Karnataka High Court
State Of Karnataka, vs Hanamappa S/O Laxmappa Marinal, on 10 April, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 KAR 1010
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF K ARNAT AKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 10 T H DAY OF A PRIL 2019
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BELLUNK E A .S.
CRL.A.NO.2514/2011
BETWEEN:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH CMO,
CIVIL J UDGE (SR.DN.) & JMFC COURT,
GANGAVATHI, DIS T: KOPPAL,
REPRES ENTED BY
ADDL. STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OFFI CE,
HIGH COURT CIRCUIT UNIT ,
DHARWAD.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI R.RAVIND RA NAIK, HCGP.)
AND:
1. HANAMAPPA
S/O LA XMAPPA MA RINA,
AGE : 35 YEARS,
OCC: NIL, R/ O A LAVANDI,
2. NINGAPPA
S/O KENCHAPPA K OLLI ,
AGE : 35 YEARS,
OCC: NIL, R/ O HUNAKUNTI,
TQ: & DIST: KOPPAL.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI T .HANUMA REDDY, ADV OCATE)
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THIS CRIMINAL APPEA L IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 378(1) & (3) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE SEEK ING TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF ACQUI TTAL DATED 28.01.2010 PASS ED I N
CC.N O.307/ 2004 ON THE FILE OF PRL.JMFC,
GANGAVATHI.
RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON : 21.03.2019
JUDGMENT PRON OUNCED ON : 10.04.2019
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD
AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT , COMING ON F OR
PRON OUNCEMENT OF J UDGMENT, THIS DAY, THE
COURT DELIV ERED THE F OLLOWING :
JUDGMENT
This is an appeal preferred by the State against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 28.01.2010 passed by the Principal JMFC at Gangavathi in C.C.No.307/2004, wherein the accused were acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 193, 196 and 205 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC', for the sake of brevity).
2. Brief facts for the purpose of this appeal are as under:
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The accused by name Anand and others were facing criminal case registered in C.C.Nos.130/ 2003 to 140/2003 in all eleven cases, for an offence punishable under Section 380 of IPC before the Hon'ble Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) & JMFC Court, Gangavathi. The accused No.1 Hanamappa had obtained RTCs belonging to one Channappa S/o Shivabasappa Malekoppamath R/o Hunakunti and handed over them to accused No.2. Accused No.2 Ningappa on 21.04.2003 appeared before the said Court, furnished suretyship for the accused Anand by producing RTC of said Channappa and falsely personated the said Channappa before the said Court and executed affidavits and also surety bonds and got accused Anand released in those eleven cases. Both accused falsely personated deceased Channappa as if he is alive and knowing fully well that said fact was false. When the accused in those criminal cases remained absent, criminal miscellaneous cases were registered and 4 NBWs were issued against the accused and surety of said case Channappa. The PW.3 Yusufsab being Court PC along with other constable who had personal knowledge about these accused persons visited the house of deceased Channappa. He came to know that he has died long back and accused persons by obtaining RTC of deceased Channappa, furnished a false surety to the Court. Therefore, he arrested these accused persons and produced them before the then Presiding Officer of that court on 20.08.2003. The Court remanded these accused persons to JC and ordered for filing of a complaint against these accused persons before CJM, Koppal. By virtue of that order, present complaint came to be filed by the then CMO of that Court before the CJM Court Koppal, after taking cognizance registered a case against the accused persons.5
3. After framing of charge, the Trial Court held trial of the case and passed the impugned order of acquittal of the accused persons. The said judgment has been assailed by the appellant-state on the following grounds:
The judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused is contrary to law facts and evidence on record. The Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence on record in a proper perspective manner. Therefore, that has led to miscarriage of justice. There was enough evidence to prove that the accused persons had furnished surety in eleven cases by swearing an affidavit before the CMO, Gangavathi and executed bail bonds before the leaned JMFC. That was proved to be false. Therefore as per the orders of the Court the private complaint was filed by CMO. Evidence of PWs.1 to 7 had proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the offences 6 punishable under Sections 193, 196 and 205 read with section 34 of IPC. Therefore, the trial court committed serious error in acquitting the accused. The judgment is illegal, perverse and capricious and hence, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has sought for setting aside the judgment of the trial court and convict the accused for the aforesaid offences.
