Karnataka High Court
The Executive Engineer Ccm vs Mahaboobsaheb S/O Khajasaheb Since ... on 5 February, 2013
Author: N.Kumar
Bench: N.Kumar
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
CIRCUIT BENCH AT GULBARGA
DATED THIS THE 05TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2013
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE N.KUMAR
WRIT PETITION No.40521 OF 2008
C/W
W.P NO.40520/2008 & W.P.NO.40522/2008 (LA-RES)
IN W.P.No.40521/2008
BETWEEN:
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (CCM)
RAICHUR THERMAL POWER PLANT
SHAKTI NAGAR, TQ. & DIST. RAICHUR
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SHIVAKUMAR KALLOOR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
HULGEPPA SINCE DECEASED BY
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
1. ZINDAPPA S/O. MULGIAPPA
AGED MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O. DEODURG, TQ. AND DIST. RAICHUR
2. BASWARAJ S/O HULGIAPPA SINCE
DECEASED BY L.Rs.
A) RAMLINGAMMA
W/O BASAWARAJAPPA
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: HOUSE HOLD
B) JAMBANNA
2
S/O BASAWARAJAPPA
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE
BOTH R/O DEOSUGUR
TQ. AND DIST. RAICHUR
C) MALLAMMA
W/O NARSIMLU
AGE: 22 YEARS
OCC HOUSE HOLD
D) MALLESH
S/O BASWARAJ
AGE: 20 YEARS
E) SURESH
S/O BASWARAJ
AGE: 16 YEARS, MINOR
U/G OF HIS MOTHER
RAMLINGAMMA
F) MEGRAJ
S/O BASWARAJ
AGE: 13 YEARS, MINOR
U/G OF HIS MOTHER
RAMLINGAMMA
3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
RAICHUR
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VEERESH B. PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R1 & R2(A-F),
SRI SHIVAKUMAR R. TENGLI, AGA FOR R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDERS DATED 20.02.2008 AT ANNEXURE-E AND
ALSO ORDER DATED 4.8.2008 AT ANNEXURE-G PASSED BY
THE ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE [SR.DN.] RAICHUR IN EXECUTION
3
PETITION NO.2/2006 AND DISMISSING THE EXECUTION
PETITION NO.2/2006 FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2.
IN W.P.No.40520/2008
BETWEEN:
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (CCM)
RAICHUR THERMAL POWER PLANT
SHAKTI NAGAR, TQ. & DIST. RAICHUR
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SHIVAKUMAR KALLOOR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
SHANKRAPPA SINCE DECEASED BY
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
1. MAREMMA
W/O SHANKRAPPA
AGE: MAJOR
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O. DEOSUGUR
TQ. AND DIST. RAICHUR
2. SUGAPPA
S/O SHANKRAPPA
AGE: MAJOR
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O DEOSUGUR TALUKA
AND DISTRICT RAICHUR
3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER/
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
RAICHUR ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VEERESH B. PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R1 & R2,
SRI SHIVAKUMAR R. TENGLI, AGA FOR R3)
4
THIS WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 4.2.2008 AT ANNEXURE-C AND
ALSO ORDER DATED 4.8.2008 AT ANNEXURE-F PASSED BY
THE ADDITIONAL JUDGE [SR.DN.] RAICHUR IN EXECUTION
PETITION NO.51/2007 AND DISMISSING THE EXECUTION
PETITION NO.51/2007 FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2.
