Calcutta High Court
Kabita Mukherjee vs Padam Chand Banthia Also Known As P.C. ... on 2 August, 2001
Equivalent citations: (2001)3CALLT233(HC), 2002 A I H C 429, (2002) 1 RENCR 503, (2002) 2 RENTLR 237, (2001) 3 CALLT 233
Author: A. Lala
Bench: Amitava Lala
JUDGMENT A. Lala, J.
1. Originally the plaintiff instituted a suit in the Court of 10th Assistant District Judge, 24 Parganas (South) at Alipore being Title Suit No. 103 of 1995 for ejectment, recovery of Khas possession and mesne profits, etc. against the defendant from the portion of his occupation available in the plaint at and from the Premises No. 20B, Ballygunge Place, Calcutta - 700 019, The defendant filed his written statement in such suit. Inspection and other formalities were completed. Such suit was ultimately transferred to the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this High Court by invocation of power of superintendence under Clause 13 of the Latters Patent and re-numbered as Extra Ordinary Suit No. 33 of 1998. Ultimately the Suit was placed for hearing. Following issues and additional issue were framed:
Issues :
1. whether the plaintiff is the owner of the Premises No. 20B, Ballygunge Place, Calcutta, as alleged in paragraph 1 of the plaint and whether there is any relation between the Plaintiff and the defendant as landlord and tenant?
2. whether the tenancy is determined in accordance with the provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act?
3. whether the defendant is guilty of acts of Waste and/or negligence?
4. whether the defendant has made any addition or alteration?
5. whether the defendant is defaulter in payment of rent from the month of April, 1995?
6. whether the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for her own use and occupation or for persons for whose benefit the premises are held as alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint?
7. whether the suit is barred by res-judicata?
8. whether the suit is bad by reason of the fact that it is instituted within three years of plaintiffs inheriting the property?
9. whether the notice dated April 27, 1995 is valid?
10. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled to?
Additional Issues :
11. Is bequeath by will in the instant case Transfer" within the meaning of section 13(3A) of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act?
12. Is the Plaintiff debarred from filing the suit within three years on the ground of Clause (f) and (ff) of section 13(1) of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act?
13. Has the suit been properly valued?
14. Is the suit hit by section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
2. An incidental event has to be taken into account at this stage. Inspite of allowing the additional issues as suggested by the defendant himself and accepted by the Plaintiff under order dated 7th December, 2000 surprisingly such defendant preferred an appeal from the order passed at his instance. However, no stay was obtained or granted by the Appeal Court. Therefore there was no embargo in proceeding with the suit. Witnesses were examined. As per prevailing practice of the Suit Court at first defendant's counsel was called upon to start argument at the end of his witness action.
3. According to the defendant, the plaintiff is not the owner of the promises. Her mother bequeathed the property to her under a Will. One Mr. Shekhar Bose, an Advocate of this Court was appointed as executor under the Will. Combined reading of sections 211, 216 and 333 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 speaks that property vestes upon an executor under a Will but unless and until such executor accords his assent to legatee property cannot pass to the beneficiary. It transpired from the question Nos. 14, 281, 283, 284. 289 and 210 of the plaintiff that no assent was accorded by the executor 3 years before the institution of the Suit. Although the plaintiff deposed by saying that she is the sole and exclusive owner of the property subject to the right of residence of her eldest sister but she has six brothers and six sisters. It cannot be said that 'transfer' has really been effected in favour of the plaintiff to become landlord of the defendant. This being the position, the plaintiff cannot get a decree for eviction as against the defendant. Since the word 'transfer' has not been defined under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (being the State Act) applicable herein, the meaning and expression of the word should be borrowed from the Transfer of Property Act, (the Central Act). Ultimately relying upon decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 79 CWN 632 (Satyabrata Banerjee and Anr. v. Usha. Probha Sarkar and Ors.) contended that a bequeath by a Will is 'transfer' within the meaning of section 13(1)(a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Such a bequeath Will also fall within the term 'assignment' under the said section. The definition of 'transfer' as appears in the Transfer of Property Act cannot be said to be exhaustive. It merely enumerates or concentrates on those to which the said definition is sought to be applied. The ordinary meaning of 'transfer' means a conveyance of right, title or interest in real or personal property from one person to another. The said transfer may take place in present or in future. By means of testamentary disposition a transfer becomes effective on the death of testator. But by virtue of the said Division Bench judgment it will be operative upon obtaining a probate.
