Madhya Pradesh High Court
Radhe Shyam vs Kailash Chand on 1 September, 2025
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
1
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I n d o r e
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 1st OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
MISC. PETITION No. 4780 of 2022
RADHE SHYAM
Versus
KAILASH CHAND AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Peyush Jain - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Rohit Mangal - Advocate for respondent.
ORDER
This miscellaneous petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is filed feeling aggrieved by the order dated 29.08.2022 passed by the Additional Judge to the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Manawar Distt. Dhar in Regular Civil Suit No. 37A/2019, whereby the learned Civil Judge rejected objection raised by the defendant with regard to admissibility and exhibition of the documents titled as Batwara Lekh dated 26.06.1995.
2. The exposition of facts in brief, giving rise to the present petition is as under:
A. Kailash Chandra S/o Pannalal filed a civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction against defendant Radheyshyam with regard to property bearing Survey no. 205/1/p - area 0.021 hectares at Man-2
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508 awar-Dhar Road. It was averred in the plaint that plaintiff and defendant had purchased the disputed property vide registered sale deed dated 17.04.1972. The plaintiff and his brother had received disputed property in furtherance of partition deed dated 26.05.1995. They are in possession of the property given in respective shares. On 26.05.1995, all the family members executed memorandum of partition and accordingly, the disput-
ed property was given in share of the plaintiff. Plaintiff had applied for mutation of the property on the basis of partition which was later assailed by the defendant in appeal. Therefore, plaintiff had filed the suit for dec- laration of title and permanent injunction to protect his possession.
B. The defendant vide written statement denied execution of any partition deed and alleged that partition deed dated 26.06.1995 was not executed by him. The plaintiff is not the sole title holder of the disputed property.
C. During pendency of the suit, the plaintiff proposed the document titled as (Batwara Lekh) partition deed in his evidence. The defendant raised an objection with regard to admissibility and exhibition of the document dated 26.06.1995 in view of Section 17 read with Section 49 of the Indi- an Registration Act, 1908[for short "the Act of 1908" hereinafter], it is not admissible in evidence with registration. Learned trial Court rejected the objection and concluded that the proposed document is not a partition deed, rather, it is a memorandum of family settlement between the par- ties. Therefore, it does not require registration. Feeling aggrieved by the order, the present petition is filed on the following grounds:
1. The impugned order has been passed without application of mind. The Evidence Act does not allow unregistered document to be exhibited in the evidence.3
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508
2. Section 17 and 49 of the Registration Act provides mandatory registration of certain documents and the questioned document falls in such category.
3. The petitioner/defendant no.1 is registered owner of the suit property. His right cannot be relinquished on the basis of unreg- istered partnership deed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner in addition to the grounds men- tioned in the petition contends that the tenor and recital of the documents in question clearly show that both the parties have agreed to transfer the land. Thus, in effect, the document in question extinguishes right of the party and creates new right in favour of the other party. Hence, it is compulsorily reg- isterable under Section 17(1)(b) read with Section 49 of the Act of 1908.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Subraya M.N. Vs. Vittala M.N. and Others reported in 2017(1) MPLJ 17 to contend that the family arrangement dealing with the immovable property can be made orally and when so made, no question of registration arises. But when the terms of family settlement between the par- ties have been reduced to writing, it has to be registered.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent referring to the terms of documents submitted that both the parties have mutually agreed to settle the property between them and the document is merely a memorandum of settlement of property between the family members. Therefore, it does not create or extinguishes any right in presenti or in future. Rather, it is merely a memorandum of settlement, which took place between the parties. There- fore, the document does not require registration u/S 17 (1)(b) of the Act of 1908.
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6. Learned counsel further contended that in view of proviso to Section 49 of the Act of 1908, the document compulsorily registerable, even if un- registered, is admissible in evidence for collateral purposes. The trial Court has committed no error in admitting the document in evidence. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the judgment in the cases of Roshan Singh Vs. Zile Singh reported in AIR 1988 Supreme Court 881, Hasu Bai Vs. Lotan reported in 2024(4) MPLJ 426, Nani Bai Vs. Geeta Bai reported in AIR 1958 SC 706, Ravinder Kaur Garewal & Others Vs. Manijit Kaur and Others, Laxmi Bai Suryawanshi and Others Vs. Mohan Goud and Others reported in 2024 SCC Online MP 973, Khilan Singh Vs. Roop Singh and Others reported in 2023 SCC Online MP 598 and in the case of Balvinder Singh Sethi Vs. Indrajeet Singh passed in M.P. No. 3970/2024 to buttress his contentions.
