Calcutta High Court
Miss Debopriya Ganguly vs State Of West Bengal And Ors. on 30 April, 2004
Equivalent citations: AIR2005CAL76, (2004)3CALLT159(HC)
Author: K.J. Sengupta
Bench: Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta
JUDGMENT K.J. Sengupta, J.
1. All these three matters are taken up together for hearing, as in the first mentioned writ petition, vires of the Regulation 2(xxviii) and 9(xxv)(c) of the West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education (Examination) regulations, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as he said Regulation), has been challenged, contending that the same are ultra vires Article 14 and Article 41 of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, has prayed for striking down of the same. It is incidentally recorded that all the petitioners in the aforesaid matters have failed to qualify themselves of passing the respective test examinations, held by their respective institutions. As such, they were not sent up for appearing in the Higher Secondary Examination by their respective schools, because they are prohibited from doing so by the Clause 9(xxv)(c} read with Clause 2(xxvin) of the said Regulation. I think, it would be apposite to set out the aforesaid two Clauses of the said Regulation.
"Clause 2(xxviii): -"Test" means such qualifying examination as is required to be held by an institution at the end of instruction of Class XII which a student is to pass to qualify in order sit for the examination."
Clause 9(xxv): -In order to be eligible to appear as a regular candidate in the examination a student is required to fulfill the following conditions, namely:
(a) In order to be eligible to appear as a regular candidate in the examination, he/she is required to prosecute regular study of the Higher Secondary Course of two years duration in a recognized Higher Secondary Institution with recorded class attendance not less than 70% of the total classes held in Class XI and XII taken together.
2. Provided that the Council may condone the deficiency in attendance not exceeding 20% on consideration of illness or other sufficient reasons to the satisfaction of the Council subject to payment of such condonation fee as may be prescribed:
3. Provided further that a student, whose attendance falls below 50%, shall not be eligible under any circumstances to appear at the examination in that year and shall have to continue in Class XII and attend classes till he/she obtains minimum percentage of attendance required for being sent up for the examination in the following year:
(b) He/she must be eligible to be admitted in class XI according to the West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education (Admission and Allied Matters) Regulation, 1987.
(c) He/she must pass the annual examination at the end of class XI and the test examination at the end of class XII:
(d) He/she must pay all fees to the Council payable by him/her:
(e) He/she must acquire eligibility to get registration certificate and admit card.
4. The argument on behalf of the petitioners was opened by Mr. Sudipto Moitra learned advocate on 17th March, 2004. Thereafter, at the time of giving reply Mr. Haradhan Bandyopadhya, learned advocate supplemented to the same. They argued, the aforesaid two Regulations purporting to create bar against taking final examination, by the regular candidates, who have failed in the test examination, are unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. They say, the bar created by the aforesaid regulations being Clauses 9(xxv)(c) and having no intelligible differentia and, without having any guide-lines whatsoever, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In absence of guide-lines, according to them, the school has been given unbridled and uncanalysed power to discriminate one student from other. They also argue that there is no specification in the said regulation, as to who could be declared to have passed the test examination, conducted at the end of instruction of class XII. In absence of specified standard for declaring a regular candidate being passed, it is bound to result in arbitrary irrational action or decision being taken.
5. The word 'pass' is not qualified nor amplified by any word or expression meaning thereby what would be the minimum marks to be secured either in aggregate of all the subjects or individual subject. It is seen that different recognised schools have laid down different standards and norms, fixing eligibility for declaring a candidate being passed, for example, in one institution, it is reported, if a candidate fails in one or two subjects and scores pass marks in aggregate, he is cleared by the school authority to take final examination treating to have passed, whereas in other institution a candidate has to obtain pass marks in each and every subject, and in aggregate as well. Besides different minimum marks and/or pass marks for qualifying have been laid down, in different schools. They then urge, the bar of passing thus does not have any nexus with the object to be achieved by this regulation, if one looks at the clauses (iv) to (xiv) of regulation 9 that too does not prescribe transparent methodology.