4. He also relied upon a judgment (Dr. Anant Trimback sabnis v. Vasant Pratap Pandit) in its paragraphs 7,8 and 9 in support of the self-same proposition. Under the said judgment a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the word 'assent' and 'transfer' are wide enough to include any type of transfer Including passing of the property from the testator to the legatee. There is no reason why the said word should not include disposal of the property under will. Even the restricted concept of 'transfer' inter vivas in Section 5 of Transfer of property Act contemplates that it is becoming effective at some future date in a given case. The bequest does not result in the passing of the property from the testator to the legatee. It is not doubt different in its nature from the sale, mortgage, lease or gift. It is none-the-less a transfer in its generic sense. So there Is no reason of such a restricted meaning of the word 'transfer' under the Transfer of Property Act
5. The whole intention of the defendant is to show that 'transfer' includes testamentary transfer in favour of the legatee. But till before 3 years of institution of the suit no such transfer actually taken place. Therefore, she cannot claim to be landlord and consequently cannot claim eviction as against defendant/tenant. As such, the suit is liable to be dismissed on such preliminary point.
6. The plaintiff joined issue therein by citing two judgment. One is reported in 85 CWN 635 (Arjun Sharma v. Brojendra Dhar and Anr.) reported in 86 CWN 1099 (Indian Oil Corporation v. Himansu Kumar Ghosh). Ratio of the judgment cited by the defendant reported in 79 CWN 632 (supra) was considered therein. It was categorically held that testamentary bequest is not a 'transfer' within the meaning of section 13(3A) of the Act and does not bar the plaintiff from suing his tenant under Clause (ff) of the Sub-section 1 amongst other. It can be instituted even before expiry of 3 years from the date of devolution of such interest. Therefore, if such sections are jointly read any embargo cannot be put in case of testamentary bequest if the same is not applicable in the case of testamentary bequest there cannot be any bar for the landlord in instituting the suit as against the tenant for recovery of the possession on the ground of reasonable requirement amongst other. The similar principle again adopted by the subsequent judgment reported in 86 CWN 1099 (supra) by another Division Bench of this Court where not only 79 CWN 632 (supra) but also (supra) and 85 CWN 635 (supra) were referred and considered. Therefore, the aforesaid judgment being the latest well considered judgment has not be followed by this Court. Thus there can hot be any bar for the plaintiff in instituting the suit against the defendant.
7. However, after the Court adjourned verdict, the appeal was finally disposed of. The appeal Court was pleased to hold that the seven original issues except issue No. 8 will be considered by this Court since that was not pressed by the appellant (defendant herein) and proceeded with the additional issue Nos. 11 and 12 which are similarly placed. However, as per the aforesaid analysis now by the stroke of pen issue Nos. 1 and 8 and additional issue Nos. 11 and 12 stand resolved analogously in favour of the plaintiff.
8. The next important issues are Nos. 13 and 14. In accordance with law in a suit for eviction, suit has to be valued on the basis of rental of 12 calendar months of an English calendar year. The dispute is about overvaluation but not about under-valuation. Valuation made for Rs. 30,440/-includes tentative valuation of mesne profits or damages. Cause of action of determination of mesne profits or damages only arises on eviction decree. It may be determined in a subsequent suit or it may be determined as a necessary corollary of the same suit. In the premises unintentional over valuation and under valuation cannot be equated. In any event undervaluation gives an impression of wrong doing which does not give of Court fees in case of over-valuation. There is a gulf of difference between wrong valuation and wrong statement of valuation. The first one is a default but second one is mistake. A mistake cannot be equated with default. Therefore, an aggrieved before a Civil Court cannot be disallowed from proceeding with the suit for making such wrong over-valuation. The defendant's argument is that the plaintiff would have invoked far inferior jurisdiction than the jurisdiction originally invoked. According to me, when a suit has been transferred to the Ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction of the High Court and such High Court is higher forum than any of the forums originally invoked or to be invoked, such argument on behalf of the defendant is redundant. It is also impractical to hold that in a case of suit for eviction with other claim the suit will be valued only on the basis of the rental of the 12 months of a year but not on any other additional claim. According to me, the valuation on the basis of rental of 12 months' of a year in case of a decree for eviction is to be construed as minimum suit valuation for the purpose of payment of Court fees. Thus the additional issue No. 13 goes in favour of the plaintiff independently.
