, which is in the register form was seized and it was determined that in the minutes of meeting of the managing committee dated 27.11.2004, on page nos. 40-43 thereof, Resolution no. 1 relates to the plot/premise and that the same was observed to be in comparatively smaller/shrunken writing/font. Correspondingly, Resolution no. 6 of the said minutes of meeting relate to the plot/premise, which was noted to have been amended after application of white fluid. Apposite to reproduce the relevant extract(s) of resolution 6, with emphasis on the amended portion, as under;
"6. To consider to Considered and transfer the share of approved. Lt. Col. Dev membership no. 1500 Raj Thukral was which was in the name of enrolled as a member of Lt. Col. Dev Raj Thukral the society in the year (Retd.) who has requested 1974. As he has shifted to transfer his share in the to USA along with his name of Mrs. Rashmi family, he requested the Bajaj w/o. Mr. Shiridhar society for the refund of Bajaj, as he had now his deposit made for the settled out of India (USA) land. He further Lt. Col. Thukral became requested that in his member in 1974 and is on place, membership be the waiting list, being a transferred in the name senior most citizen has of Smt. Rashmi Bajaj also requested to refund w/o. Sh. Shiridhar the money lying deposited Bajaj. Accordingly, the with the society. The same is approved and an Society as per practice, amount of one lakh has refunded an amount of Rs. been received from 24,840/- against Rs. Smt. Rashmi Bajaj 25,000/- deposited by towards her him. A cheque of Rs. One membership fee and CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 49 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.05.15 16:51:14 +0530 lakh on a/c. F membership deposited for the land.
fee and part payment of "Resolved
land has been received accordingly."
from Mrs. Rashmi Bajaj.
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Correspondingly, the said membership, i.e., membership bearing no. 1500 was subsequently transferred to accused Pankaj Bajaj, in place of accused Rashmi Babj vide resolution no. 3 of the society dated 25.02.2005, while accused Pankaj Bajaj had applied for membership on 30.03.2005, i.e., prior to the date of application. Needless to mention that in the aforementioned original minute book w.e.f. 12.12.2003 to 28.11.2008 of the society, under the minutes of meeting of the managing committee dated 25.02.2005, on page nos. 51-53 thereof, Resolution no. 1 relates to the plot/premise and that the same was observed to be in comparatively smaller/shrunken writing/font. Correspondingly, Resolution no. 3 of the said minutes of meeting relate to the plot/premise, recording transfer of membership in favour of accused Pankaj Bajaj in the said minutes dated 25.02.2005, prior to the said accused's application only on 30.03.2005. Apposite to reproduce the relevant extract(s) of resolution 3 of the said minutes of meeting, as under;
"3. To consider request Approved, subject to
of Mrs. Rashmi Bajaj w/o. completion of
Mr. Shiridhar Bajaj for formalities and payment
the transfer of of necessary charges.
membership no. 1500 in "Resolved
the name of her son Mr. accordingly."
Pankaj Bajaj. Mrs.
Rashmi Bajaj is a waiting
member and is without
plot.
(Emphasis supplied)
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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29. Here, it is further pertinent to note that the investigations in the instant case are proclaimed to have further revealed that from the aforementioned original minute book w.e.f. 12.12.2003 to 28.11.2008 of the society it is further observed that under the minutes of meeting of managing committee dated 13.05.2005 on page nos. 58-60, Resolution No. 5 is related to plot/premise. Correspondingly, minutes of meeting of managing committee dated 27.05.2005 on page nos. 61-64, Resolution No. 5, 6 and 7 were observed to be related to the plot/premise, where the Resolution No. 6 was determined to have been amended after applying white fluid. Relevantly, there are statements of witnesses on record of the Ld. Trial Court, being the members of the managing committee of the society, who proclaimed that the said minutes/resolutions were not made and/or written in front of them/said members of society. Needless to mention that the said resolutions were further declared to have been manipulated and fabricated by M.L. Jaggi at a later stage and that too without the knowledge of such members of society. Pertinently, the said amended/fluid marked extracts are stated to have been determined under forensic investigation to be made by accused Nakul Chand, who is stated to have manipulated/committed forgery, in the minute books and other documents of the society on the direction of co-accused M.L. Jaggi (since deceased). Needless to mention that such amendments/overwriting/insertion in shrunken fonts, as per the FSL Report dated 16.05.2013 were inter alia determined under the handwriting of the accused Nakul Chand. Apposite to reproduce the relevant extracts from the said report as under;
"...Questioned: Red enclosed writings & signatures marked Q1 to Q11 on various documents CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 51 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.05.15 16:51:24 +0530 viz. Minutes Book (New Friend's Co-operative House Building Society Ltd.) w.e.f. 12.12.2003 to 28.11.2008, Undertaking and Trasnfer of Share dated 7th June 2004.