6. Therefore, it is clear, they say, without any guideline or norms being laid down, there is a definite chance of discriminatory and whimsical decision to be taken and being taken. The students have their constitutional, if not fundamental right to learn education from the institution and further that without fair and equal chance to take public examination, learning of education is meaningless. The Council being a statutory body and entrusted with duty amongst others to conduct examination, cannot lay down such norms by framing regulation whereby and whereunder, a discriminatory treatment could be meted out. They further contend that a student cannot be denied to take public examination. It is the public examination, where a particular student can prove himself to be worth. According to them, unless the public examinations are allowed to be taken, the education of a student is not complete. Therefore, denial of accessibility to the process of public examination amounts to infringement of the constitutional right, if not fundamental right of the student.
7. They also contended that if any provision of law becomes causes and/or root of arbitrary and whimsical action, the same cannot stand on the scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, according to them, the aforesaid regulations are unconstitutional, as having infringed Article 14 and Article 41 of the Constitution of India and the same should be struck down. They further submit that each and every petitioner in all these three matters, have successfully crossed annual examination, held at the end of academic session of class XI. Therefore, they should be allowed, automatically to take final examination lifting bar of passing test examination, after completion of academic session of class XII. In support of their contention, they have relied on the following decisions: AIR 1993 Del. 108, , .
8. Then, they contend that the provision of the aforesaid Rule 9(xxv)(c) is also unreasonable and irrational. The said restriction cannot be termed to be a reasonable one in any sense, as there is no nexus between the said portion of regulation and the object thereby sought to be achieved. The whole intention for framing regulation is to impart education to the students, but this bar having effect of eliminating process will impede such object being achieved. It is seen from experience that a particular candidate, who might have failed in test examination and later on being allowed by the order of the Court on being approached, to take final examination, came to be successful with distinction. According to be them, once a candidate passes in annual examination held at the end of academic session of class XI should be allowed to take public examination as matter of course after completion of class XII academic session for the object of allowing student to study in this class it to give chance for sitting public examination conducted by Council.
9. Mr. Shyamal Kumar Sanyal learned advocate appearing for the petitioners in other petition adopts the argument of Mr. Bandopadhya. As such this provision cannot stand under the scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
10. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondents No. 5 and 6 in matter being W.P. No. 3289(Writ petition) of 2004, submits that the said regulation has been framed by the academicians and upon due deliberation. The whole object to frame the aforesaid regulation appears to be for achieving the best standard of higher secondary education in this country or this State. The scrutiny for allowing a candidate to appear in the final examination has been accepted and acknowledged for centuries with test of time not only by all section of people, but also by Courts of Law. The academicians and/or the educationists are the best person to judge as to how high standard can be achieved in this field. Their thought process should not be substituted with that of the Court. The Court must be very slow to interfere with the decisions, either by way of regulation or by way of administrative order of the expert bodies in this field.
11. The aforesaid Regulation 9(xxv)(c) has been laid down as a condition precedent for sending up of students from an affiliated institution. The freedom of choosing candidate has rightly been left with the school concerned in the test examination. It is for the institution concerned how the aforesaid bar should be applied. Each and every institution has got its own and independent style of functioning and working, and lay down their own norms, terms and conditions including those for adjudging fitness to take final examination. The parents of the students got their wards admitted in the institution, having agreed to these terms and/or norms. So, this contractual term accepted by the parents with the school, with regard to holding of examination and sending up chosen candidates for taking final examination, are not justiciable by the Court of Law and not even by this Court in exercise of power of judicial review. It is not that this Court has got no power of jurisdiction, but the subject matter of the writ petition is such, which is not justiciable.
12. His further contention is that similar and identical provision, creating mechanism for screening the students, was challenged in other Courts in this country, and the Supreme Court, Bombay High Court and this Court as well, in no uncertain terms have been extremely slow to interfere with this and in fact, in some cases, this type of Regulation has been declared to be constitutionally valid.
13. Mr. Mukherjee further submits that his institution had given sufficient opportunity to the writ petitioner, even after having him found to be unsuccessful, he was allowed to take further test and still then, he has been unsuccessful. He further submits that there cannot be any comparison nor any parity can be drawn between the standards and norms, prescribed for holding the test examination by the school and those laid down in the regulation for holding final examination, and also for evaluating performances of the candidates. Free choice has been given to the school regarding the method and procedure for judging a student to be qualified to take final examination. According to him, there is no unconstitutionality or illegality in framing the aforesaid Regulation and no guidelines is required to be laid down by the Council.