9. Moreover, such point is no longer open. When the suit was filed this point was taken by the defendant in the appropriate Court of 24 parganas (South). Such plea was rejected. The defendant preferred an appeals. The Appellate Court also rejected the plea. The defendant came up for revision in this High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India again the High Court held that there is no merit in such contention. Therefore, the suit cannot be treated to be hit by section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure any more. Such order of the High Court dated 11th April, 1997 is also part and parcel of the record. Hence, I do not find any justifiable ground to hold in favour of the defendant in respect of additional issue Nos. 13 and 14 collectively.
10. The next discussion is about issue Nos. 2 and 9 under which validity of notice of termination of tenancy is under challenge. According to the defendant since the plaintiff is neither the executor nor the legal representative of the deceased landlady, she has no right to issue any notice determining the tenancy. According to me, the discussion in this respect will be mere repitition. Answer to the question is hidden in the earlier discussions. When I have proceeded on the basis of the ratio of the Division Bench judgments by holding that testamentary bequest is not a 'transfer' within the meaning of section 13(3A) of the Act and there is no bar in suing the tenant under Clause(ff) of Sub-section 1 under Section 13, there cannot be any embargo in issuing the notice of termination by the legatee even before the property is actually passed on the basis of the probate of the Will. A notice of termination is initiation of process by which a landlord refused to give continuance of the tenancy. If there is no bar in holding a legatee as landlord immediately after the death of the testator by the power of vesting of such right, the legatee becomes landlord automatically for the purpose of taking any steps to protect the interest of the property. Thereby, I hold that there is no legal impediment to issue a notice of ejectment by the plaintiff to the defendant. So far as the factual aspect is concerned from the documentary and oral evidences of the defendant it transpires that the defendant had tendered rent to the plaintiff after the death of the testator and thereafter in the office of the Rent Controller describing the plaintiff as landlord without raising any dispute in respect thereto. Even to the answer of the question or the Court, the defendant said so from the witness box. Hence, I hold in favour of the plaintiff affirmatively in respect of issue Nos. 2 and 9.
11. Upon clarifying the picture about legal impediments now I want to deal with the factual martrix and draw a line. From the settled issues I find that there are four distinct grounds of termination of tenancy.
(a) defendant is guilty of acts of wastes and/or negligence;
(b) defendant is guilty of making addition and alteration;
(c) the defendant is guilty of defaulting payment of rent from the month of April, 1995; and
(d) the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for her own use and occupation and for the persons for whose benefit the premises is held as per paragraph 3 of the plaint.
12. According to me, the prime issue in between the parties is whether the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises or not. It goes to the root of the dispute. The other grounds may be vital but not so vital than the last one. If such ground is established, others will play an insignificant role either way. But if I construe that the plaintiff is not entitled for eviction decree on the ground of reasonable requirement such other grounds may play a prominent role in drawing inference either way. Hence issue of reasonable requirement being No. 6 is to be dealt with first leaving aside such other grounds,
13. At present, the plaintiff is occupying 930 Sq. ft. area more or less consisting of one bedroom, a multi purpose room, drawing and dining space, kitchen, bathrooms, Thakur Ghar and a chamber. It is, to be noted hereunder that she is a professional Advocate.