4. The learned High Court Government pleader, argued that the guilt of the accused had been proved by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt. The offences are committed against the administration of justice. The accused persons had given revenue records of a dead person, impersonated and cheated by filing false affidavits. Therefore, the offences committed has been proved by the evidence on record. Hence the Trial Court committed error in acquitting the accused. The learned High Court Government 7 Pleader repeating the appeal grounds and prayed to allow the appeal.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents-accused submitted that the complainant had filed the complaint on the basis of the direction by the Presiding Officer. So far as Accused No.1 is concerned he had only obtained RTC from the Revenue Authority. He has not filed any affidavit nor acted as surety for the any of the accused persons. Anybody can obtain certified copy of the revenue records from the concerned Revenue Officer. The handing over of the said revenue records to accused No.2 would not attract any offences. It is not explained, why the signature of Accused No.1 was taken on the affidavit of Accused No.2. No warrant was issued against accused Nos.1 and 2. But PW.3 - Police constable instead of executing warrant against the accused brought accused Nos.1 and 2 and 8 produced them before the Court. The alleged signature on the documents was not sent for expert opinion. PW.7 who is said to have been filed a complaint on the orders of Presiding Officer has not produced the very important document. PW.3 has not filed any complaint. Though warrant was issued against the accused persons, but PW.3 executed the said warrant against accused Nos.1 and 2 against whom no warrant was issued by the Trial Court. The evidence of PW.5 is highly suspicious. Accused No.1 never appeared before any Court. Therefore, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the order passed by the Trial Court is just and proper it is based on the evidence on record. Hence he prayed to dismiss the appeal.
6. On the basis of the above said pleadings of both the parties, the points that arise for determination of this Court are as follows: 9
1. Whether the appellant - State proves that the offences punishable under Sections 193, 196 and 205 of IPC were proved beyond any reasonable doubt against the accused Nos.1 and 2 and therefore the judgment and order of acquittal in CC.No.307/2004 dated 28.01.2010 is liable to be set aside and accused Nos.1 and 2 are liable to be convicted for the aforesaid offences.
2. What Order?
7. Finding of this Court on the above said points are as under:
1) In the negative.
2) As per the following order.
8. During the course of arguments, this Court has specifically questioned about the application of section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr.P.C as alleged is said to have taken place during the pendency of the case before the Magistrate Court.
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9. The learned High Court Government Pleader has relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2005) 4 Supreme Court Cases 370 (Iqbal Singh Marwah and Another Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and another) and contended that the falsification of documents was committed before producing the document before the Court therefore, the aid bar would not be applicable to a case where forgery document was committed before the document producing the Court.
10. In the above said authority, the Hon'ble Apex Court has given an authoritative pronouncement in respect of 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr.P.C. It is necessary to extract the very same paragraphs of the said authority in order to appreciate and find out whether the bar contained under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr.P.C. was applicable to the case in hand. Because this aspect 11 of not been gone into by the Trial Court. That goes to very root of the cases. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgments are as follows:
10. The scheme of the statutory provision may now be examined. Broadly, Section 195 Cr.P.C. deals with three distinct categories of offences which have been described in clauses (a), (b) (i) and
(b)(ii) and they relate to (1) contempt of lawful authority of public servants, (2) offences against public justice, and (3) offences relating to documents given in evidence. Clause (a) deals with offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC which occur in Chapter X IPC and the heading of the Chapter is - "Of Contempts Of The Lawful Authority Of Public Servants". These are offences which directly affect the functioning of or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to offences in Chapter XI IPC which is headed as - "Of False Evidence And Offences Against Public Justice". The offences mentioned in this clause clearly relate to giving or 12 fabricating false evidence or making a false declaration in any judicial proceeding or before a Court of justice or before a public servant who is bound or authorized by law to receive such declaration, and also to some other offences which have a direct correlation with the proceedings in a Court of justice (Sections 205 and 211 IPC). This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195, viz., that the offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant or has a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice, the expression "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court" occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the Court. The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the 13 document is produced or is given in evidence in Court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 Cr.P.C. This indicates that clause
(b)(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any Court.
11. Section 195(1) mandates a complaint in writing of the Court for taking cognizance of the offences enumerated in clauses (b) (i) and (b)(ii) thereof. Sections 340 and 341 Cr.P.C. which occur in Chapter XXVI give the procedure for filing of the complaint and other matters connected therewith. The heading of this Chapter is -"Provisions As To Offences Affecting The Administration Of Justice". Though, as a general rule, the language employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to clear words of the Section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning, but they are not to be treated as if they were marginal 14 notes or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments. They constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only as explaining the Sections which immediately follow them, as a preamble to a statute may be looked to explain its enactments, but as affording a better key to the constructions of the Sections which follow them than might be afforded by a mere preamble. (See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn., PP 207, 209). The fact that the procedure for filing a complaint by Court has been provided in Chapter XXVI dealing with offences affecting administration of justice, is a clear pointer to the legislative intent that the offence committed should be of such type which directly affects the administration of justice, viz., which is committed after the document is produced or given in evidence in Court. Any offence committed with respect to a document at a time prior to its production or giving in evidence in Court cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be an 15 offence affecting the administration of justice.
23. In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is conditioned by the words "Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice." This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may 16 cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in Court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the Court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remedyless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remedyless, has to be discarded.
24. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. Sub- section (1) of Section 340 Cr.P.C. contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not made during the pendency of the 17 proceeding before the Court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is rendered. Section 341 provides for an appeal against an order directing filing of the complaint. The hearing and ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time. Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a Court trying the complaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it is brought to its notice that an appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of which the matter has arisen. In view of these provisions, the complaint case may not proceed at all for decades specially in matters arising out of civil suits where decisions are challenged in successive appellate fora which are time consuming. It is also to be noticed that there is no provision of appeal against an order passed under Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the case is adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These provisions show that, in reality, the procedure prescribed for filing a complaint by the 18 Court is such that it may not fructify in the actual trial of the offender for an unusually long period. Delay in prosecution of a guilty person comes to his advantage as witnesses become reluctant to give evidence and the evidence gets lost. This important consideration dissuades us from accepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed upon clause (b)(ii).
25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in Court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh, after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the Court, where the document has 19 been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would he highly detrimental to the interest of society at large.
26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the Courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (Third Edn.) para 313, the principle has been stated in the following manner :
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"The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that
produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong."
28. In S.J. Grange Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners. while interpreting a provision in the Finance Act , 1972, Lord Denning observed that if the literal construction leads to impracticable results, it would be necessary to do little adjustment so as to make the section workable. Therefore, in order that a victim of a crime of forgery, namely, the person aggrieved is able to exercise his right conferred by law to initiate prosecution of the offender, it is necessary to place a restrictive interpretation on clause (b)(ii).
29. In Craies on Statute Law (1971 Edn. Chapter 21), the principle regarding 21 penal provisions has been stated as under
:
"But penal statutes must never be construed so as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words in their ordinary acceptations would comprehend. ...'.... But where the thing is brought within the words and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language used, and the court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other instrument."
31. That apart, the section which we are required to interpret is not a penal provision but is part of a procedural law, namely, the Code of Criminal Procedure which elaborately gives the procedure for trial of criminal cases. The provision only creates a bar against taking cognizance of 22 an offence in certain specified situations except upon complaint by Court. A penal statute is one upon which an action for penalties can be brought by a public officer or by a person aggrieved and a penal act in its wider sense includes every statute creating an offence against the State, whatever is the character of the penalty for the offence. The principle that a penal statute should be strictly construed, as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants can, therefore, have no application here.
32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal Courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one 23 proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. While examining a similar contention in an appeal against an order directing filing of a complaint under Section 476 of old Code, the following observations made by a Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff vs. State of Madras give a complete answer to the problem posed : (AIR P.399, Para 15 -
16) "(15) As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal Courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence 24 or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.
(16) Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.
This, however, is not a hard-and-fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution 25 ordered under section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished."
11. Therefore, from the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is clear that when a fabricated document is produced or given in evidence in a proceedings in any court then the bar contained under section 195 (1)(b)(ii) would be applicable and no court shall take cognizance of the offenses.
12. In this case according to the prosecution accused Nos.1 had obtained RTCs belonging to a deceased person called Channappa and handed over them to accused No.2. That is only act alleged against him. Then accused No.2 appeared before the Court on 21.04.2003 and furnished suretyship to the accused by producing the RTC of said Channappa by falsely personating himself as Channappaand and executed the affidavit and 26 surety bonds and got the accused released in eleven cases. The Police constable who had gone to execute the warrant against the accused and surety of the said case Channappa he came to know that the said person is dead. Since police constable had the personal knowledge of these two accused persons. Therefore, he arrested these accused persons and produced them before the Court on 20.08.2003. If the said police constable had come to know about the impersonation committed by accused Nos.1 and 2, he should have first reported the said matter to the Court disclosing the commission of the offence by the accused persons. The Court has jumped to the conclusion only on the basis of the report given by the police constable and directed the CMO to file a complaint. Based on that private complaint the case came to be registered against accused Nos.1. This procedure adopted by the learned Court is quite contrary to the procedure laid down for 27 prosecuting the persons who committed the offence punishable under sections 193, 196 and 205 read with section 34 of IPC.
13. Therefore having regard to the above said facts, I find that the bar contained under section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Act would be applicable. Therefore, the Court could not have taken cognizance of the offences alleged in the private complaint. This is one aspect of the mater.
14. Now coming to the finding of the Trial Court, I re-appreciated the evidence on record to find whether the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 193, 196 and 205 read with section 34 of IPC beyond any reasonable doubt. So far as accused No.1 is concerned absolutely there was no material to prosecute him. His role is only obtaining certified copy of the revenue documents which could have been obtained by anybody. 28 Unless it is shown that he had a common intention with accused No.2 and facilitated accused No.2 by getting the document, it cannot be said that there was prima facie case against him. Further it is not the case of the prosecution that both the accused filed any false affidavits and stood as surety. It is only accused No.2 who had stood as surety.
