Karnataka High Court
Smt Priya E vs The State Of Karnataka on 24 January, 2025
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115
CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 7564 OF 2023 (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)-)
BETWEEN:
SMT PRIYA E
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
W/O VIJAY,
R/O NO.71, GANGAMMA TEMPLE GALLI,
JALAHALLI,
BENGALURU-560013
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. CHIDAMBARA G S., ADVOCATE)
Digitally AND:
signed by
VANAMALA
N 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
Location: BY SUBRAMANYANAGAR POLICE STATION,
HIGH
COURT OF BENGALURU-560021,
KARNATAKA REP BY THE SPP,
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BENGALURU-560001.
2. SMT S DEEPIKA
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
D/O S SUKUMAR,
R/O NO.228, II TANK B MAIN ROAD,
SUBRAMANYA NAGARA,
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115
CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023
BENGALURU-560021.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. RASHMI JADHAV, ADDL SPP FOR R1;
R2 SERVED BUT UNREPRESENTED)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC PRAYING TO
QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET DATED 06.01.2023 BEARING
NO.151/2022 FILED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT POLICE AND
THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN C.C.NO.2338/2023 PENDING
ON THE FILE OF THE COURT OF 39TH A.C.M.M, AT
BENGALURU FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 34,498A,504,506 OF
IPC.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS
DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
This petition by accused No.5 in C.C.No.2338/2023 pending on the file of the XXXIX Additional CCM, Bangalore, seeks quashing of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 498A, 504, 506 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1908 [for short, 'IPC'].
2. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.
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3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that respondent No.2 is married to one Mohit Roy - accused No.1, while accused Nos.2, 3 and 4 are his family members. The respondent No.2 filed the instant complaint against the petitioner, which culminated in the impugned charge sheet inter alia alleging that the petitioner was the friend of accused No.1 and consequently, the petitioner was also guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 504, 506 read with 34 of IPC.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the contents of the FIR, Charge Sheet, statement of witnesses etc., in order to point out that apart from the fact that the petitioner not being the member of the family of respondent No.2 or her husband, cannot be construed or treated as a 'relative' within the meaning of Section 498A of IPC, none of the ingredients of Section 504 or 506 of IPC have been made out by respondent No.2 in the complaint nor were they contained in the charge sheet or the statement of witnesses and consequently, the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner - accused No.5 deserve to be quashed.
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5. Per contra, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor submits that there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
6. The issue/question whether the a person who is not a relative of the husband or the member of the family of the husband could be charged with offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC is no longer res integra in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of U. Suvetha Vs. State by Inspector of Police and Another reported in (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 757, wherein it was held as under:
"6. The High Court opined that the words "paramour"
and "concubine" stand on the same footing. In arriving at the said opinion, it agreed with the decision of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vungarala Yedukondalu v. State of A.P. [1988 Cri LJ 1538 (AP)] and differed with the decision of the Bombay High Court, to opine:
"The term 'relative' has not been defined in the Penal Code and in the absence of any such definition, we have to go by the precedents. Assuming that the allegations made against the petitioner viz. that she is the concubine of A-1 is true, then, it is to be held that there is a living relationship between the petitioner and A-1 in the case and there are specific allegations to the fact that only at the instigation of the revision -5- NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 petitioner, A-1 is harassing the second respondent and as such this Court is of the considered view that a charge under Section 498-A IPC among other offence has also been rightly framed against the revision petitioner."
7. Ingredients of Section 498-A of the Penal Code are:
(a) The woman must be married;
(b) She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and
(c) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by the relative of her husband.
8. The appellant herein had not been charged for abetment of a crime. Any conspiracy amongst the accused persons has also not been alleged. A woman in terms of the aforementioned provision must be subjected to cruelty by her husband and/or his relative. The word "cruelty" has also been defined in the Explanation appended thereto. It is in two parts. Clause (a) of the said Explanation refers to a conduct which is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health (whether mental or physical); Clause (b) provides for harassment of the woman, where such harassment, is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. It is not the case of the first informant that the appellant had any role to play with regard to demand of dowry.
9 The word "cruelty" having been defined in terms of the aforesaid Explanation, no other meaning can be attributed -6- NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 thereto. Living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not attract the wrath of Section 498-A of the Penal Code. An offence in terms of the said provision is committed by the persons specified therein. They have to be the "husband" or his "relative". Either the husband of the woman or his relative must have subjected her to cruelty within the aforementioned provision. If the appellant had not (sic) been instigating the husband of the first informant to torture her, as has been noticed by the High Court, the husband would be committing some offence punishable under the other provisions of the Penal Code and the appellant may be held guilty for abetment of commission of such an offence but not an offence under Section 498-A of the Penal Code.