7. Heard both the parties and perused the record.
8. The Relevant portion of the document in question - titled as 'Batwara Lekh" reads as under:
,slk dh ge Ik{k uacj 1 rFkk i{k uacj 2 vkil esa lxs HkkbZ gksdj lHkh Hkkb;ksa dh okfMYyksikftZr rFkk 'kkfey 'kjhd [kkunku dh dekbZ ls [kjhnh gqbZ laifRr d`f"k Hkwfe] xzke gjqer;k rFkk dekykur xzke eukoj esa IykV xzke eukoj esa fLFkr gS rFkk i{k uacj 1 rFkk i{k uacj 2 'kkfey 'kjhd dkjksckj djrs pys vk jgs Fks fdarq ge i{k uacj 1 rFkk i{k uacj 2 us gekjh okfMYyksikftZr rFkk 'kkfey 'kjhd [kkunku dh dekbZ esa [kjhnh gqbZ laifRr dk vkilh caVokjk dj fy;k gS] ftldk fooj.k bl izdkj gSA Ik{k uacj ,d ds fgLls dh laifRr dk fooj.k -----------------------------------------------------
Ik{k uacj nks ds fgLls dh laifRr dk fooj.k -----------------------------------------------------5
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508 mDrkuqlkj laifRr ij i{k uacj ,d rFkk i{k uacj nks ds fgLls o caVokjs esa vk;h gksdj i{k uacj ,d o nks vius vius fgLls esa vkbZ laifRr ij dkfct gks x, gS rFkk i{k uacj 1 o 2 dks vf/kdkj gksxk fd og vius vius fgLls esa vkbZ laifRr viuk uke ntZ dj ysos blls dksbZ i{k fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ ck/kk ugha djsxk rFkk vkt ds ckn i{k uacj ,d rFkk i{k uacj nks blls caVokjs ckor dksbZ fookn ugha djsaxs mDr laifRr ds vykok tks gekjs ikl tks py laifRr Fkh] mldk Hkh geus leku :Ik ls caVokjk dj fy;k gSA py laifRr ds ckor Hkh dks fookn ugha gSA py laifRr dk Hkh iw.kZ :Ik esa ca- Vokjk gks pqdk gS i{k uacj ,d rFkk i{k uacj nks dh dksbZ ysunkjh nsunkjh ugha gS vk- bUnk pydj ge i{k uacj ,d rFkk i{k uacj nks mDr laifRr ds fgLlk caVokjs ckor dksbZ fookn ugha djsaxsA ;fn dksbZ fookn fd;k rks og bl nLrkost caVokjk ys[k ds vk/kkj ls >wBk rFkk jn~n ekuk tk,xk ge i{k uacj ,d o nks ij rFkk gekjs ckjs lkr ij ,d leku ca/ku dkjd jgsxkA bl caVokjk ys[k dh ,d ,d izfr i{k uacj ,d o i{k uacj nks ds ikl j[kh xbZ gS vr,o ;g nLrkost caVokjk ys[k ge i{k uacj ,d o nks viuh viuh LosPNk ls ,d nwljs ds fgr esa fy[k fn;k fd lun jgs o vko';drkuqlkj dke vkos bfr fnukWad 26-06-95A
9. The Supreme Court, while dealing with the distinction between the family arrangement and the partition in the case of Roshan Singh and Oth- ers Vs. Zile Singh reported in AIR 1988 SC 881 observed as under:
8. According to the plain terms of the document Exh. P-12, it is obvious that it was not an instrument of partition but merely a memorandum recording the decision arrived at between the parties as to the manner in which the partition was to be effect-
ed. The opening words of the document Exh. P-12 are: 'Today after discussion it has been mutually agreed and decided that .....'. What follows is a list of properties allotted to the respective parties. From these words, it is quite obvious that the document Exh. P-12 contains the recital of past events and does not itself embody the expression of will necessary to effect the change in the legal relation contemplated. So also the Panch Faisala Exh. P-1 which confirmed the arrangement so arrived at, opens with the words 'Today on 31.1.1971 the following persons assembled to effect a mutual com- promise between Chaudhary Puran Singh and Chaudhary Zile Singh and unanimously decided that .....'. The purport and effect of the decision so arrived at is given there- after. One of the terms agreed upon was that the gher marked B2 would remain in the share of Zile Singh, representing the 6 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508 plaintiffs.