Standards- Red enclosed standard writings & signatures marked A1 to A7 of Sh. M.L. Jaggi , A8 to A14 of Col. D.R. Thukral and S1 to S36 of Sh. Nakul Chand.
*** *** *** III. The person who wrote the red enclosed writings stamped and marked S1 to S36 also wrote the red enclosed writings similarly stamped and marked Q2, Q3, Q5, Q7 & Q9 for the following reasons:..."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. Strikingly, it is further recorded under the chargesheet that accused M. L. Jaggi (since deceased) is asserted to have written letter on 10.02.2005 to 90 (ninety) waiting list members regarding offer of allotment of the premise/plot in question through post. However, during the course of investigation, IO/Insp. Sajjan Singh Yadav is asserted to have issued letters vide No. 1443-1530/ACP/SOS, dated 14.11.2011 through courier to all the waiting list members except accused persons, Pankaj Bajaj and Nakul Chand, whereupon, out of 88 (eighty eight) letters so issued, 50 (fifty) letters were returned undelivered and only 20 (twenty) waiting list members responded, who categorically denied regarding the receipt of any such letter/offer by them from M.L. Jaggi, except the two members. Further,
31. Concomitantly, from the investigation, it is asserted to have been determined that accused M.L. Jaggi (since deceased) executed a sale deed on 26.03.2007 in favour of Pankaj Bajaj by claiming society's ownership over the plot/premise, however, such agreement was executed on stamp paper purchased CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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GOYAL
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on 01.07.2005, besides, in order for accused Rashmi Bajaj to obtain membership, she is asserted to have tendered a declaration before the society inter alia asserted as under;
"...1. That neither I nor my husband nor any of my dependent relations (including unmarried children( is a member of any other house building cooperative society, functioning in Delhi/New Delhi/Delhi Cantt.
2. That I do not own, either in full or in part, on lease hold or free hold basis, any plot of land or a house in Delhi/New Delhi/Delhi Cantt., nor does my husband or any of my dependent relations including unmarried children, own either in full or in part, on lease hold or free hold basis, any plot of land or a house in Delhi/New Delhi/Delhi Cantt..."
(Emphasis supplied)
32. As aforenoted, accused, Rashmi Bajaj is proclaimed to have tendered declaration avowing that neither does she or her spouse or any of her dependant relations, including unmarried children, owned, either in full or in part, on lease hold or free hold basis, any plot of land or a house in Delhi/New Delhi/Delhi Cantt., either in full or in part, on lease hold or free hold basis, which was determined to be false as her/Rashmi Bajaj's husband, S.D. Bajaj was determined to be the owner of the Flat No. A-118, NFC, New Delhi and H. No. 200, Sukhdev Vihar, New Delhi, at the relevant point in time. Ergo, in conspectus of the foregoing, when the arguments of Ld. Counsel for the parties as well as the written submissions and case laws relied are considered in conjunction with the material placed on record, this Court is in consensus with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that the accused persons, acted in connivance and criminal conspiracy with each other, whereby, in furtherance to the said conspiracy, accused Nakul Chand, while working with the society manipulated and/or CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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tempered the minutes of meetings of the managing committee dated 27.11.2004 on page no. 40 to 43, concerning the resolution related to plot/premise, besides, also amended the resolution no. 6 relating to the said plot by applying white fluid. Concomitantly, accused Nakul Chand, in furtherance to said conspiracy also carried out material alterations in the minutes of meeting of managing committee dated 13.5.2005 on page no. 58 to 60 and minutes and meeting of managing committee dated 27.5.2005 relating to the premise/plot, by applying fluid, committing the offence of forgery under Section 465 IPC read with Section 120B IPC. However, this Court is not in consensus with the submission of Ld. Counsel for the complainant that the provisions under Section 467/468/471 IPC are attracted against the accused persons for the reason that neither the minutes of said meeting nor the undertaking tendered by accused Rashmi Bajaj to the society, in the considered opinion of this Court, be treated to be a valuable security under Section 30 IPC, as otherwise professed by Ld. Counsel for the complainant. Needless to mention, Section 30 IPC defines, valuable security as a document, "which is, or purports to be, a document whereby any legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or where by any person acknowledges that he lies under legal liability, or has not a certain legal right...". Clearly, neither the minutes of meeting or the said undertaking is a document which creates legal right or liability in favour of any of the accused persons in the instant case, bringing the case outside the purview of the provisions under Section 467/468/471 IPC. In fact, in this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in; Shaikh Noor CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:51:37 +0530
Mohamad Shaikh Fazal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 297: 1980 Cri. LJ 1345, wherein the Hon'ble Court in a similar situation, modified the conviction of the accused/convicts therein from Section 471/467 IPC to Section 471/465 IPC, holding that certificates deployed by the said accused/convicts for obtaining admission in college would not fall within the ambit of ' valuable security' under Section 30 IPC. Relevant extract of the said dictate is reproduced as under;
"...as regards the offence under Section 471 read with Section 467, I.P.C. we do not think that the two certificates the appellant has been found to have forged to get admission in the Art and Commerce College affiliated to Poona University could be described as "valuable security'' as the expression is defined in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code, We, therefore, alter the conviction under the aforesaid sections to one under Section 471 read with Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we set aside the sentences passed against the appellant and remit the matter to the trial court..."
