Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
The Director, Intermediate Education, ... vs Rama Prabhakara Rao, School Assistant, ... on 30 April, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(4)ALT41
ORDER B. Prakash Rao, J.
1. Heard Sri S. Satyanarayana Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Sri Vidyasagar, Sri D.V. Seetarama Murthy, Sri D.V. Subrahmanya Sarma and Smt. K. Udayasree, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents.
2. Since the issue involved in all these Writ Petitions is common, they are being taken up together for disposal.
3. In these writ petitions, filed at the instance of the Director, Intermediate Education, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Nampally, Hyderabad, challenging the very maintainability of proceedings in the contempt applications Nos.482/01, 865/01, 994/01, 964/01 and 962/01 arising out of the common orders passed in O.A. No. 4672/95 dated 02-12-1999 on the file of A.P. Administrative Tribunal, twin questions of importance arise for consideration are viz.,
(i) Whether, on the facts and circumstances, the orders of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal on being challenged in a Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India merge with the orders passed by this Court, and therefore, no contempt proceedings would lie before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal for violation of its orders; and
(ii) Whether, on the facts and circumstances, the A.P. Administrative Tribunal having entertained the contempt proceedings has any jurisdiction to pass any interim order or further other orders.
4. Since the Counsel on either side have restricted their submissions only on the scope of the aforesaid questions without touching of the facts on either side, it is not necessary to consider on merits. However, it would suffice to take into account the chequered events leading to the filing of this writ petition.
5. On the applications filed by the SGBT teachers working in the Tribal Welfare Ashram Schools in the Tribal Welfare Department in O.A.No.4672 of 1995 along with batch of cases, filed under Section 19 of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, the A.P. Administrative Tribunal disposed of the same by orders dated 02-12-1999. In the said proceedings a challenge was made to sub-rule 3 (ii) (b) of A.P. Intermediate Educational Service Rules framed in G.O.Ms.No.302, dated 30-12-1993 and the controversy was in regard to the appointment by transfer to the post of Junior Lecturers under Rule 3 in category-8. As provided under category 1(b) of class (c), the appointment was by transfer from amongst the school assistants, including Hindi Pandits and Munshies in grade 1 category 1 of Class-D of A.P. School Educational Subordinate Service Rules or by recruitment by transfer from any other service. The contention of the applicants therein is that they are working in the said schools and therefore a provision also has to be made for their appointment. In the final orders, the A.P. Administrative Tribunal opined that 50% of the vacancies in the State in the category of Junior Lecturers were earmarked for direct recruits and the remaining 50% for recruitment by transfer to School Assistants of Andhra Pradesh School Education Subordinate Service or recruitment by transfer or from any other service as defined in Rule 2(30) of A.P. State and Subordinate Service Rules. Further, it was directed that for laying down a method for apportioning to the 50% vacancies amongst the various sub-groups and consequently lay down the norms judiciously. Thereafter, the matter was carried to this Court by the aggrieved persons in W.P. No. 21648 of 2000, which was ultimately dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court, as per the orders dated 08-03-2001 holding that having regard to the absence of provisions in the special rules, the general rules cannot be made applicable and therefore it was left open for the State that in the event the State intends to appoint teachers, who were working in the Tribal Welfare Ashram School under the Social Welfare Department, they would also be eligible therefor and it was left open for the State to consider and prepare a joint seniority list, if it deemed expedient. Therefore, according to the petitioner, choice was left to the State and the orders of the Tribunal were merged with that of this Court and this Court being a superior Court, the remedy of the aggrieved person for any non-compliance or violation of the orders is only to approach this Court but not the Tribunal.
6. However, an applicant in O.A.No.24 of 1997 has filed the contempt application on 10-06-2001 before the Tribunal in Contempt Application No.482 of 2001, whereupon the Tribunal after entertaining the said application passed various orders on several dates after issuing a Show Cause Notice.