9. It is well-settled that while an instrument of partition which operates or is intended to operate as a declared volition constituting or severing ownership and causes a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst the parties to it, requires registration under s. 17(1)(b) of the Act, a writing which merely recites that there has in time past been a partition, is not a declaration of will, but a mere statement of fact, and it does not require registration. The essence of the matter is whether the deed is a part of the partition transaction or contains merely an inci- dental recital of a previously completed transaction. The use of the past tense does not necessarily indicate that it is merely a recital of a past transaction. It is equally well-settled that a mere list of properties allotted at a partition is not an instrument of partition and does not require registration. Sec. 17(1)(b) lays down that a docu- ment for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or pur- port to operate to create or declare some right in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. Two propositions must therefore flow: (1) A partition may be effected orally; but if it is subsequently re- duced into a form of a document and that document purports by itself to effect a di- vision and embodies all the terms of bargain, it will be necessary to register it. If it be not registered, s. 49 of the Act will prevent its being admitted in evidence. Sec- ondary evidence of the factum of partition will not be admissible by reason of s. 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872. (2) Partition lists which are mere records of a previous- ly completed partition between the parties, will be admitted in evidence even though they are unregistered, to prove the fact of partition: See Mulla's Registra- tion Act, 8th edn., pp. 54-57.
10. The tests for determining whether a document is an instrument of partition or a mere list of properties, have been laid down in a long catena of decisions of the Privy Council, this Court and the High Courts. The question was dealt with by Vivian Bose, J. in Narayan Sakharam Patil v. Cooperative Central Bank, Malkapur & Ors., ILR (1938) Nag. 604. Speaking for himself and Sir Gilbert Stone, CJ. the learned Judge relied upon the decisions of the Privy Council in Bageshwari Charan Singh v. Jagarnath Kuari LR (1932) 59 IA 130 and Subramanian v. Lutchman LR (1923) 15 IA 77 and expressed as follows:
"It can be accepted at once that mere lists of property do not form an instrument of partition and so would not require registration, but what we have to determine here is whether these documents are mere lists or in themselves purport to 'create, declare, assign, limit of extinguish ..... any right, title or interest' in the property which is admittedly over Rs. 100 in value. The question is whether these lists merely contain the recital of past events or in themselves embody the expression of will necessary to effect the change in the legal relation contemplated."
Sir Gilbert Stone, CJ speaking for himself and Vivian Bose, J. in Ganpat Gangaji Patil v. Namdeo Bhagwanji Patil & Ors., ILR (1942) Nag. 73 reiterated the same principle. See also: order cases in Mulla's Registration Act at pp. 56-57.
12. Partition, unlike the sale or transfer which consists in its essence of a single act, is a continuing state of facts. It does not require any formality, and therefore if parties actually divide their estate and agree to hold in severalty, there is an end of the matter.
7NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508
14. The matter can be viewed from another angle. The true and intrinsic character of the memorandum Exh. P-12 as later confirmed by the panch faisla Exh P-1 was to record the settlement of family arrangement. The parties set up competing claims to the properties and there was an adjustment of the rights of the parties. By such an arrangement, it was intended to set at rest competing claims amongst various members of the family to secure peace and amity. The compromise was on the footing that there was an antecedent title of the parties to the properties and the settlement acknowledged and defined title of each of the parties. The principle governing this was laid down by the Judicial Committee in Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain & Anr., LR (1911) 38 IA 87. Ameer Ali, J. delivering the judgment of the Privy Council quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment in Lalla Oudh Behari Lall v. Mewa Koonwar, [1868] 3 Agra HC 82 at p. 84:
"The true character of the transaction appears to us to have been a settlement between the several members of the family of their disputes, each one relinquishing all claim in respect of all property in dispute other than that falling to his share, and recognizing the right of the others as they had previously asserted it to the portion allotted to them respectively. It was in this light, rather than as conferring a new distinct title on each other, that the parties themselves seem to have regarded the arrangement, and we think that it is the duty of the Courts to uphold and give full effect to such an arrangement."
15. This view was adopted by the Privy Council in subsequent decisions and the High Courts in India. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Sahu Madho Das & Ors. v. Pandit Mukand Ram & Anr., [1955] 2 SCR 22. The true principle that emerges can be stated thus: If the arrangement of compromise is one under which a person having an absolute title to the property transfers his title in some of the items thereof to the others, the formalities prescribed by law have to be complied with, since the transferees derive their respective title through the transferor. If, on the other hand, the parties set up competing titles and the differences are resolved by the compromise, there is no question of one deriving title from the other, and therefore the arrangement does not fall within the mischief of s. 17 read with s. 49 of the Registration Act as no interest in property is created or declared by the document for the first time. As pointed out by this Court in Sahu Madho Das' case, it is assumed that the title had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary.