14. Mr. Kallol Bose learned advocate for the school authority in writ petition being No. 3290(Writ petition) 2004 adopts this argument.
15. Mr. Ranjit Chatterjee, learned lawyer appearing for the Council, though not argued verbally at the time of hearing, as he could not turn up when the matter was being heard, has filed a written notes of argument. In his written notes of argument, he has contended, basically as follows.
16. The said Regulation has been framed by the Council under Act of 1975. In Section 2(d) of the said Act, Higher Secondary Education is defined. He contends that in an unreported Division Bench judgment of this Court, the said Act has been held not to be a beneficial legislation for students. In exercise of power under Section 21 (h) of the said Act, the Council has framed the aforesaid regulation whereby and whereunder, it has made in mandatory for a candidate, amongst other, to pass, the annual examination at the end of class XI and test examination at the end of class XII, to become eligible to appear as a regular candidate. Final examination is being conducted by the Council. So, it has prescribed in details, the required norms for passing the Higher Secondary Examination but, in case of test examination, such norms of standard has not been prescribed, for passing test examination, as the same are conducted by the affiliated institution concerned. The institutions are, thus, free to set any standard for passing the test examination even higher than those prescribed by the Council (for passing Higher Secondary Examination). He has cited a decision of Bombay High Court in this connection, . His further contention is that the vires of this type of regulation was challenged and the same was upheld by a Bench decision of Gujarat High Court, reported in 1997(1) ESC 467. His further contention is that where a statute confers discriminatory power upon the executive or an administrative authority, the validity or constitutionality of such power cannot be judged on the assumption that the executive or such authority will act is an arbitrary manner in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon it. In support of this contention he has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 1986 Supp. Supreme Court 60 (paragraph 50). He further contends that under Rule 30(3) of the Management Rules of the Board, Head of the institution and/or the academic Council of the institution is the ultimate authority in all matters connected, inter alia, with admission and promotion of a student. The said Rules are applicable to higher secondary schools, as well. Therefore, he contends that the aforesaid regulation is constitutionally valid.
17. Mr. Rabi Lal Moitra, learned Government Pleader has advanced argument, basically in the same line and direction, as has been done by Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee. In addition thereto, he says that the regulation made by the Council, with an idea of devising a scrutinizing process, cannot be termed to be bad in law or unconstitutional. He submits that right to have education is not a fundamental right. The right to have education, as it appears from Article 41 of the Constitution of India, is a mere constitutional right.
18. The whole object of framing this regulation is to ensure that the students in this country can get education of higher standard. High standard can be achieved only with constant test or scrutinizing process. It is the intention of the legislature, as well as, the object of framing of the regulation, to see that sub-standard and/or meritless students, cannot crowd at the final examination stage. Therefore, the school authority has been given discretion to send up those candidates, who according to them perform upto certain norms and standard, as might be laid down by them. The school authority, in their wisdom, has laid down their own norms and procedure, for judging the performance of each and every individual student. This kind of mechanism of scrutinizing process, under the law, is always permissible, treating them as being a reasonable restriction. In support of his contention, he has relied on a decision of Gujarat High Court, reported in 1997(1) ESC 467 and decision of Bombay High Court, . Therefore, he concludes that there is no merit in the writ petitions and the same should be dismissed.
19. Having considered carefully the contentions of the learned counsels, it appears to me that the basic challenge in this matter is against the Regulation 9(XXV) Clause (c) partly and to the extent that the candidate shall pass Test Examination at the end of class XII, In all these matters there is no dispute that the candidates have failed in the Test Examinations held and adjudged by the school authorities at the end of class (XII). According to the petitioners this bar appears to be unreasonable, irrational and having no nexus with object to be achieved for holding public examination under regulation.