14. On the other hand, as per her answer to question No. 89 the defendant is occupying more or less 1280 Sq.ft. ft appears from her answer to question No. 114 that the defendant is occupying three bedrooms in the North West, bathroom, kitchen, store room, pantry and servant's area, living-cum-dining room. Further, she stated against question No. 91 that the defendant is also in occupation of part of the second floor comprising of a kitchen, a store room, a pantry and servant's area. It is not understood whether the total area of 1280 sq. ft, includes the second floor or not. In answer to question No. 92 she said that more space is needed for her personal living and for professional work. If she takes her present position for personal living it will appear that she has a single bedroom and the drawing-cum-living room both for personal living as well as professional work. Such living room is now being used for the purpose of sitting of her client and if family members are visiting her they are to be taken to the bedroom. As against question No. 93 she said that for professional need she requires a chamber for her own, a sitting room for her clients, a library to keep the books and another room with sitting arrangements for clients, stenographers and clerk as well as keeping the computer and for professional miscellany. Apart from that, she needs a garage to keep her car by doing certain additions and alterations in the ground floor. She has approached Calcutta Municipal Corporation. A report of the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Court below will give a clear picture about her requirement after remodelling by way of conversion of one portion of ground floor to a garage. It is also stated that by such remodelling, size of the ground floor northern bedroom will be reduced and chamber, bedroom, Thakur Ghar all will be partially affected. On the other hand, if she goes to the first floor she will get three bedrooms one for her, one for her sister, one for the guests because she has large family members. One of her brothers, Sri Manas Mukherjee is sick and requires another room for treatment. Besides the above, the drawing room, Thakur Ghar and servant's area etc. are necessary. She requires ground floor should be converted to a professional unit to be separated from the personal living space upstairs. She also stated that the tenant has converted the verandah in the north-eastern corner of the first floor to a room without being sanctioned by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. If she goes upstairs she will have to remove the window grills and restore it to open verandah. She has also grievance about unauthorised construction of kitchen which she went to restore to its old position as bathroom. On the other hand, the defendant stated that she is occupying four bedrooms in the first floor, three of which are attached with bathrooms. There is one sitting room with pantry. In the second floor there is a kitchen, store room and servant's room. She was originally paid rent of Rs. 500/- per month. At present, he is paying RS. 1000/- as rent and Rs. 104/- as occupier's tax. However, such question was objected by the plaintiff. From question No. 26 and exhibit thereunder it appears that sons and daughters of deceased were collecting rents from him. He had paid rent to Miss Kabita Mukherjee after 22nd December, 1998. In answer to question 46 of the Court he deposed that he used to pay rent to the plaintiff after the death of the testatrix and thereafter to the Rent Controller in the similar manner. In answer to question No. 191 of the Court, the defendant admitted that the plaintiff is a practising Advocate. He also stated as against subsequent questions that practising Advocate needs a chamber and also space for the clients but he is not exactly aware whether Advocate nees some other space for clients's waiting. He has no knowledge about the plaintiffs car. He admitted in answer to question Nos. 208 and 209 that the plaintiff inherited the property. He agreed in answer to question No. 211 that he has done remodelling of the building.
15. Upon going through the defendant's depositions I do not find any case has been made out by him whether he requires the premises for his occupation for future or not. He has not stated anywhere whether he has any alternative accommodation elsewhere or not. He has not contradicted most of the statements made by the plaintiff. There is no defence challenging the veracity of the plaintiff's evidence which can draw an adverse inference as against her. The principle laid down in carapiat's case that if anybody wants to put his own case in cross-examining a witness of other, then he has to prove the same by his own witness action. In the instant suit I find that so many questions were asked to the plaintiff in cross-examination by the defendant but miserably failed to establish his own case against the case of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff. In comparison to plaintiffs evidence defendant's evidence appears to be much a do about nothing. The examination-in-Chief of the defendant is so insignificant that, even by a cursory look it cannot satisfy the conscience of the Court. The defendant is very much aggressive towards the technicalities leaving aside the merit. It is to be noted hereunder that Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act has given certain protection to the tenants to use as defence against eviction. Such defence of the defendant/tenant will have to be so strong, so balanced, so convincing and so persuasive that the Court will not think twice but to refuse the claim of the landlord. If the defence under section 13 of the Act is not available plaintiffs claim will sustain irrespective of any proof only on the basis of the pleading. Therefore, even if the ejectment suit has to be instituted by the landlord against a tenant on the basis of certain grounds under section 13 of the Act' but the, principle is to throw the tenant to a position to discharge the onus, of his protection as against the eviction. Therefore as soon as a pleading is made prescribed element of bonafide need the onus is discharged unless such onus is reverted back with a strong and cogent defence of the defendant/tenant to the plaintiff/landlord. On the other hand if such defence is not unavailable no matter on what ground the plaintiff Requires such occupation of the premises but the prayer of such plaintiff/ landlord has to be allowed,