10. Later, in case of Ravindra Kaur Garewal and Others Vs. Manjeet Kaur and Others reported in AIR 2020 SC 3799, the Supreme Court consid- ering the law laid down by the three Judges Bench in the case of Kalu and Others Vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation and Others reported in 1976(3) SCC 119 and the other precedents observed as under:
16. Be that as it may, the High Court has clearly misapplied the dictum in the relied upon decisions. The settled legal position is that when by virtue of a family settle-8
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508
-ment or arrangement, members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once and for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family, such arrangement ought to be governed by a special equity peculiar to them and would be enforced if honestly made. The object of such arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strives which mar the unity and solidarity of the fami- ly and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family, as observed in Kale (supra). In the said reported decision, a three Judge Bench of this Court had observed thus:
"9. ..... A family arrangement by which the property is equitably divided between the various contenders so as to achieve an equal distribution of wealth instead of concentrating the same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a milestone in the ad- ministration of social justice. That is why the term "family" has to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or legal heirs but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title, a sem- blance of a claim or even if they have a spes successionis so that future disputes are sealed for ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se and wasting time, money and energy on such fruitless or futile litigation is able to devote its attention to more constructive work in the larger interest of the country. The courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement in- stead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some material benefits. ....." (emphasis supplied) In paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Court has delineated the contours of essentials of a family settlement as follows:
"10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settle- ment in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the fol- lowing propositions:
"(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family; (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;
(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;
(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, 9 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508 therefore, not compulsorily registerable;
(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;
(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement." (emphasis supplied) Again, in paragraph 24, this Court restated that a family arrangement being binding on the parties, clearly operates as an estoppel, so as to preclude any of the parties who have taken advantage under the agreement from revoking or challenging the same. In paragraph 35, the Court noted as follows:
"35. ... We have already pointed out that this Court has widened the concept of an antecedent title by holding that an antecedent title would be assumed in a person who may not have any title but who has been allotted a particular property by other party to the family arrangement by relinquishing his claim in favour of such a done. In such a case the party in whose favour the relinquishment is made would be assumed to have an antecedent title. ....." And again, in paragraph 36, the Court noted as follows:
"36. ... Yet having regard to the near relationship which the brother and the son-in-law bore to the widow the Privy Council held that the family settlement by which the properties were divided between these three parties was a valid one. In the instant case also putting the case of Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 at the highest, the position is that Lachman died leaving a grandson and two daughters. Assuming that the grandson had no legal title, so long as the daughters were there, still as the settlement was made to end the disputes and to benefit all the near relations of the family, it would be sustained as a valid and binding family settlement. ..."
While rejecting the argument regarding inapplicability of principle of estoppel, the Court observed as follows:
"38. ... Assuming, however, that the said document was compulsorily registerable the courts have generally held that a family arrangement being binding on the parties to it would operate as an estoppel by preventing the parties after having taken advantage under the arrangement to resile from the same or try to revoke it. ....."
(emphasis supplied) And in paragraph 42, the Court observed as follows:
42. ..... In these circumstances there can be no doubt that even if the family settlement was not registered it would operate as a complete estoppel against Respondents Nos. 4 and 5. Respondent No. 1 as also the High Court, therefore, committed substantial error of law in not giving effect to the doctrine of estoppel as spelt out by this Court in so many cases. ..." (emphasis supplied) 10 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508 The view so taken is backed by the consistent exposition in previous decisions referred to and duly analysed in the reported judgment. The question formulated by the High Court, in our opinion, stands answered in favour of the appellants (plaintiff), light of exposition of this Court in Kale (supra). A priori, we have no hesitation in affirming the conclusion reached by the first appellate Court that the document Exhibit P6 was nothing but a memorandum of a family settlement. The established facts and circumstances clearly establish that a family settlement was arrived at in 1970 and also acted upon by the concerned parties. That finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court being unexceptionable, it must follow that the document Exhibit P6 was merely a memorandum of a family settlement so arrived at. Resultantly, it was not required to be registered and in any case, keeping in mind the settled legal position, the contesting defendants were estopped from resiling from the stated arrangement in the subject memorandum, which had recorded the settlement terms arrived at in the past and even acted upon relating to all the existing or future disputes qua the subject property amongst the (signatories) family members despite absence of antecedent title to the concerned property.