20. Mr. Bondapadhya and Mr. Moitra, learned advocates, appearing for first mentioned three applications, have submitted that the aforesaid bar tantamount to infringement of the petitioners' constitutional right to have education, if not fundamental right. This restriction mentioned above is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
21. In the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Ms. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka & Ors. Justice Kuldip Singh speaking for the Bench of the Apex Court while considering the legality and validity of a portion of the Karnataka Legislation, seeking to charge Capitation Fee for admission of medical students, has observed and held in paragraph 14 that:
"Right to education, therefore, concomitant to the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution. The State is under a constitutional mandate to provide educational institutions at all levels for the benefit of the citizens. The educational institutions must function to the best advantage of the citizens. Opportunity to acquire education cannot be confined to the richer section of the society."
In paragraph 12 of the same judgment it is observed by Their Lordships as follows:
"right to life is the compendium of all those rights which the Court must enforce because they are basic to the dignified enjoyment of life. It extends to the full range of conduct, which the individual is free to pursue. The right to education, clothes directly from right to life. The right to life under Article 21 and dignity of an individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education the State Government is under obligation to make endeavour to provide educational facilities to its citizens......"
22. In case of Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd. the Supreme Court having considered the large number of previous decisions of the same Court reiterated while distinguishing a piece of legislation either delegated or otherwise and on the anvil of the constitutional provisions namely Article 19 has observed that:
"(b) There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection between the restriction imposed and the object sought to be achieved."
(f) It is imperative that for consideration of reasonableness of restriction imposed by a statute, the Court should examine whether the social control as envisaged in Article 19 is being effectuated by the restriction imposed on the Fundamental Rights."
23. This decision was rendered by the Supreme Court while considering a challenge against Section 25(m) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which provides for prohibition of laying off in the industrial establishment.
24. In case of Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001)2 SCC 386 the Apex Court while considering the validity and legality of an administrative (disciplinary) order has explained the principle of reasonableness and proportionality both in the field of administrative action as well legislative action. The learned counsel Mr. Bandopadhya has laid the stress on paragraph 27 of this judgment, which is reproduced hereunder:
"The principle originated in Prussia in the nineteenth century and has since been adopted in Germany, France and other European countries. The European Court of Justice at Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg have applied the principle while judging the validity of administrative action. But even long before that, the Indian Supreme Court has applied the principle of "proportionality" to legislative action since 1950, as stated in detail below."
The paragraph 28 of the same judgment provides as follows:
"By 'proportionality', we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least-restrictive choice of measure has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will see that the legislature and the administrative authority 'maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of person seeking in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve". The legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as- to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively or. not if for the Court, that what is meant by proportionality."
25. In the context as above now it has to be examined first what is the nature of the right of the petitioners have been sought to be established?
Is it their right to have education or right to have their education acquired, of being tested. The aforesaid decisions have to be considered and applied in case where the petitioner's right to education are sought to be affected. In this case the petitioners' right to admission to any institution for having education has not been affected. Admittedly, the petitioners were admitted to the affiliated institutions and they got opportunity to have education but their grievance is that they should not be denied their right to access to the public examination being held by the statutory body in this modern world one does not take education merely for the purpose of study. The candidate concerned after having taken education obviously wants to build his career for his livelihood in almost every case. Therefore, in this context the right to have access to public test being conducted by the statutory bodies is no doubt a concomitant to right to education. Unless these public bodies recognizes and accepts successful completeness of education of a particular student by issuing certificate after holding test, the petitioners' desired object for obtaining education Is basically frustrated and/or denied. Therefore, I hold the contention of Mr. Moitra and Mr. Bandopadhya that the petitioners' right to be tested by the respondent Council is an extended right to education as guaranteed under Article 41 of the Constitution of India.
26. The learned counsel for the petitioners, perhaps, have been encouraged to bring this challenge, by the decision of the Delhi High Court reported in AIR 1993 Del 108 Jayshree Ravi v. University of Delhi, wherein the Division Bench of that Court had struck down the cut off point of obtaining 50 per cent marks in qualifying Graduate Examination for admission to LL.B course as being violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It was held in that case that:
"prescribing a cut off point of obtaining 50% marks in the qualifying Graduate Examinations, does not have any reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved, and there can be only one object which can be sought, that is to attain a high standard of legal education."
