Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Nitin vs M/O Railways on 11 December, 2025
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Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH: NEW DELHI
O.A. No. 625/2016
Reserved on: 02.12.2025
Pronounced on: 11.12.2025
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Dr. Anand S. Khati, Member (A)
Nitin aged about 24 years,
Son of late Shri Gopi Chand,
Lastly App. Techn. III/OHE/NUR,
Delhi Division, Northern Railway,
Resident of 1036, Pana Paposiyan,
Narela, Delhi - 110040.
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Sachin Chauhan)
Versus
1. Union of India through,
The General Manager,
Northern Railway, HQ Office,
Baroda House, New Delhi - 01.
2. The Divisional Railway Manager,
Northern Railway, State Entry Road,
New Delhi - 1199052.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. R. S. Rana)
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Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J) :
By way of the present O.A. the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:-
"8.1 To quash and set-aside the order dated 30.1.2013 whereby the service of applicant to the post of Apprentice Skilled Artisan Elect. TRO/OHE has been terminated and order dated 21.5.2015 & 12.8.2015 whereby the grievance of applicant regarding reinstatement in service has been rejected and to further direct the respondent that applicant be reinstate back as Apprentice Skilled Artisan Elect. TRO/OHE and after completion of training/apprenticeship, the applicant be given appointment to the post of Grade Skilled Artisan with all consequential benefits including seniority & promotion and pay & allowances.
And/or Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also awarded to the applicant."
2. Learned counsel for the applicant highlighted the termination order dated 30.01.2013, though signed on 21.02.2013, which reads as under:-
"You were engaged as App. Tech.-III vide this office letter of even No. dated 01.12.2009, subject to the fulfillment of the terms and Conditions stipulated in your appointment as Apprentice Tech. III, your apprentice period was for three years from 02.12.2009 to 01.12.2012 as informed by Sr. DEE/TRD vide L.No. 230-Elect/TRD/13/1/13 dated-16.10.2012. You have been taken into Police custody by SHO/Alipur w.e.f. 03.09.2011 during the course of employment as Apprentice Tech-III and are still under Police custody due to registration of FIR No. 305 dated 01.09.2011 under Section 302/2011/1208/34 of 2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 3 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 IPC as advise by Sr.DEE/TRD vide letter dated 16.10.2012 cited above.
Your engagement as Apprentice Tech.-III/TRD/OHE has been terminated in terms of para V of your engagement letter No. 729E/64/960/P-3 dated 01.12.2009, as it has not been deemed fit to continue your engagement as Apprentice Tech.-III/TRD/OHE"
2.1. Learned counsel for the applicant stated that termination order is stigmatic in nature. 2.2. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the representation of the applicant dated 09.03.2015 for re- employment/reinstatement into Railway Services has not been acceded to and rejected by the respondents vide order dated 21.05.2015, which reads as under:-
"In the matter of subject cited above, it is informed that your request for re-employment /reinstatement into Railway Services has been regretted by the competent authority after the due consideration of the same."
2.3. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the aforesaid order dated 21.05.2015 is the subject matter of controversy in the present matter.
2.4. Learned counsel relied upon the order of acquittal passed by the Competent Court on 08.05.2015. Further, in support of applicant's case, learned counsel relied and placed on record a copy of the following orders:
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(i). O.A. No. 4020/2018 titled Mohit Kumar Chaudhary vs. GNCTD, decided by this Tribunal.
(ii). W.P. (C) No. 10385/2021 titled Nina Lath Gupta vs. UOI and anr., decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.
(iii). W.P. (C) No. 12696/2023 titled GNCTD and ors. Vs. Virender, decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.
(iv). O.A. No. 1319/2021 titled Satyender vs. GNCTD and ors. decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.
(v). O.A. No. 1529/2022 titled Ravinder vs. GNCTD and ors., decided by this Tribunal.
3. Opposing the grant of relief, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the averments contained in the counter-affidavit already filed in the original O.A., which he adopted as the reply to the amended O.A. as well. 3.1. Learned counsel submitted that the applicant was convicted in a serious offence under Article 302 of IPC and, therefore, he was not found fit and, therefore, the order so passed is not stigmatic in nature.
2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 5 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 3.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the a benefit of doubt was given to the applicant by the competent court in the order of acquittal dated 08.05.2015 and, therefore, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the applicant to the aforesaid decisions cannot be applied in the present case.
4. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the pleadings available on record.