7. The petitioner has filed a counter-affidavit on 20-06-2001 denying the allegation and stating that there is no wilful disobedience. In spite of filing of the said counter-affidavit, the Tribunal directed the Commissioner, Tribal Welfare to send a list of candidates, whereupon, the petitioner to prepare an integrated list for effecting promotions in the post of junior lecturers and till that exercise is completed, a further direction is given that there will be no promotion to the post of Junior Lecturers in the State. Thereafter, again the Tribunal has entertained another contempt application on 19-03-2002, whereupon, the Tribunal passed an order to the effect that the earlier orders passed are extended and with further directions that the list submitted by the Commissioner, Tribal Welfare, shall be supplied to all the Regional Joint Directors and other seniority list shall be prepared by the Regional Joint Directors and they shall submit to the Court on 16-04-2002. Once again on 03-05-2002, the Tribunal passed another order to the effect that in so far as Zone-V is concerned, adhoc promotions should be given on the basis of the seniority list, including the teachers working in Tribal Welfare Department of Adilabad and also on the basis of integrated seniority list and the entire such exercise shall be completed within a period of five weeks from the date of the order. On this, the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India, inter alia, contending as aforesaid that the very contempt application as has been filed and framed before the Tribunal is not maintainable, in view of the fact that the orders of the Tribunal stood merged with that of the orders of this Court in Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore no contempt would lie there, but only in this Court. That apart, a further contention was also to the effect that in a contempt application, the scope is very limited to see whether there is any disobedience of the orders, but there is no power by going into merits and to pass any interim or further orders. If at all the parties are aggrieved against any subsequent action taken, it would give rise to different cause of action to file a fresh application before the Tribunal and seek appropriate reliefs, but not seek direction in the very same contempt application.
8. Sri S. Satyanarayana Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, relied on the decisions in SHANKAR v. KRISHN, , J.S.PARIHAR v. GANPAT DUGGAR, , KUNHAYAMMED v. STATE OF KERALA, , and SMT.A.SANTHI KUMARI, I.A.S., v. K.RAVI, , in support of the plea of merger and also the principles governing therein. Further, he sought to place reliance on the decisions reported in T.V.CHOWDARY vs. RIATA INDUSTRIAL CORPoration, , VIJAY SINGH v. MITTANLAL HINDOLIYA, 1996 (6) SLR 622, and RABIA BEE v. R.SUBRAHMANYAM, to the effect that in a contempt proceedings, no interim order and any further orders would be passed, except to see whether there is any violation of the orders passed.
9. Repelling the said contentions, the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents herein sought to contend that having regard to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in L.CHANDRA KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA, and latter decision in T.SUDHAKAR PRASAD v. GOVT. OF A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 516, ample powers are exist with the Tribunal to entertain the contempt proceedings and therefore, it cannot be said that the contempt proceedings have to be filed only in this Court and the principle of merger will not apply on the facts of the case. A further reliance was placed in support of the said plea on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.10242 of 1998, dated 04-04-2003.
10. Having considered the submissions made on either side and also on perusal of the material, the main question which arises for consideration is only as to the competency of the Tribunal to entertain the contempt proceedings on the merger of its order with that of this Court in the Writ proceedings and as to whether pending the contempt proceedings, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to pass any interim or further orders.
11. There is no dispute to the facts, as submitted above, in regard to the filing of the applications before the Administrative Tribunal by the parties and the batch of cases having been disposed of on 02-12-1999 and thereafter the said orders having been challenged in a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The said Writ Petition was disposed of by this Court on 08-03-2001 with certain directions. Thereupon, the parties complaining that the said orders having not been implemented, approached the Tribunal by way of contempt application. It is imperative to take note of the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which has come into effect from 27-02-1985. Under the Chapter 3 of the aforesaid Act, apart from confirming the jurisdiction powers and authority on the administrative tribunals, a specific power of contempt has been conferred under Section 17 thereof, which reads as follows:
"17. Power to punish for contempt.-A Tribunal shall have, and exercise, the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has and may exercise and, for this purpose, the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (80 of 1971), shall have effect subject to the modifications that-
(a) the references therein to a High Court shall be construed as including a reference to such Tribunal:
(b) the reference to the Advocate-General in Section 15 of the said Act shall be construed,-
(i) in relation to the Central Administrative Tribunal, as a reference to the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General or the Additional Solicitor-General; and
(ii) in relation to an Administrative Tribunal for a State or a Joint Administrative Tribunal for two or more States, as a reference to the Advocate-General of the State or any of the States for which such Tribunal has been established."