16. It is to be remembered that the law of reasonable requirement is not a static formula which can be fit in to any requirement. For an example a small cobbler with 3 other family members may reasonably require a small room in front of the road side for running his business also for living with family members and convert the same place to a kitchen other than the professional time leaving aside use of bathroom in common with others either within or outside the premises. But such requirement cannot be comparable with the requirement of a President of India living with 3 family members in Rastrapati Bhavan. This is because basic need is always varying from person to person. Therefore, when one is assailing her requirement by way of a pleading and proof it cannot be said to be unreasonable automatically without any strong and cogent defence on the part of the defendant/tenant. The basic parameter of consideration is a comparable position in between the need of the landlord and the need of the tenant. By reading the mind of the plaintiff I have got an impression that her need is to run the profession conveniently in down stair with a better living in up-stairs. It has to be so because increase of status in related with improvement of profession. This is also part and parcel of the profession which nobody can avoid. That apart, the conversion of one portion of the ground floor to a garage or to bring back the elder sister as per the will of the deceased mother cannot be ignored. Similarly, there is no dispute that the large number of the family members are there who are very often coming. This is also undisputed that she wants to keep her ailing brother for treatment. The word 'requirement' coupled with word 'reasonable' mean that it is something more than the desire which may not be compelling or absolute or dire necessity. It is honest but not fanciful or unreasonable. See 1999(8) Judgment Today 219(SC) (Raghunath-G Panhale (deceased) Ors. v. Chaganlal Sundarji & Co.). Moreover as per-the ratio of (Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co.) the landlord is the best Judge of his own requirement for residential or business purposes and had complete freedom in the matter. Even whether the landlord acted in proper manner; or not Court has to presume outweighing or disapproving the presumption in favour of the tenant as per (Pattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Monlali Kotkunde and Anr.). But for the purpose of doing so the Judge has to sit, on the armchair of the landlord as per (Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chandra Gupta). In doing so I have taken note of comparative hardship by my own way irrespective of failure on the part of the defendant/tenant in proving his case and ultimately come to a conclusion in favour of the plaintiff/landlord.
17. Is further necessary to discuss that reasonable requirement cannot only be governed on the date of the notice but also up to the date of getting the actual physical possession of such premises upon evicting the tenant. Therefore, requirement of deceased mother in 1978 being subject matter of different suit or requirement of plaintiff at the time of instituting the suit in 1995 or her present requirement or at the time of delivery of possession cannot be the same or similar. Suits cannot be treated between the same parties. In any suits between mother alone and daughter alone cannot be treated between the same parties. Court has to take the timing of passing the eviction decree. Hence, it is far to say that the suit is hit by principle of res judicata due to disposal of the earlier suit.
18. Therefore, taking into totality of the pleading, evidence and argument I am of the view that the issue Nos. 6 and 7 should also be affirmative in favour of the plaintiff and she would be entitled to decree in terms of prayer (a) i.e. for ejectment and recovery of the khas possession of the suit premises by evicting the defendant therefrom.
19. So far as the prayer (b) i.e. compensation for damages caused by the defendant in the suit premises during his occupation is concerned, as it was not pressed seriously in addition to the relief of ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement but in lieu of the same, further discussion with regard to the same specifically in respect of issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 become academic. Hence I refuse to pass a decree in terms of prayer (b) in the plaint;
20. Similarly, defendant/petitioner cannot get any relief as regards G.A. No. 4933 of 1999 at this belated stage. There is a time for making such application. The petitioner's contention is that he repeatedly told the predecessor of the plaintiff for making repairing work in respect of the premises in question but the same was not done by herself. According to me, the repairing work, if any, as regards wear and tear, the same is done by the tenant with the consent of the landlord. But if it is major one, in that case, there is a process to follow. Firstly, the tenant will approach the landlord. In case of any failure he will make an appropriate application to the Rent Controller or to the appropriate Court at the relevant point of time for the purpose of obtaining an order for such repairing work and if such repairing work is done a further claim for adjustment Of expenses against the rental. It appears that no such step had been taken when the suit is pending from 1995 in the Court below and from 1998 in the High Court. On the other hand, the present application is made only on 14th December, 1999 when the hearing of the suit was continuing. Therefore, it appears that the application is a complete eyewash at a belated stage even after the expiry of so many years and rainy season of the particular year to stall the hearing of the suit. The same was not adhered to by the Court for obvious reason and now dismissed with the disposal of the suit. However, no order is passed as to costs.