5. ANALYSIS :
5.1 The records reveal that the applicant was engaged as an Apprentice on compassionate grounds vide the offer of appointment dated 01.12.2009. The relevant clause that has been acted upon by the respondents to dispense with the services of the applicant is in terms of para 5 of appointment letter no. 729E/64/960/P-3 dated 01.12.2009, which reads as under:-
"5. यिद आपकी गित संतोषजनक नही ं होगी या नौकरी के िलए शारी रक ि से अयो अथवा िकसी मामले म दोषी या आचरणहीन पाए जाएं गे तो आपकी अ े सिशप िबना िकसी पूव सूचना के समा कर दी जायेगी।"
2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 6 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 5.2 The issue in the present Original Application is whether the applicant, pursuant to his acquittal for offences punishable under Sections 302/201/120B IPC, can claim a right to reinstatement or re-engagement as an Apprentice Skilled Artisan, and whether the termination effected under Clause 5 of the appointment letter can still be sustained in law despite such acquittal. Pursuant to his appointment, an FIR came to be registered being FIR No. 305/2011, Police Station, Alipur, U/s 302/201/120B IPC. During the tenure of his apprenticeship, the applicant was charged for offences punishable U/s 302/201/120B IPC vide order dated 24.02.2014. A full-fledged trial was conducted, and the Competent Court of Additional Sessions Judge was observed as under:-
"63. The net result of above discussion is that the prosecution has failed to bring home the guilt of all the three accused persons beyond shadow of doubt. Consequently, all the three accused persons namely Nitin, Balwan @ Naveen and Narsi are hereby acquitted of the charges levelled against them by giving them benefit of doubt. File be consigned to Record Room after compliance of Section 437 A Cr.P.C."
5.3 It has been contended that due to the acquittal of the applicant by the Competent Court, the applicant is entitled 2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 7 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 to reinstatement. Alternatively, it has been argued that the termination order was unsustainable as a stigmatic order; since benefit of the doubt has been accorded, the applicant is entitled to protection under Article 311(2) of the Indian Constitution.
5.4 Learned counsel for the applicant has vehemently argued that the applicant's case is covered by the decision rendered in Satender Singh v/s Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. (supra) and Nina Lath Gupta v/s Union of India (supra). He also relied upon the afore-quoted decisions. 5.5 We observe that, by analogy to the facts at hand, upon perusal of the termination order, the rejection of the applicant's claim appears to be a straightforward decision and not stigmatic in nature. The termination, no doubt has been affected during the period of Apprenticeship; however, the ratio as laid down in Nina Lath Gupta v/s Union of India (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case. The said decision was rendered in the factual matrix of the given case where it was apparent that the order was stigmatic in nature.
2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 8 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 5.6 In the present case, going by the wordings of the termination order as quoted hereinabove, it cannot be said that the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is appropriate to the present facts of the case. Considering the fact that there was a serious allegation U/s 302/201/120B IPC and the benefit of doubt has been accorded, the case of the applicant has to be considered in the perspective of service jurisprudence, more particularly, whether the termination order is stigmatic or not. 5.7 Having considered the terms and conditions, more particularly clause 5 of the appointment letter, if it were to be read in consonance with Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, the services have been dispensed with by a simpliciter order, and the rejection is also on that basis.
5.8 Recently, in the case of Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. v/s Devender Singh in W.P.(C) No. 9803/2023 pronounced on 28.11.2025, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi observed as follows:
"29. The issue that arises for consideration in the present case is whether the termination of the respondent, a probationary 2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 9 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 Constable, under Rule 5 (1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, was a termination simpliciter based on unsuitability, or a punitive and stigmatic order founded on allegations of misconduct, thereby attracting the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
30. Before adverting to the merits of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to refer to the settled position of law governing cases where termination is effected under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, during the period of probation or training.
31. At the outset, it would be appropriate to reproduce Rule 5(1) of the said Rules, which provides for termination of temporary service.
The same reads as under:
"5. TERMINATION OF TEMPORARY SERVICE.
(1) (a) The services of a temporary Government servant shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant;
b) the period of such notice shall be one month.
Provided that the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith and on such termination, the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month."
32. The concept of probation has been elaborately discussed by this Court in Govt. of NCT of Delhi& Anr. v. Dalbir Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5633. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinbelow:
"11. The very concept of keeping an employee on probation is to give an employer an opportunity to observe the work and conduct, integrity, efficiency etc. of an employee in order to judge his suitability to the job, before permanently absorbing him in the services. Rule 5 (1) of CCS(Temporary Services) Rules, 1965 postulates that the services of a temporary Government servant or a probationer, can be terminated by the Appointing Authority forthwith 2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 10 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 and the Government servant on termination shall be entitled to claim sum for the period of notice.