(Emphasis supplied)
33. In so far as the charge under Section 199 IPC is concerned, this Court is not in consensus with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that tendering of false affidavit by Rashmi Bajaj to the society would bring the accused persons prima facie within the ambit of the said provision. Needless to reiterate that criminality for the offence under Section 199 IPC lies in making of declaration which a Court or a public servant is bound or authorised by law to receive in evidence. As aforenoted, where a document fails to qualify as a declaration which any court or public servant or other person is bound or authorized by law to receive as evidence of any fact or the authority does not qualify as one which has authority under the law to receive any evidence, provisions under Section CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 55 of 58 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15 16:51:41 +0530
199 IPC would not be attracted. Clearly, in the instant case, in the considered opinion of this Court, Society does not fall within the purview of an authority, authorised by law to receive a document, as an evidence of any fact, bringing the instant case outside the purview of Section 199/120B IPC, as also observed by the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Anil Kapoor v. Finance- cum-Health Secretary, Chandigarh (Supra.). Nonetheless, in the instant facts of the present case, provisions under Section 200/120B IPC are squarely applicable against the accused persons. Needless to mention that there is prima facie material against the accused persons for the offence under Section 120B IPC, as demonstrable from the material placed on record and this Court is not convinced with the submission of Ld. Counsel for the accused persons that no clear, explicit and cogent evidence is forthcoming to proceed with the said charge. Needless to reiterate in this regard that law is trite that for the offence of conspiracy, direct evidence is difficult to find for generally27, "a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. The prosecution will often rely on evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they were done in reference to their common intention. The prosecution will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such evidence direct or circumstantial." Lastly, this Court is not convinced with the submissions of Ld. Counsel for the complainant that the offence under Section 415/420 IPC stands attracted against the accused persons in the absence of even prima facie material on record to demonstrate, inducement of any kind of 27 Mukesh and Ors. v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors., MANU/SC/0575/2017. CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 56 of 58
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.05.15
16:51:46 +0530
the complainant or any other person, forthcoming on record. Lastly, this Court reiterates that the submissions of Ld. Counsel for the accused persons that they have been falsely implicated in the present case or the investigating officer has active vindictively against the accused persons or that accused Nakul Chand was actively in good faith on the instructions of his senior(s) or that the accused persons had no mens rea or consensus to commit the offence are all subject matter of trial and the accused persons' defence, which cannot be considered at the stage of framing of charge, in light of the aforesaid judicial dictates.
34. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the arguments addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the accused persons, Ld. Counsel for the complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the State, this Court observes that from the facts and circumstances of the case, material and the documents placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court, including inter alia the contents of the chargesheet, statements of witnesses, as well as other material, including the FSL report, prima facie case under Section 120B IPC, Sections 465/200IPC read with Section 120B IPC stands established against accused persons. Needless to mention that there is sufficient material/ground(s) to proceed against the accused persons for the said offences, besides there is prima facie case/grounds and strong suspicion, as well as material and witnesses who can depose against them. However, it is reiterated that in the instant case, in the considered opinion of this Court, society does not fall within the purview of an authority, authorised CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors. CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi).
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by law to receive a document, as an evidence of any fact, bringing the instant case outside the purview of Section 199/120B IPC.
35. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court unwaveringly records and reiterates that the impugned order/order dated order dated 06.12.2021, passed by Ld. ACMM-01, Central, Tis Hazari Court in case bearing, 'State v. Pankaj Bajaj & Ors., Case No. 298098/2016' , arising out of FIR No. 234/2011, PS. Crime Branch, under Sections 420/467/468/471/120B of IPC is upheld in respect of charges under Section 120B IPC and Sections 465/200 IPC read with Section 120B IPC and modified/set aside in so far as it relates to framing of charge under Section 199/120B IPC. Ergo, the aforenoted petitions/revision petitions bearing; Cr. Rev. No. 19/2022, Cr. Rev. No. 261/2022, Cr. Rev. No. 262/2022 and Cr. Rev. 544/2022 are disposed off in the above terms. Needless to mention that the judgments relied would not come to aid of the parties as facts of the present case are distinguishable.
36. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court concerned for information and compliance.
37. Revision file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.05.15
16:51:54
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 15.05.2025 ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CR No. 19/2022 Nakul Chand v. State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors.
CR No. 261/2022. Pankaj Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 262/2022 Rashmi Bajaj v. State (GNCT of Delhi). CR No. 544/2022 Meenakshi Sharma v. State & Ors. Page No. 58 of 58