Karnataka High Court
Kariyappa @ Kariyappa vs The A.C. Hassan And Ors. on 4 September, 1996
Equivalent citations: ILR1997KAR1723
Author: P. Vishwanatha Shetty
Bench: P. Vishwanatha Shetty
ORDER P. Vishwanatha Shetty, J.
1. This petition is directed against the order dated 25th September, 1989, passed by the second respondent confirming the order dated 3rd August, 1989 passed by the first respondent rejecting the application of the petitioner filed under Section 5(1) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), seeking for declaration that the sale of the land measuring 277 7/9 Sq. Yards in Veeranahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Hassan Taluk made by the petitioner to the third respondent by means of registered sale deed dated 31.11.1970 and subsequent sale of the said land made by the third respondent in favour of the 5th respondent as null and void. Copies of the order passed by respondents 1 and 2 have been produced as Annexures 'B' and 'C' to this petition.
2. Sri O. Sridharan, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the land is question was granted to the petitioner on 10th January, 1956 and the terms of the grant order prohibited the alienation of the said land for ever and since the petitioner has sold the said land by means of registered sale deed dated 31st November, 1970 in contravention of the terms of the grant, the first respondent ought to have declared the sale of the land in question as null and void and directed resumption of the said land to the petitioner. He submitted that Sub-rule 6(a)(i) of Rule 43(1) of the Land Revenue Rules which governed the grant of land in question prohibits the alienation of the land for a period of 15 years from the date of the grant and since the land in question was said within 15 years from the date of the grant apart from the prohibition contained in the order of grant that the land in question should not be alienated for ever, the respondents 1 and 2 ought to have held that the land in question was sold in violation of the law providing for the grant of land in question. According to the Learned Counsel, the land in question was a free grant made to the petitioner as per the grant order dated 10th January, 1956, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-A. He further submitted that the claim of the petitioner was rejected by the respondents solely on the ground that the land in question is a house site and as such the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable. According to the Learned Counsel this finding is erroneous in law as the Act does not make any difference whether the granted land is a house site or an agricultural land.
3. Sri Siddagangaiah, learned High Court Government Pleader supported the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the Act does not make any distinction between a house site and any other land, and the provisions of the Act are applicable irrespective of the nature of the land, whether it is an agricultural land or a non-agricultural land including house sites.
4. Sri D.G. Surya Kumar, Learned Counsel appearing for the 5th respondent submitted that there is no infirmity in the orders impugned. According to Sri Kumar, the finding recorded by the respondents 1 and 2 that the provisions of the Act will not apply so far as the house site is concerned is fully justified. Sri Surya Kumar, submitted that the provisions of the Act will not apply both in respect of house sites and also non-agricultural lands and the Act is applicable only in respect of agricultural lands which are granted by the Government. He further submitted that at any event of the matter, the land in question was granted sold to the petitioner for an upset price and therefore the petitioner was prohibited from alienating the land in question only for a period of 10 years from the date of the grant as provided under sub-clause 6(a) (ii) of Ruie-43(1) of the Rules which governed the grant of land in question and since the land in question came to be sold after 14 years from the date of the grant, the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable as the land in question was not sold either in violation of the terms of the grant or the law providing for the grant. He also seriously disputed that the claim of the petitioner that the petitioner is a Scheduled Caste and the land in question is a granted land.
5. In the light of the rival contentions advanced by the Learned Counsel appearing for the parties, a short question that would arise for my consideration is as to whether the provisions of the Act are not applicable if the granted land is either a house site or a non-agricultural land.
6. The respondents 1 and 2 have rejected the claim of the petitioner solely on the ground that the land in question is only a house site, and therefore the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable. I am of the view that the said view taken by respondents 1 and 2 is totally erroneous in law and unwarranted from the reading of the provisions of the Act. The Act does not make any distinction between an agricultural land or a non-agricultural land or a house site. The object of the Act is to provide for prohibition of transfer of certain lands granted by the Government to persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and for restoration of possession of granted land to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which came to be sold either in violation of the terms of the grant or the law providing for the grant. Section 3(b) of the Act defines the 'granted land' as follows;
"granted land" means any land granted by the Government to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and includes land allotted or granted to such person under the relevant law for the time being in force relating to agrarian reforms or land ceilings or abolition of inams, other than that relating to hereditary offices or rights and the word 'granted' shall be construed accordingly."