Apparently, the holding of inquiry has not been mandated though the termination of service may be preceded by an inquiry by the employer, only to ascertain whether the Government servant should be retained in service or not.
12. In order to attract the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, it needs to be seen whether the 'misconduct' or 'negligence' was a mere 'motive' for the order of reversion or termination or whether it was the very 'foundation' of the said order. The form of the order may not be conclusive of its true nature and the Court can tear the veil behind a termination order, which is innocuous and discharge simpliciter, to examine the entirety of the circumstances preceding or attended to the order of termination. Termination simpliciter does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India unless the termination involves 'stigma'.
13. The important principles, which are deducible on the concept of 'motive' and 'foundation' which have been repeatedly highlighted also stand reiterated in paragraphs 26 and 27 in Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. (supra) and may be beneficially reproduced:
"26. The whole case-law is thus based on the peculiar facts of each individual case and it is wrong to say that decisions have been swinging like a pendulum; right, the order is valid; left, the order is punitive. It was urged before this Court, more than once including in Ram Chandra Trivedi case [(1976) 4 SCC 52 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 542 : AIR 1976 SC 2547 : (1977) 1 SCR 462] that there was a conflict of decisions on the question of an order being a simple termination order or a punitive order, but every time the Court rejected the contention and held that the apparent conflict was on account of different facts of different cases requiring the principles already laid down by this Court in various decisions to be applied to a different situation. But the concept of "motive" and "foundation" was always kept in view.
27. The important principles which are deducible on the concept of "motive" and "foundation", concerning a probationer, are that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the 2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 11 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for the determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question or for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an inquiry is held and it is on the basis of that inquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are allegations of misconduct and an inquiry is held to find out the truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed on the basis of that inquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the inquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations of misconduct against that employee. In this situation, the order would be founded on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of "motive""
(Emphasis Supplied)
33. Similarly, the Apex Court, in Ravindra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corpn. Ltd. & Anr., 1987 Supp SCC 739, while dealing with the case of termination of a temporary employee, drew a distinction between simpliciter termination and punitive termination, by applying the test of motive and foundation. This Court clarified the said distinction and observed as under:
"6. As we have already observed, though the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution do not apply, the Service Rules which are almost on a par make the decisions of this Court relevant in disposing of the present appeal. In several authoritative pronouncements of this Court, the concept of "motive" and "foundation" has been brought in for finding out the effect of the order of termination. If the delinquency of the officer in temporary service is taken as the operating motive in terminating the service, the order is not considered as punitive while if the order of termination is founded upon it, the termination is considered to be a punitive action. This is so on account of the fact that it is necessary for every employer to assess the service of the temporary incumbent in order to find out as to whether he should be confirmed in his appointment or his services should be terminated. It may also be necessary to find out whether the officer should be tried for some more time on temporary basis. Since both in regard to a temporary employee or an officiating employee in a higher post such an assessment would be necessary merely because the appropriate authority proceeds to make an assessment and leaves a record of its views the 2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 12 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 same would not be available to be utilised to make the order of termination following such assessment punitive in character. In a large democracy as ours, administration is bound to be impersonal and in regard to public officers whether in government or public corporations, assessments have got to be in writing for purposes of record. We do not think there is any justification in the contention of the appellant that once such an assessment is recorded, the order of termination made soon thereafter must take the punitive character."
34. In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Sukhwinder Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 569, the Supreme Court has held as under:
"20. In the present case neither any formal departmental enquiry nor any preliminary fact- finding inquiry had been held and a simple order of discharge had been passed. The High Court has built an edifice on the basis of a statement made in the written statement that the respondent was a habitual absentee during his short period of service and has concluded therefrom that it was his absence from duty that weighed in the mind of the Senior Superintendent of Police as absence from duty is a misconduct. The High Court has further gone on to hold that there is direct nexus between the order of discharge of the respondent from service and his absence from duty and, therefore, the order discharging him from service will be viewed as punitive in nature calling for a regular inquiry under Rule 16.24 of the Rules. We are of the opinion that the High Court has gone completely wrong in drawing the inference that the order of discharge dated 16-3-1990 was, in fact, based upon misconduct and was, therefore, punitive in nature, which should have been preceded by a regular departmental enquiry. There cannot be any doubt that the respondent was on probation having been appointed about eight months back. As observed in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab5 the period of probation gives time and opportunity to the employer to watch the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserves a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period, which is styled as period of probation. The mere holding of preliminary inquiry where explanation is called from an employee would not make an otherwise innocuous order of discharge or termination of service punitive in nature. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the respondent's absence from 2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 13 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 duty was the foundation of the order, which necessitated an inquiry as envisaged under Rule 16.24(ix) of the Rules."