27. I think this case is distinguishable from the present one on hand as in that case the restriction imposed for getting admission to the LL.B. course was held unreasonable as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, because the right to have education of the candidates in LL.B. course was denied. In this case the petitioners' right to have education is not affected or disturbed.
28. The decisions cited by Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee namely AIR 2001 SC 3676 and the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2002(2) CLJ 140 are not helpful in this case, in those cases there was no challenge against the prescribed rules for holding examination and/or sending up of the students for taking final examination. In all those cases the students concerned came for obtaining relief without challenging the concerned rules as to constitutional validity. Under those circumstances the Court held that the norms and standard laid down by the expert body should not be interfered with.
29. Even in paragraph 16 of the decision of the Supreme Court the Apex Court did not rule out the possibility of interfering by the Superior Court within the scope of judicial review. The paragraph 16 is set out hereunder.
"The learned single Judge further held that to prescribe the academic standards falls exclusively in the domain of special bodies like the Senate, Board of Governments and Syndicate etc. The Court would normally not interfere with such prescribed standards and especially when they are intended to improve the academic standards in their respective institutes. The scope of judicial review in such matters would be very limited."
30. The decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education & Anr. v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumarsheth, cited by Mr. Mukherjee is certainly a guiding factor for the decision and the issues involved here. The Supreme Court while examining the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Board Regulations (77) and (104) has observed in paragraph 18 as follows:
"In the light of what we have stated above, the constitutionality of the impugned regulations has to be adjudged only by a three-fold test, namely, (1) whether the provisions of such regulations fall within the scope and ambit of the power conferred by the statute on the delegate; (2) whether the rules/ regulations framed by the delegate are to any extent inconsistent with the provisions of the parent enactment and lastly (3) whether they infringe any of the fundamental right or other restrictions or limitations imposed by the Constitution. We have already held that the High Court was in error in holding that the provisions of Clause (3) of Regn. 104 do not serve the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act and are ultra vires on the ground of there being excess of the regulation-making power conferred by Section 36. The writ petitioners had no case before the High Court that the impugned clauses of the regulations were liable to be invalidated on the application of second and third tests. Besides the power conferred under Section 36(1), the only other point urged was that they were in the nature of bye-laws and were liable to be struck down on the ground of unreasonableness."
31. In the context as above now it has to be examined whether the impugned regulations are unconstitional or not. It is nobody's case that the said regulation ultra vires the parent Act and nobody has submitted either that the Council has no jurisdiction to prescribe conditions for holding test examination for judging competence and qualification of the candidates to take final examination. The whole point centers round as to whether the impugned regulations is unreasonable, irrational, so as to hit the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
32. I do not find any substance of the argument of the learned lawyer for the petitioners that the impugned regulation stands up as a bar and/or restriction to the right to have education. All that the constitution guarantees the citizen of India for equal opportunity for having educations and the studies and these have been ensured under Articles 41 and 14 but nowhere in the Constitution it is provided that State has to ensure success in education of the citizen. Success has to be achieved and/or ensured by the student himself or herself by dint of his/her hard labour and devotion. The State can ensure opportunity. The object of imparting education is not to produce bad and sub-standard students but standard if not high standard so that supply of useful working force in the society can be ensured. The Welfare State is to develop and build strong nation in all spheres with careful grooming of human resources by proper education. That is why the Council being a regulatory body in this field in its wisdom has laid down the screening process for accepting the suitable candidates for final test examination.
33. It is rightly argued by Mr. Mukherjee and the learned Government Pleader that the academicians who are the experts in the field can judge how the high academic standard in the Higher Secondary Education can be achieved and their wisdom should not be interfered by the Court. I do not find any thing how the aforesaid impugned regulation can be termed to be irrational and unreasonable. With the constant test and screening device the best standard and the performance of the students can be achieved, more is the examination and/or test, more is the sense of competition. Unless there is an element and sense of competition there cannot be improvement nor desired standard of education. It is not that by the aforesaid regulation the failed candidate in the test examination is debarred from taking final examination for good. The failed candidate in the following year can very well appear in the final examination.
