Madras High Court
M.Sridhar vs The District Collector on 7 November, 2008
Author: G.Rajasuria
Bench: G.Rajasuria
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED : 07/11/2008 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA W.P(MD)No.1472 of 2008 and M.P(MD)Nos.1 and 2 of 2008 M.Sridhar ... Petitioner Vs - 1.The District Collector, Madurai District, Madurai. 2.The Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai. 3.The Tahsildar, Madurai South Taluk, Madurai. 4.Ayyathurai ... Respondents Prayer Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records pertaining to the impugned order of the second respondent in Na.Ka.No.12237/2005-H dated 14.02.2008, quash the same and direct the second respondent to refer the dispute to civil Court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. !For Petitioners ...Mr.R.Subramanian ^For Respondents ...Mr.R.Manoharan Govt.Advocate (Writs) for R.1 to R.3 Mr.M.Thirunavukkarasu for R.4 - - - :ORDER
Animadverting upon the order passed by the second respondent vide Na.Ka.No.12237/2005-H dated 14.02.2008, in rejecting the prayer of the petitioner to refer the matter under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Court concerned, but on the other hand, holding in support of the plea of the fourth respondent that he has got the title over the property acquired, this writ petition is focused on various grounds, the gist and kernel of them, could be portrayed thus:
The Land Acquisition Officer throwing to winds his limitations in dealing with the application under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, entered into the arena of the factual controversies and gave his decision like a civil Court as though the fourth respondent is the owner of the property and not the petitioner and that too, after interpreting the documents. Accordingly, he prayed for quashing the impugned order in Na.Ka.No.12237/2005-H dated 14.02.2008 and directing the second respondent to refer the matter under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to decide the dispute between the petitioner and the fourth respondent relating to the title over the property acquired under the Land Acquisition Act.
2. Per contra, denying and refuting, challenging and impugning the allegations/averments in the affidavit accompanying the writ petition, the respondents 1 to 3 filed the counter setting out various contentions, the warp and woof of them, would be to the effect that the petition filed by the petitioner's deceased father, namely Mahalingam was a belated one; he was not competent to be a party to the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act; he cannot be treated as an interested person relating to the land acquired as per the well settled proposition of law. Accordingly, he prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition.
3. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the learned Government Advocate (Writs) for the respondents 1 to 3 and the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent filed their respective written submissions also.
5. The whole kit and caboodle of facts and figures found exemplified and expatiated from the records placed before this Court and the written submissions, would enable this Court to infer that the entire issue got boiled down as to whether a party who is turned out to be not competent to get referred the matter under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Sub Court, would be entitled to get the dispute which he has raised relating to title, could be got referred under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Sub Court by obtaining the order from the Land Acquisition Officer.
6. A re'sume' of facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this writ petition would run thus:
The Land Acquisition Officer initiated proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and acquired the land in S.Nos.15/1A2, 15/1B2 and 17/3C2 to an extent of 41.99 cents. In the award No.1 of 1993, dated 02.02.1993, the name of the fourth respondent T.Ayyadurai alone was found specified as the owner of the land and accordingly, on his request, the matter was referred under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Sub Court for adjudging the claim for enhancement of compensation. The petitioner's father who is the brother of the fourth respondent filed an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code before the Sub Court which was seized of the matter under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and he was allowed to be impleaded, as against which the fourth respondent herein filed a revision petition before this Court wherein this Court vide its order dated 09.03.2007 in C.R.P.PD.(MD)No.895 of 2006, set aside the order of the lower Court by holding that the said Mahalingam cannot get himself impleaded in the proceedings pending before the Sub Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Certain excerpts from the said judgment would run thus:
"17. When the impleading petition is not maintainable as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decision, the subsequent examination and cross-examination of the second respondent herein by the reference Court will not make the impleading application maintainable. Further this being a legal defect cannot be cured at all. Therefore the evidence given by the second respondent in the reference Court is to be eschewed.