(Emphasis Supplied)
35. The termination Order dated 11.01.2013, whereby the services of the respondent were dispensed with under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, is reproduced hereinbelow:
"In pursuance of the provision to Sub Rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1965. I, P.K.Mishra,Dy. Commissioner of Police / Vice Principal, Police Training college, Jharoda Kalan, New Delhi hereby terminate forthwith the services of Recruit Constable Devender Singh No. 30593/PTC (PIS No. 28120794) and direct that he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice of one month at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services."
36. From the perusal of the termination Order dated 11.01.2013, it is clear that the services of the respondent were terminated under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The order does not contain any reference to misconduct, indiscipline, or moral blameworthiness. It merely states that his services are terminated forthwith with pay in lieu of notice. Such an order, on its face, is innocuous and simpliciter in nature.
37. Applying the above principle to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the termination Order dated 11.01.2013 was passed in exercise of powers under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, and is simpliciter in nature. The competent authority, upon assessing the overall conduct of the respondent during training, found him to be habitually absent and lacking in discipline, and therefore, unsuitable for police service. No departmental enquiry was initiated, no charge of misconduct was framed, and no findings were recorded establishing guilt. The instances of absence were merely the reason for forming an opinion regarding his unsuitability, not the foundation for imposing punishment.
38. In the present case, the Court finds that the frequent absence of the respondent during his training were merely the motive for assessing his general suitability for retention in service and not the foundation of any punitive action. The competent authority did not hold any formal inquiry, record any findings of guilt, or attribute any proven misconduct to the respondent. The 2025.12.12 ANKIT 10:58:27 SAKLANI +05'30' 14 Item No.55 (C-IV) O.A. No. 625/2016 termination Order dated 11.01.2013 was passed under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, in exercise of administrative discretion based on overall unsuitability, and not as a consequence of disciplinary proceedings.
39. This Court is unable to accept the finding of the learned Tribunal that the Order dated 11.01.2013 stood merged with the Appellate Authority Order dated 22.05.2013 so as to render the termination stigmatic or punitive. The Order dated 11.01.2013 was passed under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, terminating the services of a temporary employee on the grounds of unsuitability. The Appellate Authority, while rejecting the representation, merely reiterated the facts and circumstances that had led to the termination. Merely because certain observations were made in the Appellate Authority order referring to the respondent's absence or lack of discipline does not alter the nature of the original order, nor does it make the termination stigmatic or punitive. Furthermore, the Appellate Authority order does not substitute or supersede the Original order of termination.
40. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the respondent cannot, on the one hand, assail an order of termination simpliciter as arbitrary for want of reasons, and on the other, term it stigmatic when reasons are furnished, bears force. This Court concurs that the respondent cannot approbate and reprobate in the same breath.
CONCLUSION:
41. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that the Order dated 11.01.2013, terminating the services of the respondent, was a termination simpliciter passed under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, on account of unsuitability during training. The order does not cast any stigma, nor is it founded on any allegation of misconduct so as to attract the protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
42. The reasoning recorded by the Appellate Authority in its Order dated 22.05.2013, while rejecting the respondent's representation, was merely explanatory in nature and cannot alter or override the character of the original termination order.
43. Consequently, the Impugned Order dated 23.05.2023 passed by the learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 660/2017 cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. The order of termination dated 11.01.2013 passed by the Disciplinary Authority shall stands affirmed.
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44. The petition, along with the pending application, is disposed of with the above direction.
45. There shall be no order as to costs."
6. CONCLUSION :
6.1 In view of the above, the present OA is devoid of merits and the action of the respondents in terminating the services vide order dated 30.01.2013/21.02.2013 and the order rejecting his representation vide communication order dated 21.05.2015 cannot be said to have any infirmity. On plain reading of the impugned order(s), we are of the view that the same does not cause any stigma, nor does it afford the protection claimed by the applicant.
6.2 In view of what has been stated hereinabove, the OA is dismissed. Pending, MAs, if any, shall stand disposed of.
There shall be no order as to costs.
(Dr. Anand S. Khati) (Manish Garg)
Member (A) Member (J)
/as/
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