21. So far as the prayer (c) is concerned, the plaintiff claimed mesne profit or compensation for damages for wrongful use and occupation of the suit premisses, from 1st August, 1985 upto the date of delivery of the possession tentatively for Rs. 400/- per month in terms of Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to me, cause of action of mesne profit arises only On an ejectment decree because by virtue of such decree, Court validates the termination of tenancy. Although claim of mesne profit, thus creates a fresh cause of action but it is incidental or natural corollary of the ejectment decree. Hence, a decree can also be passed in the same suit upon verifying the comparable rental market value and upon payment of deficit Court fees, if any.
22. The next question is what would be the period for mesne profit. It is to be noted hereunder that the termination of ejectment was given effect by the plaintiff upon the defendant by service of notice. Such termination has been sanctioned by the Court of Law by an ejectment decree. Therefore, when the decree is not passed, no question of any mesne profit will arise because the occupation of the defendant as a tenant even after the termination of tenancy by notice since the tenancy subsists. On the other hand ejectment decree relates back to termination by notice: Hence, the claim of mesne profit has to be calculated from the date of receipt of the notice determining the tenancy till the date of recovery of khas possession on the ejectment decree.
23. The third and most important point is the rate of the mesne profit. There are two modes of determination of the rate of mesne profit. One is market value and another is rental value. Since the relationship in between landlord and tenant is determined under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and also when the defendant occupied the premises as a tenant for residential purposes the rate of mesne profit will be governed by the rental value. Such rental value cannot be construed abnormally low or abnormally high but on the basis of comparable market rental value for the periods in which the tenant was in wrongful occupation of the premises. Therefore, to ascertain what would be the rate of such rent an independent person to be appointed by the Court by way of preliminary decree.
24. Therefore, there will be a decree in terms of prayer (a) for the purpose of ejectment and recovery of the khas possession of the suit premises by evicting the defendant therefrom within a period of two months from the date of issuance of certified, copy of the decree falling which decree will be put for execution. There will be no decree for compensation or damages etc. in terms of prayer (b). So far as prayer (c) as regards mesne profits and damages are concerned there will be a preliminary decree in this respect whereunder Miss Tapati Ghosh, an Advocate of this Court is appointed Commissioner to ascertain the appropriate comparable local rental market value of the suit premises by making an enquiry in a summary manner in the manner as she thinks fit and proper and furnish a report in this Court by 28th August. 2001 for the purpose of passing final decree on a, following date to be fixed by this Court. The Commissioner will be entitled for consolidated remuneration of 500 G.Ms. and incidentals, if any, to be incurred by her in connection thereto which will be paid by the plaintiff at this stage and will be added to her claim as to costs of the suit. Decree as to costs in terms of prayer (d) will be fixed as and when the final decree will be passed by this Court.
25. The plaintiff will be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited by the defendant either in the office of the Rent Controller or in the office of the Registrar, Original Side upon communication of the operative part of the order to them and upon completion of all formalities in connection thereto for such withdrawal.
Prayer for stay is made. Since time is granted for vacating the premises in the decree itself. I do not find any reason for granting any stay, therefore, the prayer for stay is refused.
Decree will be drawn up expeditiously after passing the final decree and taking into account both the preliminary and final decree. However, parties will be at liberty to take inspection of the Judgment and decree passed by this Court.
Xerox certified copies of this judgment will be supplied to the parties within seven days from the date of putting requisites for drawing up and completion of the decree and certified copy of this Judgment and; decree.
The Commissioner, the Registrar, Original Side, concerned Rent Controller and all parties are to act on a signed copy minute of the operative part of this judgment on the usual undertaking and subject to satisfaction of the officer of the Court in respect as above,
26. Petition allowed