IN W.P.No.40522/2008
BETWEEN:
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (CCM)
RAICHUR THERMAL POWER PLANT
SHAKTI NAGAR, TQ. & DIST. RAICHUR
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SHIVAKUMAR KALLOOR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
MAHABOOBSAHEB
S/O KHAJASAHEB
SINCE DECEASED BY
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
1. HAJISAHEB
S/O MAHABOOBSAB
AGE: 64 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O DEOSUGUR
TQ. AND DIST. RAICHUR
2. KHAJABEE
W/O MAHJABOOBSAHEB
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: HOUSE HOLD
R/O DEOSUGUR
5
TQ. AND DIST. RAICHUR
3. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER/
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
RAICHUR
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VEERESH B. PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R1 & R2,
SRI SHIVAKUMAR R. TENGLI, AGA FOR R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 3.4.2008 ANNEXURE-E AND ALSO
ORDER DATED 4.8.2008 AT ANNEXURE-G PASSED BY THE
ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE [SR.DN.] RAICHUR IN EXECUTION
PETITION NO.345/2006 AND DISMISS THE EXECUTION
PETITION NO.345/2006 FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2.
THESE PETITIONS COMING ON FOR HEARING THIS DAY,
THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
As in all these writ petitions common question of law is involved, they are taken up for consideration together and disposed of by this common order.
2. For the purposes of clarity, facts in one of those cases are set out herein to appreciate the legal issues involved in this case.
3. The land of the respondents were notified for acquisition under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition 6 Act, 1894 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for the purpose of setting up of a thermal power plant at Shakthi Nagar. The final notification under Section 6(1) of the Act was issued on 17.03.1979. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award on 06.06.1981 at the rate of Rs.2,800/- - Rs.3,000/- per acre. The Land Acquisition Act came to be amended by an Act on 16.08.1984 inserting Section 23(1-A) of the Act as well as amending Sub-section(2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Principal Act. The said amendment came into force from 30.04.1982. The respondents being aggrieved by the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer sought a reference. On reference, Civil court enhanced the compensation to Rs.5,800/- on 12.04.1996. The award passed by the reference Court attained finality. When the award amount was not paid, respondents were constrained to file execution petition. After service of notice, certain amounts which according to the calculations of the petitioners is due has been 7 paid. However, the respondents contend the amount deposited by the petitioners do not discharge full liability. Therefore, they filed a memo of calculations claiming balance amount. The petitioners have filed the objections. Similarly one more memo of calculation was filed for which also petitioners have filed objections. The main objection to the calculations filed by the respondents was firstly Section 23(1-A) is not applicable to the awards in this case and therefore, the respondents are not entitled to any amount under that head. Secondly, the amended provisions of Section 23(2) though is attracted to the facts of the case, petitioners are not liable to pay any interest on solatium. Therefore, they contend that the memo of calculations filed by the respondents is not correct and the petitioners are not liable to pay the said amount. The Executing Court relying on a judgment of this Court in the case of BASAPPA VEERABHADRAPPA HURAKADLI AND OTHERS V. THE ASSISTANT 8 COMMISSIONER, DHARWAD reported in ILR 2003 KAR 1298, held that the decreeholders are entitled to interest on solatium. Insofar as the application of Section 23(1-A) is concerned, the Executing Court held that the decreeholder is entitled to interest on additional market value and solatium. In fact, the Executing Court has not recorded any finding on the question whether Section 23(1-A) is applicable to the award in question or not. Aggrieved by the said orders, petitioners are before this Court.
4. Sri Shivakumar Kalloor, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners assailing the impugned order passed by the Executing Court contends as the award in question is passed on 06.06.1981 prior to the amendment Act came into force on 30.04.1982, the interest payable as market value under Section 23(1-A) is not attracted. Secondly, he contends that no interest is payable on solatium as interest is payable only on the market value of the property. Therefore, he submits 9 that memo of calculations filed by the respondents including the amount both under Section 23(1-A) of the Act as well as interest on solatium is not correct. These aspects have not been considered by the Executing Court.
5. Per contra, Sri Veeresh B. Patil, learned counsel appearing for respondents contends that in view of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, DANDELI V. SOMA GOPAL GOWDA reported in AIR 1986 KARNATAKA 179, Section 23(1-A) is attracted even to cases where award has been passed prior to coming into force of the amendment act. Secondly, in view of the judgment of this Court referred to supra in Basappa's case, interest is also payable on the solatium. Therefore, the order passed by the Executing Court is valid and legal.