34. Then it is contended by the learned lawyer for the petitioners that if the aforesaid regulations is left outstanding this may lead to discriminatory and arbitrary action being taken by the school authority as there is no uniform guidelines and norms. I think this argument in practical aspect of the life has no basis, as it appears that the power of judging fitness of a student to take final examination has been left with the school concerned. Therefore, normal propensity of the school authority would be to send up as many as good and competent students for taking final examinations so that they can achieve good result with high success rate, consequently they can bring reputation and goodwill of the school presenting them for taking examination.
35. In the case of Ms. Sophy Kelly v. State of Maharashtra the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in paragraph 61 observed amongst others that:
"........The principle of non-discrimination enunciated in Article 14 does not require standards to be uniform for diversity of standard can itself be a basis of reasonable classification it is well known that may parent want their children to be admitted in the better type of schools. This is because what the parent want is not that their children should somehow scrape through the SSC Examination but that they should succeed with distinction. The parent send their children to the better type of school, not in spite of the higher standard of education and discipline maintained there, but because of that standard. The policy behind the impugned regulation is calculated to deprive the parent and their children of such type of schools."
36. In case of Paritosh Maghrqj Calla v. Gujarat University reported in (1997)1 ESC 467 Guj., a learned single Judge of the Gujara High Court in paragraph 16 has observed that:
"There are all matters of academic judgment. The value of internal evaluation has been accepted by the Education Commission and it is to be implemented stages and by learning from experiences and different modalities may be adopted by different authorities depending on their academic judgment. Merely because the respondents authorities have laid down the policy in the statutory Regulations for preventing students with poor academic record in internal evaluation from appearing in the external examination cannot be said to be in any way irrational. When a student has failed to achieve a minimum passing standard in half of the subjects, it is not irrational to hold that he cannot be permitted to appear at the external examination and to go to the higher standard merely on the basis of the result of the external examination. Even para 11.54 relied upon by the petitioner also shows that even when both the results are shown side by side, passes should be required separately in both."
37. It appears from Section 21 of the West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education Act, 1971 being source of power, that the Council respondent has no jurisdiction and/or authority to give any direction aiming at to interfere with the independent functioning of the institution. Each and every institution ought to have and/or might have laid down its own norms and terms and conditions for admitting students and declaring a student to be successful in class examination as well as for taking test examination. Having agreed to the terms and conditions the guardians of the students got admission of their wards. I do not see any irrationality in laying down different standards and norms by different schools according to their own policy and wisdom having regard to their suitability. The internal arrangement of schools concerned as urged appropriately by learned Government Pleader should not be interfered with by the Council or for that matter by the Court in any manner even by giving direction or laying down any norms. It is true if there is any discrimination in the assessment and evaluation of the performance of a particular student on the basis of their own norms such aggrieved students may approach the appropriate forum for getting redressal individually. Mr. Chatterjee has rightly drawn my attention to the Supreme Court decision reported in 1986 (supp) SCC 20 (paragraph 50) wherein it is observed amongst other that possibility of abuse of power or arbitrary exercise of power, cannot invalidate the statute conferring the power of the power, which has been conferred by it. Similarly as because in one or two isolated case(s) the said Clause 9(xxv)(c) is proved to have worked injustice and ineffective to one or more candidates who though failed in test examination, came out successful on the strength of Courts order, cannot be a factor to hold the same being irrational and discriminatory. This restriction in my opinion, is reasonable aiming at to classify between bad student and good student and aiming at to achieve the object of the said Act and Regulation framed thereunder.
38. Under those circumstances I am of the view that the aforesaid regulation is not unconstitutional in any manner nor irrational. However, I think that each and every institution affiliated to the Council shall expressly prescribe their own norms and terms and conditions for holding examination and declaring 'qualified' to take final examination. Such norms and policy of each and every institution shall also be communicated to the Council.
39. Accordingly, I direct the Council in terms of this judgment and order to call for the standard and norms of each and every institution for declaring successful and/or qualified students for taking final examination. Thus there will be no order on these applications. The same are hereby dismissed without passing any order as to costs.