10. In the absence of any statutory definition, the term "relative" must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or granddaughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word "relative" would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or adoption.
11. The word "relative" has been defined in P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, Vol. 4, 3rd Edn. as under:
"Relative.--'Relative' includes any person related by blood, marriage or adoption. (Lunacy Act ...) -7- NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 The expression 'relative' means a husband, wife, ancestor, lineal descendant, brother or sister. (Estate Duty Act ...) 'Relative' means in relation to the deceased,
(a) the wife or husband of the deceased,
(b) the father, mother, children, uncles and aunts of the deceased, and
(c) any issue of any person falling within either of the preceding sub-clauses and the other party to a marriage with any such person or issue. (Estate Duty Act ...) A person shall be deemed to be a relative of another if, and only if--
(a) they are members of a Hindu undivided family; or
(b) they are husband and wife; or
(c) the one is related to the other in the manner indicated in Schedule I-A [Companies Act (1 of 1956 ...)] 'Relative' in relation to an individual means--
(a) the mother, father, husband or wife of the individual, or
(b) a son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece of the individual, or
(c) a grandson or granddaughter of the individual, or
(d) the spouse of any person referred to in sub-clause (b).
(Income Tax Act ...) 'Relative' means--
(1) spouse of the person;
(2) brother or sister of the person;
(3) brother or sister of the spouse of the person; (4) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the person;
-8-NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 (5) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the person;
*** ... (Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act ...)"
12. Random House Webster's Concise College Dictionary defines "relative" at p. 691 to mean:
"Relative n. 1. a person who is connected with another or others by blood or marriage. 2. something having, or standing in, some relation to something else. 3. something dependent upon external conditions for its specific nature, size, etc. (opposed to absolute). 4. a relative pronoun, adjective, or adverb. -- adj. 5. considered in relation to something else; comparative: the relative merits of gas and electric heating. 6. existing or having its specific nature only by relation to something else; not absolute or independent: Happiness is relative. 7. having relation or connection. 8. having reference :
relevant; pertinent (usually fol. by to): two facts relative to the case. 9. correspondent; proportionate: 10. depending for significance upon something else: 'Better' is a relative term.
11. of or designating a word that introduces a subordinate clause and refers to an expressed or implied element of the principal clause: the relative pronoun who in 'That was the woman who called.' 12. (of a musical key) having the same key signature as another key: a relative minor."
13. Furthermore, Section 498-A is a penal one. It, thus, deserves strict construction. Ordinarily, save and except where a contextual meaning is required to be given to a statute, a penal provision is required to be construed strictly.
-9-NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 This Court in T. Ashok Pai v. CIT [(2007) 7 SCC 162 : (2007) 8 Scale 354] held as under: (SCC p. 168, para 17) "17. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the more stringent is the law, more strict construction thereof would be necessary. Even when the burden is required to be discharged by an assessee, it would not be as heavy as on the prosecution. (See P.N. Krishna Lal v. Govt. of Kerala [1995 Supp (2) SCC 187 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 466] .)"
(See also Noor Aga v. State of Punjab [(2008) 16 SCC 417 : (2008) 9 Scale 681] .)
14. A three-Judge Bench of this Court, however, in Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of M.P. [(2007) 15 SCC 369 : (2002) 2 Crimes 177 (SC) : JT (2002) 2 SC 641] while interpreting Section 498-A of the Penal Code, in a case where the prosecution alleged that during the life of the first wife Kalindi, the appellant therein married for the second time, Mohini, but after marriage both Kalindi and Shiv Charan tortured Mohini as a result thereof, she ultimately committed suicide by burning herself, opined:
".. One, whether the prosecution under Section 498-A can at all be attracted since the marriage with Mohini itself was null and void, the same having been performed during the lifetime of Kalindi. Second, whether the conviction under Section 306 could at all be sustained in the absence of any positive material to hold that Mohini committed suicide because of any positive act on the part of either Shiv Charan or Kalindi.
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 There may be considerable force in the argument of Mr Khanduja, learned counsel for the appellant so far as conviction under Section 498-A is concerned, inasmuch as the alleged marriage with Mohini during the subsistence of valid marriage with Kalindi is null and void. We, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 498-A IPC."
15. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, however, in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam [(2004) 3 SCC 199 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 699] while construing the expression "husband" opined that the word should not be given a restricted meaning to include those, who had married for the second time strictly in accordance with law, stating: (SCC p. 210, para 18) "18. ... If such restricted meaning is given, it would not further the legislative intent. On the contrary, it would be against the concern shown by the legislature for avoiding harassment to a woman over demand of money in relation to marriages. The First Exception to Section 494 has also some relevance. According to it, the offence of bigamy will not apply to 'any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction'. It would be appropriate to construe the expression 'husband' to cover a person who enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions--Sections 304-B/498-A, whatever
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 be the legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC. Such an interpretation, known and recognised as purposive construction has to come into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a definition of 'husband' to specifically include such persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabit with such woman, in the purported exercise of their role and status as 'husband' is no ground to exclude them from the purview of Section 304-B or 498-A IPC, viewed in the context of the very object and aim of the legislations introducing those provisions."
16. It is not necessary to go into the controversy as to whether Reema Aggarwal6 was correctly decided or not as we are not faced with such a situation here. We would assume that the term "husband" would bring within its fold a person who is said to have contracted a marriage with another woman and subjected her to cruelty.
17. Herein, as noticed hereinbefore, relationship of the appellant with the husband of the first informant, is said to have been existing from before the marriage. Indisputably they lived separately. For all intent and purport the husband was also living at a separate place. The purported torture is said to have been inflicted by the husband upon the first informant either at her in-law's place or at her parents' place. There is no allegation that the appellant had any role to play in that regard.
18. By no stretch of imagination would a girlfriend or even a concubine in an etymological sense be a "relative". The
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 word "relative" brings within its purview a status. Such a status must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not arise.
19. We may notice that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rajeti Laxmi v. State of A.P. [(2007) 1 DMC 797 (AP)] held as under: (DMC p. 798, para 4) "4. The entire reading of the charge-sheet and the statements of LWs 1 to 7, goes to show that it is nobody's case of the accused or the prosecution that A-6 is the relative of husband of LW 1. She is only concubine of A-1 and having illicit intimacy with him. Therefore, in the absence of any averment in the charge-sheet or any statement that she is a relative of A-1, I am of the opinion that the offence under Section 498-A IPC does not attract to A-6. Even as per the dictionary meaning 'relative' means a person connected by blood or marriage or 'a species related to another by common origin'. Simply because A-6 is having illicit intimacy with A-1, it cannot be said that she is a relative of A-1. Accordingly, the criminal petition is allowed quashing the proceedings in CC No. 233 of 2004 for the offence under Section 498-A IPC, against the petitioner A-6. Insofar as the other offences are concerned, it may go on."
20. A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Bench at Aurangabad, in Swapnaja v. State of Maharashtra [ Criminal Application No. 388 of 2008 decided on 21-4-2008] opined:
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 "... Even assuming that due to her extramarital relation with husband of Respondent 2, she is being ill-treated or subjected to harassment by her husband and his relatives, then also it is difficult to say that the applicant is accountable to answer the charge for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. For, she is not related to husband of Respondent 2 nor can be regarded as the person, who can fall within Explanation (a) or (b) of Section 498-A IPC." To the similar effect is the law laid down by the same High Court in Ranjana Gopalrao Thorat v. State of Maharashtra [2007 Cri LJ 3866 (Bom)] .
21. A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, however, preferred to follow Shivcharan Lal Verma5 in preference to Reema Aggarwal6 to hold that precedentially the former is binding on the High Court, stating:
"Therefore the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma5 will clearly take precedence over the decision in Reema Aggarwal6. That being the case, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners would have to be accepted that the provisions of Section 498-A IPC would not be attracted inasmuch as the marriage between Mohit Gupta and Shalini was null and void and Mohit Gupta could not be construed as a 'husband' for the purposes of Section 498-A IPC. Clearly, therefore, the charge under Section 498-A IPC cannot be framed and the Metropolitan Magistrate had correctly declined to frame any charges under Section 498-A IPC."
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023
22. Similar view was taken by a learned Single Judge of the same High Court in Capt. Rajinder Tiwari v. State (NCT of Delhi) [ Criminal Revision Petition No. 872 of 2006 decided on 14-12-2006] stating:
"9. As already indicated above, insofar as the charge under Section 498-A IPC is concerned, that issue is no longer open for debate. The same has been decided by this Court in Mohit Gupta [Mohit Gupta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2006) 3 JCC 1923] applying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma5. Since the marriage between Rajinder and Meenakshi was a nullity in view of the pendency of Rajinder's divorce proceedings qua his first wife, the offence under Section 498-A, which is specific to 'husband', would not be maintainable, therefore, the impugned order needs to be corrected on this ground also."