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6. In the light of the aforesaid facts and rival contentions, the points that arise for consideration in these writ petitions are as under:
a) Whether Section 23(1-A) is attracted to awards passed prior to the coming into force of amendment Act?
b) Whether the interest is payable on solatium?
7. Point No.1:
a) The Full Bench of this Court in the case of SOMA GOPAL GOWDA referred to supra held in all pending cases whether on reference or on appeal, the Court is required to apply the provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 in determining the compensation payable to the claimants. Dealing with similar situation, the Apex Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER V. ZORA SINGH AND OTHERS reported in (1992) 1 SCC 673, held as under:11
"12. A perusal of the provisions of sub- section (1-A) of Section 23 makes it clear that the said sub-section deals with substantive rights and it confers a substantive right to claim the additional amount calculated as set out in the said sub-section in the circumstances set out therein. Similarly, sub- section (2) of Section 23 also confers a substantive right on the claimant to a higher solatium. Under the well settled rules of interpretation, the said provisions of the said Act, being substantive in nature, can have only prospective application unless the language in which the provisions are couched, read in the context, show that the intention of the legislature was to give retrospective effect to them. The language of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 shows that a duty is cast on the Court to award an amount calculated as stated therein in addition to the market value of the land acquired for the period commencing from the date of the publication of the Section 4 Notification to he date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession, whichever is earlier.12
13. The expression "award" used in Section 23(1-A) suggests that the intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the said sub-section applicable to cases where the Collector had yet to make his award or the trial court hearing the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act had still to make its award after the coming into force of the said sub-section on September 24, 1984. The expression "award"
is to be distinguished from the expression "decree" and hence, it appears that in the absence of any contrary or inconsistent provision in the said Act the provisions of sub- section would not come into play where the award had been made by the Collector earlier as well as by the Reference Court but on the date of coming into effect of the said sub- section, an appeal from the said award might have been pending in a court. In that case, the Court would not be "awarding" any amount but would be making a "decree" for an amount.
14. By reason of the provision of Section 30(1)(a) of the Amendment Act of 1984 the 13 provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the said Act were, by a deeming provision, made also applicable to every proceeding for the acquisition of land under the said Act where the Collector had not made his award by April 30, 1982. On a correct interpretation of the provisions of Section 23(1-A) read with Section 30(1)(a) of the Amendment Act of 1984, an additional amount calculated in the manner indicated in Section 23(1-A) is also payable in those cases where the Collector had not made his award on or before April 30, 1982, even in cases where the court might have made its award before September 24, 1984.
15. It is true that the aforesaid construction we are giving to the provisions of Section 23(1-A) and Section 30(1)(a) will, in a sense, limit the benefits strictly conferred by Section 30(1)(a) to only those cases where the Collector as well as the Court have made their respective awards between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 but, in our view, that cannot be helped as that is the result of the plain grammatical construction of the 14 clear language used in the relevant provisions. We are of the opinion that we would not be justified in giving an unduly restricted meaning to the provisions of Section 23(1-A) unwarranted by the plain language of that sub-section as appears to have been done in the case of Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama discussed more particularly hereinafter, in order to give a wider meaning of the provisions of Section 30(1)(a). Section 23(1-A) refers clearly to the duties of the Court. As we have already pointed out, the court is defined by Section 3(d) as the principal court of original jurisdiction, except in the circumstances set out in the said sub-section, which would be the court having jurisdiction to decide the reference under Section 18 of the said Act. There is, therefore, no warrant to read in the place of the word "Court" in Section 23(1-A) the word "Collector". Moreover, the decision of such a court determining compensation is regarded as an award under the said Act. In the light of these provisions, there is no warrant to give 15 an unduly restricted meaning to Section 23(1- A) of the said Act, as pointed out above."