18. Therefore in the absence of a valid reference, the application filed in I.A.No.403 of 2005 is not at all maintainable. That itself is sufficient to dismiss the impleading application. Further, even assuming for arguments sake that he is also a co-owner of the acquired property, still he is not entitled to any enhancement of the compensation amount as the reference application filed by the Revision Petitioner is on behalf of him only and not on behalf of other Co- owners.
19. Hence, I have no hesitation in setting aside the order in I.A.No.403 of 2005 by allowing the Civil Revision Petition. ..."
7. Thereafter, it appears, the Sub Court ordered enhancement of compensation also wherein, the fourth respondent herein was alone a party. Subsequently, the petitioner's father Mahalingam made a representation to the Land Acquisition Officer for referring the matter to the Sub Court for getting the title dispute between the said Mahalingam and the fourth respondent adjudged, whereupon in connection with that, the said Mahalingam also filed W.P.No.4243 of 2007 for issuing a direction to the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, considering his representation dated 23.01.2007 which was not immediately considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and this Court on 27.04.2007, issued a direction to the Land Acquisition Officer to consider the representation as against which, a writ appeal was filed in W.A.No.378 of 2007 which was disposed of by this Court on 13.09.2007 with some observations.
8. Whereupon, the Land Acquisition Officer after hearing both sides passed the impugned order dated 14.02.2008 holding that the fourth respondent herein is the owner of the suit property and that the said Mahalingam could not claim any right to get compensation along with the fourth respondent.
9. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer to the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Land Acquisition Officer exceeded his jurisdiction in delving deep into the documentary evidence as put forth by the fourth respondent and gave a finding in his favour. A bare perusal of the impugned order of the Land Acquisition Officer would exemplify and evince that he took into account the unregistered document dated 03.10.2002 and held that as per the said document, the said Mahalingam had no right.
10. In my considered opinion, such a finding given by the Land Acquisition Officer based on naive approach throwing to winds the legal implications involved in appreciating the said document, was unwarranted. In fact, the interpretation of the said document dated 03.10.2002 involves application of a catena of decisions of this Court as well as the Honourable Apex Court and it is not such an easy task as the Land Acquisition Officer assumed by arrogating to himself the power to decide on that document in such a cryptic and non-legal style. The Land Acquisition Officer also felt that it was a belated petition even though there was no period of limitation contemplated to deal such an application. However, it is a trite proposition of law that without undue delay, such an application should be filed.
11. Be that as it may, in this case, the Land Acquisition Officer could have refrained from giving his finding on merits based on the document, in view of the complications involved in interpreting the said unregistered document as well as the rival contentions of the parties based on the Hindu Law.
12. The next phase of analysis arises, is as to whether the petitioner's father the deceased Mahalingam was competent to approach the Land Acquisition Officer for getting the matter referred under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Sub Court concerned?
13. The learned Counsel for the fourth respondent would fruitfully cite the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India and others reported in (2004) 7 Supreme Court Cases 362 (in short Meher Rusi Dalal's case). Certain excerpts from it, would run thus:
"19. Even otherwise, we find that the High Court has clearly erred in not noticing that it has already been held by this Court that the respondents are not entitled to a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. What is the scope of Sections 18 and 30 has been set out by this Court in the case of G.H. Grant (Dr.) v. State of Bihar. It has been held as follows: (AIR pp. 242-43 & 244, paras 13 & 19) "13. There are two provisions, Sections 18(1) and 30 which invest the Collector with power to refer to the Court a dispute as to apportionment of compensation or as to the persons to whom it is payable. By sub-section (1) of Section 18 the Collector is enjoined to refer a dispute as to apportionment, or as to title to receive compensation, on the application within the time prescribed by sub-section (2) of that section of a person interested who has not accepted the award. Section 30 authorises the Collector to refer to the Court after compensation is settled under Section 11, any dispute arising as to apportionment of the same or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. A person shown in that part of the award which relates to apportionment of compensation, who is present either personally or through a representative, or on whom a notice is served under sub-section (2) of Section 12, must, if he does not accept the award, apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under Section 18(2) to refer the matter to the Court. But a person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector may, if he is not served with notice of the filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable, and apply to the Court for a reference under Section 30, for determination of his right to compensation which may have existed before the award, or which may have developed upon him since the award. Whereas under Section 18 an application made to the Collector must be made within the period prescribed by sub-section (2) clause (b), there is no such period prescribed under Section 30. Again under Section 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed by a person interested. The Collector is under Section 30 not enjoined to make a reference: he may relegate the person raising a dispute as to apportionment, or as to the person to whom compensation is payable, to agitate the dispute in a suit and pay the compensation in the manner declared by his award.