The definition of granted land does not make any distinction between a house site or any other type of land. It cannot be disputed that the house site is also a land though it is a small portion of a larger extent of land. From the plain reading of the definition of granted land, I am of the view that there is no scope to take the view that either a house site or a non-agricultural land is excluded from the purview of the definition of "granted land", and also the Act. Further, while considering the definition of "granted land" if the object of the Act is also kept in mind, it would not give any scope to take the view that either the house sites or non-agricultural lands excluded from the purview of the Act. As stated earlier, the object of the Act is to prohibit the transfer of granted land and to declare all alienations made in violation of the terms of the grant or the law providing for the grant as null and void and restore possession of such granted land to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The enactment has been passed taking into account the social and cultural back-ground, illiteracy, poverty, and weaknesses of the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to be easily exploited by the affluent sections of the Society. If that being the object, in the absence of any provision made in the Act restricting the application of the Act only to agricultural lands, I do not find any justification to take the view that the Act would apply only in respect of agricultural lands and it would not apply either to house sites or non-agricultural lands as contended by Sri Kumar, the Learned Counsel for the 5th respondent. If the interpretation of the land as placed by respondents 1 and 2 is accepted, it would seriously affect the interest of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who belong to weaker Sections of the Society for whose benefit the Act has been passed. It is relevant to point out that a piece of land could be granted to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes either to use it as a house site for the purpose of giving them an abode for their accommodation or for the purpose of agricultural operations to enable them to eke-out their livelihood or for any other non-agricultural purposes. The object of the legislation is to prevent alienation of such lands granted to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and restore possession of the same to the original grantees, if the alienations are made either in violation of the terms of the grant or the law providing for the grant. Therefore, I am of the view that the nature of the land granted or the purpose for which it is granted is irrelevant to decide the applicability of the Act. Further, it is also relevant to point out that sub-section 2 of Section 3 of the Act provides that the words or expression not defined in this Act shall have the meaning assigned to them in the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Land Revenue Act'): Sub-section (14) of Section 2 of the Land Revenue Act defines the 'land' as follows:
"land" includes benefits to arise out of land, and this attached to earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth, and also shares in, or charges on the revenue or rent of villages or other defined areas."
Therefore, the definition of land provided in the Land Revenue Act is also very wide in its application and it is inclusive definition. The said provision also supports the view that the house site also is a land within the meaning of sub-section (14) of Section 2 of the Land Revenue Act. Further, the land has been defined in Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary as follows:
"any part of the earth's surface not covered by a body of water."
In Chambers Dictionary (20th Century-New Edition), the word 'land' is defined as follows:
"the solid portion of the surface of the surface of the globe; part of an empire or federation; real estate; ground; soil; a group of dwellings of tenements under one roof and having a common entry."
Therefore, from the definitions referred to above, it is clear that the land includes house site or a portion of land also. Therefore, I am of the view that in the absence of any provision in the Act excluding either the house site or non-agricultural land from the purview of the Act, it is not possible to take the view that either the house site or non-agricultural land is excluded from the purview of the Act. 1 do not find any rational basis to take the said view. Therefore the findings recorded by respondents 1 and 2 that the land in question is a house site and therefore the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable are unsustainable. Therefore, the orders impugned are liable to be quashed.
7. However, since both the Authorities have failed to go into the question with regard to the status of the petitioner and also as to whether the land in question was granted for an upset price or reduced upset price or free of cost, the matter requires to be remitted to the first respondent for fresh consideration. Therefore, I make the following:-
ORDER
i) Rule issued is made absolute, and the Order Annexure-B, dated 3rd August, 1989 passed by the first respondent and Annexure-C, dated 25th September, 1989, passed by the 2nd respondent are hereby quashed;
ii) The second respondent is directed to reconsider the entire matter in the light of the observations made above and conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible and at any event of the matter, not later than six months from the date of receipt of this order;
iii) The petitioner and the 5th respondent are directed to appear before the first respondent on 3.10.1996, at 3.00 P.M.;
iv) All the other contentions urged on behalf of the parties are left open to be decided by the second respondent and liberty is also reserved to the parties to file additional statements or lead necessary evidence in support of their claim.
8. In terms stated above, this petition is disposed of.
9. Sri Siddagangaiah, learned High Court Government Pleader, is given four weeks' time to file his memo of appearance from today.
PVSJ: 5.11.1996 While disposing of the above petition, I had directed the petitioner and the 5th respondent to appear before the first respondent on 3.10.1996. It has been brought to my notice that the time fixed for the appearance of the parties before the first respondent, has already expired. Under the circumstances, it is necessary to give a fresh date for their appearance before the first respondent.
2. Accordingly, the petitioner and the 5th respondent are directed to appear before the first respondent on 23.12.1996 at 3.00 p.m.
3. Office to communicate a copy of this order to the first respondent forthwith.