Under the above provision, the Tribunal has been conferred with the powers on par with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as conferred on this Court to take action in respect of contempt of itself. Therefore, it cannot be said that unlike the situation existing prior to the enforcement of the aforesaid Act, no such power is vested with the Tribunal. The Act is self-contained one with the inclusion of specific power of contempt. The powers of the Tribunal and this Court to entertain the application are quite independent of each other. Therefore, both such powers of contempt run concurrently and cannot be said that one overrides the other. Further, any order passed by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is only to correct any orders in exercise of powers of judicial review and not as any higher authority in the hierarchy of the remedial ladder under the Act.
12. In SHANKAR's case (1 supra) considering the Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India vis-à-vis Sections 96, 115 and 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"Where, on its revisional jurisdiction being invoked against the order of the appellate Court under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the High Court dismisses the revision, after hearing both the parties, the order of the appellate Court becomes merged with the order made in revision, and, thereafter, the appellate order cannot be challenged or attacked by another set of proceedings in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The principle of merger of orders of inferior Courts would not become affected or inapplicable by making any distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal."
13. In J.S. PARIHAR's case (2 supra), considering the jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Supreme Court held as follows:
"Once an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum."
14. In KUNHAYAMMED's case (3 supra) Supreme Court held as follows:
"The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by inferior Court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior Court has disposed of the lis before it either way-whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior Court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the Court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter."
15. In SMT. A.SANTHI KUMARI's case (4 supra), Division Bench of this Court considering the provisions under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, held that an order passed in Writ Petition merges with the order in Writ Appeal and therefore, the contempt petition is not maintainable.
16. Having regard to the aforesaid principles, and especially in view of the specific provision as contained under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the parallel provisions as contained under the Contempt of Courts Act, both operate in different fields, and the principles of merger thus cannot be made applicable.
17. In T.SUDHAKAR PRASAD's case (9 supra), directly considering the provisions of Section 17 & 30 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and by taking into consideration the principles laid down in L.CHANDRA KUMAR's case (8 supra), Supreme Court held that it cannot be said in view of the L.CHANDRA KUMAR's case (8 supra) the Administrative Tribunals lost the right to hear on their own contempt, further Section 30 did not negate the right of the Administrative Tribunals and further held that the jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals to punish for their contempt in respect of matters covered by Section 14(1) is the same as vested in High Court under Article 215 read with provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
18. In view of the aforesaid principles as laid down, it is quite clear that Administrative Tribunal has ample powers of its own to entertain the contempt application irrespective of the orders passed by this Court on judicial review.
19. Coming to the second question, as to whether the Tribunal has any jurisdiction to pass any interim orders or further orders on proceedings initiated for contempt, the power of contempt as conferred under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, as pointed out above, is on par with the same power as conferred under the High Court not only under the Article 215 of Constitution of India, but also under provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Considering the similar question, the Division Bench of this court in T.V.CHOWDARY's case (5 supra), it was held that it is trite to say that the scope and purport of the contempt jurisdiction is to see whether the order of the Court has been complied with in substance or deliberately flouted. Similarly, in VIJAY SINGH's case (6 supra), considering the provisions of Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, Supreme Court it was held that once it is found that respondent has not deliberately disobeyed the order, there is no powers to issue further directions.
20. In RABIA BEE's case (7 supra), Division Bench of this Court considering once again the scope of contempt proceedings held that once an order was passed, as per the directions of the High Court, the Court cannot go into correctness of the said order and it is the aggrieved party to seek redressal in appropriate forum.
21. In the circumstances, it is now well established that scope of the contempt application is very much restricted only to see whether the order is flouted and therefore, it cannot be said that Contempt Court can issue interim or further directions. In the circumstances, the Tribunal in this case having entertained the application, ought not to have issued any further directions and the entire enquiry should have been restricted only to see whether there is any violation of the orders.
22. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petitions are partly allowed only to the extent that all the further directions given by the Tribunal pending the Contempt proceedings are set aside, and main Contempt Application has to be disposed of in accordance with law after hearing both sides. No costs.