19. ? The Collector is not authorised to decide finally the conflicting rights of the persons interested in the amount of compensation: he is primarily concerned with the acquisition of the land. In determining the amount of compensation which may be offered, he has, it is true, to apportion the amount of compensation between the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have appeared before him. But the scheme of apportionment by the Collector does not finally determine the rights of the persons interested in the amount of compensation: the award is only conclusive between the Collector and the persons interested and not among the persons interested. The Collector has no power to finally adjudicate upon the title to compensation: that dispute has to be decided either in a reference under Section 18 or under Section 30 or in a separate suit. Payment of compensation, therefore, under Section 31 to the person declared by the award to be entitled thereto discharges the State of its liability to pay compensation (subject to any modification by the Court), leaving it open to the claimant to compensation to agitate his right in a reference under Section 30 or by a separate suit."
20. This Court has again in the case of Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar very succinctly dealt with the provisions of Sections 18 and 30 and on an analysis of the provisions and the various authorities held as follows: (SCC pp. 143-44 & 147, paras 26 & 36) "26. The scheme of the Act reveals that the remedy of reference under Section 18 is intended to be available only to a 'person interested'. A person present either personally or through a representative or on whom a notice is served under Section 12(2) is obliged, subject to his specifying the test as to locus, to apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under Section 18(2) to make a reference to the court. The basis of title on which the reference would be sought for under Section 18 would obviously be a pre-existing title by reference to the date of the award. So is Section 29, which speaks of 'persons interested'. Finality to the award spoken of by Section 12(1) of the Act is between the Collector on one hand and the 'persons interested' on the other hand and attaches to the issues relating to (i) the true area i.e. measurement of the land, (ii) the value of the land i.e. the quantum of compensation, and (iii) apportionment of the compensation among the 'persons interested'. The 'persons interested' would be bound by the award without regard to the fact whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not. The finality to the award spoken of by Section 29 is as between the 'persons interested' inter se and is confined to the issue as to the correctness of the apportionment. Section 30 is not confined in its operation only to 'persons interested'. It would, therefore, be available for being invoked by the 'persons interested' if they were neither present nor represented in the proceedings before the Collector, nor were served with notice under Section 12(2) of the Act or when they claim on the basis of a title coming into existence post-award. The definition of 'persons interested' speaks of 'an interest in compensation to be made'. An interest coming into existence post-award gives rise to a claim in compensation which has already been determined. Such a person can also have recourse to Section 30. In any case, the dispute for which Section 30 can be invoked shall remain confined only (i) as to the apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part thereof, or (ii) as to the persons to whom the amount of compensation (already determined) or any part thereof is payable. The State claiming on the basis of a pre-existing right would not be a 'person interested', as already pointed out hereinabove and on account of its right being pre-existing, the State, in such a case, would not be entitled to invoke either Section 18 or Section 30 seeking determination of its alleged pre- existing right. A right accrued or devolved post-award may be determined in a reference under Section 30 depending on the Collector's discretion to show indulgence, without any bar as to limitation. Alternatively, such a right may be left open by the Collector to be adjudicated upon in any independent legal proceedings. This view is just, sound and logical as a title post-award could not have been canvassed up to the date of the award and should also not be left without remedy by denying access to Section 30. Viewed from this angle, Sections 18 and 30 would not overlap and would have fields to operate independent of each other.