23. We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in John Idiculla v. State of Kerala [2005 MLJ (Cri) 841 (Ker)] relying on Reema Aggarwal6 gave a wider meaning to the word "second wife" to hold:
"25. The test under Section 498-A IPC is whether in the facts of each case, it is probable that a woman is treated by friends, relatives, husband or society as a 'wife' or as a mere 'mistress'. If from the pleadings and evidence the Court finds that the woman concerned is regarded as wife and not as a mere mistress, she can be considered to be a 'wife' and consequently as 'the relative of the husband' for the
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 purpose of Section 498-A IPC. Proof of a legal marriage in the rigid sense as required under civil law is unnecessary for establishing an offence under Section 498-A IPC. The expression 'marriage' or 'relative' can be given only a diluted meaning which a common man or society may attribute to those concepts in the common parlance, for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC. A second wife who is treated as wife by the husband, relatives, friends or society can be considered to be 'the relative of the husband' for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC. If she inflicts cruelty on the legally wedded wife of the husband, an offence under Section 498-A IPC will not lie against her."
24. Applying the principles laid down in various decisions referred to above, we have no doubt in our mind, that the appellant is not a relative of the husband of the first informant. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed."
So also in the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dechamma I.M. @ Dechamma Koushik Vs. the State of Karnataka and Another in SLP (Crl.) No.3421/2022 decided on 04.12.2024 it is held as under:
"6. Smt. Upadhyaya submits that even if the allegations in the FIR or in the charge-sheet are taken at
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 their face value, no case under Section 498A of IPC is made out against the appellant herein. She further submits that the allegations are false and fabricated as the appellant is residing 200 kms., away with her husband. Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector of Police and Another , Ms. Upadhyaya submits that the appellant cannot be construed to be a relative within the meaning of the relatives of the husband under the purview of Section 498A of IPC. She, therefore, submits that the proceedings deserve to be quashed.
7. It is further submitted that respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1 have amicably settled the matter as amongst them and a decree of divorce by mutual consent has also been passed dissolving the marriage between respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1.
8. This Court, in the case of U. Suvetha (supra), had an occasion to consider a question as to whether the girlfriend or a woman with whom a man has had romantic or sexual relations outside of marriage would be a "relative of the husband" for the purposes of prosecution under Section 498A of IPC.
9. This Court, after considering the earlier judgments of this Court and the dictionary meaning of a relative, observed thus:--
"18. By no stretch of imagination would a girlfriend or even a concubine in an etymological sense be a "relative". The word "relative" brings within its purview a status. Such a status must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. If
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not arise."
10. It could thus be seen that this Court has, in unequivocal terms, held that a girlfriend or even a woman with whom a man has had romantic or sexual relations outside of marriage could not be construed to be a relative.
11. Apart from that for bringing a case under Section 498A of IPC, the material placed on record should show that the ill treatment was meted out by the husband or a relative, which is connected with non-fulfilment of demand of dowry.
12. Taking the allegations at their face value in the FIR or even in the entire material placed in the charge-sheet, it will show that there is no averment or material to show that the appellant was in any way concerned with causing harassment to respondent No. 2 on account of non-fulfilment of demand of dowry.
13. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant herein would be nothing else but an abuse of process of law. We find that the present appeal deserves to be allowed.
14. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeal is accordingly allowed;
(ii) The judgment and order of the High Court dated 12th April 2021 is quashed and set aside; and
(iii) The proceedings in Crime No. 339 of 2019 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Gundlupete for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 504, 109 of IPC
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, are quashed and set aside qua the appellant herein.
14. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of."
As is clear from the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, the petitioner not being a 'relative' within the purview of Section 498A of IPC, the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner for alleged offence under Section 498A of IPC deserve to be quashed.
7. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, a bare perusal of the contents of the complaint, FIR, charge sheet, statement of witnesses etc., will also indicate that the ingredients for constituting offences under Sections 504 or 506 of IPC are not contained therein and consequently, continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner - accused No.5 in relation to the offences punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of IPC would also amount to abuse of process of law warranting interference by this Court in the present petition.
8. Hence, the following:
ORDER a. The petition is hereby allowed.
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NC: 2025:KHC:3115 CRL.P No. 7564 of 2023 b. The impugned proceedings in C.C.No.2338/2023 pending on the file of the XXXIX Additional CCM, Bangalore is quashed qua the petitioner.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE RB