17. As regards the decision in Bhoop Singh (supra) and Som Dev & Ors. vs. Rati Ram & Anr. (2006) 10 SCC 788, the same dealt with the question of necessity to register any decree or order of a Court governed by clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act, 1908. In the present case, however, clause (v) of sub Sec-
tion 2 of Section 17 of the 1908 Act is attracted. Section 17 as applicable when the cause of action arose (prior to amendment of 2001) reads thus:
"Part III OF REGISTRABLE DOCUMENTS
17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.
(1) xxx xxx xxx (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) applies to -
(i) xxx xxx xxx
(ii) xxx xxx xxx
(iii) xxx xxx xxx
(iv) xxx xxx xxx
(v) any document not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguish-
ing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest; or ....."
18. In our considered view, reliance placed by the High Court on the decisions of this Court will be of no avail to alter or impact the conclusion recorded by the first appellate Court. As aforementioned, in Bhoop Singh (supra) and Som Dev (supra), the Court was dealing with the issue of compulsory registration 10 For short, "the 1908 Act" of a decree or order of Court. In the context of the applicable clause (vi) in subSection (2) of Section 17, the Court in Bhoop Singh (supra) went on to hold as follows:
"18. The legal position qua clause (vi) can, on the basis of the aforesaid discus- sion, be summarised as below:
(1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp duty and frustrate the law relating to 11 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508 registration, would not require registration. In a converse situation, it would require registration.
(2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first time right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of Rs.100 or upwards in favour of any party to the suit the decree or order would require registration. (3) If the decree were not to attract any of the clauses of subsection (1) of Section 17, as was the position in the aforesaid Privy Council and this Court's cases, it is apparent that the decree would not require registration. (4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of compromise, as was the position in Lahore case, benefit from the terms of compromise cannot be derived, even if a suit were to be disposed of because of the compromise in question. (5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the "subjectmatter of the suit or proceeding", clause (vi) of subsection (2) would not operate, because of the amendment of this clause by Act 21 of 1929, which has its origin in the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council, according to which the original clause would have been attracted, even if it were to encompass property not litigated."
In the present case, as noted earlier clause (v) of Section 17(2) is attracted, which pertains to execution of any document creating or extinguishing right, title or interest in an immovable property amongst the family members. Thus, the dictum in Kale (supra) is attracted in the fact situation of this case.
19. Considering the above, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court committed manifest error in interfering with and in particular reversing the wellconsidered decision of the first appellate Court, which had justly concluded that document dated 10.3.1988 executed between the parties was merely a memo- randum of settlement, and it did not require registration. It must follow that the re- lief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit, as granted by the first appellate Court ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court and more so, in a casual man- ner, as adverted to earlier.
11. The recital, tenor and true intent of the documents in question - Bat- wara Lekh dated 26.06.1995 has been examined in the light of aforestated propositions of law. Although, the document is titled as Batwara Lekh. The recital, especially the highlighted portion, manifest that both the parties to the document, brothers, have settled their inter-se dispute with regard to movable and immovable properties and mutually partitioned the movable as well as immovable property. The document was written to facilitate muta- tion in accordance with the prior family settlement and to resolve any future dispute. It does not by itself create, declare, assign limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in the property. No new right is created or extinguished by the document in question. Rather, it is a memorandum of prior settlement of inter-se right and interest between the brothers. Therefore, the document 12 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:24508 in question is not a partition deed. Rather, it is merely a memorandum of family settlement. At the most, it would fall under Clause V of sub-section 2 of Section 17 of the Act of 1908 and it did not require registration. Learned trial Court committed no error in admitting the document dated 26.06.1995 in evidence.
12. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opin- ion that no impropriety, illegality or error of jurisdiction is committed by the trial Court in rejecting the objection of defendant with regard to admissibili- ty and exhibition of document titled as Batwara Lekh dated 26.06.1995.
13. Consequently, the present miscellaneous petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR) JUDGE sh/-
SEHAR Digitally signed by SEHAR HASEEN
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
INDORE, ou=BENCH AT INDORE,
2.5.4.20=900ec6fc757798eaeb3df7
HASEE
a32860bd3298415a4d1c2d914362
13f2568c8f27da,
postalCode=452001, st=Madhya
Pradesh,
serialNumber=E7DBBA955B262C04
N
B8413251CE7FB6F0B7DBA610C57F
1559C08BF6C6F5DD40D4,
cn=SEHAR HASEEN
Date: 2025.09.02 10:48:57 +05'30'