36. To sum up, the State is not a 'person interested' as defined in Section 3(b) of the Act. It is not a party to the proceedings before the Collector in the sense, which the expression 'parties to the litigation' carries. The Collector holds the proceedings and makes an award as a representative of the State Government. Land or an interest in land pre-owned by the State cannot be the subject-matter of acquisition by the State. The question of deciding the ownership of the State or holding of any interest by the State Government in proceedings before the Collector cannot arise in the proceedings before the Collector [as defined in Section 3(c) of the Act]. If it was government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to the pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the civil court for determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference made by the Collector to the court was wholly without jurisdiction and the civil court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the civil court suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared so." (emphasis in original)
21. It is thus clear that persons who have notice of acquisition proceedings would have to apply for a reference under Section 18. To be noted that under Section 18 reference could be in respect of the measurement of the land and/or the amount of compensation and/or in respect of persons to whom it is payable and/or for apportionment of compensation amongst persons interested. Section 30 merely deals with apportionment of compensation when the amount of compensation has been settled. Thus, as set out in the abovementioned cases, Section 18 is to be invoked when a person claiming a pre-existing right has notice of the acquisition proceedings, whereas Section 30 comes into play only if a person had no notice of the acquisition proceedings or the rights came into existence after the acquisition proceedings. It is clear that the person who had notice of the acquisition proceedings and who, by virtue of Section 50, is debarred from filing a reference under Section 18 cannot be allowed to apply for a reference under Section 30. In this case, this Court has already held that the respondents were not entitled to apply for a reference under Section 18. This meant that they were not entitled to seek a reference not just in respect of the compensation but also for apportionment of the compensation. Once it has been held that they had no right to move under Section 18 there was no question of their being permitted to move under Section 30. To permit a party, who cannot apply under Section 18, to apply under Section 30 would be to render Section 50 nugatory."
14. Placing reliance on the aforesaid precedents of the Honourable Apex Court, the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent would convincingly put across his point that once a person is having no right to invoke Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as in this case on the part of the deceased Mahalingam, the question of he trying to get the matter referred under Section 30 of the said Act to the Sub Court would not arise.
15. Whereas the learned Counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Dr.G.H.Grant v. The State of Bihar reported in AIR 1966 Supreme Court 237 (in short G.H.Grant's case), and put forth his argument to the effect that in the said decision, even a person who is not a party to the proceedings under Section 18 of the said Act or in any one of the earlier proceedings, could get the matter referred under Section 30 of the said Act to the civil Court. It is also his contention that the decision rendered by the Honourable Apex Court in G.H.Grant's case is by the Three Judges' Bench of the Honourable Apex Court, whereas decision cited by the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent in Meher Rusi Dalal's case is by the Two Judges' Bench of the Honourable Apex Court and hence, this Court has to follow the ratio decedendi as found emerged in the decision in G.H.Grant's case.
