Himachal Pradesh High Court
Deepak Sood And Others vs Cpri on 3 December, 2024
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Chief Justice
( 2024:HHC:13352 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
LPA No. 427 of 2024
Decided on: 3rd December, 2024
Deepak Sood and others .......Appellants
Versus
CPRI, Bemloi and others ...Respondents
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Acting Chief Justice The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Satyen Vaidya, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the appellants: Mr. Vishal Mohan, Senior Advocate with Ms.Ritu Mohan, Advocate.
For the respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, A.G. with Mr.Rakesh Dhaulta, Addl. A.G and Ms. Priyanka Chauhan, Dy.
A.G for respondent-State.
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, ACJ (Oral) The moot question, raised in this appeal, is as to whether the person whose land has been lawfully acquired, can claim for return of the land on the ground that it has not been used for the public purpose. However, before we answer the question, certain bare minimal facts need to be noticed.
2. The father of the appellants was owner in possession of Khasra Nos. 179/66, 179/67, 179/68, 179/64, 179/65 and 178/66 measuring 40.8 bighas and Khasra 1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 2 Nos.60 and 63 measuring 21.11 bighas respectively, situated in Kufri Koti, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P., which were acquired by the acquiring authority for setting up Central Potato Research Institute.
3. The respondents initially issued Notifications for acquisition of the land on 21.05.1977 and 04.01.1978 respectively, under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter, after completing all the necessary codal formalities under the Land Acquisition Act, the Land Acquisition Collector, passed the award on 28.04.1983. Since the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners were aggrieved by the inadequacy of the compensation, they preferred a reference, which was decided by the learned District Judge, Shimla vide award dated 31.12.1985.
4. The aforesaid award was challenged by the State vide RFA Nos. 124 and 97 of 1986, wherein, appellants also preferred cross objections. All these appeals were disposed of vide judgment dated 18.03.1997. According to the appellants, they are poor rustic villagers and could not raise any objection before any authority at that time with regard to acquisition of their land and now they are in dire need of this valuable land as the same is the only source of their ( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 3 livelihood. They accordingly, approached the learned writ Court for the grant of following substantive relief:-
"That the valuable land of the fathers of the petitioners comprised in Khasra Nos. 179/66, 179/67, 179/68, 179/64, 179/65 and 178/66 situated in Village Kufri-Koti, Tehsil & District Shimla and Khasra Nos. 60 and 63, situated in Kufri-Koti, respectively, may very kindly be ordered to be returned back to the petitioners by forfeiting the amount compensation as is lying deposited in the Registry of this Hon'ble Court, in the interest of law and justice."
5. The learned writ Court vide its judgment dated 02.04.2024 dismissed the petition, constraining them to file the instant appeal.
6. By now, it is more than settled that the Court cannot direct the restoration of the land that has been lawfully acquired, more particularly, on the ground that the land has not been utilized. Moreover, delay in filing of the writ petition, which has been taken note of by the learned writ Court is also a ground for rejecting the instant appeal.
7. It would be noticed that the land in question was acquired in the year 1977 and thereafter, the appellants kept on agitating their claim with the respondent Department in the concerned Court of law on account of inadequacy of compensation and had never claimed that the land should be reverted back to them and they approached the Court for grant of this relief only after 42 years. In such ( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 4 circumstances, obviously, the writ petition was bound to be dismissed.
8. An identical issue came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Northern India Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh and others (2003) 1 SCC 335, wherein, the claimants approached the writ Court almost after 17 years, on taking of possession and it was observed as under:-
"6. It is not in dispute that the writ petition was filed almost after 17 years from the date of passing the award and after taking possession of land. There is no explanation for inordinate delay and laches except the statement made in para 8 of the writ petition to the effect, that although the possession of the land was taken 17 years back in 1973, the compensation was not paid fully and the acquisition was mala fide and illegal and that the acquisition was made only to pay down the prices. It is also not in dispute that respondents 1-5 accepted/received the amount of compensation as early as on 16.10.1974 on the basis of the award passed; they sought reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation and further they pursued the matter in the High Court seeking further enhancement of the compensation till 1988. Three years thereafter they filed writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings. In our view, in the absence of any explanation for inordinate delay and laches on the part of the respondents 1-5 in approaching the High Court, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on this short ground, It appears that the High Court was impressed by two circumstances -(1) that even after 17 long years the respondents were not paid enhanced compensation and (2) if the acquisition proceedings are not quashed and if no direction is given to revest the land in respondents 1-5, there would be unjust enrichment by the appellant-company. According to the High Court, this was extra-ordinary situation, which warranted exercise of its writ jurisdiction to quash the acquisition proceedings.