15. PW2 has been examined who had deposed about obtaining of RTC. He has stated that anybody can obtain RTC of any land. He was also unable to depose as to who had obtained Ex.P.1 from his office. Therefore, the allegations that accused No.1 had furnished false information and obtained Ex.P.1 from his office does not prove any guilt of on his part.
16. PW.3 is the important witnesses who had reported about the impersonation committed by accused No.2. It is nobodies' allegation that accused No.1 has also committed any 29 impersonation. There was no warrant issued to arrest accused Nos.1 and 2 for having committed alleged offences. According to him since oral order was given by the Court therefore, he arrested and produced them which is not acceptable. As the Trial Court found in the evidence of PW.3 that at the instance of Gurubasappa police constable who is the relative of the deceased Channappa these accused persons are involved in the case.
17. The trial court found that, in spite of any warrant duly issued by the Court, these witnesses PWs.3 and 4 went to the said place and arrested them. Therefore, the act of the accused persons was believed to be untrue and it was perfectly within the knowledge of PW.3 and knowing fully well that accused No.2 was not Channappa for the reasons best known to him he had kept quiet when accused No.2 furnished surety.
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18. Therefore, the role of PWs.3 and 4 who acted without any warrant or order to arrest the accused persons, the trial court raised a reasonable suspicion and therefore disbelieved their evidence. The signature of accused No.1 has been obtained on the left side of the affidavit though it was not a joint affidavit. Accused No.2 was the only deponent in the affidavit. Therefore, trial court has rightly suspected even the evidence of CMO. Though the PW.5 the then Presiding Officer deposed that he had given a written order to give complaint i.e., Ex.P.3 the same is said to have been produced in the case, but it is not forthcoming. Such an important document could not have been lost or not produced because it was the basis to file such complaint.
19. It is also admitted that signature found in the affidavit of accused No.1 was not in his presence. The Presiding Officer admitted that 31 accused No.1 never appeared before him. Though the Presiding Officer first deposed that the said Hanamappa put his signature in his presence then later he had admitted that signatures were not obtained in his presence and the said person has not appeared before him. With this evidence, I find that there could not have been any conviction of the accused persons for the alleged offences.
20. The Trial Court also found that the Advocate's (PW6) endorsement was also not found in the affidavit to the effect that he has identified accused No.2 on the basis of information given by accused No.1. According to the PW.5 it is accused No.1 of this case introduced accused No.2 to him as Channappa. On that basis he has prepared the surety affidavits etc. The Court also doubted whether these accused persons had appeared before the PW.6 and executed the document of false suretyship by personating Channappa. 32
21. Lastly the evidence of PW.7 the Presiding Officer who has stated that he was not working as Presiding Officer when the accused Anand was enlarged on bail in 11 cases. It is only production of those persons by PW.3 and on the report at Ex.P.36 he realized about the impersonation and false suretyship given by the accused. There is no sworn statement of PWs.3 and 5 in the preliminary enquiry. It is also admitted by the Presiding Officer that he had not issued warrant to arrest the accused persons nor he had given any oral direction to arrest these persons. It is only on the basis of report given by PW.3 he found that the accused persons had filed false affidavit and documents and got the accused released. He could not say that it was on account of ill-will between PWs.3 & 4 and the accused persons. He admitted that he had not signed personally to Ex.P.3. Though he had directed one K.V.Panchal, CMO of the Court to file complaint but the said document is not in the records. It is 33 also admitted by the learned Presiding Officer that he has not referred the signature appeared in the bail bonds and affidavits were that of the accused by referring the same to the handwriting experts.
22. Therefore, from the evidence on record it is clear that there is no order complying the statutory requirement of section 195 and 340 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the Trial Court rightly held relying on certain authorities that the complaint is not in accordance with section 195 and 340 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, on re-appreciation of the evidence on record I find that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. Even otherwise the bar contained under Section 195 (1)(b)(ii) of Cr.P.C. is applicable to the case in hand. Therefore, the case could not have been prosecuted in the absence of any specific finding with regard to the commission of offences, falsification of document or cheating by impersonating etc. Hence, for all 34 the above said reasons, I find that the accused could not have been connected by the trial court based on the evidence on record and also the legal embargo. Hence the appeal cannot be allowed.
23. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, evidence on record and the relevant law applicable to the case in hand. Accordingly the point No.1 raised for determination by this Court is answered in the negative.
Appeal filed by the State is dismissed. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 28.01.2010 passed by the Principal J.M.F.C., Gangavathi in C.C.No.307/2004 is hereby confirmed.
Registry to send back the LCR along with copy this order to the trial court for further needful action in the matter.
Sd/-
JUDGE EM