16. By way of buttressing and fortifying his stand, the learned Counsel for the petitioner would also rely on the following decisions:
(i) Union of India and another etc. v. Raghubir Singh reported in 1989 MLJ Reports (I) (SC) 35. Certain excerpts from it, would run thus:
"27. What then should be the position in regard to the effect of the law pronounced by a Division Bench in relation to a case raising the same point subsequently before a Division Bench of a smaller number of Judges? There is no constitutional or statutory prescription in the matter, and the point is governed entirely by the practice in India, of the courts sanctified by repeated affirmation over a century of time. It cannot be doubted that in order to promote consistency and certainty in the law laid down by a superior Court, the ideal condition would be that the entire Court should sit in all cases to decide questions of law, and for that reason the Supreme Court of the United States does so. But having regard to the Vol. of work demanding the attention of the Court, it has been found necessary in India as a general rule of practice and convenience that the Court should sit in Divisions, each Division being constituted of Judges whose number may be determined by the exigencies of judicial need, by the nature of the case including any statutory mandate relative thereto, and by such other considerations which the Chief Justice, in whom such authority devolves by convention, may find most appropriate. It is in order to guard against the possibility of inconsistent decisions on points of law by different Division Benches that the Rule has been evolved, in order to promote consistency and certainty in the development of the law and its contemporary status, that the statement of the law by a Division Bench is considered binding on a Division Bench of the same or lesser number of Judges. This principle has been followed in India by several generations of Judges. We may refer to a few of the recent cases on the point. In John Martin v. State of West Bengal, a Division Bench of three Judges found it right to follow the law declared in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, decided by a Division Bench of five Judges, in preference to Bhut Nath Mate v. State of West Bengal decided by a Division Bench of two Judges. Again in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, Beg, J. held that the Constitution Bench of five Judges was bound by the Constitution Bench of thirteen Judges in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala. In Ganapati Sitaram Balvalkar v. Waman Shripad Mage, this Court expressly stated that the view taken on a point of law by a Division Bench of four Judges of this Court was binding on a Division Bench of three Judges of the Court. And in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, this Court specifically observed that where the view expressed by two different Division Benches of this Court could not be reconciled, the pronouncement of a Division Bench of a larger number of Judges had to be preferred over the decision of a Division Bench of a smaller number of Judges. This Court also laid down in Acharya Maharajshri Narandraprasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat that even where the strength of two differing Division Benches consisted of the same number of Judges, it was not open to one Division Bench to decide the correctness or otherwise of the views of the other. The principle was reaffirmed in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.which noted that a Division Bench of two Judges of this Court in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana had differed from the view taken by an earlier Division Bench of two Judges in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. on the point whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel could be defeated by invoking the defence of executive necessity, and holding that to do so was wholly unacceptable reference was made to the well accepted and desirable practice of the later Bench referring the case to a larger Bench when the learned Judges found that the situation called for such reference.
28. We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of the same or a smaller number of Judges, and in order that such decision be binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of the Court. We would, however, like to think that for the purpose of imparting certainty and endowing due authority decisions of this Court in the future should be rendered by Division Benches of at least three Judges unless, for compelling reasons, that is not conveniently possible."
(ii) Krishena Kumar v. Union of India v. (1990) 4 Supreme Court Cases 207. Certain excerpts from it, would run thus:
"20. In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it. In the words of Halsbury (4th edn., Vol. 26, para 573) "The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, as ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which when it is clear it is not part of a tribunal's duty to spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgment and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reasons than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment, all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi."