7. This Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., [1998] 4 SCC 387 in para 21 has stated thus:-
( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 5 "This Court has repeatedly held that writ petition challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches if challenge is not made within a reasonable time. This Court has said that the petitioner cannot sit on the fence and allow the State to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notifications on the grounds which were available to him at the time when these were published as otherwise it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics."
8. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., [1996] II SCC 501, after reviewing the entire case law, this Court held that a person who approaches the court belatedly to question the legality of the notification under Section 4(1), declaration under Section 6 and the award of the Collector under Section 11, shall not be granted relief. Touching the question of delay and laches, in para 29, it is stated that:
''29. it is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226."
9. For restoration of land, as observed above, it is settled that after passing the award and taking possession, the acquired land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if, the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the land owner does not get any right to ask for revesting of the land in him and to ask for restitution of possession.
( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 6
10. This issue has been dealt with in Northern India Glass Industries's case (supra) in paras 9 to 12, which reads as under:-
"9. Looking to the facts of the present case and conduct of the respondents 1-5, the High Court was not at all justified in ignoring the delay and laches and granting relief to them. As already noticed, the respondent 1-5 approached the High Court by filing writ petition almost after a period of 17 years finalization of the acquisition proceedings. They accepted the compensation amount as per the award and sought for enhancement of the compensation amount without challenging the notification issued under Section 4 and 6. Having sought for enhancement of compensation only, they filed writ petition even three years after the appeals were disposed of by the High Court in the matter of enhancement of compensation. There is no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions. Merely because full enhanced compensation amount was not paid to the respondents, that itself was not a ground to condone the delay and laches, in filing the writ petition. In our view, the High Court was also not right in ordering restoration of land to the respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used for which it had been acquired. It is well-settled position in law that after passing the award and taking possession under Section 16 of the Act, the acquired land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the land-is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the land owner does not get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask for restitution of the possession. This Court as early as in 1976 in Gulam Mustafa and Ors., v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., [1976] 1 SCC 800 in para 5 has stated thus:-
"At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony. Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long after the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration."
( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 7
10. In Chandraguda Ramgonda Patil and Anr. v. Slate of Maharashtra and Ors., [1996] 6 SCC 405, it is stated that the acquired land remaining unutilized was not intended, to be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of notification.
11. Yet again in C. Padma and Ors., v. Dy. Secretary to the Government of T.N. and Ors., [1997] 2 SCC 627, it is held that acquired land having vested in the State and the compensation having been paid to the claimant, he was not entitled to restitution of possession on the ground that either original public purpose had ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for other purpose.
12. If the land was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to the State Government to take action but that did not confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land. As already noticed, the State Government in this regard has already initiated proceedings for resumption of the land. In our view, there arises no question of any unjust enrichment to the appellant company."
11. Accordingly, the question, as posed above, is answered in the following terms:-
"After passing the award and taking possession, the acquired land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the land owner does not get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask for restitution of possession.
12. This legal position has been affirmed by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority vs. Manohar Lal and others (2020) 8 SCC 129. It would be apt to reproduce para 129 of the same, which reads as under:-
"129. Various decisions were referred on behalf of the State of Haryana that once possession has been taken and land has not been utilised, there cannot be withdrawal from the ( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 8 acquisition of any land. Land cannot be restituted to the owner after the stage of possession is over. Following decisions have been pressed into service:
129.1. In Gulam Mustafa & Ors , it was observed:
"5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony.
Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration."
129.2. Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil & Anr. (supra) when restitution of land was sought, on the basis of some Government resolutions, after possession had been taken, this observed thus:
"2... Since he had sought enforcement of the said government resolution, the writ petition could not be dismissed on the ground of constructive res judicata. He also seeks to rely upon certain orders said to have been passed by the High Court in conformity with enforcement of the government resolution. We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions." (emphasis supplied) 129.3. Again, in C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary & Ors93, this court stated that:
"4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (for short "the Act") in GOR No. 1392 ( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 9 Industries dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in GOMs No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the Company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs No. 439 Industries dated 10-5-1985. In GOMs No. 546 Industries dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.
5. Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, contends that when by operation of Section 44-B read with Section 40 of the Act, the public purpose ceased to be existing, the acquisition became bad and therefore, the GO was bad in law. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that after the notification in GOR 1392 dated 17-10-1962 was published, the acquisition proceeding had become final, the compensation was paid to the appellants' father and thereafter the lands stood vested in the State. In terms of the agreement as contemplated in Chapter VII of the Act, the Company had delivered possession subject to the terms and conditions thereunder. It is seen that one of the conditions was that on cessation of the public purpose, the lands acquired would be surrendered to the Government. In furtherance thereof, the lands came to be surrendered to the Government for resumption. The lands then were allotted to SRVS Ltd., 5th respondent which is also a subsidiary amalgamated company of the original company. Therefore, the public purpose for which acquisition was made was substituted ( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 10 for another public purpose. Moreover, the question stood finally settled 32 years ago and hence the writ petition cannot be entertained after three decades on the ground that either original purpose was not public purpose or the land cannot be used for any other purpose.
6. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was right in refusing to entertain the writ petition."
(emphasis supplied) 129.4. The decision in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh thus:
"9...There is no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions. Merely because full enhanced compensation amount was not paid to the respondents, that itself was not a ground to condone the delay and laches in filing the writ petition. In our view, the High Court was also not right in ordering restoration of land to the respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used for which it had been acquired. It is a well-settled position in law that after passing the award and taking possession under Section 16 of the Act, the acquired land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the landowner does not get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask for restitution of the possession. This Court as early as in 1976 in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 in para 5 has stated thus: (SCC p. 802, para 5) "5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony. Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no 94 (2003) 1 SCC 335 principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long after the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration." (emphasis supplied) 129.5. Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi (supra)95 the Court observed that:
"28. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid judgments would reveal that while taking possession, symbolic and ( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 11 notional possession is perhaps not envisaged under the Act but the manner in which possession is taken must of necessity depend upon the facts of each case. Keeping this broad principle in mind, this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259 after considering the judgment in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700, observed that while taking possession of a large area of land (in this case 339 acres) a pragmatic and realistic approach had to be taken. This Court then examined the context under which the judgment in Narayan Bhagde case had been rendered and held as under: (Viswam case, SCC p. 262, para 9) "9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or panchnama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not be cooperative in taking possession of the land."
40. In Narayan Bhagde case one of the arguments raised by the landowner was that as per the communication of the Commissioner the land was still with the landowner and possession thereof had not been taken. The Bench observed that the letter was based on a misconception as the landowner had re-entered the acquired land immediately after its possession had been taken by the Government ignoring the scenario that he stood divested of the possession, under Section 16 of the Act. This Court observed as under: (Narayan Bhagde case, SCC p. 712, para 29) "29. ... This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal position is clear that even if the appellant entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land was actually taken possession of and became vested in the Government, such act on the part of the appellant did not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting." To our mind, therefore, even assuming that the appellant had re-entered the land on account of the various interim orders granted by the courts, or even otherwise, it would have no effect for two reasons, (1) that the suits/petitions were ultimately dismissed and ( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 12 (2) that the land once having vested in the Government by virtue of Section 16 of the Act, re-entry by the landowner would not obliterate the consequences of vesting."
129.6. This court stated, in Leelawanti & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors96 thus:
"19. If Para 493 is read in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants then in all the cases the acquired land will have to be returned to the owners irrespective of the time gap between the date of acquisition and the date on which the purpose of acquisition specified in Section 4 is achieved and the Government will not be free to use the acquired land for any other public purpose. Such an interpretation would also be contrary to the language of Section 16 of the Act, in terms of which the acquired land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the law laid down by this Court that the lands acquired for a particular public purpose can be utilised for any other public purpose.
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22. The approach adopted by the High Court is consistent with the law laid down by this Court in State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, (1997) 5 SCC 432 and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558. In the first of these cases, the Court considered the validity of an executive order passed by the Government for assignment of land to the erstwhile owners and observed: (M. Bhaskaran Pillai case, SCC p. 433, para
4) "4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, LA by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in ( 2024:HHC:13352 ) 13 consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value."
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24. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the appellants have failed to make out a case for issue of a mandamus to the respondents to release the acquired land in their favour. In the result, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs."
(emphasis supplied)
13. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we find no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.
( Tarlok Singh Chauhan )
Acting Chief Justice
December 03, 2024 ( Satyen Vaidya )
(naveen) Judge