7. Subsequent bench of the Apex Court doubted the correctness of the said judgment of the Apex Court. Therefore, the matter was referred to Larger Bench to consider the correctness of the decision in the said case. The constitution bench of the Apex Court on such reference formulated the following points for consideration:
"Whether the additional amount payable at the rate of 12% per annum on the market value under Section 23(1-A) is restricted to matters referred to in Clause a and b of Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act or is to be awarded in every cases where the reference was pending before the Reference Court on September 24, 1984 (date of commencement of the amendment Act) irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. After referring to the amended provisions, they extracted Section 30 of the 16 amendment Act. Section 30 of the amending Act, which contains transitional provision, it reads as under:
26. Section 30 of the amending Act contains the following transitional provisions:
"30. Transitional provisions.-
(1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to,-
(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the house of the People], in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date;
(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act. 17 (2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People] and before the commencement of this Act.
(3) The provisions of Section 34 of the principal Act, as amended by Section 20 of this Act shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, in relation to,-
(a) every case in which possession of any land acquired under the Principal Act had been taken before 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the house of people] and the amount of compensation for 18 such acquisition had not been paid or deposited under Section 31 of the Principal Act until such date, with effect on and from that date; and
(b) every case in which such possession has been taken on or after that date but before the commencement of this Act without the amount of compensation having been paid or deposited under the said Section 31, with effect on and from the date of taking such possession."
27. Section 23(1-A) of the principal act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act are inter-related and have to be read together. Similarly Section 23(2) of the principal Act, as amended, and Section 30(2) of the amending Act have to be read together. Though sub- sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 of the amending Act are differently worded, the construction that is placed on one set of provisions has a bearing on the construction of the other set. Since the provisions of Section 23(2) of the principal Act and Section 30(2) of the amending Act came up for 19 consideration before this Court earlier than the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act, we will briefly refer to the decisions wherein Section 23(2) of the principal Act as amended and Section 30(2) of the amending Act have been construed before we come to the decisions in Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act.
8. The Constitution Bench by a majority answered the said question as under:
"74. ..........A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act shows that it divides the proceedings for acquisition of land which had commenced prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act into two categories, proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 and proceedings which had commenced after 30- 4-1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982, clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced 20 after 30-4-1982. By virtue of clause (a), Section 23(1-A) has been made applicable to proceedings which had commenced prior to 30.4.1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those proceedings before 30-4-1982. It covers (I) proceedings which were pending before the Collector on 30-4-1982 wherein award was made after 30-4-1982 but before the date of the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made by the Collector after the date of the commencement of the amending Act. Similarly Section 30(1) (b) covers (I) proceedings which had commenced after 30- 4-1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made after the commencement of the amending Act. It would thus appear that both the clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 cover proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1). If Section 23(1-A), 21 independently of Section 30(1), is applicable to all proceedings which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) would have been confined to proceedings which had commenced prior to the commencement of the amending Act and had concluded before such commencement because by virtue of Section 15 the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act. There was no need to so phrase Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to proceedings which were pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. This only indicates that but for the provisions contained in Section 30(1) Section 23(1-A) would not have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act.
9. This judgment has been followed by the Apex Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA V. GIANI reported 22 in AIR 2011 SC (CIVIL) 633, where at paragraph 8 it has been held as under:
"8. In the present case the acquisition proceeding commenced with the notification under Section 4 issued on 06.03.1965 and it culminated in passing of the award by the Collector on 09.07.1980, i.e., before 30.04.1982, the date from which the amending act 68 of 1984 was made applicable to the pending and subsequent proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of K.S.Paripoornan (AIR 1995 SC 1012) (supra) the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1A).