(iii) State of U.P v. Ram Chandra reported in AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 2547. Certain excerpts from it, would run thus:
"21. In a recent decision of this Court in Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, (1976) 3 SCC 334 = (AIR 1976 SC 1766) to which one of us was a party. Sughar Singh's case (AIR 1974 SC 423) (supra) which is the sheet anchor of Mr. Garg's contention was also adverted to and it was explained therein that case did not depart from earlier decisions on applicability of Article 311(2) or Article 16 of the Constitution. The following observations made in Pawan Kumar Dubey's case (supra) should suffice to clear the doubts that may still be lurking in some quarters as to the ratio decidendi of Sughar Singh's case (supra) :-
"We think that the principles involved in applying Article 311 (2) having been sufficiently explained in Shamsher Singh's case (AIR 1974 SC 2192) (supra) it should no longer be possible to urge that Sughar Singh's case (supra) could give rise to some misapprehension of the law. Indeed, we do not think that the principles of law declared and applied so often have really changed. But the application of the same law to the differing circumstances and facts of various cases which have come up to this Court could create the impression sometimes that there is some conflict between different decisions of this Court. Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would, we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi to each case is correctly understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts. This Court's judgment in Sughar Singh' case (supra) shows that it was only following the law on Article 311(2) of the Constitution as laid down repeatedly earlier by this Court. It specifically referred to the following cases; Parshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, (AIR 1958 SC 36) (supra); State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur. (AIR 1968 SC 1089) (supra); State of Orissa v.Ram Narayan Das, (AIR 1961 SC 177) (supra); R. C. Lucy v. State of Bihar, (C. A. No. 590 of 1962 decided on October 23 1963) (SC);
Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India (AIR 1964 SC 449) (supra); A. G. Benjamin v. Union of India, (1967) 1 Lab LJ 718 (SC); Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 1 SCR 472 = (1969) 2 SCC 240 = (AIR 1970 SC 158); Union of India v. Gajendra Singh, (1972) 2 SCR 660 = (1973) 3 SCC 797 = (AIR 1972 SC 1329); Divisional Personnel Officer v. Raghavendrachar, (1966) 3 SCR 106 = (AIR 1966 SC 1529); Union of India v. Jaswant Ram, AIR 1958 SC 905; Madhav v. State of Mysore, (1962) 1 SCR 886 = (AIR 1962 SC 8); State of Bombay v. Abraham, (1962) Supp 2 SCR 92 = AIR 1962 SC 791. In Sughar Singh's case (supra), this Court summarised the propositions of law deducible from the cases mentioned above; and, while considering the applicability of some of the propositions of law to the facts of the case, it did observe that, on the face of it, the action against Sughar Singh did not appear to be punitive. Nevertheless, on a total consideration of all the facts, including the admission in the High Court before Verma, C.J. by the Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State, that the reversion order could not be explained except as a result of the adverse entry made two years earlier, it had finally applied the ratio decidendi of the State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra, (AIR 1971 SC 1011) (supra) where this Court had affirmed the opinion of the High Court, on facts, that the reversion was not in the usual course or for administrative reasons but it was after the finding on an enquiry about some complaint against the plaintiff and by way of punishment to him.
On this view of the case, it was not really necessary for this Court to consider whether the reversions of Sughat Singh was contrary to the provisions of Article 16 also.
We do not think that Sughar Singh's case (supra) in any way, conflicts with what has been laid down by this Court previously on Article 311(2) of the Constitution or Article 16 of the Constitution."
22.Thus on a conspectus of the decisions of this Court referred to above, it is obvious that there is no real conflict in their ratio decidendi and it is no longer open to any one to urge with any show of force that the constitutional position emerging from the decisions of this Court in regard to cases of the present nature is not clear. It is also to be borne in mind that even in cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and smaller benches of this Court, it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger benches. The proper course for a High Court in such a case, as observed by this Court in Union of India v. K. S. Subramanian (Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1975, decided on July, 30, 1976)* to which one of us was a party, is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court which practice, hardened as it has into a rule of law is followed by this Court itself."
17. The perusal of the aforesaid decisions of the Honourable Apex Court relating to the precedents, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner in this case cannot canvas his point to the effect that this Court has to ignore the recent decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Meher Rusi Dalal's case in preference to the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in the earlier G.H.Grant's case for the reason that in the latest decision namely Meher Rusi Dalal's case, the Honourable Apex Court referred to the decision in G.H.Grant's case and rendered its verdict. It is not as though while rendering the judgment in Meher Rusi Dalal's case, the Honourable Apex Court had not taken into consideration the earlier decision in G.H.Grant's case. In fact, in Meher Rusi Dalal's case, certain excerpts from the decision in G.H.Grant's case are found extracted. Over and above that, one other decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar reported in (2003) 3 SCC 128 was also taken into consideration. The Honourable Apex Court after considering the quintessence, the pith and marrow, the gist and kernel, the nitty-gritty of those earlier decisions of the Honourable Apex Court including the G.H.Grant's case, decided the Meher Rusi Dalal's case. As such, the Honourable Apex Court while rendering the judgment in Meher Rusi Dalal's case considered the purport of the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in G.H.Grant's case and ultimately, in paragraph No.21 of the decision in Meher Rusi Dalal's case, held that a person who cannot invoke or participate in the proceedings under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, cannot invoke Section 30 of the said Act and in such a case, the other decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner relating to the binding nature of the precedents, in no way support his contention.
18. If this Court is posted with barely two conflicting decisions of the Honourable Apex Court, one by a Larger Bench and another by a smaller Bench, certainly, this Court should prefer the ratio decedendi of the Larger Bench. But, in this case, to the risk of repetition without being tautologous, I would highlight that in Meher Rusi Dalal's case, the Honourable Apex Court extracted various excerpts from the earlier decisions of the Honourable Apex Court including G.H.Grant's case and laid down the law in paragraph No.21 of the decision in Meher Rusi Dalal's case. This Court cannot even for a moment ponder over or analyse as to whether the Honourable Apex Court in Meher Rusi Dalal's case properly considered the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in G.H.Grant's case and laid down the law in paragraph No.21 of the decision in Meher Rusi Dalal's case. The approach as suggested by the learned Counsel for the petitioner would be antithetical to the well established rules relating to binding nature of judicial precedents. If the argument as suggested by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted, it amounts to clearly stating that the Honourable Apex Court while deciding Meher Rusi Dalal's case has not properly appreciated and understood the ratio decedendi in the decision in G.H.Grant's case and such an approach is totally antithetical to judicial discipline. Hence, this Court is expected to implicitly follow the decision rendered in Meher Rusi Dalal's case as in that decision, while rendering the judgment, the Honourable Apex Court comprehended the ratio decedendi in G.H.Grant's case and ultimately, laid down the law.
19. The learned Counsel for the fourth respondent would also cite the following decisions,
(i) Kempoji Rao v. Special Land Acquisition and Estate Officer reported in AIR 2008 KARNATAKA 54.
(ii) Government of Karnataka v. Gowramma reported in AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 863.
(iii) Krishena Kumar v. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 SUPREME COURT 1782.
(iv) C.I.T v.M/s.Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. reported in AIR 1993 SUPREME COURT 43.
and develop his argument that the latest precedent of the Honourable Apex Court is a binding precedent on this Court. The aforesaid four decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent is generally on precedents.
20. Pithily and precisely, I would like to posit a segment of the law relating to precedents as under:
When the latest decision of the Honourable Apex Court after considering earlier decisions of the Honourable Apex Court including the Larger Bench of the Honourable Apex Court which the litigant before the High Court cited, lays down as to what is the law, then the High Court has got no power to ignore such recent decision and arrive at a conclusion that the earlier decision of the Larger Bench of the Honourable Apex Court would be applicable.
21. A deep reading of Chapter 5 relating to Precedent in the famous treatise Salmond on Jurisprudence (by P.J.Fitzgerald - Twelfth Edition) glaringly supports the view taken by me and I refrain from quoting excerpts from it here as it is a notable classic on the subject.
22. Hence, considering pro et contra, I am of the considered view that even though the Land Acquisition Officer exceeded his power in giving a finding relating to title in favour of the fourth respondent, nonetheless his conduct in refraining from referring the matter under Section 30 of the said Act to the Sub Court cannot be faulted with.
23. Hence, in these circumstances, while dismissing this writ petition with this finding, I would like to observe that the petitioner is at liberty to file a civil suit by way of asserting his share/right over the property acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Proceedings and also pray for such other incidental reliefs and in the event of he filing such suit, the Court concerned is expected to decide it untrammeled or uninfluenced by any of the observations/remarks made by this Court in disposing of this writ petition. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are dismissed. No costs.
rsb TO
1.The District Collector, Madurai District, Madurai.
2.The Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai.
3.The Tahsildar, Madurai South Taluk, Madurai.