10. From the aforesaid judgments, it is clear provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 was amended by way of insertion. Therefore, in the normal circumstances, it would have come into effect from the date of passing of the enactment. But the amending Act provides for transitional provision. The said transitional 23 provision provides from what date this amended provision comes into effect not withstanding the fact that it was brought into statute book by way of insertion. As held by the constitution bench of the Apex Court, Section 23(1-A) applies to every proceedings for the acquisition of any land under the Act pending on 30.04.1982, the date of introduction of the land acquisition (amendment bill 1982) but in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date. Therefore, the Parliament has expressly made its intention clear i.e., amended provision has no application to an award which has been made prier to the introduction of the land acquisition (amendment bill 1982) on 30.04.1982. If an award is made subsequent to that date, if an acquisition proceedings is initiated after land acquisition (amendment bill 1982) was introduced in the parliament on 30.04.1982, then the amended provisions are applicable. Similarly, by sub- section (2) of Section 30 of the transitional provision, 24 the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Principal Act as amended were made applicable to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court, in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the Principal Act after the 30th day of April 1982. Therefore, the Legislature has expressly made known its intention regarding the application of Section 23(1-A) as well as amended provisions of sub-section(2) of Section 23 in a different manner. Therefore, it is clear that if an award is passed before 30.04.1982 by the Land Acquisition Officer, the said land owner is not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1-A), though he is entitled to the benefit of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 as amended and Section 28 as amended, even if the award of the reference Court or orders passed in an appeal by the High Court or Supreme Court. In fact, this aspect has been completely missed by the Executing Court and no finding is recorded. But the memo of calculation 25 filed by the decreeholders makes it very clear that he is claiming compensation under Section 23(1-A) and on the said amount, he has also claimed interest, which is not legally permissible and therefore, the decreeholder is not entitled to the said amount.
b) The question is whether interest under Section 28 is payable on only market value of the property or on solatium also. Section 28 reads as under:
28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation.- If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of [nine per centum] per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court:26
[Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry.]
11. It neither refers to the market value nor it refers to the solatium. It refers to the compensation payable to the owner of the land. It provides when the Court awards compensation in excess of the same the Collector did award as compensation, then, on such excess amount, a direction may be issued to the Collector to pay 9% interest per annum from the date on which he took the possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court. Where the amount of compensation is not paid with interest at 9% per 27 annum within a period of one month from the date on which the possession is taken, then after expiry of the said period of one year, on the amount outstanding, the interest payable would be 15% per annum. Therefore, the interest payable under this provision is on compensation. Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining compensation. It explicitly makes clear in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under the Act, the Court shall take into consideration the first market value, then damage if any as set out in the said provision and then by virtue of the amended provision 23(1-A) interest at 12% on such market value from the date of preliminary notification till the date of the award of the collector or the taking of possession whichever is earlier and prior to amendment, 15% per annum as solatium as consideration for compulsory nature of acquisition. After amendment it has become 30%.
Therefore, the word 'compensation' includes market 28 value of the property plus solatium payable and after amendment interest from the date of preliminary notification till the date of award or the date of taking possession. Section 28 deals with payment of interest on compensation. Therefore, it necessarily follows, interest is payable on solatium also. That is precisely what has been held in the case of BASAPPA VEERABHADRAPPA HURAKADLI referred to supra. In that view of the matter, there is no merit in the contention of the petitioners that no interest is payable on solatium.
12. In the light of what is stated above, memo of calculations field by the respondents is incorrect. As such the order passed by the Executing Court upholding the said memo of calculations to the extent mentioned above is incorrect and therefore, the order requires to be set aside. The decreeholders should be given an opportunity to file proper memo of calculations excluding the claim under Section 23(1-A) but including 29 the interest on solatium after giving due deduction to the amount paid by the petitioners so far. He would be entitled to balance amount if any.
13. Hence, I pass the following:
ORDER
a) All the writ petitions are allowed in part.
b) It is held that the respondents in this case are not entitled to any amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Act.
c) Interest under Section 28 of the Act is payable on solatium.
d) Respondents are given liberty to file fresh memo of calculations including the amount if any due after giving due deductions of the amount.
e) Petitioners are at liberty to file their memo of calculations.
f) The Executing Court shall look into those memo of calculations, bearing in mind, the law 30 discussed above and then pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.
Sd/-
JUDGE NB*